Zajradhara v. Lutnick et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
ZAJI OBATALA ZAJRADHARA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HOWARD LUTNICK, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Commerce,
SCOTT BESSENT, in his official capacity
as Secretary of the Treasury,
BROOKE ROLLINS, in her official
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture,
KELLEY LOEFFLER, in her official
capacity as Administrator of the Small
Business Administration,
LINDA E. MCMAHON, in her official
capacity as Secretary of Education, and
JOHN DOES 1-3, in their official or
individual capacities as employees or
agents of the Northern Mariana College or
relevant federal agencies,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00009
SCREENING ORDER
DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Before the Court are the following two filings, both filed by pro se Plaintiff Zaji Obatala
Zajradhara on August 29, 2025: (1) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (ECF No. 1); and (2) Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Judgment, and Injunctive
Relief Under Bivens, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and Bill of Attainder Prohibitions
(ECF No. 2). As a preliminary matter, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application. For the reasons
F I L E D
Clerk
District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands
By________________________
(Deputy Clerk)
FEB 18 2026
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set forth below, the Court DISMISSES the entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice and
grants Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint in accordance with the strictures of this order.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
As Plaintiff is proceeding without prepayment of costs or fees, the Court is “require[d]” to
screen Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), and
ascertain whether it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). As to failure to state a claim, a complaint survives dismissal “only if,
taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194
(9th Cir. 1998) (noting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s “failure to state a claim” language “parallels
the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)” and applying standard of review for
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissals to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). A claim is
“plausible on its face” where there is sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required; however, a plaintiff must plead “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (rejecting “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; as such, his Amended Complaint “must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Furthermore, as Plaintiff raises a
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civil rights claim, the Court has an obligation “to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford
[Plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe, 927 F.3d at 342 (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d
1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The Court, however, will not “accept any unreasonable inferences
or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” Ileto v. Glock Inc.,
349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were
not initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not
sufficient to [survive dismissal].” Id.
II. BACKGROUND
In his sprawling, thirty-page, single-spaced Complaint,1 Plaintiff names as defendants U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins, U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Administrator
Kelly Loeffler, U.S. Secretary of Education Linda E. McMahon, and “unidentified
employees/agents of [Northern Marianas College (NMC)] or federal agencies involved in the
discriminatory acts” against him, with all identified federal officials sued in their official capacity.
(Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 2.) In brief, Plaintiff alleges the following.
(1) In 2018, the House of Representatives of the Twenty-First Northern Marianas
Commonwealth Legislature “declar[ed]” Plaintiff persona non grata through House
Resolution 21-005. (Id. at 2, 7.)
1 Plaintiff references exhibits throughout his Complaint but did not file the exhibits. Plaintiff cites his lack
of financial means and pendency of his request to proceed in forma pauperis as grounds for not filing his
exhibits with the Complaint. (See Compl. 29 (“Will add as addendum upon Acceptance-, due to
Impoverishment / Incorporated”).) The Court, however, does not accept Plaintiff’s explanation because
exhibits filed simultaneously with a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis are
processed and docketed by the Clerk’s Office even while a determination concerning Plaintiff’s in forma
pauperis status remains pending.
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(2) The House of Representatives took action through House Resolution 21-005 in response
to Plaintiff’s anti-corruption advocacy and whistleblowing activities, including Plaintiff’s
past labor-claims litigation and emails concerning NMC’s alleged misuse of federal funds.
(Id. at 2-4, 7-8, 18-23.)
(3) Plaintiff was subsequently denied access to federally funded programs and events by
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“the Commonwealth”) and NMC
officials or employees. (Id. at 7.)
(4) Plaintiff filed complaints with the various federal agencies that fund the programs and
events, asserting that the Commonwealth and NMC discriminated or retaliated against him
in violation of federal law, regulations, policies, mandates, and memoranda of
understanding governing the use of federal funds. (Id. at 2-3, 7-9.)
(5) All named Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s complaints or otherwise take action to
enforce federal anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, and whistleblower protection
provisions and reverse or correct the adverse decisions of the Commonwealth and NMC.
(Id. at 6-9, 11-15, 17, 24.)
