Marshall v. Taylor et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
______________________
VICTOR MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:26-cv-1883-KWR
ANNE TAYLOR, et al,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Docs. 31, 36) filed on July 7, 2026, and August 17, 2026. Having reviewed the parties’
briefs and applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are well taken and,
therefore, are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Victor Marshall, a New Mexico attorney, has a longstanding conflict with the New Mexico
Supreme Court (“NMSC”) stemming from his suspension from legal practice in 2022, the NMSC’s
contempt finding, and Marshall’s subsequent disbarment. During the NMSC’s various hearings
with Marshall, the NMSC applied certain standards of decorum, of discipline, and of evidence.
The NMSC issued two opinions explaining its conclusions in Marshall I and Marshall II. In re
Marshall, 528 P.3d 653 (N.M. 2023) (“Marshall I”); In re Marshall, 528 P.3d 670 (N.M. 2023)
(“Marshall II”). The NMSC agreed with the previous findings of the NMSC’s Disciplinary Board
(“Board”) that Marshall had violated multiple New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct by (1)
making statements with reckless disregard for their truth by impugning a judge’s integrity (Rule
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16-802(A)); (2) filing frivolous pleadings related to the judge (Rule 16-301); and (3) filing
groundless pleadings prejudicial to justice (Rule 16-804(D)). Marshall I, 528 P.3d at 666–67.
Three days later, the NMSC issued an additional order explaining why it found Marshall in
contempt. Marshall II, 528 P.3d at 672. The NMSC found that Marshall had failed to comply with
the standards applicable to suspended attorneys and remarked that his behavior “was incredibly
disruptive and lacked any sense of decorum.” Id. at 674, 676. The NMSC issued a fine against
Marshall. Id. at 676. After Marshall failed to comply with the contempt order, the NMSC
permanently disbarred him in July 2023. Marshall v. Bacon, No. 24–2076, 2025 WL 369436 at *2
(10th Cir. 2025).
Marshall brought a lawsuit in federal court against the then-Chief Justice of the NMSC,
and other New Mexico officials including members of the NMSC’s Disciplinary Board. Marshall
v. Bacon, 23–494, 2023 WL 7703946 (D.N.M. 2023). This previous lawsuit bears immense
similarity to the one now before this Court. Marshall primarily contended that the NMSC had
applied unconstitutional rules of conduct to him, which Marshall termed the “new censorship
rules.” Id. at *2. Among numerous constitutional claims, Marshall argued that the rules the NMSC
used violate the First Amendment and due process. Id. After the lawsuit was dismissed based on
the Eleventh Amendment and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court’s dismissal. Marshall v. Bacon, 24–2076, 2025 WL 369436 at *5, 7 (10th Cir. 2025).
Restyling his arguments, Marshall brings his current legal challenges to this Court alleging
twenty-four counts. Complaint, Doc. 1. Marshall no longer sues the NMSC. Complaint at 1.
Marshall focuses this lawsuit’s attention on members of the Disciplinary Board whom Marshall
contends applied unconstitutional rules against him prior to his disbarment. Id. at ¶ 1. Marshall
seeks protection from future harms from these rules that he suggests could fall upon either himself
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or other New Mexico attorneys. Id. Marshall brings numerous constitutional claims and New
Mexico state law claims. In contrast with the first federal lawsuit, Marshall adds Raul Torrez, the
Attorney General of New Mexico (“AG”), and Ryan Ellison, the First Assistant United States
Attorney for the District of New Mexico (“First AUSA”). Compl. at 1. Marshall argues that the
AG and First AUSA may have to apply the allegedly problematic NMSC rules in federal court.
Compl. ¶ 14. Marshall does not indicate that they have done so, nor does he detail any actions
taken by these individuals that have affected him. To resolve the Motions to Dismiss, the Court
will consider the Complaint as a whole since the separate claims seldom warrant an independent
explanation.
