Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
JAVIER GREGORIO BRICENO ANDRADE,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 2:25-cv-01240 KWR-JHR
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, El Paso Field Office Director,
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
DORA CASTRO, Warden, Otero County Processing Center,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Javier Gregorio Briceno Andrade’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.1), Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Disclosure and
Preserve Jurisdiction (“Emergency Motion”) (Doc. 13) and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 14). This matter turns on whether Petitioner’s claims are
mooted by his removal and whether Petitioner demonstrates that a mootness exception applies.
Petitioner only challenges his detention and seeks release, and he never sought to amend his
Petition to challenge his removal process. Due to his removal, the Petition is moot unless Petitioner
can demonstrate that a mootness exception applies. Since Petitioner fails to demonstrate that an
exception applies, the Court finds that the Petition is moot.
Having reviewed the parties’ pleadings, exhibits, and the relevant law, the Court finds that
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is well-taken, and therefore, is GRANTED.
Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) and Emergency Motion (Doc. 13) are DISMISSED as moot.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States on September 16, 2022. Doc.
1 ¶¶ 1, 4 (Pet.); Doc. 1-2 at 11 (Exs.). Upon entering the United States, Petitioner was processed
for expedited removal. Doc. 14-1 ¶ 5. He passed a credible fear interview on October 10, 2022,
and was released from custody on parole. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4, 27; Doc. 1-2 at 16–27.
Following an arrest and guilty plea to three misdemeanor charges in 2023, Respondents
detained Petitioner. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 28–30; Doc. 1-2 at 53–54. On April 1, 2024, an immigration judge
issued a removal order against Petitioner and simultaneously issued an order withholding removal
to Venezuela. Doc. 1 ¶ 31; Doc. 1-2 at 2–6. He was then released on an order of supervision. Doc.
1 ¶ 32; Doc. 1-2 at 7–9.
On September 18, 2025, Petitioner was arrested on allegations of damaging a vehicle. Doc.
1 ¶ 36; Doc. 1-2 at 29–31. Petitioner was never charged, but he was transferred directly into
Respondents’ custody. Doc. 1 ¶ 39; Doc. 1-2 at 29–31. On February 13, 2026, Respondents
removed Petitioner to Mexico. Doc. 14-1 ¶ 23 (Ortez Decl.).
On February 18, 2026, Petitioner filed his Emergency Motion (Doc. 13), and Respondents
filed their Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 14) claiming that this
matter is now moot. The Court ordered briefing about whether the Court possesses the authority
to provide Petitioner the relief he requests in his Emergency Motion and whether the matter is
moot. Doc. 15 at 1 (Order Revoking Reference and Order for Briefing). Petitioner filed his
opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2026. Doc. 16 (Pet’r’s Mem. Resp.
Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss).
LEGAL STANDARD
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The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who
demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). 	“Challenges 	to 	immigration 	detention 	are 	properly 	brought 	directly 	through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
DISCUSSION
The outcome of this Petition turns on whether his removal moots the issue of his allegedly
unlawful detention. Respondents argue that the Petition is moot. Doc. 14 at 2. Petitioner argues
that the Court retains jurisdiction and that the matter is not moot. Doc. 16 at 2. In his Petition,
Petitioner challenges and seeks relief from his detention, not his removal order or removal process.
Doc. 1 ¶ 1. Petitioner never sought to amend his Petition, and thus, any claim beyond his allegedly
unlawful detention is not properly before the Court. Petitioner has been released due to his
removal. Therefore, there is not a live case or controversy before the Court, and the matter is moot.
I. 	Petitioner’s removal moots the matter.
Petitioner argues that the Petition is not moot because the Court can still provide
meaningful relief. Id. at 6. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s challenge to his detention is mooted
by his removal to Mexico. Doc. 14 at 2. Since Petitioner seeks relief from his detention—not his
allegedly unlawful removal—and he has been released by his removal, the Court finds that the
Petition is moot.
Section 2241(c)(1) provides that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless [he] is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
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§ 2241(c)(1). A petitioner’s release “does not automatically moot” his petition. Riley v. INS, 310
F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). Once a petitioner
is released from custody, the inquiry becomes whether he meets an exception to the mootness
doctrine. Id. A petition is not moot if: (1) secondary or collateral injuries survive after the petitioner
is released; (2) after release, the detention is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading
review; (3) the respondent voluntarily ceases the allegedly illegal practice but may resume it at
any time; or (4) the action is properly certified as a class action. Id. at 1257 (citations omitted).