Plaintiff sets forth five counts:
• “Count I: Bivens Claim – Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Violations,”
in which he alleges that Defendants’ inaction on Plaintiff’s complaints denied him “notice
and an opportunity to be heard” “as they denied fair hearings or investigations” and
permitted the Commonwealth and NMC to continue to discriminate against him on the
basis of race, national origin, and whistleblower status (id. at 10-12);
• “Count II: Bivens Claim – First Amendment Retaliation,” in which he alleges that “federal
officials punished Plaintiff for exercising protected speech” (id. at 12-13);
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• “Count III: [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] Violation – Arbitrary and Capricious
Agency Action,” in which he alleges that Defendants’ inaction on the issues identified in
Plaintiff’s complaints to the agencies is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law,
warranting “judicial review and set-aside” pursuant to the APA (id. at 13-17);
• “Count IV: Bill of Attainder Violation,” in which he contends that House Resolution 21-
005 is a bill of attainder that is prohibited by Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution (id. at 18-23); and
• “Count V: Declaratory Judgment,” in which he seeks a judgment declaring that
“Defendants’ action[s], including their systemic failure to enforce anti-discrimination, anti-
retaliation, and whistleblower protections in federally funded programs[,]” violate federal
laws, regulations, guidance, mandates, memoranda, and executive orders (id. at 24-28).
As to his requested relief,
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $100,000,000.00 for
emotional distress, economic harm, and punitive purposes;
declaratory judgment that Defendants’ actions are unconstitutional
and unlawful; injunctive relief to compel enforcement of anti-
discrimination mandates and restore access to programs; and
costs/attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (28
U.S.C. § 2412).
(Compl. 3; see also id. at 29 (also requesting a bench trial and “[o]ther relief as just”).)
III. DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claims as asserted against the named federal-officer
Defendants. The Court then assesses the claims as asserted against the unnamed Doe Defendants.
//
//
//
//
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A. Named Federal-Officer Defendants
1. Plaintiff’s Bivens Claims (Counts I and II)
Plaintiff’s first two counts allege claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny, namely, that Defendants—as
federal officers—violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights such that Plaintiff is entitled to damages.
See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 490-93 (2022) (discussing evolution of availability of
damages pursuant Bivens and progeny). Plaintiff’s Bivens claims against all Defendants in their
official capacity must be dismissed.
First, the Ninth Circuit has explained:
Bivens created a remedy for violations of constitutional rights
committed by federal officials acting in their individual capacities.
In a paradigmatic Bivens action, a plaintiff seeks to impose personal
liability upon a federal official based on alleged constitutional
infringements he or she committed against the plaintiff. “[A] Bivens
action can be maintained against a defendant in his or her individual
capacity only, and not in his or her official capacity.” This is because
a Bivens suit against a defendant in his or her official capacity would
merely be another way of pleading an action against the United
States, which would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (quoting Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987));
see also FBI v. Super. Ct., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The general rule is that
a suit against the United States is defined broadly as any action seeking a judgment that would:
1) ‘expend itself on the public treasury or domain;’ 2) ‘interfere with the public administration;’ or
3) ‘restrain the Government from acting’ or ‘compel it to act.’ An action against a government
employee constitutes a suit against the United States assuming it would have one of these effects.”
(citations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1969),
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superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Mashiri v. Dep’t of Educ., 724 F.3d 1028,
1032 (9th Cir. 2013))); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994).
In this case, Plaintiff’s Bivens claims are against named federal officials in their official
capacity overseeing agencies that fund and partner with NMC and Commonwealth entities who
allegedly punished Plaintiff for exercising protected free speech. However, the Court “lack[s]
subject-matter jurisdiction over [Plaintiff’s Bivens claims] because the United States has not
consented to its officials being sued in their official capacities.” Consejo, 482 F.3d at 1173.
Accordingly, dismissal without prejudice of Counts I and II as against the named federal-officer
Defendants is necessary. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3); Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847
F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (requiring dismissal where
in forma pauperis complaint “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief”).
Second, even if Plaintiff had properly brought his Bivens claims against the federal-officer
Defendants in their individual capacities,2 Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the federal-
officer Defendants. The Supreme Court has explained:
[I]t must be noted that a Bivens action is not “a proper vehicle for
altering an entity’s policy.” [Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
61, 74 (2001).] Furthermore, a Bivens claim is brought against the
individual official for his or her own acts, not the acts of others.
“[T]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.” Meyer, [510 U.S.
at 485.] Bivens is not designed to hold officers responsible for acts
of their subordinates. See Iqbal, [556 U.S. at 676] (“Government
officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
2 Ordinarily, the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s first two counts would preclude the Court
from addressing the substance of the two counts. However, the Court sets forth alternative bases for
dismissal here in view of the reasoning herein being controlling as to the Doe Defendants (see infra Part II-
B), the opportunity to file an amended complaint (see infra Part II-C), and Plaintiff’s pro se status.
