Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
ELVIA NARCISA REA-CHILENO,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 2:26-cv-00117-KWR-JMR
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice, in her official capacity,
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
in her official capacity,
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in his official capacity,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
El Paso Field Office, in her official capacity,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 1). Having reviewed the Petition, exhibits, and the relevant law, the Court finds that
the Petition is well-taken, and therefore, the Petition is GRANTED in part. The Court orders
Respondents to hold an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner within five (5) days of the entry
of this Order.
BACKGROUND
Elvia Narcisa Rea-Chileno (“Petitioner”) is a citizen of Ecuador and entered the United
States on or about March 30, 2024. Pet. ¶ 2, Doc. 1. Petitioner was detained after her entry and
released pursuant to an Alternative to Detention (“ATD”) program. Id. ¶ 2. During her release,
Petitioner filed an asylum application. Id. ¶ 27. Petitioner was served a Notice to Appear, placing
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“her in Section 240 removal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 3. On January 6, 2026, Petitioner was driving to
pick up her daughter from school when she was arrested and detained. Id. ¶ 5.
On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision holding that
immigration judges lacked authority or jurisdiction to consider bond requests for any person who
entered the United States without admission. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. 216, 225 (BIA
2025) (“Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens, like
the respondent, who are present in the United States without admission.”). As of the filing of this
Petition, Petitioner is detained at Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico. Id.
¶ 6.
Petitioner has remained in custody without an opportunity to post bond or request
conditional release since her detention has been classified as mandatory under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp’ts’ Resp. 2, Doc. 8. Petitioner requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas
corpus requiring Respondents to immediately release Petitioner or, alternatively, provide her an
individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). Pet. ¶¶ 34–35.
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. Order to Answer, Doc. 2. The Court
directed Respondents that their answer “must address the merits of the Petition and attach all
relevant evidence [they] wish the Court to consider.” Id. at 7. On February 19, 2026, Respondents
filed their Response in which they incorporate arguments made in a prior case before this Court,
Munoz Teran v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-01218-KWR-SCY, 2026 WL 161527, at *1 (D.N.M. Jan. 21,
2026). Resp. 4. In Munoz Teran, the respondents did not raise administrative exhaustion or
jurisdictional bars. The Court declines to raise these issues sua sponte.
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LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who
demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). A challenge to immigration detention is “properly brought directly through habeas.”
Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 687–88 (2001)).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends she is in “custody [in] a violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States.” Pet. ¶ 17. She argues that she is improperly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and that she is entitled to release or a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Id. at 35. Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to Petitioner. Resp. 3–5. The Court finds
that Petitioner, who was previously released under § 1226 authority, is currently detained under
§ 1226(a) and entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.
I. Whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or discretionary detention
under § 1226(a) applies.
This Petition hinges on whether § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs Petitioner’s detention and she is not entitled to a
bond hearing. Resp. 2. Petitioner contends that DHS had already released her under § 1226(a)
authority, and her release must remain within that statutory scheme. Pet. ¶ 97. After a plain reading
of § 1225(b)(2)(A), the Court finds that Petitioner cannot be “seeking admission” as required for
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply. Thus, § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
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When interpreting a statute, courts first “examine the statute’s plain text” and “[a]bsent
ambiguity, [the] analysis ends there.” United States v. Koerber, 10 F.4th 1083, 1112 (10th Cir.
2021). Should the analysis continue, the Court considers the “language itself, the specific context
in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); see also Conrad v. Phone Directories Co., 585 F.3d 1376, 1381
(10th Cir. 2009) (“We also take into account the ‘broader context of the statute as a whole’ when
ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision.” (citation omitted)). Courts also consider
traditional canons of statutory interpretation. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054,
1062 (10th Cir. 2011). Generally, the Court considers non-textual evidence bearing on Congress’s
intent or purpose, such as legislative history, only if the statutory language is ambiguous. See, e.g.,
United States v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is a longstanding principle that
absent ambiguity we cannot rely on legislative history to interpret a statute.”).
