USA v. Bryant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 2:21-cr-1045 RB
CHRISTOPHER HAROLD BRYANT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Christopher Harold Bryant’s Motion to
Amend/Correct PSR. (Doc. 52.) Bryant asks the Court to remove a paragraph from his final
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) describing an unprosecuted sexual‑assault allegation. He
asserts that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is relying on that information to classify him and to restrict
his access to programs and employment. The United States responds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to amend a PSR after sentencing and that any concerns about BOP classification must
be addressed through the administrative process. Having reviewed the motion, the parties’
submissions, and the relevant law, the Court concludes that no rule or statute authorizes the
post‑judgment relief Bryant seeks and will therefore DISMISS the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
I. 	Background
On October 15, 2020, the United States filed a three‑count Criminal Complaint charging
Bryant with: (1) possession of a firearm or ammunition by a prohibited person, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug‑trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (3) possession with intent to distribute 50 grams and more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). (Doc. 1 at 1.) The charged
conduct occurred on or about August 11, 2020, in Doña Ana County. (Id.)
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On January 12, 2021, Bryant notified the Court of his intent to plead guilty. (Doc. 18.) The
United States Probation Office (USPO) filed a PSR on June 11, 2021. (Doc. 21.)
On July 21, 2021, a grand jury returned a four‑count Indictment. (See Docs. 26–27.) Count
1 	charged 	Bryant 	with 	possession 	with 	intent 	to 	distribute 	50 	grams 	and 	more 	of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Doc. 26
at 1.) Count 2 charged Bryant with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug‑trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). (Id. at 1–2.) Counts 3 and 4
charged Bryant with felon‑in‑possession offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924.
(Id. at 2.)
On July 30, 2021, Bryant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. (See Doc. 29.) On
August 31, 2021, Bryant filed another notice of intent to plead guilty. (Doc. 32.) On September
21, 2021, Bryant entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to Counts 1, 3, and 4 of the
Indictment, with Count 2 to be dismissed at the time of sentencing. (See Docs. 38–39.)
On November 19, 2021, the USPO filed the final PSR. (Doc. 42.) Bryant filed neither
written objections to the PSR nor a motion to amend the PSR.
On May 4, 2022, the United States moved to dismiss Count 2 of the Indictment. (Doc. 47.)
That same day, the Court conducted the sentencing hearing. (Doc. 48.) On May 5, 2022, the Court
entered Judgment, sentencing Bryant to 120 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 3, and 4,
to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release. (See Doc. 49.) The Court also
entered an order dismissing Count 2. (Doc. 50.)
More than three years later, on December 9, 2025, Bryant filed a pro se motion requesting
that the Court amend the PSR to remove a paragraph describing an unprosecuted sexual‑assault
allegation. (Doc. 52.) Bryant asserts the BOP has relied on that paragraph in making classification
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and program‑eligibility decisions. (See id. at 1–2.) The United States filed its response on
December 30, 2025. (Doc. 55.)
II. 	Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and “possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994) (citations omitted). Once a district court imposes sentence, its authority to revisit
sentencing‑related matters becomes “very limited.” United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 290
(10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). A court may modify or correct a presentence report after
sentencing only if a statute or rule expressly grants jurisdiction to do so. See id. (citation omitted);
see also United States v. Fykes, 733 F. App’x 950, 952–53 (10th Cir. 2018).
III. 	Discussion
The Court may only act pursuant to some source of jurisdiction. Because no rule or statute
authorizes the post‑judgment relief Bryant seeks, the Court lacks jurisdiction to amend the PSR
after sentencing. Bryant argues that the BOP is relying on a paragraph in the PSR to improperly
classify him and to restrict his access to programs and employment. (See Doc. 52.) The paragraph
recounts an unprosecuted 2012 sexual-assault allegation involving a former intimate partner. (See
Doc. 42 ¶ 78.)
The 	United 	States 	argues 	that 	the 	Court 	lacks 	jurisdiction 	to 	amend 	the 	PSR
post‑sentencing and that Bryant’s concerns must be addressed through the Bureau of Prisons’
administrative process. Bryant’s motion identifies no authority that would permit the court to grant
the requested relief, and the Court is also unable to identify any.
In light of the issue raised, the Court considers four potential sources of authority that might
allow amendment of a PSR after sentencing—Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32, 35, and 36,
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and 28 U.S.C. § 2255—and concludes that none provides a basis for the Court to amend the PSR
in this posture.