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Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 140-41 (2017). Here, Plaintiff asserts that the federal-officer
Defendants did not take action on his complaints and otherwise took unconstitutional actions
against him. But Plaintiff’s allegations do not even begin to show that any of the federal-officer
Defendants were personally aware of Plaintiff, his activities and complaints, or the specific
conduct of the Commonwealth and NMC entities and affiliates that allegedly wronged him.
Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate the only contact he had with any federal entity was through
his complaints, as submitted to the inspectors general of the federal agencies that fund the
Commonwealth and NMC programs and events that he cannot access or attend. As such, Plaintiff
has put forward mere “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights
violations” that are insufficient to state a claim against any federal-officer Defendant in their
individual capacity. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Third, Bivens does not provide a remedy for Defendants’ alleged violations of Plaintiff’s
rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Plaintiff bases the Due Process Clause
portion of his Fifth Amendment Bivens claim on Defendants’ inaction on Plaintiff’s complaints,
including Defendants’ failure to provide any notice and opportunity to be heard on his complaints.
The Supreme Court has held that Bivens does not extend to circumstances where “there are sound
reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of
the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong” or where “there is an alternative remedial
structure present,” i.e., that “Congress has created ‘any alternative, existing process for protecting
the injured party’s interest[.]’” Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137 (original brackets omitted) (quoting Wilkie
v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). Here, a claim based on a federal agency’s action or inaction,
as with a claim that challenges the arbitrariness, capriciousness, or unlawfulness of an agency
determination, falls within the broad scope of the APA as the “comprehensive remedial scheme,”
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enacted by Congress, for legal wrongs arising from unfavorable agency actions. W. Radio Servs.
Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2)(A)
(scope of judicial review of agency actions includes, inter alia, “compel[ling] agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” and “hold[ing] unlawful and set[ting] aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”). Even if an action under the APA would not provide the same exact scope
or types of relief as Bivens, “[s]o long as the plaintiff has an avenue for some redress, bedrock
principles of separation of powers forecloses judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.”
W. Radio Servs., 578 F.3d at 1120 (original brackets omitted) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69).
Therefore, the Due Process Clause portion of Count I is not a cognizable claim for relief.
Fourth, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to show that Defendants discriminated against
him in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.3 “To state a violation of
equal protection, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate both differential treatment and discriminatory
motive.” Cole v. Oravec, 465 F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, Plaintiff does not set forth
any allegations showing that he was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals
who differ only in the protected characteristics asserted by Plaintiff. Nor does Plaintiff plead
sufficient facts to permit the Court to draw the plausible inference that Defendants had an
impermissible discriminatory motive based upon the existence of House Resolution 21-005 or
Plaintiff’s protected activities or characteristics. Instead, Plaintiff conflates the named and
3 Though the Fifth Amendment does not have language guaranteeing “the equal protection of the laws,”
compare U.S. Const. amend. V with U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, “[t]he Supreme Court has determined
that ‘the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting
the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups,’” such that the analysis
of equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment is identical and applicable to equal protection
claims brought under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.
2023) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
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unnamed Defendants with the acts of non-parties (e.g., the House of Representatives, NMC,
Commonwealth agencies) and effectively seeks the Court to draw, through a series of “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, the inference that
Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s activities, characteristics, and alleged persona non grata
status and acted (or chose not to act) to punish Plaintiff for the same. Such pleading fails to state
a claim. Id.; Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1200; Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. As such, the equal protection portion
of Count I would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, as well.
Fifth, as to Plaintiff’s Bivens claim based on retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has expressly held—and Plaintiff’s Complaint recognizes—that
“there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 499. (See Compl.
12 (quoting Egbert).) Therefore, Count II in its entirety, as with the Due Process Clause portion
of Count I, is not a cognizable claim.
2. Plaintiff’s APA Claim (Count III)
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a claim under the APA based on Defendants’ arbitrary,
capricious, and unlawful failure to enforce various provisions of federal law and related legal
guidance applicable to federally funded programs. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim.
