Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JESUS OSVALDO RAMIREZ CORRAL,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-01175-SMD-SCY
TODD M. LYONS, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 1). The Court
has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, and for the reasons set
forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jesus Osvaldo Ramirez Corral, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States
without inspection on or about January 15, 1996. Doc. 1 at 4. The record omits Petitioner’s
specific release conditions, including whether he was placed in immigration custody in 1996 and
subsequently released on bond or recognizance.
On an unspecified date, local police in Midland, Texas stopped Petitioner because the
officer could not verify that Petitioner had car insurance. Id. The officer contacted Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which then took Petitioner into immigration custody and held
him at the Otero County Processing Center in New Mexico. Id. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) placing Petitioner in removal proceedings and
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charging him under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. Petitioner
asserts that he has not received a bond hearing. Id.
Petitioner seeks immediate release or a constitutionally adequate bond hearing, asserting
that his prolonged detention violates, inter alia, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 11.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
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Mass. 2025); see also, Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
Petitioner was detained in the U.S. interior and is therefore not subject to the mandatory detention
provisions of § 1225, which apply to those seeking admission, specifically noncitizens who present
at a port of entry or are apprehended immediately after entering. See Doc. 1 at 4. See Aragon v.
Noem, No. 2:26-CV-00065, 2026 WL 458449, at *2 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v.
Noem, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 3485771, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025); Velasquez Salazar
v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Pu
Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov.
14, 2025); see also Figuera v. Ripa, No. 26-CV-20307-JB, 2026 WL 467569, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
19, 2026); Wuilmer v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3236 (NEB/JFD), 2026 WL 458457, at *3 (D. Minn.
Feb. 18, 2026); Villatoro v. Ripa, No. 2:26-CV-00213-SPC-DNF, 2026 WL 452432, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 18, 2026).
II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
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that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018).
The Government has offered neither a justification nor a formal process for the deprivation
of Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. Petitioner entered the United States in 1996,
approximately 30 years ago. See Doc. 1 at 4. The NTA further states that an asylum officer has
found that Petitioner has demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture. Id. While the
Court recognizes that neither authorized release nor length of residency constitutes legal
authorization to remain in the country, any revocation of the protected interests arising from these
circumstances must still comport with constitutional procedural safeguards.
The United States’ power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and was deprived
of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
The Government concedes that the material facts of this case are similar from those in
Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063-SMD-GJF, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb.
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11, 2026). See Doc. 9 at 2–3. Furthermore, the Government acknowledges that Martin Ramirez
controls the outcome here should the Court adhere to that precedent. See id. Because Respondents
have offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief
pursuant to § 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869; Cortez-Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771,
at *3.
Because the Court resolves the petition on Fifth Amendment grounds, it does not reach
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment arguments regarding unconstitutional arrest and seizure.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 24 hours of the next business day
following the entry of this Order;
3) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by notifying Petitioner’s counsel when and where he can be collected, and by
providing all necessary identity and travel documents to return to his primary
address;
4) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
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5) Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
6) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
7) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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