On June 10, 2026, Marshall filed his Complaint in this Court. Compl. The same day,
Marshall filed a Motion for Partial Declaratory Relief asking the Court to provide legal answers to
a variety of constitutional questions. Doc. 5. On July 7, 2026, the Disciplinary Board Defendants
(Anne Taylor, Joseph Gonzales, Jane Gagne, Christine Long, and David Stout) and Defendant AG
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim. Doc. 31. On August
17, 2026, Defendant First Assistant United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico Ryan
Ellison (“First AUSA”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim. Doc. 36. All the parties filed a variety of replies and responses. See,
e.g., Docs. 32, 33, 34, 39. On August 28, 2026, Marshall filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Doc. 37. Defendants filed responses to this Motion. Docs. 42, 44.
LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court is one of limited jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitution provides that this
Court may only hear “Cases” and “Controversies.” Const. Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 1. A case or
controversy exists only when a plaintiff establishes an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and
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actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). “Together, these elements help us
distinguish cases and controversies fit for judicial resolution from questions of public policy
reserved to the elected branches or abstract disputes better left to the debating hall.” First Choice
Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, 608 U.S. 174, 183 (2026). Article III “require[s]
that a case embody a genuine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby preventing the federal
courts from issuing advisory opinions.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58 (2020).
The Supreme Court “has long made clear that distress at or disagreement with the activities
of others is not a basis under Article III for a plaintiff to bring a federal lawsuit.” National Park
Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States, 609 U.S. ___, 2026 WL
2564318 at *2 (2026) (quoting FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 390 n.3
(2024)). “Causation requires showing ‘the injury was likely caused by the defendant.’” Diamond
Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency, 606 U.S. 100, 101 (2025) (quoting
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)). Injuries “result[ing] from the independent
action of some third party not before the court” are not redressable. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S.
43, 44 (2024) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 at 41–42
(1976)). “Where a standing theory rests on speculation about the decision of an independent third
party . . . , the plaintiff must show at the least ‘that third parties will likely react in predictable
ways” based on the Court’s remedy. California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 661 (2021) (quoting
Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019)). If the third parties are unlikely
to resolve the injury in response to the Court’s remedy, then it is not redressable. When a plaintiff
has not established standing, the Court dismisses the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Full Life Hospice, LLC v. Sebelius, 709 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Additionally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded
factual allegations from the complaint and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097–1098 (10th Cir. 2009). However, “the
four corners of the complaint” mark the boundaries of the allegations the Court uses to determine
the outcome of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir.
1994).
Pleadings must do more than provide “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“[A] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action” is not enough. Id. (citation modified). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified). The Court
“disregard[s] conclusory statements and look[s] only to whether the remaining[] factual allegations
plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Tavernaro v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 43 F.4th
1062, 1066–67 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th
Cir. 2012)).
DISCUSSION
The Court will do its best to fairly address the arguments Marshall raises even if the
arguments are, at times, unclear. To resolve these legal issues, it is not necessary or appropriate
for the Court to expound on the propriety or impropriety of Marshall’s disbarment. First, the Court
concludes that it does not have jurisdiction as Marshall lacks standing against both (1) the Board
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Defendants and (2) the remaining Defendants (the AG of New Mexico and the First AUSA for the
District of New Mexico). Second, the Court holds that Marshall has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Last, the Court finds that Rooker-Feldman bars its jurisdiction.
I. Marshall fails to establish Article III Standing
A. Marshall does not have standing to bring claims against the NMSC
Disciplinary Board Defendants
Marshall spends much of his briefing discussing issues he says face the New Mexico legal
community as a whole. Compl. ¶ 1. Marshall takes issue, among other things, with what he alleges
are the NMSC’s promotion of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (“DEI”) programs, support of
transgender identities, public statements made by the NMSC criticizing the President’s Executive
Orders, and alleged conspiracies between New Mexico politicians and Jeffrey Epstein. Id. ¶¶ 56,
153, 182, 202. Little is done to tie these political disagreements to specific actions taken by the
Disciplinary Board against Marshall. Purely political disagreements are often quintessential
examples of questions “of public policy reserved to the elected branches or abstract disputes better
left to the debating hall.” First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc., 608 U.S. at 183.