A. 	Rule 32
Rule 32 does not provide the Court with jurisdiction to amend a Presentence Investigation
Report after sentencing. Rule 32 establishes the procedures for parties to challenge and amend a
PSR. Rule 32(f) allows the parties to object to a PSR within 14 days of receipt, and Rule 32(i)(3)
requires the court to rule on any such objection. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f), (i)(3). The Tenth Circuit
has held that Rule 32 governs only pre‑sentencing objections and cannot be used to reopen a PSR
once judgment has been entered. Simply put, the rule’s mechanisms operate before sentence is
imposed. Once sentencing has occurred, Rule 32 “standing alone, cannot provide a district court
with jurisdiction to hear challenges to a presentence report . . . .” United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d
287, 290 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Engs, 884 F.2d 894, 896 (5th Cir. 1989))
(subsequent citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed this principle in United States v.
Fykes, explaining that a post‑sentencing motion to amend a PSR must be dismissed because Rule
32 does not authorize district courts to modify a PSR after judgment. See 733 F. App’x 950, 952–
53 (10th Cir. 2018).
Despite Bryant’s argument regarding the BOP’s reliance on a paragraph describing an
unprosecuted allegation to classify him and to restrict his access to programs and employment,
Rule 32 does not provide a mechanism to revisit factual content in a PSR years after sentencing.
This is true even where a defendant alleges adverse collateral consequences. The Tenth Circuit has
made clear that Rule 32’s procedures must be invoked “prior to the imposition of sentence . . . .”
Warner, 23 F.3d at 290 (citations omitted). The record reflects that Bryant filed no objections to
the PSR before sentencing.
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Nor does Rule 32 contain any language authorizing post‑judgment amendment based on
later‑arising concerns about BOP classification or programming decisions. Courts within and
outside this circuit apply the same rule. See, e.g., United States v. Gill, No. 2:15-cr-0519, 2020
WL 3791908, at *1–2 (D. Utah July 7, 2020) (dismissing post‑sentencing request to delete PSR
information affecting BOP classification because Rule 32 affords no jurisdiction after sentencing);
United States v. Cervantes, No. 2:01-cr-1309 LH, 2011 WL 13285435, at *2 (D.N.M. June 10,
2011) (same). These decisions reflect the view that Rule 32 is a sentencing‑stage rule, not a
post‑judgment rule for altering PSR content. In short, Rule 32 does not provide a basis for
jurisdiction to amend the PSR post-judgment.
B. 	Rule 35 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Neither Rule 35 nor § 2255 authorizes the Court to amend a PSR after sentencing, because
both provisions apply only to challenges to a sentence itself and do not permit post‑judgment
alteration of factual content in a PSR. Rule 35 permits a court to correct or reduce a sentence under
narrow circumstances. Subsection (a) permits a court to correct a sentence that resulted from
“arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days after sentencing, while subsection (b)
authorizes a sentence reduction based on substantial assistance, upon motion of the government
and generally within one year of sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), (b). The rule does not
authorize modification of a PSR, nor does it provide any mechanism for altering factual content in
the PSR after judgment has been entered.
Critically, Bryant does not seek correction of his sentence, and his motion was filed more
than three years after sentencing—well outside Rule 35’s time limits. The United States argues
that Rule 35 is inapplicable for these reasons, and the Court agrees. (See Doc. 55 at 3.) Courts
addressing similar motions uniformly hold that Rule 35 cannot be used to amend a PSR or to
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address 	collateral 	consequences 	arising 	from 	Bureau 	of 	Prisons 	classification 	decisions,
particularly where—as here—the motion is filed well outside Rule 35’s strict 14‑day jurisdictional
deadline. See, e.g., United States v. Horne, No. 2:18-cr-0022, 2019 WL 5103112, at *2–3 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 11, 2019); United States v. Gomez, No. 1:14-cr-10297 IT, 2020 WL 1930471, at *2–3 (D.
Mass. Apr. 21, 2020) (Rule 35 cannot be used to revise a PSR more than 14 days after sentencing,
even where defendant alleges adverse BOP consequences).
