Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
TANLEE CHANTE GRANT-DAVIS,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 2:26-cv-00054-MIS-LF
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, in her official
capacity 	as 	Field 	Office 	Director 	for
Enforcement and Removal Operations, El
Paso Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TODD 	M. LYONS, in his
official 	capacity 	as 	Senior 	Official
Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S.
Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement;
SECRETARY, 	Department 	of 	Homeland
Security; PAMELA BONDI, in her official
capacity as Attorney General of the United
States; 	and 	WARDEN, 	Otero 	County
Processing Center,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING
PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS 	MATTER 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Petitioner 	Tanlee 	Chante 	Grant-Davis’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), ECF No. 1, filed January, 12, 2026.
On January 13, 2026, the Court issued an Order Directing Service and Order to Show Cause
(“Order”), ECF No. 3. On February 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order or Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 14. On February 24, 2026, Respondents Mary De Anda-
Ybarra, Todd M. Lyons, Kristi Noem, and Pamela Bondi (“Federal Respondents”) 1 filed a Motion
1 	Respondent Warden of the Otero County Processing Center appeared but did not file a response in
this case. Instead, she filed a Notice of Joinder in Federal Respondents’ forthcoming claims and defenses. ECF No. 7.
It has become standard practice in habeas cases for the warden of the relevant detention center to either appear and
adopt the federal respondents’ arguments, see, e.g., Intriago-Sedgwick v. Noem, Case No. 1:25-cv-01065-MIS-LF,
Notice of Joinder In USA Respondents’ Forthcoming Claims and Defenses, ECF No. 11 (D.N.M. Dec. 3, 2025), or
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to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (“Motion”). ECF No. 20. Petitioner filed a reply on February
25, 2026 (“Reply”). ECF No. 21.2 Upon review of the Parties’ submissions, the record, and the
relevant law, the Court will GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
I. 	Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Jamaica who lawfully entered the United States on a J-1 visa on
May 8, 2022. Pet. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. Petitioner overstayed her J-1 visa. Id. ¶ 72.
In February 2023, Petitioner met Kayshawn Davis, a United States citizen, at an
amusement park in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Notice of Decision on Form I-130, Petition for
Alien Relative, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, June 13, 2025, ECF No. 1-2 at 9
[hereinafter Notice of Decision]. On May 21, 2024, Petitioner married Mr. Davis. Decl. of Tanlee
Chante Grant-Davis ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-2 at 4 [hereinafter Grant-Davis Decl.].
In January 2025, Mr. Davis filed a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on behalf of Petitioner. See Receipt of Form I-
130, Petition for Alien Relative, ECF No. 1-2 at 34; Grant-Davis Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 1-2. On June
12, 2025, Petitioner and Mr. Davis appeared for their interviews with USCIS. Grant-Davis Decl.
¶ 12, ECF No. 1-2. The same day, USCIS denied the Petition for Alien Relative, id., and Petitioner
was detained by United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), id. ¶¶ 1, 14.
Petitioner has been detained since. Id. ¶¶ 1, 17.
not appear at all, see Francisco v. Dedos, Case No. 1:25-cv-01229-MIS-GJF, Proposed Findings and Recommended
Disposition at 8, ECF No. 53 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026).
2 	Petitioner also filed a supplement to her reply but offers no federal or local rules permitting such a
supplement be filed. See generally ECF No. 22.
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In its Notice of Decision, USCIS explained that it denied Mr. Davis’s Petition for Alien
Relative because he failed to meet his “evidentiary burden in establishing the legal validity and
bona fides of the claimed relationship and [found] that [Mr. Davis] and [Petitioner] entered into a
fraudulent marriage for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit.” ECF No. 1-2 at 9. In
support, USCIS stated that Mr. Davis admitted under oath that he married Petitioner “because she
offered to pay [him] $10,000.00 of which $5,000.00 was paid to [him]” and that Petitioner stated
under oath “that she offered [Mr. Davis] $10,000.00 of which $5,000.00 was paid to [Mr. Davis]
in order to help [Mr. Davis] purchase a vehicle.” Id. at 8. The Notice of Decision further recounts
several discrepancies in their testimony. Id. at 9-10.
