Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
YI XING,
Petitioner,
v. 	2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, in her official capacity
as Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and Removal Operations, El Paso Field Office;
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, in her official
capacity as Attorney General of the United States; and
DORA CASTRO, in her official capacity as Warden of
the Otero County Processing Center,
Respondents.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Yi Xing’s Amended Verified
Emergency Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Petitioner Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (“Petition”), filed on February 6, 2026. Doc. 2. On February 25, 2026, Mr. Xing filed a
Notice of Supplemental Authority. Doc. 12. On February 26, 2026, the Federal Respondents
filed a response. Doc. 15. Warden Dora Castro joined the Federal Respondents’ position. Doc.
10. On February 27, 2026, Mr. Xing filed a reply. Doc. 16. Senior United States District Judge
James O. Browning referred this case to me pursuant 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (b)(3) to
recommend an ultimate disposition. Doc. 4. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that
the Petition (Doc. 2) be GRANTED IN PART and that Mr. Xing be granted a bond hearing.
I. 	Background
Petitioner Yi Xing is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. Doc. 2 at 2 ¶ 1. On
March 17, 2024, Mr. Xing entered the United States approximately 30.6 miles east of Tecate,
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 1 of 12

2
California, at a place other than a port of entry. Doc. 2 at 2 ¶ 2; Doc. 2-3 at 2; Doc. 15-1 at 1–2.
On March 18, 2024, Mr. Xing was apprehended by Border Patrol and charged with being subject
to removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i).1 Doc. 15-1 at
2. Mr. Xing was placed in removal proceedings under § 240 of the INA.2 Doc. 2-3 at 2. After
determining that Mr. Xing did not have any criminal history and was not “a threat to national
security, border security, or public safety,” the Department of Homeland Security issued Mr.
Xing a Notice to Appear and released him by Order of Recognizance. Doc. 2-3 at 2–4; Doc. 15-
1 at 3. On May 17, 2024, Mr. Xing filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal
based on his “fear of persecution in China due to his religious beliefs and anti-CCP [“Chinese
Communist Party”] activism.”3 Doc. 2 at 8 ¶ 27.
Mr. Xing has resided in Flushing, New York since his arrival in the United States, where
he is an active member in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Doc. 2 at 8 ¶¶ 26, 32.
Mr. Xing avers that he “has remained in total compliance with all DHS requirements, including
attending every scheduled check-in with ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) in
New York City.” Doc. 2 at 8 ¶ 28.
On November 19, 2025, Mr. Xing was re-detained after he reported for a routine U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check in. Doc. 2 at 2 ¶ 3; Doc. 15-2 at 3. No
1 This section of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). It provides that “[a]n alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”
2 This section of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Aliens placed in these removal
proceedings are entitled to proceedings before an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
3 Respondents’ records show that Petitioner’s application was filed on March 18, 2024, as
opposed to March 17, 2024. Doc. 15-2 at 3. The date discrepancy does not affect the Court’s
analysis.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 2 of 12

3
evidence indicates that Mr. Xing violated the conditions of his parole or that the government took
any action to revoke his parole before or since he was taken into custody. Nevertheless,
Respondents now purport to detain Mr. Xing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Doc. 2 at 1-2.
Mr. Xing is currently incarcerated in the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral,
New Mexico. Doc. 2 at 8 ¶ 30.
II. 	The Parties’ Arguments
Mr. Xing asserts three claims for relief in his petition. See Doc. 2. First, Mr. Xing argues
that Respondents have violated the INA by detaining him under the incorrect statutory authority,
8 U.S.C. § 1225, thereby denying him the bond hearing to which he is properly entitled under 8
U.S.C. § 1226. Id. at 9 ¶¶ 35–40. Second, he alleges that re-detaining him “at a routine check-in
without any change in circumstances or individualized finding of risk” and holding him without
a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Id. at 10 ¶¶ 41-45. Third, he
argues that due process requires that the government bear the burden of justifying his continued
detention at any bond hearing. Id. at 10–11 ¶¶ 46-49.
In his prayer for relief, Mr. Xing asks the Court to order “Respondents to provide [him]
with an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within seven (7) days of this
Court’s order.” Doc. 2 at 11; but see Doc. 16 at 7 (Mr. Xing’s reply brief asking the Court to
order a bond hearing within 48 hours). He further requests that, at such a bond hearing, the
government “bear the burden of proof to justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and
convincing evidence that he is either a flight risk or a danger to the community.” Doc. 2 at 11.
Finally, “if the Government fails to provide the required bond hearing within the specified seven-
day timeframe[,]” he requests immediate release from custody. Id.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 3 of 12

