Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
SAHIL SAHIL,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 2:26-cv-00434-DHU-JFR
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, El
Paso Field Office; TODD LYONS, Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, U.S.
Attorney General,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 5. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s
request for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner was detained by immigration officials over two years after being released on his
own recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Doc. 2 at ¶ 68; see also Doc. 5-2 at 9.
On February 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)
with this Court. In the Petition, Petitioner seeks immediate release from immigration custody,
alleging that the Government is detaining him unlawfully in violation of his substantive and
procedural due process rights and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 89-
104. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his detention bears no reasonable relation to any legitimate
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government purpose. Id. at ¶ 93. He argues that the Due Process Clause entitles him to notice and
a pre-deprivation hearing before the Government can re-detain him after his prior release. Id. at ¶¶
95-98. Petitioner also alleges Respondents are wrongfully detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),
when in fact he is properly subject to the discretionary detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Id. at ¶¶ 100-101.
Respondents were served with the Petition on February 19, 2026, Doc. 3, and on February
20, 2026, this Court ordered the Government to show cause why the Petition should not be granted
within ten business days of service, Doc. 4.
On February 24, 2026, Petitioner filed the present Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction, seeking immediate release from detention to alleviate the harm he
faces due to his allegedly unlawful detention. Doc. 5 at ¶ 4. The motion argues that the last
uncontested status—the status quo ante—is the moment prior to Petitioner’s detention. Id. at 12-
13. Petitioner also asks for a preliminary injunction hearing subsequent to this TRO to maintain
his release pending final resolution of his habeas petition. Id. at 2.
On February 27, 2026, Respondents submitted a response to Petitioner’s motion. Doc. 10.
In it, the Government articulates its position that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b), pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Id. at 2 (citing 29 I & N Dec. 216, 228 (BIA
2025)). Respondents acknowledge, however, that this Court has reached the opposite conclusion
in cases containing substantially similar facts as those before the Court in this case. Id. (citing Vega
Uribe v. Noem, 2026 WL 127621, at * 1 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2026); Requejo Roman v. Castro et al.,
--F.Supp.3d--, 2026 WL 125681 (D.N.M. 2026)). The Government does point the Court to a non-
binding case recently decided by the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the Government’s position. Id.
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(citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)). The response does not address
Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a hearing before being re-detained.
II.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
Petitioner supported his Motion for TRO with the facts provided in his Petition, the motion
itself, and Exhibits attached to the motion. See Docs. 2, 5. Respondents did not provide any
information to dispute the factual allegations contained in the Petition and Motion. See Doc. 10 at
2. Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, based on the facts provided in Petitioner’s Petition
and Motion for TRO, the Court makes the following initial findings of fact concerning Petitioner’s
detention:
1. Petitioner Sahil Sahil is a native and citizen of India. Doc. 2 at ¶ 17. He entered the United
States without inspection on September 19, 2023. Id. at ¶ 59.
2. Petitioner was apprehended at some point after entering and was issued a Notice to Appear
the next day. Doc. 5-2 at 5. He was charged as “an alien present in the United States who
has not been admitted or paroled.” Id.
3. On September 20, 2023, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Id. at 9.
4. After his release, Petitioner continued to report to ICE, Doc. 2 at ¶ 72, and he filed an
application for asylum and withholding of removal, Doc. 5-2 at 11.
5. Over two years after his release, Petitioner was arrested by immigration officials, and he
remains detained in Respondents’ custody at this time. Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 68, 73.
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III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A temporary restraining order “preserve[s] the status quo [ante]” before a final decision on
the merits. Resolution Trust Corp v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 1992). The status quo
ante is “the last peaceable uncontested status existing between the parties before the dispute
developed.” Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, Colo., 916 F.3d 792, 798 n.3 (10th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
To obtain a temporary restraining order, a petitioner “must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief,” and that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in his favor. Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A petitioner seeking a temporary restraining order must
demonstrate that “all four of the equitable factors weigh in [his] favor.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick,
539 F. App’x 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2013). “The likelihood-of-success and irreparable-harm factors
are ‘the most critical.’” People’s Trust Fed. Credit Union v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 350
F.Supp.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).
Regarding irreparable harm, “[w]hen an alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold
that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v.
Herbert, 828 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The
balance-of-equities and public-interest factors “merge” where, like here, the Government is the
opposing party. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.
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IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner is Likely to Succeed on the Merits.
1. Procedural Due Process Claim
Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars Respondents
from re-detaining him without first providing him with a pre-deprivation hearing. Doc. 2 at ¶ 57.
Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures
necessary to ensure any deprivations of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.