Petitioner has requested, and has been granted, three custody redeterminations before an
Immigration Judge. See Orders of the Immigration Judges, ECF No. 1-2 at 22-27. On July 7, 2025,
an Immigration Judge denied relief on the following grounds: “Flight Risk: No form of relief;
current relief was a fraudulent marriage by admission of the respondent.” Id. at 22. On August 5,
2025, an Immigration Judge denied relief on the following grounds: “no material changes. Flight
risk Respondent is an overstay and admitted to engaging in marital fraud so to gain immigration
benefits.” Id. at 24. Most recently, on December 8, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied relief on
the following grounds: “no change in material circumstances and it still clear that respondent
engaged in immigration fraud in her marriage to a USC.” Id. at 26. Petitioner has an appeal pending
before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Pet. ¶ 23, ECF No. 1.
On January 12, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief seeking release from detention. Id. The crux of
her argument is that the Immigration Judges presiding over her custody redetermination
proceedings did not properly consider new evidence Petitioner and Mr. Davis provided regarding
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the bona fides of their marriage which evidence, allegedly, establishes that she is not a flight risk.
See id. ¶¶ 19-37.
On February 24, 2026, the Federal Respondents filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 20, to which Petition filed a Reply on February 25,
2026, ECF No. 21.
II. Discussion
Petitioner may bring a habeas claim to the district court since she is in custody. See Galaviz-
Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 491-92 (10th Cir. 1994); Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1052 (10th
Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). She must still, however,
meet other habeas requirements like administrative exhaustion. See Galaviz-Medina, 27 F.3d at
492.
Petitioner argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to justify bond denial
based on her status as a flight risk, therefore her continued detention beyond six months violates
due process and she is entitled to release on bond during the pendency of her immigration
proceedings. Pet. ¶¶ 38, 53, 60, 85, ECF No. 1. Respondents argue (i) venue and subject matter
jurisdiction are improper as to Petitioner’s claim of error in “application of the evidence to the
legal standard” by the immigration judge (IJ), (ii) Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative
remedies as required, and (iii) 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) bars review of discretionary IJ decisions. Mot.
at 1-3, ECF No. 20. Petitioner replies that (i) venue and subject matter jurisdiction are proper
because her claim is based partially on her prolonged detention, (ii) exhaustion is futile, and (iii)
case law affirms § 1226(e) is not a jurisdictional bar. Reply at 2-9, ECF No. 21.
Petitioner’s arguments fail. Her several bond hearings provided her sufficient due process,
she has not exhausted her administrative remedies prior to bringing a petition for habeas corpus—
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nor has she demonstrated exhaustion is futile, and § 1226(e) bars review of IJ discretionary
decisions. The Court denies her Petition for the reasons below.
A. Petitioner’s three bond hearings over the last nine months constitute due process.
First, Petitioner has not been subject to prolonged detention without due process. Petitioner
cites three cases purporting to establish that detention beyond six months is presumptively
unreasonable, Pet. ¶ 61, ECF No. 1, but fails to recognize that unlike her, the petitioners in all three
cases were held without a bond hearing, Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d
469, 470-71 (3d. Cir. 2015); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid
v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 491-92 (1st Cir. 2016). Petitioner has received at least three bond
hearings, the most recent of which was less than four months ago. ECF No. 20-1 at 1-6. An IJ
denied bond on all three occasions upon determining Petitioner is a flight risk based on engaging
in marital fraud. See id. Petitioner cannot claim a lack of due process based on prolonged detention
because she has received timely bond hearings.
B. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies is futile
and has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required prior to bringing a
habeas petition.
Second, Petitioner has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. In the Tenth Circuit,
“[t]he exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a prerequisite for § 2241 habeas relief,
although we recognize that the statute itself does not expressly contain such a requirement.” Garza
v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). There is a narrow exception if
the Petitioner “can demonstrate that exhaustion is futile.” Id. (citation omitted).
Petitioner brings this habeas Petition while appeal of her bond decision is pending before
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Pet. ¶ 62, ECF No. 1. She argues exhaustion is futile but
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offers only conclusory statements that “[t]he IJ has demonstrated a set intent to maintain the
Petitioner’s detention,” Pet. ¶ 76, ECF No. 1, and “the IJ’s persistent error and continuous reliance
on a document which reliability has been invalidated by DHS’s own FOIA records . . . only serve
to confirm futility in this matter,” Reply at 7, ECF No. 21. These statements belie her claim to a
“good faith effort[]” to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 8. The Court concurs with
Respondents that Petitioner has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
C. The Court lacks jurisdiction over discretionary bond denial decisions under § 1226.
(1) Section 1226(e) permits only constitutional challenges.