4
On February 25, 2026, Mr. Xing filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. Doc. 12. Mr.
Xing’s supplemental authority is the February 18, 2026, order in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-
CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 468284, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). Mr. Xing cites this
authority for two reasons:
(1) The Bautista court expressly vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the primary authority used to
incorrectly classify him as an immigrant subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
(2) He is a member of the bond-eligible class in Bautista, and his class membership
entitles him to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
Doc. 12.
On February 26, 2026, Respondents filed “an abbreviated response in lieu of a formal
responsive memorandum of law . . . .” Doc. 15 at 1. Therein, Respondents state they have
“determined that the legal issues presented concern the statutory authority for ICE’s detention of
Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) or 1226(a), whether Petitioner is entitled to a bond
hearing, and whether Petitioner must first exhaust his administrative remedies before applying to
this Court.” Id. Respondents claim Mr. Xing is “subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)” and reference the “similar conclusion” reached in Singh v. Noem, No. CIV 25-1110,
2026 WL 146005 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026). Id. at 1–2. Respondents then purport to “incorporate
by reference all arguments raised in its response brief in Singh v. Noem.” Id. at 2 n.2. Notably,
however, Respondents also state that:
The United States, in prior similar matters, cited Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I.
& N. Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025), for this proposition. Undersigned counsel was
alerted on the evening of February 26, 2026, that the Matter of Yajure Hurtado
decision has been vacated through an order filed in Lazaro Maldonado Bautista,
et al. v. Ernesto Santacruz Jr, et al., 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18,
2026). Therefore, the United States is not relying on the Matter of Yajure
Hurtado decision.
Id. at 2 n.1.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 4 of 12

5
III. 	Habeas Authority
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(citing U.S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). Federal courts are authorized to issue a writ of habeas
corpus when a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Challenges to
immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388
F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
IV. 	Analysis
I recommend that the Court find that Respondents have waived their right to respond to
the Petition. In the alternative, I recommend that the Court find that the Respondents failed to
respond to two of Mr. Xing’s arguments.
A. Respondents waived the right to respond to the Petition.
Respondents, without approval of the Court or authorization under local rule, purport to
incorporate by reference the briefing submitted under seal in a different case. Specifically,
Respondents reference the “similar conclusion” reached in Singh v. Noem, No. CIV 25-1110,
2026 WL 146005 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026) and “incorporate by reference” “all arguments raised in
its response brief . . . .” Doc. 15 at 2 & n.2. This response is problematic for several reasons.
First, there is no legal authority for “incorporat[ing] by reference” a pleading or response
from another case.4 Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) provides for adoption by
4 To preserve resources, some judges in this district have ordered respondents to distinguish a
particular petition from another factually similar petition on which the same judge has already
ruled. See, e.g., Doc. 4 at 2–3, Khasanov v. De Anda-Ybarra, 1:26-cv-00452-MLG-JMR (filed
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 5 of 12

