Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MAMADOU BONTHORO DIALLO,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00852-KG-GJF
DORA CASTRO, et al.,
Respondents.
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Mamadou Bonthoro Diallo’s motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) under Federal Rule of Procedure 65(a). See Doc. 2. For
the reasons below, the Court grants the motion and orders the Government to release Petitioner.
I. Background
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States without inspection on
January 12, 2024. Doc. 1 at 7. Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) agents arrested Petitioner
and conducted a system check, confirming that Petitioner had no criminal history or outstanding
warrants, and did not otherwise pose a threat to national security. Id. at 2. On January 13, 2024,
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings. Id. DHS
released Petitioner on his own recognizance on January 15, 2024, after determining that
Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. Id. at 2–3. Following his
release, Petitioner filed Form I-589 seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture. Id. at 7.
As a condition of release, Petitioner was required to attend check-ins with Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and appear at all immigration court proceedings. Id. at 3.
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Petitioner maintains he has fully complied with these conditions and has obtained employment
authorization from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Id.
On November 11, 2025, Petitioner appeared for a scheduled check-in with ICE agents.
Id. At the check-in, ICE rearrested Petitioner and revoked his order of supervised release. Id. at
8. Petitioner remains in detention at the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New
Mexico. Id.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a TRO and
preliminary injunction, arguing that his redetention, without notice or a hearing, violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Docs. 1 at 1, 2 at 2. Petitioner seeks a TRO (1) ordering his
immediate release from detention, (2) enjoining the Government from transferring him outside of
New Mexico, (3) prohibiting the Government from rearresting or redetaining Petitioner absent
evidence that Petitioner violated a condition of his supervised release, and (4) ordering the
parties to file a joint status report informing the Court of Petitioner’s release and any related
custody developments. Doc. 2 at 2.
II. Standard of Review
A TRO “preserve[s] the status quo [ante]” before a final decision on the merits.
Resolution Trust v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 1992). The status quo is “the last
peaceable uncontested status...before the dispute developed.” Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v.
City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 798 n.3 (10th Cir. 2019). A party seeking a TRO “must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Petitioner “must prove that all four of the equitable factors weigh in its favor.” Sierra Club. v.
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Bostick, 539 Fed. Appx 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2013). However, “[t]he likelihood-of-success and
irreparable-harm factors are the most critical.” People’s Trust Fed. Credit Union v. Nat’l Credit
Union, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1139 (D.N.M. 2018). “When the government is the party
opposing the temporary restraining order, the balance of the equities and public interest merge.”
Garcia Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1253 (D.N.M.).
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court concludes that (A) Petitioner is likely to succeed on the
merits of his habeas petition, (B) he will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief, and
(C) the balance of the equities and public interest weigh in his favor.
A. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his petition.
Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claim.1
Petitioner contends that his redetention, without notice or a hearing, violates his due process
rights. Doc. 2 at 6. “Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivations of that protected liberty interest accords with the
Constitution.” Domingo, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1251–52 (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).
1Petitioner also brings a substantive due process challenge to his detention, arguing that
the Government’s rationale for detaining him—namely ensuring his appearance at immigration
proceedings and protecting the community—do not justify his detention in this case. Doc. 2 at
14. Because this TRO releases Petitioner from ICE custody and, therefore, obviates the threat of
any imminent deprivation of his substantive due process rights, the Court declines to address
Petitioner’s substantive due process claim at this preliminary stage of the proceedings. See Sahil
v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at 4 (D.N.M.) (declining to assess the petitioner’s
substantive due process claim where the petitioner established a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits of his procedural due process claim).
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Here, Petitioner “possesses a protected liberty interest in his continued freedom from
physical confinement.” Doc. 2 at 7. Courts have recognized that a conditional release from
immigration detention gives rise to a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.
Domingo, 806 F. Supp. 3d. at 1252; cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (noting
that parolees have a protected interest in their continued liberty as they have “relied on at least an
implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the parole
conditions”). Petitioner’s prior release from custody enabled him “to do a wide range of things,”
including “be gainfully employed” and form “enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 482. Petitioner was released from immigration custody in January 2024, more than
two years ago. Doc. 1 at 2–3. He has since obtained employment authorization, established
community ties, and complied with the terms of his conditional release. Doc 2 at 8.
Next, the Court concludes Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a substantial
likelihood that the Government erroneously deprived him of a protected liberty interest. To
determine what process is necessary, the Court considers (1) “the private interest” affected, (2)
“the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s interest”
including “the fiscal and administrative burdens” of additional procedural safeguards. Domingo,
806 F. Supp. 3d at 1252 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
First, as noted above, there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner can demonstrate that
he has a significant private interest in remaining free from detention after being released from
ICE custody. Petitioner was free from custody for more than two years before he was
redetained. Doc. 1 at 2–3.
Next, there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner can show a significant risk of
erroneous deprivation. Although DHS may revoke release “at any time,” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b),
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courts require “a material change in circumstances as to whether the noncitizen poses a danger to
the community or an unreasonable risk of flight” before such revocation. Cuya-Priale v. Castro,
2025 WL 3564145, at * 2 (D.N.M.). Here, ICE made a unilateral decision to redetain Petitioner
without a bond hearing, preventing a neutral assessment of his potential danger to the community
or flight-risk.
Finally, there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner can show that the Government’s
interest in his continued detention without a bond hearing is low. Petitioner has complied with
all terms of his conditional release, Id., and the cost of providing a bond determination to
Petitioner is minimal. See Domingo, 806 F. Supp. 3d. at 1252. For these reasons, Petitioner has
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his procedural due process claim.
B. Petitioner will face irreparable harm without injunctive relief.
“When an alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further
showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 828
F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here,
Petitioner has demonstrated a substantial likelihood that the Government erroneously deprived
him of his protected liberty interest. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)
(“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause
protects.”). As a result, “no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Domingo, 806
F. Supp. 3d at 1253.
C. The equities and public interest favor relief.
Finally, any burden on the Government to release Petitioner from custody and hold a pre-
deprivation hearing is minimal compared to the harm that Petitioner suffers in improper
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detention. The public interest also weighs in Petitioner’s favor as it is “not in the public’s
interest to allow unexplained detention.” Domingo, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1253. Here, Petitioner
has complied with the conditions of his release, has no criminal history, and has timely pursued
his asylum claim. Doc. 1 at 3. While the Government has an interest in securing Petitioner’s
appearance at immigration proceedings, detention appears unnecessary to ensure Petitioner’s
attendance.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court orders that:
1. Petitioner’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order, Doc. 2, is granted.
2. The Government must release Petitioner within 24 hours of this order. Upon release, the
Government may not subject Petitioner to post-release monitoring or supervision not in
place before his detention.
3. The Government may not redetain Petitioner unless it demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter, that Petitioner
is a danger or flight risk.
4. This order shall remain in effect for 28 days for good cause shown. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b)(2).
5. Given the important constitutional rights at stake for Petitioner, the Court finds that no
bond is required. See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1206
(10th Cir. 2003) (providing district courts with “wide discretion under Rule 65(c)” to
determine “whether to require security”).
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6. The Court reserves ruling on the underlying habeas petition. The Government must file a
response to the underlying habeas petition no later than ten (10) business days from the
date of this Order. Petitioner may file a reply within seven (7) days thereafter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the NEF
(Notice of Electronic Filing) accompanying this
document. Electronically filed documents can be
found on the court’s PACER public access
system.
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