Under the Immigrant and Nationality Act (“INA”), two statutes generally govern a
noncitizen’s detention pending a final order of removal: §§ 1225 and 1226. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Section 1225, which mandates detention and does not afford
a bond hearing, applies when “an applicant for admission” is “seeking admission” and “not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226 provides that a
noncitizen “may be arrested and detained” pending a removal decision. § 1226(a). Under
§ 1226(a), the Attorney General may detain the arrested noncitizen, release them on bond, or
release them on conditional parole. Section 1226(c) mandates detention for a noncitizen that is (1)
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General and (2) “is charged with, is
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arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits” to committing certain criminal
acts. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
In sum, immigration law authorizes the detention of “certain aliens seeking admission into
the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and
(c).” Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289). For Petitioner’s detention to be governed by § 1225(b)(2), the Court
must find that Petitioner is (1) an “applicant for admission,” (2) who is “seeking admission,” and
(3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court begins with the plain text of the phrase “seeking admission.” See Koerber, 10
F.4th at 1112. Since “seeking” is statutorily undefined, the Court will first consider the word
“admission.” “Admission” is statutorily defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
“Entry” is statutorily undefined. Respondents do not assert that the word “entry” has any unusual,
technical meaning, and therefore, the Court will apply its “ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.” Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. 405, 414 (2017). “Entry” ordinarily
means “[t]he action or an act of entering a place, area, building, etc.” Entry, Oxford English
Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/entry_n?tab=meaning_and_use#5515547 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2026); see also Entry, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Immigration. Any
entrance of an alien into the United States, whether voluntary or involuntary.”). Thus, the word
“admission,” as used in § 1225(b)(2)(A), refers to a noncitizen’s lawful act of physically entering
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.
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Turning to the statutorily undefined word “seeking,” in this context, it ordinarily means
trying to obtain something or trying to bring about or effect. Seek, Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/seek_v#23724107 (last visited Feb. 25, 2026). In choosing the
present participle “seeking,” courts should give effect to Congress’s verb choice and find that
“seeking” signals present and continuous action. Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010)
(“Consistent with normal usage, we have frequently looked to Congress’ choice of verb tense to
ascertain a statute’s temporal reach.”); see also Present Participle, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/present%20participle (last visited Feb. 25, 2026).
Therefore, the Court finds that the plain reading of the phrase “seeking admission” demonstrates
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens who are presently trying to lawfully and physically
enter the United States. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who
have lived in the United States for an extended duration and are not presently seeking lawful entry
into the United States.
If the Court were to accept Respondents’ interpretation, the phrase “seeking admission”
would be rendered superfluous, “violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction.”
Castañon-Nava, 161 F.4th at 1061. Courts are to presume that an interpretation of a provision is
incorrect if it “would render another provision superfluous.” Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010)). This presumption is “strongest when an interpretation would render
superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme,” as would occur here if the Court adopts
Respondents’ interpretation. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013).
Further, another section in § 1225 provides that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants for
admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States
shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The Supreme Court has noted
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that the word “or” is “almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are ‘to be given
separate meanings.’” United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the phrase “or otherwise” signals that the phrase “applicants for admission” has a
different meaning than “seeking admission.” Or Otherwise, Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/otherwise_n?tab=meaning_and_use#33058328 (last visited Feb.
13, 2026) (“In another way or ways; in a different manner; by other means; in other words;
differently.”). Therefore, a plain reading of § 1225(a)(3) indicates that the phrases “applicants for
admission” and “seeking admission,” as used throughout § 1225, do not have the same meaning.
Respondents’ interpretation would render recent amendments to § 1226(c) superfluous. As
amended in 2025, § 1226(c)(1)(E) requires detention for a noncitizen who is (1) inadmissible as
an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and (2) “is charged with,
is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits” to committing certain crimes.
Respondents’ interpretation would require every noncitizen that is present in the country without
being admitted or paroled be detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Such an interpretation would render
the recent § 1226(c)(1)(E) amendment superfluous in that detention would be required regardless
of the noncitizen’s criminal involvement.
The Supreme Court, in dicta, has recognized that § 1225(b) generally applies “to aliens
seeking entry into the United States” and that § 1226 “applies to aliens already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297, 303. The Jennings Court further noted that § 1226(a)
creates a default rule for noncitizens present in the United States “by permitting—but not
requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal
proceedings,” and also permitting “the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” Id. at
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303. Thus, the Supreme Court’s construction of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a) align with this Court’s
reading of the phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission.”
Applying the above statutory interpretation to these facts, the Court finds that Petitioner is
not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner has been living in the United States for
over a year while enrolled in an ATD Program. Pet. ¶ 81–82. Neither Petitioner nor Respondents
put forth any facts suggesting that Petitioner was “seeking admission” at the time of her arrest.