6
reference in some circumstances, “referencing a pleading from a different case is impermissible,
even if the two cases involve the same parties . . . .” Macias v. New Mexico Dep’t of Labor, 300
F.R.D. 529, 562 (D.N.M. 2014) (Browning, J.); see also Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger, 2019 WL
13299003, at *1 (D.N.D. June 17, 1999) (“allegations in pleadings in another action, even if
between the same parties, cannot be incorporated by reference” (citing 5A Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1326 (4th ed. 2018) (collecting cases prohibiting incorporating
by reference pleadings from another case))). Beyond referencing a pleading in another case,
Respondents here have attempted to adopt an entire responsive brief. Respondents have
disregarded their duty to respond to the merits of Mr. Xing’s arguments with legal citations.5
Feb. 18, 2026) (“Any response filed by the USAO must therefore demonstrate why the specific
facts or procedural posture of this case warrant a departure from the Court’s prior rulings.”)
(Garcia, J.); Doc. 3 at 3, Thapa v. Bondi, 2:26-cv-00202-MIS-JMR (“Any response filed by
Respondents must therefore demonstrate that the facts of this case warrant a departure from the
Court’s prior rulings.”) (Strickland, J.). No such order or invitation was made in this case. See
Doc. 5 (Order for Respondents to Show Cause). I also have not issued a recommendation in any
case that is factually or legally similar to Petitioner’s.
5 The Court finds important to reiterate the message set forth by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana in Fuentes Gomez v. Olsen:
No doubt, the bond eligibility issue has been the predominant basis for the hundreds
of habeas challenges raised by ICE detainees in this and other federal courts in
recent months. This Court is sensitive to the reality that the government’s attorneys
face an ever-expanding workload with the same constraints on time, personnel, and
energy that limit the courts.
Nevertheless, the Court expects the government’s attorney—who is a tenured and
respected practitioner in this District—to move forward mindful of the following.
First, the federal government has chosen to make arrests at breakneck pace in the
name of immigration enforcement. 	The government and its lawyers have also
embraced the newfound legal position that every alien arrested inside the United
States without a visa is subject to compulsory detention without the possibility of
bond or other relief. 	While the Court is sympathetic to the challenges the
government’s attorneys face, it is reasonable and appropriate for the Court to expect
the same level of responsiveness in this litigation, despite its volume and pace, as
in any other.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 6 of 12

7
Second, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause as to why Mr. Xing’s petition
should not be granted. Doc. 5. The briefing in Singh, naturally, does not address the merits of
Mr. Xing’s petition. Mr. Xing is represented by different counsel than Mr. Singh, and he raises
different arguments based on different legal authority. By declining to address the merits of Mr.
Xing’s petition, the Respondents have ignored this Court’s order.
Third, the briefing in Singh is sealed. In other words, the Singh briefing is only available
to the Court and the participants in that case. Neither the public nor Mr. Xing’s counsel have
access to the briefing. So, even if this Court were to excuse the Respondents’ adoption of the
briefing in another case, Mr. Xing would have no way to reply to those arguments. Indeed, Mr.
Xing’s reply briefing does not refer to the briefing in Singh or address the arguments made by the
Respondents in Singh. See Doc. 16. It is unreasonable to expect Mr. Xing to reply to an
argument that he cannot access.
For these reasons, I recommend that the Court find Respondents have waived their right
to respond to Mr. Xing’s petition. “[T]he Tenth Circuit said that arguments made in a cursory
Second, as with all case types, non-responsiveness is unacceptable. Each time the
Court must write such a decision, it delays the time when it will reach the next ripe
case. 	During that time, the petitioner—and every other petitioner with a
meritorious claim—remains in jail without legal justification. The government is
not obligated to defend against every petition. If it cannot or will not defend against
the arguments raised by the petitioner, the government should clearly and promptly
notify the Court that it does not oppose the petition, it has afforded the relief that
has been requested, and the case is moot. If that approach is not strictly required
by the law, it [is] certainly called for by basic notions of professional courtesy.
Again, the Court declines at this stage to treat the government’s failure to
meaningfully respond to this petition as an act of bad faith. The government should
not, however, conclude that its approach in this case is acceptable or that it should
be repeated.
No. 26-CV-00021, 2026 WL 413371, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2026).
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 7 of 12