Finally, Petitioner cannot seek habeas relief based on discretionary bond denial decisions.
Petitioner is detained subject to § 1226. See Pet. ¶ 43, ECF No. 1. Section 1226(e) states: “the
Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be
subject to review.” This language permits courts to review the constitutionality of “legislation
authorizing [a petitioner’s] detention without bail.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)
(The “clear text [of § 1226(e)] does not bar respondent’s constitutional challenge . . . .”); see also
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (Observing that Ҥ 1226(e) does not preclude
‘challenges [to] the statutory framework that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.’”)
(alternations in original); Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2012); Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). But this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 1226(e) to
review discretionary judgments in bond hearings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295 (“As we have
previously explained, § 1226(e) precludes an alien from ‘challeng[ing] a ‘discretionary judgment’
by the Attorney General or a ‘decision’ that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention
or release.’”) (alteration in original); Mwangi, 465 F. App’x at 787 (“[T]o the extent [the petitioner]
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challenges the agency’s discretionary bond decision, the magistrate judge was correct that the court
lacked jurisdiction.”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of her bond hearing or the statutory
framework. Petitioner attempts to frame her argument as an attack on the constitutionality of her
detention. Pet. ¶¶ 86-87, ECF No. 1. But the Court finds her argument is properly understood as a
request to review the discretionary decision of the IJs—relief that is not available in habeas
proceedings under § 1226. Petitioner asks the Court to review whether the IJ properly weighed the
government’s evidence—specifically the I-130 denial decision—against the Petitioner’s evidence.
Id. ¶ 53 (“[T]he IJ has continuously relied on an allegation that the Petitioner admitted to marital
fraud relayed in a single contested document (the I-130 denial decision at Exhibit B) in order to
justify its denials of her custody redetermination requests, even after submission of substantial
evidence which demonstrated the unreliability of said document[’s] contents . . . .”); Id. ¶ 85 (“In
this case, the IJ’s flight risk determination has been grounded on faulty consideration of evidence
and improper application of binding legal standards, as discussed above. Consequently, neither
community protection nor flight risk applies to the Petitioner.”). That is a challenge to the
discretionary decision of the IJ, not a constitutional challenge.3
(2) Petitioner’s cases in support are inapplicable and unpersuasive.
Petitioner attempts to get around § 1226’s jurisdictional bar by arguing that whether she is
a flight risk is a mixed question of law and fact, permitting review under Wilkinson v. Garland’s
holding that “[t]he application of a statutory legal standard . . . to an established set of facts is a
quintessential mixed question of law and fact.” Reply at 8, ECF No. 21; 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024).
3 	Although Petitioner does contend that the immigration court violated “constitutional mandates” by
improperly disregarding “Board precedents” to resolve Petitioner’s removal proceedings, that claim does not impact
Petitioner’s detention. Pet. ¶¶ 56-58, ECF No 1.
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But Wilkinson does not apply here and Petitioner’s other case in support, Martinez v. Clark, 124
F.4th 775 (9th Cir. 2024), does not stand for what Petitioner claims and is unpersuasive.
(a) Wilkinson permitted review under different jurisdiction-stripping language and
flight risk is not a statutory legal standard.
Wilkinson permits review of a mixed question of law and fact under different jurisdiction-
stripping language than that at issue here. Wilkinson held that review of mixed questions of law
and fact is permissible because § 1252(a)(2)(D) allows review of “questions of law.” 601 U.S.
218-19. Therefore, an IJ decision applying facts to the statutory phrase “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D) is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact. Id.
at 221-22.
Conversely, § 1226(e) is not permissive, like § 1252(a)(2)(D), but restrictive. Section
1226(e) bars “review” of a “discretionary judgment.” Review under § 1226(e) is limited
constitutional challenges to statutory framework, not every question of law. See supra I.C.1.
Petitioner is subject to language that does not permit review of the IJ’s bond denial.