Rather, Petitioner was already released on parole subject to supervision and had been on her way
to pick up her daughter from school when Respondents arrested her. Id. ¶ 5. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).
II. The Court finds that a bond hearing, rather than immediate release, is the
appropriate remedy.
Petitioner requests immediate release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing. Pet. 33–35.
Petitioner argues that “[n]othing in her circumstances has changed since” her release under the
ATD Program and that a “bond hearing would be an empty formality serving no legitimate
purpose.” Id. ¶ 100. To avoid taking away Respondents’ discretion afforded by § 1226(a), the Court
concludes that a bond hearing is warranted.
Section 1226(a) affords Respondents discretion to detain, release on bond, or parole a
noncitizen. Generally, the release or bond decision is discretionary. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The
Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be
subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under
this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”).
Federal district courts have broad equitable powers to craft habeas relief. Burton v.
Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992). A federal court is vested with “the largest power to
control and direct the form of judgment to be entered in cases brought up before it on habeas
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corpus.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987). In issuing a writ of habeas corpus, a
federal court has the power and authority to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice
require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Assuming that the Court has the authority to order Petitioner’s
immediate release, the Court, in its discretion, orders Respondents to provide Petitioner an
individualized bond hearing so that she may receive the process she is due under the statute. See
§ 1226(a) (providing that the Attorney General may continue to detain a noncitizen or release her
on bond or parole pending a decision of removal).
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that she is entitled to relief or a remedy,
including whether the burden should be placed on the Respondents to justify her detention at a
bond hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[I]t was error for the District Court to effectively impose on the Government the burden
of proving that [petitioner] was not ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate
a “deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention” under § 2241. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d
83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting
that, in the context a Brady violation, the petitioner “bears the burden of showing that the
prosecution suppressed material evidence favorable” to the petitioner).
Petitioner does not argue that any due process violation requires her release over a bond
hearing.1 See Pet. ¶ 117–122. Rather, Petitioner cites a district court case, Pichardo Medina v.
1 The Court recognizes that Petitioner argues for release over a bond hearing in her Reply, Pet’r’s
Reply 4–9, Doc. 9, but her Petition does not address why a bond hearing would be an inadequate
form of relief. To the contrary, Petitioner requests release and, “[i]n the alternative,” an “order
requiring Respondents to set a bond hearing.” Pet. 34–35. Arguments “raised for the first time in
a reply brief are generally deemed waived.” United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d 907, 918 (10th Cir.
2011); Okland Oil Co. v. Knight, 92 F. App’x 589, 607 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that “district courts
are not required to address arguments and allegations raised for the first time in a reply brief”).
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Hermosilla, No. 3:25-cv-02233-MC, 2025 WL 3712271, at *6 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2025), for the
proposition that “given newly binding BIA precedent, there is little indication Petitioner would
receive adequate process before an IJ.” Pet. ¶ 99. Since the Court orders a bond hearing pursuant
to § 1226(a) and orders that Petitioner shall not be denied parole or bond on the basis of § 1225,
Petitioner will receive the process she is due.
Petitioner also examines her due process claim under the factors set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), but her analysis does not demonstrate why a due process
violation requires her release as opposed to a bond hearing. Pet. ¶¶ 118–122. Rather, her due
process analysis is directed at demonstrating an alleged violation of “the core guarantees of
procedural due process.” Id. ¶ 122. The Court will not sua sponte consider whether her due process
claim warrants immediate release as opposed to a bond hearing. See United States v. Davis, 622 F.
App’x 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is not this court’s duty, after all, to make arguments for a
litigant that he has not made for himself.”); see also Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790,
800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that a court has no obligation to make arguments or perform
research on behalf of litigants). Accordingly, the Court finds that the proper remedy is an
individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).
While an exception exists for new arguments “offered in response to an argument raised in the
[appellee’s] brief,” see In re Gold Res. Corp. Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d 1103, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015), no
new argument was made here, see Resp. 1–5. Respondents maintained their position that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) controls Petitioner’s detention which mandates detention and does not afford a
bond hearing. Id. at 3. Petitioner argues that Respondents did not address her argument for release.