First, judicial review of agency actions under the APA is limited to agency actions that are
“final,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, namely, actions (1) which “mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s
decisionmaking process” and (2) “by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from
which ‘legal consequences will flow,’” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (first
quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948), then
quoting Port of Boston Mar. Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970)). Here, Plaintiff’s factual allegations merely show that he filed complaints with federal
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agencies after being denied or excluded from NMC and Commonwealth programs and events but
do not show that the federal agencies4 made any final determination as to any of his complaints.5
Plaintiff’s implied presumption that the lack of any response as to any of his complaints constitutes
final agency action is a conclusory legal assertion that the Court cannot accept. See Al Otro Lado,
Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1207 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“A plaintiff may not simply attach
a policy label to disparate agency practices of conduct.”); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S.
871, 890 (1990) (rejecting challenge to entirety of federal agency’s “continuing (and thus
constantly changing) operations” in carrying out statutory mandate as not identifying an “agency
action” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 702 or a “final agency action” within the meaning of
5 U.S.C. § 704); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1200.
Second, and more critically, even if Plaintiff’s allegations could establish that Defendants
indeed made a final determination to not investigate and remedy the wrongful acts identified in
any of Plaintiff’s complaints, Defendants’ decision would not be subject to judicial review under
the APA. “[T]he APA does not apply if the ‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law’ or if ‘statutes preclude judicial review.’” City of Oakland v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th
4 As with his Bivens counts, Plaintiff conflates the acts of NMC, Commonwealth entities, and other non-
parties with Defendants’ actions or inactions. (See, e.g., Compl. 14 (asserting “Defendants’ failure to
investigate or remedy Plaintiff’s complaints” is “evidenced by email showing unaddressed inquiries to
CNMI officials).) The relevant actions or inactions here are those of the federal agencies headed by the
federal-officer Defendants—and not those of NMC, Commonwealth entities, and other local officials or
individuals that are not affiliated with Defendants’ federal agencies.
5 Insofar as Plaintiff’s claim could be construed as a challenge to agency inaction under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1),
see Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1207 (S.D. Cal. 2019); Vaz v. Neal, 33 F.4th
1131, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2022), Plaintiff’s generalized attack against alleged lackluster enforcement of
federal law and demand for a substantive policy result as relief—namely, an order directing the federal
agencies to “enforce” federal law and compel NMC and Commonwealth entities to accept him in federally
funded programs and events—place his claim beyond the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). See Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64-65 (2004) (explaining that claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) is limited to
claims where “an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take,” such that “broad
programmatic attack[s]” and “judicial direction of even discrete agency action that is not demanded by law”
are not cognizable).
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Cir. 2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2)). The Supreme Court “has recognized on several
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion,”
such that there exists a “presumption . . . that judicial review is not available.” Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); see also id. at 832 (“[W]e recognize that an agency’s refusal to institute
proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of the prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special province
of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3)).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s APA claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
show that the actions challenged are “final” and otherwise subject to judicial review. See also Vaz
v. Neal, 33 F.4th 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he requirements for obtaining relief under the
APA go to the merits, not to subject matter jurisdiction.”).
3. Plaintiff’s Bill of Attainder Claim (Count IV)
Plaintiff’s fourth count alleges that House Resolution 21-005 violates the prohibition
against bills of attainder as set forth in Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.6 “A
6 Article I, Section 9, Clause 3’s prohibition on bills of attainder applies only to Congress, while the parallel
prohibition set forth at Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 applies to the States. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 468 n.30 (1977). The Commonwealth Legislature is neither Congress nor a legislature of a
State, thus begging the question of which clause’s prohibition on bills of attainder applies to the
Commonwealth, if at all.
Plaintiff asserts, without authority, that Article I, Section 9, Clause 3’s prohibition extends to the
Commonwealth Legislature as a “territorial legislature acting under federal authority.” (Compl. 18.) The
limited number of decisions concerning other territories on this issue suggest that Article I, Section 9,
Clause 3’s prohibition does not apply to territorial governments, even if such governments ultimately derive
their authority from Congressional establishment of the government pursuant to Congress’s plenary power
to legislate for the territories, see Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 174 F. Supp. 3d 585, 647
(D.P.R. 2016) (“The prohibition in Article I, Section 9, is only ‘applicable to Congress’ and thus is of no
relevance here.” (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468 n.30)), and Congress would be limited by the prohibition
in enacting legislation concerning the territory, see Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1955)
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bill of attainder is a ‘law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an
identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.’” Fowler Packing
Co., Inc. v. Lanier, 844 F.3d 809, 816-17 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)); see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-49 (1965)
(discussing history of bills of attainder, federal constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder, and
cases). Plaintiff fails to state a claim because his allegations fail to establish that House Resolution
21-005 is a law.