Furthermore, Wilkinson applies to statutory standards, not simply a list of factors. Petitioner
argues that IJs consider the factors from Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) to
determine flight risk, see Pet. ¶ 50, ECF No. 1, and that determining flight risk is a mixed question
of law and fact as in Wilkinson. Reply at 8, ECF No. 21. The Guerra factors, however, are not a
statutory legal standard—they were created by the BIA. 24 I&N Dec. at 40. In contrast,
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a statutory standard. 601 U.S. at 211-12. The BIA
uses BIA-created factors to make hardship determinations under the statutory standard, but
Wilkinson does not rest on the factors, it rests on the standard derived from the statutory phrase.
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See 601 U.S. at 222. Petitioner cites no statutory phrase; therefore, Wilkinson does not apply, and
a flight risk determination is not a quintessential mixed question of law and fact.
(b) Petitioner incorrectly cites Martinez to support her assertion that this Court has
jurisdiction over flight risk determinations and Martinez relies on unpersuasive
reasoning.
Petitioner also cites to Martinez, which holds that applying facts to the factors in Guerra
to determine dangerousness in bond hearings is a mixed question of law and fact which permits
habeas review. 124 F.4th at 779. Where Petitioner cites Martinez correctly, the Court finds it
unpersuasive because it relies on unexplained reasoning.
First, Petitioner incorrectly claims Martinez applies to flight risk. Reply at 8-9, ECF No.
21 (“[R]uling that district courts maintain jurisdiction to review questions of whether a person is a
flight risk or danger to the community in a court-ordered bond hearing.”). It does not. See Martinez,
124 F.4th at 782 (“So we must decide whether the BIA’s determination that [the petitioner] is a
‘danger to the community’ is a ‘discretionary judgment’ or a ‘question of law.’”).
Second, Martinez relies on unsupported reasoning to establish jurisdiction. To find
jurisdiction over questions of law under § 1226, so as to establish jurisdiction over mixed questions
of law and fact, Martinez cites to Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). 124 F.4th
at 781-82. Singh extended habeas jurisdiction under § 1226 to questions of law by holding the
language in Demore permitting jurisdiction over “constitutional challenge[s]” and “challenges [to]
the statutory framework” under § 1226(e), 538 U.S. at 517, is synonymous with “constitutional
claims or questions of law,” see 638 F.3d at 1202 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 516-17). This
extension is not justified and is unpersuasive.
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“Questions of law” is a broad category of which “constitutional challenges” and
“challenges to statutory frameworks” are subcategories. A “question of law,” per Black’s Law
Dictionary, could be (1) “An issue to be decided by the judge, concerning the application or
interpretation of the law,” (2) “A question that the law itself has authoritatively answered, so that
the court may not answer it as a matter of discretion,” (3) “An issue about what the law is on a
particular point; an issue in which parties argue about, and the court must decide, what the true
rule of law is,” or (4) “An issue that, although it may turn on a factual point, is reserved for the
court and excluded from the jury; an issue that is exclusively within the province of the judge and
not the jury.” Question of Law, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). For example, “questions
of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) encompasses the “application of a legal standard to undisputed or
established facts.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 227 (2020).4
Singh gives no justification for why constitutional challenges or challenges to statutory
frameworks are synonymous with questions of law rather than subcategories. See 638 F.3d at 1202.
Singh cannot have been interpreting based on the nature of the challenge in Demore because that
petitioner challenged the “constitutionality of § 1226(c) itself.” 538 U.S. at 514. And Singh was
based on a habeas petitioner alleging constitutional due process violations. 638 F.3d at 1201.
Singh’s expansive “questions of law” extension appears to have arrived out of thin air. Therefore,
the Court finds its use in Martinez unpersuasive, rendering unpersuasive Martinez’s establishment
of jurisdiction, based on the language in § 1226(e), over questions of law and mixed questions of
law and fact.
Nonetheless, having established jurisdiction over mixed questions of law and fact,
Martinez turned to Wilkinson. Even if § 1226(e) did permit review, Martinez extends Wilkinson
4 	This is the holding relied on by Wilkinson. 601 U.S. at 217.
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without justification. Martinez holds that, since applying facts to statutory standards is a mixed
question of law and fact, applying facts to any list of factors is a mixed question of law and fact.