8
manner . . . are waived.” United States v. Martinez, 542 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1185 (D.N.M. 2021)
(Browning, J.); see also United States v. Gordon, 710 F. 3d 1124, 1150 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
arguments are presented in a perfunctory and conclusory fashion, and we are rightly hesitant to
definitively opine on such legally significant issues when they have received such cursory
treatment.”). Courts regularly grant relief under § 2241 when respondents fail to respond to a
petitioner’s arguments. See Fuentes Gomez v. Olsen, No. 26-CV-00021, 2026 WL 413371, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2026) (“[R]espondents have not answered Gomez’s argument that she was
arrested while on parole and therefore her detention violates the Constitution and laws of the
United States. The government therefore has waived any defense to the issue, and Gomez’s
petition is granted.”); Diego L. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-382, 2026 WL 145206, at *1, *3 (D. Minn.
Jan. 20, 2026) (granting habeas relief when respondents incorporated briefing from another case
and failed to respond to one argument, which court held was an independent basis for relief); F.B.
v. Noem, No. CV-25-04271, 2025 WL 3628652, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 4, 2025) (Respondents filed
boilerplate response and because “Respondents do not acknowledge or address Petitioner’s
actual arguments . . .[t]he Court . . . finds Respondents have waived any challenge to them.”).
The Respondents’ incorporation of the Singh briefing here results in an insufficiently cursory
response.6 As such, I recommend that the Court find that the Respondents failed to show cause
as to why Mr. Xing’s petition should not be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Doc. 5.
6 Respondents also reference, in a footnote, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 2026 WL 323330 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), which they “also believe . . . is relevant . . . .” Doc. 15 at 2 n.2. 	Again,
though, “arguments made in a cursory manner, such as a footnote, are waived.” Martinez, at 542
F. Supp. 3d at 1185.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 8 of 12

9
B. Respondents failed to respond to two of Mr. Xing’s arguments.
In the alternative, I recommend that the Court find the Respondents failed to respond to
two arguments in Mr. Xing’s petition. Because the Respondents failed to respond, I recommend
that the Court grant the petition as to those arguments.
Even if the Court allowed the Respondents to incorporate the Singh briefing in this case,
the Singh briefing does not address all of the claims in Mr. Xing’s petition. In Singh, the
Respondents first argued that Mr. Singh failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Doc. 16
at 10–11, Singh v. Noem, No. CIV 25-1110 (filed Nov. 28, 2025). But Respondents have not
provided any specific factual or legal argument about whether or not Mr. Xing exhausted his
administrative remedies. Next, in Singh, the Respondents argued that Mr. Singh was properly
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as opposed to § 1226. Id. at 11–14. This is the only argument
that Mr. Singh and Mr. Xing make in common. See Doc. 2 at 9. The Singh briefing does not
address Mr. Xing’s additional arguments that his Due Process rights were violated by his re-
detention or that he is a member Bautista class.
Courts routinely deem an issue “waived” when a party fails to respond to a movant’s
substantive argument. See, e.g., Rock Roofing, LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 413 F. Supp. 3d
1122, 1128 (D.N.M. 2019) (plaintiff’s failure to respond to defendant’s argument waived the
issue); Zane v. Kramer, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1256 (W.D. Okla. 2016) (plaintiffs waived claim
by failing to respond to argument raised in defendants’ summary judgment motion); Palmer v.
Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1250–51 (D. Kan. 1999) (“[T]he court
deems plaintiff’s failure to respond to an argument raised in defendants’ papers tantamount to an
express abandonment of any such claim.”).
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 9 of 12