See Ky. Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
a. Petitioner Possesses a Protected Liberty Interest.
Turning to the first step—whether Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest—this
Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner will be able to show that he has a
protected liberty interest in his release from immigration custody. Courts have resolved the issue
of whether a conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest by comparing the
release in the case to the liberty interest in parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See
Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010). Like the parole discussed in
Morrissey, Petitioner’s release from immigration custody enabled “him to do a wide range of
things,” including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482. Indeed, Petitioner was released from
immigration custody over two years ago, was granted work authorization, and lived freely in the
United States. Doc. 2 at ¶ 67.
This Court, and at least one other in this District, has found that noncitizens acquire a liberty
interest once released from immigration detention. See Garcia Domingo v. Castro, --F.Supp.3d--,
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2025 WL 2941217, at *3 (D.N.M. 2025) (Urias, J.) (at TRO stage, finding petitioner released by
ORR demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on claim that he possesses a protected liberty
interest in release from detention); Cuya-Priale v. Castro, 2025 WL 3564145, at * 2 (D.N.M. Dec.
12, 2025) (Gonzales, J.) (finding the same at the TRO stage for a petitioner released from detention
to seek asylum). Neither Respondents nor the Court can identify any factual distinctions in this
case that warrant a different conclusion with respect to this Petitioner’s liberty interest.
b. A Pre-Deprivation Hearing Was Required Before Petitioner Was Re-
Detained.
Having found that there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner will be able to show a
protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to ensure any deprivation
of that protected interest accords with the Constitution. To make this determination, the Court
considers the three factors outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge: 1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action,” 2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,”
and 3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Turning to the first Mathews factor, the Court finds there is a substantial likelihood that
Petitioner can show that he has a significant private interest in remaining free from detention after
being released from immigration custody. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due
Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). As mentioned previously,
Petitioner was out of immigration custody for over two years before being re-detained by ICE,
during which time his interest in release grew even stronger as he worked and presumably
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“form[ed] the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. His private
interest in freedom from detention is therefore substantial.
With respect to the second Mathews factor, the Court also finds that there is a substantial
likelihood that Petitioner can show that the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case is
considerable, particularly here where ICE previously released Petitioner and has not shown a
change in circumstances or otherwise explained why re-detention is necessary. See Doc. 5 at 5-7.
As Petitioner suggests, see id. at 11, a pre-deprivation hearing would likely attenuate this risk, but
Respondents provided no such hearing to Petitioner before re-detaining him.
Finally, the Court finds there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner can show that the
third Mathews factor favors him as well. Respondents’ interest in placing Petitioner in detention
absent some reason for doing so is low. And requiring a pre-deprivation hearing does not
undermine the Government’s interest in enforcing its immigration laws; it merely ensures its
enforcement tactics comport with due process. Moreover, the effort and costs of providing
Petitioner this simple procedural safeguard is minimal.
On balance, the Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner, under the
three Mathews factors, can show that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing prior to being
re-detained. Having found that there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner can show a protected
liberty interest, and that due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing, the Court finds that
Petitioner has established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his procedural due
process claim. This alone warrants relief, without needing to assess Petitioner’s substantive due
process claim or his INA claim.
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B. Petitioner Will Face Irreparable Harm Without Injunctive Relief.
The Court next finds that Petitioner has demonstrated that his detention has caused and will
continue to cause irreparable harm. It is well-established that “the infringement of a constitutional
right” is enough to show irreparable harm. Free the Nipple-Fort Collins, 916 F.3d at 805. Having
found a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim, “no further
showing of irreparable injury” is necessary. Id.
C. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weigh in Petitioner’s Favor.
When the Government is the party opposing the temporary restraining order, the balance
of equities and public interest merge. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. The Court finds that the balance of
equities and public interest weigh in Petitioner’s favor here. Any burden on Respondents to release
Petitioner from custody and provide a pre-deprivation hearing is minimal compared to the harm
that Petitioner suffers due to his continued detention. It is also not in the public’s interest to allow
unexplained and/or unlawful detention.
V.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining
order are met. The Court also finds that the status quo ante is the position that Petitioner was in
prior to his re-detention by ICE. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED;
2. Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner within twenty-four hours of this Order;
3. Respondents are RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker;
4. The requirement that bond be posted is WAIVED;
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5. The Court will consolidate the request for a preliminary injunction with consideration of
the merits of the habeas petition pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2); and
6. This order, for good cause shown, shall remain in effect until resolution of the merits of
the habeas petition. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
HONORABLE DAVID HERRERA URIAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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