This impermissibly disassociates a list of factors from a statutory standard, which is the threshold
requirement in Wilkinson. At best, Martinez equates a list of factors with a statutory standard but
fails to explain why they are equivalent.
Martinez 	holds 	that 	“Wilkinson 	compels 	the 	conclusion 	that 	application 	of 	the
‘dangerousness’ standard is a reviewable mixed question [of law and fact] . . . so long as federal
courts can ‘assess whether an IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts.’”
Id. at 783 (citing Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 221).
Wilkinson, however, held only that the mixed question depended on interpreting a
“statutory standard” like “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 601 U.S. at 221-22 (citing
Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U.S. at 234). Although the BIA uses factors to interpret the statutory
standard, it is the statutory phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” that is the
threshold requirement. See id. at 222. Whether or not BIA uses factors to interpret the statute is
immaterial. See id.; supra I.C.2.a.
But per Martinez, it is the list of factors that matter, not the statutory standard. See 124
F.4th at 783. Martinez states only that the dangerousness standard is based on “nine factors under
BIA precedent,” 124 F.4th at 783 (citing Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40). It does not state that
dangerousness is a statutory standard. See generally id. Martinez gives no reason why multifactor
lists do not have to rely on a statute, or why those lists are the same as a statutory standard, but
only offers that
‘dangerousness’ is not so different from the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship’ standard or the ‘good faith marriage’ standard. All provide multiple
factors for an IJ to consider before making the ultimate determination . . . [and they]
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provide no guidance on what combination of factors constitutes ‘exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship’ or a ‘good faith marriage.’
Id. at 783-84. Since each of the multifactor lists “grant an IJ broad discretion” they are all “mixed
questions of fact and law.” Id. at 784. Under Martinez’s reasoning, if the BIA created a list of
factors to interpret its own case law, its decision ceases to be discretionary and can be brought
under habeas jurisdiction. That cannot be the case.
Despite this, dangerousness might be a mixed question of law and fact under Wilkinson’s
reasoning because it is a statutory phrase, making the factors a statutory standard. Section §
1226(c)(4) permits the Attorney General to release aliens who “will not pose a danger to the safety
of other persons or of property.” (Emphasis added). But that is not the holding of Martinez and
furthermore relies on § 1226(e) permitting review of questions of law, not just constitutional
challenges and challenges to the statutory framework.
In contrast, “flight risk” does not appear in § 1226. See generally § 1226. It is an
interpretation of § 1226. Matter of R-A-V-P- 27 I&N Dec. 803, 804 (BIA 2020) (“An alien
requesting a redetermination of his or her custody status under section [§ 1226(a)] ‘must establish
to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge and the Board that he or she does not present a danger
to persons or property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.’”)
(citation omitted). Section 1226(c)(4) permits the Attorney General to release aliens “likely to
appear for any scheduled proceeding,” which is somewhat analogous to “flight risk.” But even
assuming that language is close enough to “flight risk” to make the latter a statutory phrase, and
the factors a statutory standard, applying Wilkinson still requires § 1226(e) permit review of
questions of law other than constitutional challenges and challenges to the statutory framework.
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D. Assuming Petitioner is correct that “flight risk” is a mixed question of law and fact
and exhaustion of administration remedies is futile, the IJ reasonably denied
Petitioner’s bond based on flight risk.
Assuming arguendo that Petitioner is correct that whether she is a flight risk is a reviewable
mixed question of law and fact, and exhaustion is futile, the Court finds the IJ did not abuse his
discretion in denying bond. The Court assumes proper review of bond denial is abuse of discretion.
See Martinez, 124 F.4th at 785.
Petitioner claims IJs must consider four factors in determining whether a detainee is a flight
risk: (1) whether the detainee has a fixed address in the U.S.; (2) the length of the detainee’s
residence in the U.S.; (3) the detainee’s family ties in the U.S.; and (4) the detainee’s manner of
entry into the U.S. Pet. ¶ 50, ECF No. 1 (citing Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40). That is not correct.