For House Resolution 21-005 to be a bill of attainder, it must be a law—that is, an exercise
of the Commonwealth’s power to “legislatively” determine Plaintiff’s guilt and inflict punishment
without judicial trial. Fowler Packing Co., 844 F.3d at 817 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468); see
also Brown, 381 U.S. at 444-46 (explaining that prohibition is intended to “limit[] legislatures to
(holding Congressional amendment to Guam’s Organic Act was an ex post facto law and an unconstitutional
bill of attainder because the legislative act inflicted punishment without a judicial trial).
On the other hand, whether Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 applies to the territories is a more
complex question that implicates the nature of the prohibition against bills of attainder, namely, whether
such a prohibition is so fundamental to government that it cannot be violated by any governmental entity,
regardless of federal, state, or territorial status. See Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 3d at 647-68
(noting conflicting authority on fundamental nature of prohibition but declining to resolve issue because
parties did not contest applicability of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 to Puerto Rico); In re Pet. of
Pangelinan, 2008 MP 12 ¶¶ 58-74 (N. Mar. I. 2008) (discussing history and cases concerning identification
of fundamental rights within the context of the Insular Cases and the Commonwealth’s political, legal, and
cultural background).
The Court, however, need not wade into such murky waters because the history and legal
arrangements unique to the Commonwealth point to Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 as the applicable
prohibition on enactment of bills of attainder by the Commonwealth Legislature. Section 501(a) of
Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United
States of America provides that both Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 “will
be applicable within the Northern Mariana Islands as if the Northern Mariana Islands were one of the
several States[.]” 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (text of Covenant) (emphasis added). As such, the Commonwealth
Legislature, treated as a legislature of a State, would be subject to Article I, Section 10, Clause 1’s
prohibition against bills of attainder that are applicable to the various States. Furthermore, and in any event,
the analysis governing bill of attainder claims is the same under both clauses. See SeaRiver Mar. Fin.
Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 672 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the task of rule-making”), cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (characterizing action by
one house of Congress as “essentially legislative in purpose and effect” where such action “had
the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties[,] and relations of persons,” including
those “outside the legislative branch”). The Commonwealth Constitution vests the
Commonwealth’s legislative power exclusively in the bicameral Northern Marianas
Commonwealth Legislature. N. Mar. I. Const. art. II, § 1; Torres v. Commonwealth Utils. Corp.,
2009 MP 14 ¶ 25 (N. Mar. I. 2009). The Commonwealth Legislature “may not enact a law except
by bill and no bill may be enacted without the approval of at least a majority of the votes cast in
each house of legislature,” N. Mar. I. Const. art. II, § 5(c), and no bill shall become law without,
inter alia, transmittal of the enacted bill to the Commonwealth Governor for further action, id. art.
II, § 7(a). See also In re Status of Certain Tenth Leg. Bills, 1998 MP 3 (N. Mar. I. 1998) (discussing
transmittal requirement).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations assert that House Resolution 21-005 has the force of law, as a
legislative enactment that specifically identifies Plaintiff, lists his undesirable conduct, and
declares him persona non grata and directs NMC and Commonwealth entities to discriminate
against him. The Court takes judicial notice of the Commonwealth Law Revision Commission’s
collection of public laws enacted by the Twenty-First Legislature and the Commonwealth
Legislature’s records concerning the legislative history of House Resolution 21-005, as matters
“that [are] not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also
Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting request to take judicial notice
of legislative history of state statute). House Resolution 21-005 is not among the forty-four public
laws enacted by the Twenty-First Legislature. See 21st Legislature, COMMONWEALTH LAW
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REVISION COMMISSION, https://cnmilaw.org/pl21.php. Nor do the Commonwealth Legislature’s
records indicate that House Resolution 21-005 was ever adopted by the House of
Representatives—instead, records show that House Resolution 21-005 was introduced and
referred to committee without any further action. See House Resolutions: HR 21-005, NORTHERN
MARIANAS COMMONWEALTH LEGISLATURE, https://cnmileg.net/leg_sts.asp?legID=15743&
secID=1 (listing last action as March 12, 2019 referral to House of Representatives Committee on
Judiciary and Governmental Operations, with reporting deadline of May 11, 2019). The final
adjournment of the Twenty-First Legislature extinguished any further consideration of House
Resolution 21-005. See In re Status of Certain Tenth Legis. Bills, 1998 MP 3 ¶ 16 (“All bills which
were pending in the Tenth Legislature ‘died’ after final adjournment.”). As such, House Resolution
21-005 was never enacted and is not law. The Commonwealth accordingly has not “legislatively
determine[d]” Plaintiff’s guilt and inflicted a punishment through House Resolution 21-005.
