Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
JAGJEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 2:26-cv-00298 KWR-JFR
DORA CASTRO, Warden of the Otero County Processing Center,
TODD LYONS, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Field Office Director of the El Paso Field Office,
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States,
and KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 1). Having reviewed the parties’ pleadings, briefing, and the relevant law, the Court
finds that the Petition is well-taken and therefore is GRANTED in part. The Court orders
Respondents to hold an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner within five (5) days of the entry
of this order.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of India and is detained by Respondents at the Otero County
Processing Center in New Mexico. Pet. ¶ 4, Doc. 1. He entered the United States without inspection
on or around March 18, 2024. Pet. ¶ 41. He was released on his own recognizance. Id. Petitioner
was subsequently arrested on or about November 20, 2025. Id. ¶ 44.
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On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision holding that
immigration judges lacked authority or jurisdiction to consider bond requests for any person who
entered the United States without admission. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA
2025) (“Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who
are present in the United States without admission.”). Here, bond hearings were held on December
19 and 29, 2025, but the immigration judge denied bond due to lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
Hurtado. Pet. ¶ 48.
In sum, Petitioner has remained in federal immigration custody without an opportunity to
post bond or request a conditional release because his detention has been classified as mandatory
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Petitioner requests that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring
Respondents to “schedule him for a discretionary bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).” Pet., Doc.
1 at 2.
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer by March 2, 2026. See Order to Answer,
Doc. 3 at 3. Respondents failed to file an answer. In the order to answer, the Court warned
Respondents that if they failed to timely answer the Petition, the Court may proceed to rule on the
Petition without further notice. See Id. Although the Warden filed a summary joinder to the
Federal Respondents’ hypothetical answer, the joinder does not provide any reason to deny the
Petition. Therefore, the Court will proceed to rule on the Petition and will not make arguments on
behalf of Respondents.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who
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demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.”
Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 687-88 (2001)).
DISCUSSION
I. The discretionary detention provisions under § 1226(a) apply to Petitioner, rather
than the mandatory detention provisions under § 1225(b).
Petitioner is in the custody of Respondents. At issue is whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or §
1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention while a decision on his removal is pending. Mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens “seeking admission” into the United States.
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a bond hearing or immediate release pursuant to § 1226(a),
as he has resided in the United States for years and is not “seeking admission” into the United
States. In prior cases, Respondents argued that the mandatory detention provision under §
1225(b)(2)(A) applies, as that provision covers not only those who present themselves at the
border, but any noncitizen who is present in the United States without admission, pending a
decision on removal. See, e.g., Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)
(“Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are
present in the United States without admission.”). The Court agrees with Petitioner and concludes
he is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The statutory phrase “seeking admission” cannot
be interpreted to apply to Petitioner, who has lived in the United States for years. Therefore,
Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a), for the reasons articulated by the Court in
Munoz Teran v. Bondi, 2:25-cv-1218 KWR/SCY, 2026 WL 161527 (D.N.M. January 21, 2026),
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which the Court incorporates herein. See also Camac-Huanca v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01253
KWR-JFR, 2026 WL 357651, at *2-6 (D.N.M. Feb. 9, 2026).
Moreover, Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is mandatorily detained under the
expedited removal provisions of § 1225(b)(1). Respondents have therefore waived any argument
he is detained under § 1225(b)(1). Alternatively, the record before the Court does not reflect that
Petitioner was placed in expedited removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1) such that the
mandatory detention proceedings under that provision apply. The Notice to Appear does not state
that he was treated as an arriving alien. Notice to Appear, Doc. 1-1 at 1. Moreover, the Petition
states that Respondents consider him detained under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1225(b)(1). Pet. ¶ 51.
Respondents did not respond to rebut these factual assertions, and the Court therefore must find
that § 1225(b)(1) does not apply here.
II. The Court finds that a bond hearing is an appropriate remedy for violation of the
INA.
Petitioner appears to request a bond hearing as a remedy. Pet., Doc. 1 at 2 (Petitioner
requests that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to “schedule him for a
discretionary bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).”). Elsewhere, he requests immediate release or
in the alternative a bond hearing. Id. at 17. To the extent Petitioner requests either release or a
bond hearing, Petitioner did not argue or carry his burden that he should be immediately released
or that the Court is required to release him rather than order a bond hearing. Moreover, he did not
request that the Court should shift the burden at any bond hearing to the Government. As explained
below, relying in part on the burden of proof and principles of party presentation, the Court
declines to immediately release Petitioner. Therefore, exercising its discretion under § 2241, the
Court will order an individualized bond hearing.