Marshall seems to primarily tailor his lawsuit towards prospective relief in challenging the
future use of New Mexico rules against himself or against other New Mexico attorneys. Compl.
¶ 1. However, the center of gravity of Marshall’s Complaint and his grievances seem to lie in his
past disbarment. He frequently references and critiques the past decisions by the NMSC that led
to his disbarment. The Court will address both of these possible types of claims and find the Court
lacks standing.
i. Marshall lacks standing to raise challenges to the Disciplinary Board’s actions
leading to his disbarment
Marshall indirectly raises many issues surrounding his disbarment. For thoroughness, the
Court will address Marshall’s lack of standing to bring claims challenging his disbarment. At their
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clearest, Marshall’s disputes revolve around the NMSC issuing rules that bind lawyers to adopt
practices Marshall views as in violation of the First Amendment among many other alleged
defects. Compl. ¶¶ 2–9. To establish standing, Marshall must show a “concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent [injury]; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). The standing issues with
this claim primarily pertain to causation and redressability as disbarment likely supplies a
cognizable injury.
First, looking to causation, the NMSC (not named as a Defendant) issues these rules and
finalizes attorney disbarments. The Disciplinary Board does not. Marshall v. Bacon, 2025 WL
369436 at *2 (“the NMSC issued an order permanently disbarring Marshall due to his failure to
purge himself of his contempt.”). Marshall seems to acknowledge this. Compl. ¶ 2 (“the NMSC
has systematically stripped these constitutional protections” through the “censorship rules”). The
Disciplinary Board performs advisory duties culminating in a recommendation of a course of
action to the NMSC. Marshall v. Bacon, 2025 WL 369436 at *1 (“[t]he NMSC explained that
substantial evidence supported the decision of a hearing committee of the NMSC’s Disciplinary
Board . . .”). The rules governing the NMSC and Disciplinary Board make this clear. While the
Board can investigate and the Board may recommend an action to the NMSC, the NMSC makes
final determinations. New Mexico Rules 17-102 (“Powers and duties” of the Board to
“investigate”); Rule 17-105 (Board can “recommend” “discipline involving suspension . . . [or]
disbarment”); Rule 17-201 (Board governs attorneys only). The rules suggest only the NMSC can
disbar a lawyer, not the Board. Rule 17-315(E) (the Board may “recommend” suspension or
disbarment, then must “prepare a written report” and send to the NMSC for approval or denial).
Therefore, the Disciplinary Board is an improper defendant for this grievance.
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Marshall contends the NMSC Disciplinary Board applied a variety of rules against him
that were unconstitutional. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 48. As the Disciplinary Board did not finalize
Marshall’s disbarment, even if the Disciplinary Board used unconstitutional rules or improperly
recommended his disbarment, this action is not sufficiently connected to Marshall’s disbarment to
be appropriate for standing purposes. The Disciplinary Board merely made recommendations, not
final decisions against Marshall. Rule 17-315(E). While the Disciplinary Board made findings that
Marshall committed violations, the NMSC not the Disciplinary Board disbarred him. Marshall v.
Bacon, 2025 WL 369436 at *1. “Causation requires showing ‘the injury was likely caused by the
defendant.’” Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency, 606 U.S.
100, 101 (2025) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)). To the extent
that Marshall’s professed injury is disbarment, the Board’s recommendation did not cause his
disbarment, the NMSC did.
Second, there is also a redressability problem. If the Court ordered the Board to reinstate
Marshall, this would not effectuate Marshall’s reinstatement. Only the NMSC’s action led to his
disbarment.1 Injuries “result[ing] from the independent action of some third party not before the
court” are not redressable. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 44 (2024) (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 at 41-42). “[T]he plaintiff must show at the least
that third parties will likely react in predictable ways” to invoke standing based on the prediction
of the third party’s response. California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 661 (2021) (quoting Department
of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019)) (quotation modified). Here, even if the Court
ordered the Board to alter their recommendation of disbarment, it seems that NMSC would not
1 The Tenth Circuit dealt with the Rooker Feldman issues, among other problems, with Marshall’s
previous lawsuit directed at the NMSC itself. Unfortunately for Marshall, pursuing only the Board
and not the NMSC does not provide the Court with standing, as discussed.