Section 2255 likewise provides no jurisdictional basis for the relief Bryant seeks because
it authorizes challenges only to the legality of a sentence, not to factual content in a PSR or to BOP
classification decisions. See United States v. Ballard, 512 F. App’x 152, 153 (3d Cir. 2013). In
Ballard, the Third Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction under § 2255 where
defendant sought only amendment of PSR to address BOP classification consequences. See id. The
Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Leath, where the defendant sought
to correct allegedly erroneous PSR information because it affected his parole classification. See
711 F.2d 119, 120–21 (8th Cir. 1983).1 The court held that such a request “is a challenge to the
execution of the sentence rather than to the sentence itself,” and therefore falls outside § 2255. Id.
at 120 (citing United States v. Fraser, 688 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1982)). That reasoning applies
with equal force here: Bryant does not challenge the validity of his sentence; rather, he seeks to
remove information from the PSR to influence Bureau of Prisons classification and program
eligibility.
The Tenth Circuit has recognized a narrow category of § 2255 claims involving Rule
1 As in Leath, the Court also lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Bryant did not file his motion in the
district of his confinement. See Leath, 711 F.2d at 120. “The case law is clear—a prisoner must seek judicial review
of § 2241 claims in the district of his confinement[,]” which in this case is the Eastern District of Texas. See United
States v. Jaramillo, No. 1:21-cr-065 WJ, 2024 WL 1935903, at *1 (D.N.M. May 2, 2024) (citing Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004))
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32(c)(3)(D) errors2—where the sentencing court failed to attach written findings resolving PSR
objections—but that exception applies only when the alleged PSR error is connected to a
sentencing error, rather than to post‑sentencing prison conditions. See United States v. Brumley,
753 F. App’x 594, 598–99 (10th Cir. 2018) (discussing United States v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432
(10th Cir. 1988)). Bryant identifies no Rule 32(i)(3) violation, filed no objections to the PSR before
sentencing, and does not allege that the challenged paragraph affected his guideline calculations
or the sentence imposed.
Because Bryant does not challenge his sentence and identifies no sentencing‑related error,
neither Rule 35 nor § 2255 provides jurisdiction to amend the PSR. The Court therefore lacks
jurisdiction under either Rule 35 or § 2255 to amend the PSR.
C. 	Rule 36
Rule 36 also does not authorize the Court to amend Bryant’s PSR because the rule permits
correction only of clerical errors, not substantive changes to factual content. Rule 36 provides that
“[a]fter giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error
in a judgment, order, or other part of the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R. Crim.
P. 36.
Courts within the Tenth Circuit have already rejected attempts to use Rule 36 to amend a
PSR for purposes of influencing Bureau of Prisons decisions. In United States v. Cervantes, the
defendant sought to amend his PSR years after sentencing so that the BOP would admit him to a
drug treatment program. Cervantes, 2011 WL 13285435, at *1. The court held that Rule 36 did
not apply because the omission in the PSR was not a clerical error but the result of a strategic
2 Former Fed. R. Crim. P 32(c)(3)(D) was renumbered as Rule 32(c)(1) in the 1994 amendments, when Rule 32 was
substantially reorganized. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) advisory committee’s note (1994). The provision was
renumbered again in the 2002 amendment, and it now appears in Rule 32(i)(3). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3) advisory
committee’s note (2002).
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choice, and the court thus lacked jurisdiction to amend the report. See id. at *2 (citing United States
v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997)).
This approach is consistent with Tenth Circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly
held that Rule 36 is limited to correcting clerical mistakes and does not permit substantive changes
to a presentence report. See United States v. Hayden, 10 F. App’x 647, 650 (10th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Long, 419 F. App’x 845, 848 (10th Cir. 2011) (Rule 36 cannot be used to
challenge factual findings in a PSR).
Bryant does not identify any clerical mistake in the PSR. A clerical error under Rule 36 is
one that fails to accurately record what the court or a party actually said or intended. See Horne,
2019 WL 5103112, at *1 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 277 n.4, 277–78 (3d
Cir. 2005)). He instead seeks removal of a paragraph describing an unprosecuted allegation
because he believes the Bureau of Prisons is relying on it to classify him and to restrict his access
to programs. That request is substantive, not clerical. The United States argues that Rule 36 is
inapplicable for this reason, and the Court agrees. (See Doc. 55 at 4.) Courts routinely reject
attempts to use Rule 36 to revise PSR content for purposes of influencing BOP decisions. See, e.g.,
Horne, 2019 WL 5103112, at *1–2 (denying request to delete PSR information where defendant
argued the BOP was relying on it, because the request was substantive rather than clerical).
Accordingly, because Bryant seeks a substantive revision to the PSR that Rule 36 does not
permit, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested relief under this rule.
IV. 	Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction to amend Bryant’s PSR or to
grant any other relief requested in his motion. The motion must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Bryant’s Motion to Amend the Presentence Report
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is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
________________________________
ROBERT C. BRACK
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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