Fowler Packing Co., 844 F.3d at 817 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468). Dismissal of Count IV is
therefore appropriate.7
4. Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment Claim (Count V)
Plaintiff’s final count seeks a declaratory judgment in his favor. Dismissal of Count V is
appropriate because Plaintiff’s allegations in support of Count V are premised on the same
controversies and legal theories animating his other counts (see Compl. 24-28 (Defendants’
systemic failure to enforce federal law, adverse NMC and Commonwealth actions, purported
7 Plaintiff seeks to link the Commonwealth Legislature’s actions on House Resolution 21-005 to Defendants
such that Defendants would be liable for any damages caused by the Commonwealth’s purported legislative
acts. As discussed supra, Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that Defendants (either personally or
through the agencies they administer) were aware of Plaintiff or the Commonwealth’s purported legislative
acts or that they took action pursuant to the purported legislative acts. Therefore, apart from the lack of an
enacted legislative determination of Plaintiff’s guilt and punishment, Count IV is also subject to dismissal
for failure to adequately plead a cognizable link between House Resolution 21-005 and Defendants’
conduct.
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persona non grata status, challenge to agency inaction)), and the same technical and substantive
defects that warrant dismissal of all of his other counts similarly require dismissal of his
declaratory judgment count.
B. Unnamed Doe Defendants
Plaintiff identifies “John Does 1-3,” sued in both their official and individual capacities, as
additional defendants who were “involved in the discriminatory acts.” (Compl. 6.) The Ninth
Circuit has explained:
As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is
not favored. However, situations arise . . . where the identity of
alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a
complaint. In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants,
unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or
that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.
Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). As such, Plaintiff must
still satisfy all other pleading requirements as to the Doe Defendants such that “even if Doe’s
identity is discovered, the complaint would [not] have to be dismissed on other grounds.”
Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, first, Plaintiff fails to set forth any specific allegations as to any of the Doe
Defendants throughout the entirety of his Complaint. Plaintiff merely repeatedly inserts “John
Does 1-3” next to conclusory assertions about the federal-officer Defendants’ liability without any
further factual allegations. (See Compl. 1, 5, 6, 13, 18.) Such pleading fails to state a claim against
any of the Doe Defendants. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1200; Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.
Dismissal of all claims against all Doe Defendants is therefore appropriate.
Second, the rationale for dismissing all of Plaintiff’s counts as to the federal-officer
Defendants applies with equal force to the Doe Defendants. Counts I and II must be dismissed
because (1) Plaintiff fails to plead any allegations showing that any Doe Defendant personally
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engaged in wrongful conduct against him; (2) Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
Bivens claim is foreclosed by the availability of relief under the APA; (3) Plaintiff fails to plead
sufficient allegations to establish his Fifth Amendment equal protection Bivens claim; and
(4) Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation Bivens claim is squarely foreclosed by precedent. See
supra Part II-A-1. Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege a final agency
action that is subject to judicial review. See supra Part II-A-2. Count IV must be dismissed
because House Resolution 21-005 was never enacted. See supra Part II-A-3. And Count V must
be dismissed because Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim relies upon the same defective
allegations and legal theories asserted across his four other counts. See supra Part II-A-4.
C. Leave to Amend
Having determined that dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims as to all Defendants is
appropriate, the Court will nonetheless give Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. Lopez, 203
F.3d at 1130. Should Plaintiff desire to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff must cure all
deficiencies as identified in this order, including setting forth sufficient, specific facts as to each
and every Defendant he contends is liable to him on each and every count. In addition, Plaintiff
must file all exhibits cited in any first amended complaint at the time of filing of a first amended
complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff’s Complaint
(ECF No. 2) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, to wit:
(1) Counts I and II are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to the named federal-
officer Defendants and dismissed for failure to state a claim as to the Doe Defendants;
(2) Count III is dismissed for failure to state a claim as to all Defendants;
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(3) Count IV is dismissed for failure to state a claim as to all Defendants; and
(4) Count V is dismissed for failure to state a claim as to all Defendants.
Plaintiff must file any first amended complaint that complies with the requirements set forth in this
order by no later than March 30, 2026. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this case
with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of February, 2026.
____________________________________
RAMONA V. MANGLONA
Chief Judge
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