Kyle McEvoy

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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In re: 	Chapter 7
Kyle McEvoy, 	Case No. 8-25-70177-las
Debtor.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISALLOWING
AND EXPUNGING PROOF OF CLAIM NO. 8-1
I. 	Introduction
Before the Court is the motion of Kyle McEvoy (the “Debtor”) objecting to the
allowance of proof of claim no. 8-1 filed by Zackery Forrest Riley (“Riley”) asserting a general
unsecured claim in an “unknown” amount for “Money Loaned/Services Provided”. [Doc. Nos.
75, 76.] The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions carefully and conducted an
evidentiary hearing on February 5, 2026. For the reasons set forth on the record at the
evidentiary hearing, the Court sustained the Debtor’s objection to Riley’s proof of claim no.
8-1, disallowed and expunged the claim, and “so ordered” the record. This Memorandum
Decision and Order is consistent with and explains further the bases for the Court’s ruling
at the February 5 evidentiary hearing.
II. 	Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction to consider this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and the
Standing Order of Reference entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), dated August 28, 1986 (Weinstein, C.J.),
as amended by Order dated December 5, 2012 (Amon, C.J.). This is a core proceeding under
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) that the Court may hear and decide. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
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III. 	Background and Procedural History 1
In or about October 2019, Riley and the Debtor became business partners with each
holding a 50% interest in Collaborative People, Inc. (“Collaborative People”). Collaborative
People provided certain administrative and billing services with respect to the Debtor’s
former 	therapy 	business, 	Collaborative 	Therapy 	Mental 	Health 	Counseling, 	P.C.
(“Collaborative Therapy”). The business relationship ended in July or August of 2024. In
September of 2024, Riley commenced an action in New York State court against the Debtor,
Collaborative People and Collaborative Therapy.
The Debtor terminated all the employees of Collaborative Therapy on January 10,
2025, asserting that it did not have the funds to meet payroll and other expenses. Five days
later, on January 15, 2025, the Debtor individually filed a petition for relief under chapter 7.
One day later, on January 16, 2025, the Debtor commenced a new business under the name
Kyle McEvoy Mental Health Counseling PC. On April 28, 2025, Riley filed a complaint
objecting to the Debtor’s discharge or, in the alternative, the dischargeability of debt allegedly
owed to him by the Debtor under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 523, respectively.
On May 28, 2025, Riley filed proof of claim no. 8-1 (“POC No. 8-1”) asserting a general
unsecured claim in an “unknown” amount for “Money Loaned/Services Provided”. There is no
documentation attached to POC No. 8-1 and, on the Claims Register, Riley included a
comment, “Unable to calculate claim without judicial intervention.”
On December 2, 2025, the Debtor filed a motion [Doc. No. 75] and memorandum of
law [Doc. No. 76] (together, the “Claim Objection Motion”) seeking an order pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f) disallowing and expunging POC No. 8-1 on the basis that the proof
of claim does not set forth the date of the loan, the reason for the loan or the amount repaid,
1 The relevant facts are not in dispute, unless otherwise noted.
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if any, and that the proof of claim does not describe the nature of the services or when the
services were allegedly rendered. Furthermore, the Debtor asserted that POC No. 8-1 fails to
attach any documents as required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c) to support the claim. The
Debtor argued that Riley never loaned any monies to him nor provided him with any services.
The Notice of Hearing on the Claim Objection Motion set forth a hearing date of January 6,
2026 at 10:00 a.m. and an objection deadline of December 31, 2025. [Doc. No. 75.] On January
2, 2026, Marc Pergament, Esq. (“Pergament”) of Weinberg, Gross & Pergament LLP, the
Debtor’s counsel, filed a Certificate of No Objection certifying that the Claim Objection
Motion was filed and served in a timely fashion, the deadline to file opposition has passed
and no opposition has been filed or served upon the Debtor or filed on the Court’s docket and
that he was aware of no informal objection.