Here, Respondents removed Petitioner to Mexico, and he is no longer in custody. Doc. 14
at 2. Throughout his Petition, Petitioner only challenges his detention. Doc. 1 ¶ 1. Upon being
removed to Mexico, Petitioner is no longer in custody experiencing the effects of his allegedly
unlawful detention. See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[Petitioner’s]
challenge to the legality of his detention without an opportunity for bond or a bond hearing is moot.
[His] administrative removal order has been executed, and thus, [he] is no longer in the custody of
the DHS to benefit from a bond determination or release.”). If this Court were to find Petitioner’s
detention unlawful and order release, the ruling would have no effect because Petitioner has
already been released from custody. This is the hallmark of mootness. See Kennecott Utah Cooper
Corp. v. Becker, 186 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the core mootness inquiry is
whether granting relief “will have some effect in the real world”).
Petitioner argues that removal under these circumstances does not eliminate the Court’s
authority to issue appropriate relief or determine whether Respondents’ actions complied with the
law. Doc. 16 at 7. Petitioner lists several cases that purportedly demonstrate this authority. Id. But
several of the cases he cites support the contrary finding that this matter is moot because he only
challenges his detention. See Xing Jian Yu v. Sessions, No. 6:17-cv-06699-MAT, 2019 WL
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4258892, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2019) (“Because the only relief sought by Yu and obtainable
from this Court was release from DHS custody, the Court finds that the Petition became moot upon
his removal from this country, which terminated his custodial detention.”); see also So v. Reno,
251 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Mr. So’s challenge to the lawfulness of the length
of time that he has been held in the physical custody of the INS is moot. Since Mr. So has already
been deported, it is impossible to grant his request for supervised release or release on bond or
supervision until he can be deported.”). A case Petitioner cites that found the matter not moot
challenged 	the 	final 	order 	of 	removal, 	not 	the 	detention.1 	See 	Gonzalez 	v. 	INS, 	No.
1:01-cv-06229-HB, 2002 WL 31444952, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002) (noting that petitioner
challenged his “final order of deportation,” not his detention).
Even if the Court were to consider Petitioner’s unlawful removal argument despite it not
being in the Petition, the case Petitioner cites in which the court denied dismissing the matter as
moot is inapposite. The respondents in that case violated a court order by removing the petitioner.
Reyes Vasquez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01146-JNP, 2026 WL 309631, at *1–2 (D. Utah Feb. 5, 2026)
(noting that the respondents had removed petitioner in violation of the court’s order, and
respondents acknowledged the violation and attempted to facilitate the return of the petitioner).
There is no comparable order in place here. Petitioner seems to suggest that the Court’s order that
the parties must “immediately alert the Court if any changes to Petitioner’s detention . . . would
affect the outcome of this habeas case” requires Respondents to notify the Court prior to any
removal. Doc. 16 at 7. Not so. The order does not require that notice be given prior to the removal
or transfer, just that notice be immediately given if any changes occurred that would affect the
1 Even if Petitioner did challenge his final order of removal, which he did not, “judicial review of
an order of removal” is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d
1266, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018).
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outcome of the case. See Doc. 9 at 3. Petitioner’s removal did not occur in violation of the Court’s
order, and thus, Reyes Vasquez is inapposite.
Petitioner argues that the Court can provide meaningful relief such as “judicial review of
the legal authority for [his] re-detention,” “compelling disclosure of all agreements and assurances
provided by the Mexican government,” and “ordering equitable remedies necessary to restore the
status quo ante if the challenged detention and removal are found to have been unlawful.” Doc. 16
at 6. His Petition seeks an order of “immediate release,” declaratory judgment about the lawfulness
of his detention, injunction from future arrests or detainment, attorney’s fees and costs, and further
relief that the Court deems proper. Doc. 1 at 17. Petitioner has been released by his removal to
Mexico. Doc. 14-1 ¶ 23. Judicial review of the legality of his past detention would constitute an
advisory opinion. See Vaupel v. Ortiz, 244 F. App’x 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
petitioner’s claims for declaratory relief were moot after removal and declining to “issue an
advisory opinion regarding the legality of [his] detention”). Compelling the disclosure of
agreements and assurances provided by the Mexican government would not affect Petitioner’s
status as a detainee because he is no longer detained. Ordering an equitable remedy to “restore the
status quo” would not make Petitioner any more released from Respondents’ custody than he
already is.