10
Respondents entirely failed to identify and/or respond to Mr. Xing’s argument that he is a
member of the bond-eligible class in Bautista, and that his class membership entitles him to a
bond hearing.7 Respondents had the opportunity to respond to Mr. Xing’s supplemental
authority, either in their response or in a supplemental filing, but they did not do so. See
D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.8(c) (response to supplemental authority due within seven days of the filing of
the notice of supplemental authority). Respondents have waived their right to contest Mr. Xing’s
assertion that he is a member of the bond-eligible class in Bautista, and that his class
membership entitles him to a bond hearing. Federal courts are expected “to apply principles of
comity to each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.” Smith
v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 317 (2011). While this Court may not reach the same conclusion
as the Baustista court, see Singh, comity principles and the rule of law require the Court to honor
the Bautista court’s decision when the matter is squarely put before it. See Ramirez v. Smith, No.
5:25-CV-186-BJB, 2026 WL 228778, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 28, 2026).
Respondents also failed to respond to Mr. Xing’s argument that his Due Process rights
were violated by his sudden re-detention.8 Many courts have found due process violations and
granted habeas relief on this basis. See, e.g., Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1069,
1082 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[I]f DHS has released a noncitizen pending civil removal proceedings,
7 Bautista was temporarily stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending a ruling on the government’s
emergency motion for a stay pending appeal on March 6, 2026. Bautista v. United States
Department of Homeland Security, Doc. 5, No. 26-1044, (9th Cir. filed March 6, 2026). Because
the stay is temporary, it is unclear what effect, if any, the stay may have on the merits of Mr.
Xing’s arguments.
8 While the Respondents in Singh did discuss due process generally in their response in that
case, see Doc. 16, Singh v. Noem, No. CIV 25-1110, their brief does not discuss the due process
claim Mr. Xing makes in this case: that his Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights were violated
by Respondents “re-detaining [him] at a routine check-in without any change in circumstances or
individualized finding of risk, and by holding him without a bond hearing.” Doc. 2 at 10 ¶ 45.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 10 of 12

11
the noncitizen has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody.”); O.F.C.
v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-9816, 2026 WL 74262, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2026) (holding the
same); Diallo v. Orozco, No. 2:26-CV-00066-MLG-JHR, 2026 WL 608746, at *2–4 (D.N.M.
Mar. 4, 2026) (holding “that due process requires conditionally paroled noncitizen to receive a
hearing before an immigration judge prior to re-detention”); Danierov v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-
01215-KG-KRS, 2025 WL 3653925, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 2025) (same); Singh v. Stevens, No.
3:26-CV-133, 2026 WL 456489, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2026) (“[O]nce removal proceedings
are initiated under § 1226(a), the government cannot change course and subject individuals to §
1225’s mandatory detention.”). Respondents have waived their right to contest Mr. Xing’s
assertion that his due process rights were violated by his sudden re-detention.
Because the Respondents have failed to respond to Mr. Xing’s arguments regarding his
Bautista class membership and re-detention, I recommend that the Court grant habeas relief. In
conformity with the Bautista court’s order, I recommend that the Court order a bond hearing
within seven (7) days, wherein the government should bear the burden of proof to justify Mr.
Xing’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence that he is either a flight risk or a
danger to the community.
V. 	Recommendation
Mr. Xing seeks a writ of habeas corpus compelling the government to provide him with a
bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days of this Court’s order. Respondents
have not responded to Mr. Xing’s argument that he is a member of the bond-eligible class in
Bautista, and that his due process rights were violated by his re-detention. The government
therefore has waived any defense to these issues, and Petitioner’s Amended Verified Emergency
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Petitioner Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 11 of 12

12
2) should be GRANTED IN PART, in the form of ordering a bond hearing within seven (7)
days, wherein the government should “bear the burden of proof to justify Petitioner’s continued
detention by clear and convincing evidence that he is either a flight risk or a danger to the
community.” If Respondents do not hold a bond hearing within seven (7) days, I recommend the
Court order Mr. Xing’s immediate release. Mr. Xing’s Petition (Doc. 2) should otherwise be
DENIED AS MOOT.
Finally, I recommend that Mr. Xing’s Notice of Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 6) be DENIED AS MOOT.9
THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE of
a copy of these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may file written
objections with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Written
objections must be both timely and specific. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., With
Buildings, Appurtenances, Improvements, & Contents, Known as: 2121 E. 30th St., Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). A party must file any objections with the
Clerk of the District Court within the fourteen-day period if that party wants to have
appellate review of the proposed findings and recommended disposition. Failure to file
timely and specific objections will result in waiver of de novo review by a district or
appellate court. Id. In other words, if no objections are filed, no appellate review will be
allowed.
_____________________________________
JENNIFER M. ROZZONI
United States Magistrate Judge
9 Mr. Xing requested a stay of all administrative removal proceedings until the Court reached a
decision on merits related to his habeas petition. The Court here reaches the merits, rendering
this motion moot.
Case 2:26-cv-00306-JB-JMR Document 17 Filed 03/06/26 Page 12 of 12