At 8:02 a.m. on the morning of January 6, 2026, Riley emailed Chambers and
Pergament opposition to the Claim Objection Motion and physically submitted the opposition
papers to the Clerk’s Office at 10:58 a.m., which were docketed as Document No. 82.
Pergament appeared at the January 6 hearing 2 on behalf of the Debtor and Riley appeared
pro se. At the hearing, Riley raised the arguments set forth in Document No. 82 emphasizing
that he wasn’t properly served with the Claim Objection Motion as required by Bankruptcy
Rule 3007(a)(2).
Bankruptcy Rule 3007(a)(2) requires that an objection to a claim and a notice of the
objection “must be served by mail on the person the claim holder most recently designated to
receive notices on the claim holder’s original or latest amended proof of claim, at the address
so indicated”. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007(a)(2). Riley noted that the affidavit of service filed by
Pergament indicates that Riley was only served electronically by email on December 2, 2025
2 The transcript of the January 6, 2026 hearing shall hereinafter be referenced as “Jan. 6 Tr.”. [Doc. No. 88.]
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[Doc. No. 77] and not by mail as required by Bankruptcy Rule 3007(a)(2). Accordingly, Riley
asserted that Pergament failed to properly serve him with the Claim Objection Motion and
that Pergament and his firm knew Riley disputed the relief sought and/or had communicated
his opposition before Pergament filed the Certification of No Objection.
At the hearing, Pergament represented that substantially all communication between
him and his firm with Riley has been by email during pendency of the bankruptcy case. Jan.
6 Tr. 7:4-6. Although Pergament thought his office served Riley with a copy of the Claim
Objection Motion by first class mail, he acknowledged that he has no way of substantiating
that this was indeed the case. Jan. 6 Tr. 7:1-4. Pergament represented that he did not receive
any communication from Riley since a hearing on November 18, 2025 other than an email
request on January 5, 2026 at approximately 1:05 p.m. seeking an adjournment of the Claim
Objection 	Motion. 	Jan. 	6 	Tr. 	31:6-8; 	35:5-6. 	The 	record 	shows 	that 	there 	was 	no
communication from Riley to Pergament or his office other than filings made with the New
York State court. Jan. 6 Tr. 33:24-25, 34:1-6. Riley copied Pergament on communications
directed to state court counsel for Collaborative Therapy and Collaborative People regarding
the ongoing state court litigation. Jan. 6 Tr. 32:23-25. Pergament further represented that
he was not involved in the state court litigation because continuation of that litigation as
against the Debtor was stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Jan. 6 Tr. 31:22-25; 32:7-10;
34:6-7.
For his part, Riley acknowledged receiving the Claim Objection Motion by email on
December 2, Jan. 6. Tr. 10:16-17, although he did not learn of the Claim Objection Motion
until sometime between December 2 and December 14 when he checked the Court’s case
docket on PACER. Jan. 6 Tr. 14:12-24; 15:2-6. Although Riley was fully aware of the Claim
Objection Motion, Jan. 6 Tr. 17:14-16, he did not file opposition until the morning of the
January 6 hearing.
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Seeing no prejudice to either party and no evidence of bad faith intent by Pergament
and his firm in failing to serve Riley by first class mail, the Court adjourned the January 6
hearing on the Claim Objection Motion to allow Riley an opportunity to formally file
opposition to the Claim Objection Motion for purposes of judicial economy and efficiency. The
Court saw no purpose in having Pergament re-serve and re-notice the Claim Objection
Motion when it was clear from the record that Riley had received and saw the Claim Objection
Motion. As the Court noted at the January 6 hearing, the procedural issues with service have
been addressed and the Court was adjourning the hearing on the Claim Objection Motion at
which time the Court will solely address the merits. Jan. 6 Tr. 41:7-14.
Riley submitted that his opposition to the Claim Objection Motion was embodied in
Document No. 82 and that no further written opposition would be filed. Jan. 6 Tr. 41:24-42:5.