Although it appears that an equitable order to facilitate Petitioner’s return would have a
real world effect, Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful removal is not properly before the Court. The
Petitioner challenges his detention and seeks immediate release, which has been accomplished,
but Petitioner has not formally amended his Petition to challenge his allegedly unlawful removal.
Thus, the claim, and his request for related equitable relief, is not properly before the Court. See
Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1346 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to consider a claim against
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the United States not raised in the original complaint); see also Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302,
1319–20 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We do not review these claims because [Petitioner] failed to assert
them in his district court petition for habeas relief.”). As such, the Court will not consider
Petitioner’s new claim alleging unlawful removal. Accordingly, unless one of the exceptions
applies, the matter is moot.
Of the available exceptions to the mootness doctrine, Petitioner only raises collateral
consequences.2 The 	Court 	addresses 	whether 	there 	are 	sufficient 	collateral 	consequences
stemming from Petitioner’s detention that save this matter from mootness.
A. Collateral Consequences
Petitioner contends that the Petition is not moot since there are several collateral
consequences that remain despite his removal. Doc. 16 at 14. Petitioner points to issues concerning
his visa application and potential removal to Venezuela. Id. at 13–16. The Court finds that these
consequences do not flow from Petitioner’s detention, rather they are the consequences of his
removal which is an issue not properly before the Court.
The collateral consequences exception provides that a case is not moot “if there remains a
secondary or collateral injury despite the resolution” of a petitioner’s primary claim. See Kan. Jud.
2 The voluntary cessation exception does not apply. Even if Petitioner’s release is characterized as
“voluntary cessation,” Respondents would not be free to re-detain Petitioner as he has been
removed to Mexico. See Audubon of Kan., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 67 F.4th 1093, 1104 (10th
Cir. 2023) (noting that the voluntary cessation exception does not apply when the allegedly
wrongful behavior “is highly fact-and-context-specific, rather than conduct that is likely to ‘recur’
on similar facts and in the same context”). Further, this exception “traces to the principle that a
party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering
questionable behavior.” Suarez-Tejeda v. United States, 85 F. App’x 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1 (2001)). There is
no indication that Respondents removed Petitioner to evade judicial review as their policy to detain
Petitioner is in furtherance of their goal to remove him. Petitioner is not a member of a certified
class action which renders that exception inapplicable to this case.
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Rev. v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57
(1968)). Entirely speculative or hypothetical consequences, however, do not defeat mootness.
Schell v. OXY USA Inc., 814 F.3d 1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, a case is moot “if no
consequences can be foreseen or if foreseeable possible consequences seem remote.” Kan. Jud.
Rev., 562 F.3d at 1248.
Petitioner argues that had “Respondents not redetained him in violation of the law, and
thereafter removed him,” he would have been able to manage his visa process from within the
United States. Doc. 16 at 14. Petitioner improperly merges these events. If Petitioner was still
detained by Respondents, his visa process could be managed from within the United States.
Relatedly, Petitioner is concerned about his ability to prove that he “will be able to remain in the
area for the period required to process the application” as required by 22 C.F.R. § 42.61 (2026).
Doc. 16 at 14. Petitioner asserts that the “Administrative Agreement” from the Mexican
government was valid only until March 1, 2026, which makes it unlikely that he can remain in
Mexico for the entire time needed to complete the visa process. Id. This consequence does not
flow from his detention. Petitioner could have remained detained and satisfied the regulation. See
Ferry, 457 F.3d at 1132 (finding that a petitioner’s “inability to return to the United States is a
continuing injury that stems from his removal order, not his detention.”). Further, Petitioner’s
argument about his visa petition remains speculative as the entire argument hinges on the visa
petition’s approval which had not occurred before his removal. See Doc. 16 at 14. Not only is this
concern speculative, but it arises from his removal which is not an issue properly before the Court.3
3 The cases Petitioner points to are unavailing. See Fonge v. Comfort, 62 F. App’x 266, 268 (10th
Cir. 2003) (finding that a petitioner did not allege sufficient collateral consequences to save his
petition from mootness after deportation). None of the cases found collateral consequences arising
out of a petitioner’s detention, which is what the Petition here challenges. See Tapia Garcia v. INS,
237 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding sufficient collateral consequences that flowed from
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Similarly, the consequence that Mexico may remove Petitioner to Venezuela is not a
collateral consequence of his detention, which is the harm alleged in the Petition, see Doc. 1 ¶ 1;
rather, that is the consequence of his removal. See Ferry, 457 F.3d at 1132 (“[The] inability to
return to the United States is a continuing injury that stems from his removal order, not his
detention.”). Petitioner briefly argues that he also suffers concrete, redressable legal consequences
such 	as 	“statutory 	inadmissibility 	consequences, 	additional 	barriers 	to 	his 	family-based
immigration relief, and exposure to indirect refoulement.” Doc. 16 at 2. However, as Petitioner
asserts, these are legal consequences “flowing directly from his removal,” id., not from his
detention which is the harm he seeks relief from, Doc. 1 ¶ 2. The Court must avoid issuing an
advisory opinion on the legality of Petitioner’s detention because there are no collateral
consequences that save this matter from mootness. Both consequences flow from Petitioner’s
removal, not his detention. Accordingly, the collateral consequences exception does not prevent
mootness.4
a petitioner’s deportation and conviction, not detention); see also Mendoza v. Jeffers, 62 F. App’x
266, 268 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding sufficient collateral consequences that flowed from a conviction
and deportation, not detention); Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 385 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding
sufficient collateral consequences that stemmed from an order of removal, not detention).