Reply 4. However, Respondents position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) controls is sufficient argument that
release is unwarranted. Further, Petitioner’s argument that a bond hearing is inadequate does not
qualify as a new argument offered in response to an argument made in Respondents’ brief as their
argument was limited to why § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. Accordingly, the Court will not consider
the newly raised arguments in Petitioner’s Reply as to why a bond hearing is now inadequate.
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III. This opinion and judgment should not be construed as addressing 8 U.S.C. § 1231, if
that provision becomes applicable.
The Petition presents a narrow issue, whether Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225
or § 1226 pending a decision on her removal. Neither party addresses whether § 1231 applies and
nor does this Order.
Once an order of removal becomes final, § 1231 governs. Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez,
596 U.S. 573, 574 (2022) (“After the entry of a final order of removal against a noncitizen, the
Government generally must secure the noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day removal period,
during which the Government ‘shall’ detain the noncitizen.”). Section 1231 governs the detention
of noncitizens “during” and “beyond” the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)– (6). Generally,
the Attorney General shall remove a noncitizen within 90 days, a time frame known as the
“removal period.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The removal period begins once a removal order becomes
“administratively final,” id. § 1231(a)(1)(B), meaning the order has been affirmed by the BIA or
the time for seeking review has expired, id. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 267
(2025) (“An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) ‘a determination by
the [BIA] affirming such order,’ or (2) ‘the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted
to’ petition the BIA for review of the order.”) (citing § 1101(a)(47)(B)). Detention is mandatory
during the removal period. § 1231(a)(2).
Neither party contends that § 1231 applies here. Neither party alleges that removal
proceedings have become final. The Court determines the narrow issue of whether § 1225 or
§ 1226 applies. The Court’s Order and Judgment do not opine on whether or when in the future
Petitioner may be detained pursuant to § 1231.
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IV. The Court need not rule on Petitioner’s remaining claims.
Petitioner asserts violations of due process, the APA, and the INA. Pet. ¶¶ 114– 130.
Because the Court grants habeas relief, the Court need not address Petitioner’s additional claims
or declaratory relief. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (finding it unnecessary
to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting full relief on one claim because
“any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would be cumulative”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (stating that “[a] fundamental and
longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them”); Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1224
(10th Cir. 2002) (declining to address the remaining claims in a habeas petition after already
granting habeas relief on one claim).
V. Costs and fees under the EAJA.
Petitioner requests an award of “reasonable fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act.” Pet. 35. In light of recent Tenth Circuit precedent, the Court finds that it may consider
Petitioner’s request for costs provided that Petitioner follows proper EAJA procedure.
The EAJA provides for the following procedure:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred
by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Tenth Circuit recently held that the EAJA “unambiguously
authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th
1152, 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025).
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A fee award is required if (1) the petitioner prevails, (2) the Government’s position was not
“substantially justified,” and (3) there are no special circumstances rendering an award of fees
unjust. Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 2412(d)(1)(A)). While
fees are authorized, the EAJA requires that Petitioner, “within thirty days of final judgment in the
action, submit to the court an application for fees or other expenses” and allege that “the position
of the United States was not substantially justified.” § 2412(d)(1)(A), (B). Upon filing this
application, the Government must justify its position in any underlying proceedings and district
court litigation. See Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1170.
Since the Court grants Petitioner habeas relief, should Petitioner pursue costs and fees, she
is instructed to file an EAJA application following the appropriate procedure.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Therefore, the Petition (Doc. 1) is granted. Respondents are directed to arrange an individualized
bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) for Petitioner within five (5) days of the entry of this Order.
Respondents shall not deny Petitioner bond or parole on the basis that § 1225(b) requires
detention. However, the Court makes no determination whether or when § 1231 will apply to
Petitioner’s detention. The parties are ordered to file a status report within seven (7) days of the
entry of this Order. The Court will enter a separate judgment.2
2 The Court need not delay entry of judgment to wait for Respondents to comply with the Court’s
order. The Court “always retains jurisdiction to enforce its lawful judgments, including habeas
judgments.” Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010); Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690,
693 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that district court has authority to enforce its habeas judgment).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) is hereby
GRANTED for reasons described in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall provide Petitioner an individualized
bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to § 1226(a), as opposed to § 1225(b), within
five (5) days of the entry of this Order. Petitioner shall not be denied bond or parole on the
basis of § 1225.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the parties are directed to file a joint status report within
seven (7) days of the entry of this Order.
_____/S/____________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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