Accordingly, the Court directed Pergament to serve his reply on Riley by January 16, 2026
and the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Claim Objection Motion for February
5, 2026.
Pergament filed and served his reply on January 16, 2026. [Doc. Nos. 84, 85.] The
Court held the evidentiary hearing on the Claim Objection Motion on February 5, 2026 at
which Riley testified under oath and was cross-examined by Pergament. The Court carefully
considered the Claim Objection Motion, Riley’s opposition and Riley’s sworn testimony on the
merits. Based upon all the pleadings and the record made at the February 5, 2026 evidentiary
hearing, the Court found that Riley’s POC No. 8-1 must be disallowed and expunged in its
entirety.
IV. 	Discussion
A. Legal Standards
1. 	Pro Se Pleadings
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As an initial matter, pro se pleadings “must be construed liberally and interpreted to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 299, 403
(2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, “the liberal treatment afforded
to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.’” Ndremizara v. Swiss Re Am. Holding Corp., 93 F. Supp. 3d
301, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting 	Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y.
2013)); see also Iwachiw v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 194 F. Supp. 2d 194, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, while the Court can liberally construe the contents of Riley’s POC No. 8-1 to
assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate, whether Riley actually has a prepetition claim
against the Debtor individually and thus, against the bankruptcy estate, requires a factual
and legal determination.
2. 	Allowance of Claims
Under chapter 7, only a holder of a claim, defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), that is
allowed may receive a distribution from the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). A “claim”
is defined in the Bankruptcy Code, in relevant part, as “right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, continent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5)(A) (emphasis added).
A claim or interest, for which a proof of claim is filed, is deemed allowed unless a party
in interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). “A proof of claim signed and filed in accordance with
these [Bankruptcy Rules] is prima facie evidence of the claim’s validity and amount.” Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 3001(f); see also In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 531, 538 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
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2013). Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, “when a claim . . . is based on
a writing, a copy of the writing shall be filed with the proof of claim.” Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3001(c)(1). The claimant must allege facts sufficient to support the claim and attach
supporting documentation to a proof of claim. In re Aiolova, No. 11-10503, 2013 Bankr.
LEXIS 4504, at *5-6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2013). “If a proof of claim is not supported by
the requisite documentation, it is not presumed to be prima facie valid.” Id., 2013 Bankr.
LEXIS 4504, at *7. “Failure to attach the documentation required by Rule 3001 will result in
the loss of the prima facie validity of the claim.” In re Minbatiwalla, 424 B.R. 104, 112 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010). Courts in the Second Circuit have disallowed claims based upon insufficient
documentation to support the claim. Id., at 118-9 (collecting cases). The documentary support
is necessary to “enable the debtor or trustee to evaluate the claim’s amount and validity and
to challenge portions of the claim that may be inaccurate.” In re Live Primary LLC, 626 B.R.
171, 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021).
“The burden of proof for claims brought in the bankruptcy court under section 502(a)
rests on different parties at different times. . . . [A] claim that alleges facts sufficient to
support a legal liability to the claimant satisfies the claimant’s initial obligation to go
forward.” Residential Capital LLC, 501 B.R. at 538 (quoting In re Allegheny Intern., Inc., 954
F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1992)). “The claim will be prima facie valid, if the averments in the
filed claim meets this standard of sufficiency.” In re Brown, 615 B.R. 725, 738 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2020) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d, No. 1:20-cv-03943 (MKV), 2021 WL
510157 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2021). “Federal pleading standards apply when assessing the
validity of a proof of claim. Accordingly, a claimant must allege enough facts to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” In re Residential Capital LLC, Case No. 12-12020, 2015
WL 2375979, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
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“Although ‘[claims] drafted by pro se claimants] are to be construed liberally, [ ] but they must
nonetheless be supported by specific and detailed factual allegations sufficient to provide the
court and the defendant with a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about
and ... whether there is a legal basis for recovery.’” In re Residential Capital, LLC, 523 B.R.