Guerra lists nine factors to which “Immigration Judges may look . . . in determining whether an
alien merits release from bond, as well as the amount of bond that is appropriate.” 24 I&N Dec. at
40 (listing: “(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length of
residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family ties in the United States, and whether they
may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the alien’s
employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record,
including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness
of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to
flee prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of entry to the
United States.”). Petitioner appears to confuse Guerra with Matter of Dobrotvorskii, which
considers factors (1), (2), (3), and (9) in finding DHS met its burden to establish the alien was a
flight risk, 29 I&N Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 2025). See Pet. ¶ 50, ECF No. 1. But the Court will proceed
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with Petitioner’s four factors, noting that factor (3) is not simply her family ties but whether those
ties “may entitle [Petitioner] to reside permanently in the United States in the future.” Id.; Matter
of Dobrotvorskii, 29 I&N Dec. at 212.
Reviewing the four factors: (1) Petitioner appears to have a fixed address, though it is
contested whether it is shared with Mr. Davis in El Paso or not, see Notice of Decision at 10, ECF
No. 1-2; Pet. ¶ 36, ECF No. 1; (2) Petitioner resided in the U.S. for thirty-seven months prior to
her detention, Pet. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1; (3) Petitioner’s only family tie to the United States entitling
her to remain is the contested marriage to Mr. Davis, see Notice of Decision at 10, ECF No. 1-2
(noting a marriage to Mr. Davis would help both Petitioner and Petitioner’s daughter obtain an
immigration benefit); and (4) Petitioner entered into the U.S. on a J-1 visa, which she subsequently
overstayed, Pet. ¶¶ 14, 17, ECF No. 1.
Furthermore, the IJ weighed the I-130 denial letter against Petitioner’s evidence. Pet. ¶ 53,
ECF No. 1. The denial letter stated that at the I-130 interviews on June 12, 2025: (i) Mr. Davis
stated he married Petitioner “because she offered to pay [him] $10,000.00 of which $5,000.00 was
paid;” (ii) Petitioner “admitted under oath, to only having married [Mr. Davis] for the purpose of
getting a green card;” (iii) Petitioner and Mr. Davis’s accounts of their meeting, relationship, and
even their dinner together the night prior contained “many inconsistencies;” and (iv) Petitioner
“admitted to having a return flight because she is not living [in El Paso with Mr. Davis].” Notice
of Decision at 8-10, ECF 1-2. Petitioner provided as evidence an affidavit by Mr. Davis contesting
his admission, Decl. of Kayshawn Marken Davis at 29-31, ECF No. 1-2, an affidavit by Petitioner
denying her admission, Grant-Davis Decl. at 4-6, ECF No. 1-2, a partially redacted transcript of
one interview of Petitioner on June 12, 2025, which does not contain an admission of marital fraud,
R. of Sworn Statement at 39-51, ECF No. 1-2, and “new evidence” including “proof of her
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continued residence at her marital address in El Paso, TX” and “substantial joint documentation
confirming the good faith of the marriage from inception,” Pet. ¶ 36, ECF No. 1. Petitioner claims
the IJ failed to place any burden on the government to prove she is a flight risk, but Petitioner
provides no support. Reply at 5, ECF No. 21.
The IJs denied Petitioner’s bond because they found “current relief was a fraudulent
marriage by admission of [Petitioner],” “[Petitioner] is an overstay and admitted to engaging in
marital fraud so to gain immigration benefits,” and “it is still clear that [Petitioner] engaged in
immigration fraud in her marriage to a [U.S. citizen].” ECF No. 20-1 at 1-6.
Considering the evidence before the IJ and the four factors above, the Court finds the IJs
did not abuse their discretion in finding Petitioner a flight risk based on fraudulent marriage.
E. Conclusion
In sum, Petitioner has received due process, has not exhausted her administrative remedies,
and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary decisions made in her bond hearings.
The proper course for Petitioner to contest the IJs’ weighing of evidence is an appeal to the BIA.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.38. Petitioner has an appeal pending. Pet. ¶ 62, ECF No. 1. And, even if the Court
could review the IJs’ discretionary decisions, the IJs did not abuse their discretion in denying bond.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that,
1. 	Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED consistent with this order; and
2. 	Petitioner’s Petitioner for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction or alternatively DENIED on the merits.
………………………………………….
MARGARET STRICKLAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:26-cv-00054-MIS-LF Document 26 Filed 03/23/26 Page 15 of 15