4 The Court finds that Petitioner’s harm is not capable of repetition yet evading review. A case is
deemed capable of repetition yet evading review when (1) the action is too short in duration “to be
fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration,” and (2) there is a “‘reasonable expectation’ that the
same plaintiff ‘will be subject to the same action again.’” Audubon of Kan., Inc., 67 F.4th at 1104
(quoting Kingdomware Tech., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016)). This exception is
limited to “exceptional situations.” Id. Petitioner cannot meet the second prong. It is unlikely that
Petitioner will enter the United States and be detained again by Respondents. The Court cannot
find a “reasonable expectation” that Petitioner will be subject to allegedly unlawful detention
again. See Audubon of Kan., Inc., 67 F.4th at 1104 (declining to apply the exception when it was
“doubtful” that a new agreement would be made between the parties “with the same terms”).
Accordingly, the Court declines to apply the exception.
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II. 	Petitioner’s unlawful removal claim is not properly before the Court.
On February 18, 2026, Petitioner filed his Emergency Motion in which he requested that
the Court order Respondents to file a sworn declaration detailing Petitioner’s removal to Mexico,
disclose Petitioner’s “precise physical location and whether or not he is in foreign government
custody within 24 hours,” and document the terms and restrictions of any transfer to foreign
custody. Doc. 13 at 5. Further, Petitioner requested that the Court consider an order directing
Respondents to facilitate Petitioner’s return and possible sanctions for Respondents to comply with
the Court’s orders. Id. Given that Petitioner’s Emergency Motion seeks relief far beyond the relief
sought in his Petition, the Court directed Petitioner to provide further briefing, within fourteen
days of February 18, 2026, addressing the Court’s authority to address this requested relief. Doc.
15 at 1.
Petitioner’s Emergency Motion asserts new issues arising out of the allegedly unlawful
removal of Petitioner. The Emergency Motion seeks to preserve jurisdiction and other various
forms of relief, but it does not seek to amend the original Petition. See Doc. 13. Thus, any claim
concerning Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful removal is not properly before the Court and will not
be considered. See Parker, 394 F.3d at 1319–20 (“We do not review these claims because
[Petitioner] failed to assert them in his district court petition for habeas relief.”); see also Cone v.
Dowling, 809 F. App’x 523, 526 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2020) (declining to address a “claim [that] was not
in [a petitioner’s] original habeas petition”). The Petition before the Court concerns, and seeks
relief from, Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention. Petitioner is no longer detained. Thus, no
live controversy exists for this Court to adjudicate, and the Court is powerless “to give opinions
upon moot questions or declare principles of law” that cannot have a real world effect. Chihuahuan
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Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).5
Accordingly, the Court finds that the matter is moot.
CONCLUSION
Having found that Petitioner only challenged and sought release from detention, his
removal moots this matter. Petitioner does not seek to amend his Petition, and thus, any claims for
relief beyond his detention are not properly before the Court. Petitioner is no longer detained, and
the Court cannot effectuate any relief that would remedy his detention. Therefore, his removal
moots the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is
GRANTED for reasons described in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Petition is
dismissed without prejudice. The Court will enter a separate judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1) and Emergency Motion to
Compel (Doc. 13) are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot.
____/S/______________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5 Since there is no live controversy before the Court, Petitioner’s remaining due process and APA
claims are moot as well. Doc. 1 at 17. The controversy as to the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention
has been mooted by his removal.
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