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Petitioner bears the burden of proof of showing that he is entitled to relief or a remedy. See
28 U.S.C. § 2241; see also Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The burden of
proof of showing deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention [under § 2241] is on the
petitioner.”); Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t was error for the
District Court to effectively impose on the Government the burden of proving that [petitioner] was
not ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’ ” under §
2241); see also Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that, in the context
a Brady violation, the petitioner “bears the burden of showing that the prosecution suppressed
material evidence favorable” to the petitioner).
Section 1226(a) affords Respondents discretion to detain, release on bond, or parole a
noncitizen. Notably, this section does not expressly provide a statutory right to immediate release.
Generally, the release or bond decision is discretionary. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney
General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to
review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section
regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”). Discretionary
bond decisions are generally not reviewable. Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App'x 784, 786–87 (10th Cir.
2012) (“Therefore, to the extent Mr. Mwangi challenges the agency's discretionary bond decision,
the magistrate judge was correct that the court lacked jurisdiction.”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 295, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841, 200 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2018) (explaining that § 1226(e) bars a
challenge to a discretionary judgment or decision by the Attorney General, but does not preclude
challenges to the statutory framework).
To be sure, federal district courts have broad equitable powers in ordering habeas relief.
Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992). A federal court is vested with “the largest
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power to control and direct the form of judgment to be entered in cases brought up before it on
habeas corpus.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2118, 95 L.Ed.2d 724
(1987) (citation omitted). In issuing a writ of habeas corpus, a federal court has the power and
authority to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Munaf
v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220–21, 171 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2008). Assuming the
Court has authority to order Petitioner’s immediate release, the Court in its discretion would order
a bond hearing, as an individualized bond hearing would provide Petitioner with the process he is
due under the statute. See § 1226(a) (providing that the Attorney General may continue to detain a
noncitizens pending a decision on removal or may release the noncitizen on bond or parole); see
Martinez Escobar v. Baltazar, No. 26-CV-00296-NYW, 2026 WL 503313, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb.
24, 2026) (ordering bond hearing rather than immediate release where due process rights were
violated by respondents’ failure to apply § 1226(a) discretionary detention provisions).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the proper remedy is an individualized bond hearing pursuant to
§ 1226(a). Therefore, the Court orders that Respondents hold a bond hearing within five (5) days
of the entry of this order.
Petitioner also does not argue or demonstrate in his Petition that any due process or
constitutional violation requires his release. He does not cite to any standard or law the Court
should apply in deciding whether a due process violation requires his release. For example, should
the Court apply the Mathews test in determining whether he should be immediately released, and
if so, how does the Mathews test apply to the facts of this case to warrant his immediate release?
The Court therefore declines to sua sponte analyze whether his constitutional claim requires his
release over a bond hearing, as this issue was not properly argued or presented to the Court. See
United States v. Davis, 622 F. App'x 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is not this court's duty, after
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all, to make arguments for a litigant that he has not made for himself.”); Phillips v. Hillcrest Med.
Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that a court has no obligation to make
arguments or perform research on behalf of litigants) (quoting Pelfresne v. Village of Williams
Bay, 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.1990) (“A litigant who fails to press a point by supporting it
with pertinent authority, or by showing why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in
the face of contrary authority, forfeits the point. [The court] will not do his research for him.”).
The principle of party presentation is particularly appropriate here, where this district court is
overwhelmed with habeas petitions, and petitioners request that the Court rule immediately. If the
Court were to act as Petitioner’s counsel and make arguments or do research on his behalf, it would
prejudice other petitioners by delaying a ruling on their petitions. Therefore, Petitioner has not
properly placed before the Court the issue of whether he must be immediately released, or he has
not carried his burden.
Moreover, Petitioner does not request that the Court should shift the burden to Respondents
on the issues of flight and dangerousness at the bond hearing, and the Court declines to sua sponte
raise this issue. 1
III. This opinion and the judgment should not be construed as addressing detention under
§ 1231, if that provision becomes applicable.
The Petition presented the Court with a narrow issue, whether Petitioner’s detention
pending a decision on removal is governed by § 1225 or § 1226. Once an order of removal has
become final, the authority governing a noncitizen’s detention shifts to another statutory provision,
1 Petitioner may not raise new arguments in any reply, as it deprives the opposing party an
opportunity to respond. Geringer v. Strong, 766 F. App'x 620, 625 (10th Cir. 2019); Reedy v.
Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) (the general rule in this circuit “is that a party
waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).
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8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 574 (2022) (“After the
entry of a final order of removal against a noncitizen, the Government generally must secure the
noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day removal period, during which the Government “shall” detain
the noncitizen.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1), (2)).
Section 1231 governs the detention of noncitizens “during” and “beyond” the “removal
period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)–(6). In general, when a noncitizen is ordered removed, the Attorney
General shall remove them within 90 days, known as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). The
“removal period” begins once a noncitizen’s removal order “becomes administratively final,” §
1231(a)(1)(B), meaning the order has been affirmed by the BIA or the time for seeking review has
expired, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 267 (2025) (“An order of
removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) ‘a determination by the [BIA] affirming
such order,’ or (2) ‘the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA
for review of the order.’) (citation omitted). During the removal period, detention is mandatory. §
1231(a)(2).
Here, no party has asserted that § 1231 applies. Therefore, as of the entry of this order, it
appears that the Court retains the ability to order the relief requested in the Petition, i.e., to
determine whether §§ 1225 or 1226 applies to her detention pending a decision on removal. The
Court’s order and judgment should not be construed to opine on whether or when in the future
Petitioner may be detained under § 1231.
IV. The Court need not rule on Petitioner’s remaining claims.
Petitioner also asserted a due process claim. Because the Court grants habeas relief, the
Court need not address his other claims or enter a declaration. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,
689 n.10 (2004) (finding it unnecessary to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after
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granting full relief on one claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would
be cumulative.”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (stating
that “[a] fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid
reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Scott v. Mullin,
303 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to address the remaining claims in a habeas
petition after already granting habeas relief on one claim). The Petition focuses on whether §§
1225(b) or 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention. Petitioner’s due process claim was asserted in
a summary manner. As explained above in Section II, Petitioner failed to carry his burden or argue
why immediate release is the only available remedy, and why the Court cannot order a bond
hearing. Therefore, he has received all relief to which he is entitled.
V. Attorney’s Costs and Fees under the EAJA.
Finally, Petitioner requests that the Court award attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Considering recent Tenth Circuit precedent and the relevant
procedure, the Court finds that it may consider Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs
provided that Petitioner follows proper EAJA procedure.
The EAJA provides for the following procedure:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred
by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Tenth Circuit recently held that the EAJA “unambiguously
authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th
1152, 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025).
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A fee award is required if (1) the petitioner prevails, (2) the Government’s position was not
“substantially justified,” and (3) there are no special circumstances rendering an award of fees
unjust. Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 2412(d)(1)(A)).
While fees are authorized, the EAJA requires that Petitioner, “within thirty days of final judgment
in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses,” and an allegation
demonstrating that “the position of the United States was not substantially justified.”
§ 2412(d)(1)(A), (B). Upon filing this application, the Government must justify its position in any
underlying proceedings and district court litigation. See Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1170.
Since the Court grants Petitioner habeas relief, should Petitioner continue to pursue costs
and fees, Petitioner is instructed to file an EAJA application following the appropriate procedure.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention pending a decision on whether he should
be removed from the United States is governed by § 1226(a) as opposed to § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Accordingly, the Petition (Doc. 1) is granted in part. Respondents are directed to arrange an
individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) for Petitioner before an immigration judge
within five (5) days of the entry of this Order. Respondents shall not deny Petitioner bond or
parole on the basis that § 1225(b) requires mandatory detention. However, the Court makes
no determination whether or when in the future § 1231 applies to his detention, as it was not briefed
or raised in the Petition. The parties are ordered to file a status report within seven days of the
entry of this order. The Court will enter a separate judgment.2
2 The Court need not delay entry of judgment to wait for Respondents to comply with the Court’s
order. The Court “always retains jurisdiction to enforce its lawful judgments, including habeas
judgments.” Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010); Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690,
693 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that district court has authority to enforce its habeas judgment).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) is hereby
GRANTED in part for the reasons described in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall provide an individualized bond
hearing before an immigration judge for Petitioner pursuant to § 1226(a), as opposed to § 1225(b),
within five (5) days of the entry of this order, provided that the Court makes no determination
whether or when in the future § 1231 detention provisions may apply.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the parties are directed to file a joint status report within
seven (7) days of the entry of this order.
____________/S/______________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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