24, 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 20143) (quoting Kimber v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC (In re Residential
Capital, LLC), 489 B.R. 489, 494 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)); see also Iwachiw v. N.Y.C. Bd. of
Elections, 126 Fed. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2005).
“The burden then shifts to the objector to rebut the presumption of the prima facie
validity of the claim.” Brown I, at 738. The party objecting to the proof of claim has the burden
of going forward with sufficient evidence (i) to rebut the validity or amount of the claim
asserted or (ii) to show the claim should be disallowed. Aiolova, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4504, at
*6; Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). “By
producing ‘evidence equal in force to the prima facie case,’ an objector can negate a claim's
presumptive legal validity, thereby shifting the burden back to the claimant to ‘prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that under applicable law the claim should be allowed.’” In re
Residential Capital, LLC, 523 B.R. 24, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Creamer v. Motors
Liquidation Co. GUC Trust (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. 12 Civ. 6074(RJS), 2013 WL
5549643, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013)); see also In re Rockefeller Center Properties, 272
B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Once an objectant offers sufficient evidence to
overcome the prima facie validity of the claim, the claimant is required to meet the usual
burden of proof to establish the validity of the claim.”). “The burden of showing something by
a preponderance of the evidence . . . simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the
existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the
party who has the burden of persuade the [judge] of the fact’s existence.” Metro. Stevedore
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Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S .121, 137 n.9 (1997) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)).
“The ultimate burden of proof, however, always lies with the claimant.” In re Taranto,
No. 10-76041, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1320, at *18 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012); Primavera
Familienstifung, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 540. Additonally, ‘[a]s the finder of fact, the Court is
entitled to make credibility of findings of the witnesses as the testimony.” Merck Eprova AG
v. Gnosis, S.p.A, 901 F. Supp. 2d 436, 448 (S.D.N.Y 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d. 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
Here, Riley timely filed POC No. 8-1 and the proof of claim was deemed allowed
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), unless a party in interest objects. POC No. 8-1 would be prima
facie valid as to validity and amount if it complied with the Bankruptcy Rules.
The Debtor filed an objection on December 8, 2025 arguing that POC No. 8-1 is not
entitled to prima facie validity as to the basis and the amount of the claim as there are no
documents attached to the proof of claim that provides factual support for Riley’s claim. POC
No. 8-1 asserts a claim for “money loaned/services provided” in an “unknown” amount but
Riley failed to attach any loan documents describing the amount loaned, the date(s) the
money was loaned, and the terms and conditions, if any, of the loan(s), including the
repayment terms, maturity date, and interest rate, if any. Similarly, Riley did not attach any
service or employment contract demonstrating what services were rendered to the Debtor.
POC No. 8-1 is devoid of any information and factual details that permits the Court, the
bankruptcy estate or the Debtor to assess the validity and accuracy of Riley’s claim. Indeed,
POC No. 8-1 does not even set forth an amount owed but rather states that the claim is for
“unknown amount”. Thus, based upon the insufficient documentation supporting POC No.
8-1, the Court cannot find that the filing of POC No. 8-1 constitutes prima facie validity of
that claim.
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Thus, the burden shifted to Riley to come forward with evidence to support his claim
by preponderance of the evidence. Given Riley’s pro se status, the Court provided Riley with
the opportunity to provide such documentation at the evidentiary hearing scheduled for
February 5, 2026. 3 Assuming Riley did not see the Claim Objection Motion until mid-
December of 2025, when he opened his emails, Riley had more than a month to gather and
provide actual documentation to the Court. At no time did Riley produce any documentation,
such as contracts, agreements, or even bank statements, to support his claim that he loaned
money to the Debtor individually.
The Court considered Riley’s testimony, under oath, at the evidentiary hearing where
Riley admitted there is no loan agreement in writing between him and the Debtor under
which Riley personally agreed to loan a certain amount of money to the Debtor personally.
Feb. 5 Tr. 9:15-19. 	Riley admitted there is also no promissory note signed by the Debtor
acknowledging that Riley personally loaned him money or that he was personally obligated
to repay Riley. Id. 10:20-24.
Riley asserted that there were conversations between him and the Debtor where they
agreed to take funds from their retirement accounts and put them into a joint bank account
in 2020. Id. 10:12-15; 11:3-5. Riley was a signatory to the joint bank account. Id. 15:8-11.
Riley testified that “[a]ll of [the parties’] expenses, income, everything, went into that one
joint account.” Id. 14:21-23. When questioned about the date of the loan, the amount of the
loan, the terms of repayment, the maturity date and whether there were any interests or
fees, Riley initially stated that he needed judicial intervention to calculate the amount owed.
Riley asserts that all the bank statements went to the Debtor and he is unable to get the
statements from Capital One. Id. 16:20.
3 The transcript of the February 5, 2026 evidentiary hearing shall hereinafter be referenced as “Feb.
5 Tr.”. [Doc. No. 91.]
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Not once during this bankruptcy case, including the discovery period in the adversary
proceeding commenced by Riley objecting to the Debtor’s discharge and dischargeability of
debt, and the period since Riley received the Claim Objection Motion did Riley seek the bank
statements from the Debtor, especially when Riley was aware that one of the Debtor’s
grounds for objecting to POC No. 8-1 was the lack of documentation. At no point did Riley
seek judicial intervention from this Court by filing a motion to compel the production of
documents in the bankruptcy case or in the adversary proceeding. Notwithstanding the lack
of bank statements, as the Court noted at the evidentiary hearing, Riley should at least have
personal 	knowledge 	of 	the 	actual 	amounts 	loaned 	and 	repayment 	terms 	and 	other
information regarding the facts and circumstances of any loans to the Debtor individually
loans without the need for discovery or judicial intervention. Id. 12:6-10; 14:13-19. As the
Court noted, it has no evidence to support whether Riley’s contribution to the joint account
was a loan and not a gift or an agreement by both sides to contribute equally to the payment
of household expenses. Id. 13:21-24.
Riley offered that he withdrew money from his 401(k) in 2024 and put it in the joint
account but Riley could not provide any concrete evidence of the amount or any promise by
the Debtor individually to repay Riley individually. Id. 18: 9-12l 19:3-4. To the extent Riley
claims he has text messages, Riley has not provided evidence of those text messages. 16:15-
18.
As for Riley’s assertion that he has a claim for services provided, Riley concedes that
he does not have any written agreement or contract that details the services Riley
individually provided to the Debtor individually for which the Debtor was obligated to pay
Riley. Id. 19:9-16; 24:13-16. He admits that he does not have any invoices or invoice
statements. Id. 19:17-22; 20:9-15. Riley contends that there was a deferment of his payroll
for seven months. Id. 21-22. However, the deferment of salary for services rendered and not
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paid related to the obligation of Collaborative People, Id. 22:7-11; 23:21-25, and Riley
confirmed that he did not render any services to the Debtor for which the Debtor was
personally obligated to pay for those services, Id. 22:15-18.
Based upon the lack of any documentary evidence and testimonial evidence presented
at the February 5, 2026 hearing, the Court finds that Riley is unable to satisfy his burden of
proof in demonstrating that he personally has a “right to payment” and, thus a “claim”
against the Debtor individually for “moneys loan/services rendered.” Whether Riley has a
claim against Collaborative People and Collaborative Therapy for monies loan or services
rendered to them is the subject of ongoing state court litigation and is not before this Court.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Debtor’s motion is granted and the Debtor’s
objection to POC No. 8-1 is sustained. POC No. 8-1 is disallowed and the Clerk’s Office is
directed to expunge No. POC 8-1 from the Claims Register.
So Ordered.
____________________________
Louis A. Scarcella
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Dated: July 30, 2026
Central Islip, New York
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