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reinstate Marshall. Under their rules, “[a] person who has been disbarred may not apply for
reinstatement.” Rule 17-214(A). Just as the NMSC can agree with the Board’s recommendation
of disbarment, so too can the NMSC deny the Board’s recommendation not to disbar an attorney.
Thus, Marshall’s alleged injury pertains to the NMSC’s action not the Disciplinary Board. This
injury is both not connected to the Board and not redressable by any order the Court could address
to the Board. In conclusion, Marshall has failed to establish standing over the Board Defendants.
ii. Marshall also lacks standing for claims seeking prospective relief against the
Board Defendants
Marshall also suggests that he is seeking prospective relief. Compl. ¶ 1. “In the First
Amendment context, two types of injuries may confer Article III standing to seek prospective
relief.” Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). A plaintiff may
have standing by alleging “an intention” to violate a statute plaintiff contends is in conflict with
the First Amendment and “there exists a credible threat of prosecution” for this violation. Id.
(citation modified). Relatedly, a plaintiff can show standing under the theory that a law chills
speech. To receive prospective relief based on the chilling theory, the plaintiff must show evidence
of participation in the prohibited category of speech, evidence of a future desire to engage in such
speech, and a “plausible claim” that they will not speak “because of a credible threat that the statute
will be enforced.” Rio Grande Foundation v. City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, 7 F.4th 956, 959 (10th
Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Marshall’s prospective relief claims fail to establish standing at the
outset.
In support of his professed future injury, Marshall writes that he “is facing the immediate
threat of incarceration and unlimited fines” and “both civil and criminal penalties for contempt,
with no ability to defend himself.” Compl. ¶ 30. Marshall then attaches court documents from a
pending and unrelated case in the New Mexico Second Judicial District Court. Doc. 2. (Ex-1) at
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3–6. In that case, Marshall was sanctioned for failing to respond to a New Mexico subpoena for a
deposition in a Florida State domestic relations case. Id. at 4,6. There is no clear connection
between that case and the present one. Marshall does not spend much time trying to draw a
connection.2 Additionally, Marshall is no longer a licensed attorney in New Mexico after his
disbarment. Professionals often have standing to challenge regulations for First Amendment issues
that they are subject to. Chiles v. Salazar, 607 U.S. 627, 637 (2026). While lawyers may have
standing to challenge rules governing their practices as violating, for example, the First
Amendment, non-lawyers often do not as they are not typically subject to the bar rules. See, e.g.,
Harrington v. Wilson, 242 Fed. App’x 514 at *1 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). Here,
Marshall does not adequately allege a future injury specific to him, a non-lawyer. A pending,
unrelated case is insufficient to show that the NMSC or other governmental body intends to
penalize him. Relatedly, the Board is a poor fit for a defendant for the same reason stated above,
namely that the NMSC is the body that imposes penalties. As Marshall is disbarred, he is not an
attorney subject to the complained-of rules. Therefore, it seems untenable to believe that Marshall
will be subject to future rule violations or that Marshall could speak in a way prohibited by the
rules. A lack of any future subjection to the rules defeats Marshall’s claim for prospective relief.
Marshall makes a further attempt to salvage standing on behalf of attorneys who may be
chilled by NMSC rules. Compl. ¶ 1. This is also unavailing. Most fundamentally, as discussed
above, the Board Defendants would also be improper defendants under a third-party standing
theory as these Defendants do not finalize license disbarments or propagate bar rules.
2 Marshall claims that the case is a “further enforcement of the unconstitutional rulings in”
Marshall I and Marshall II. Doc. 43 at 5. The Court does not see that this is so, and Marshall
provides no reasoning supporting this.
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The Court will briefly discuss other reasons why this attempt at third-party standing is
inadequate. Marshall does not show any “close relationship” with New Mexico attorneys that make
him the proper representative of their claim before this Court. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125,
130 (2004). As in Kowalski, Marshall shows “no relationship at all” with the third parties he would
like to use for standing. Id. at 131. Second, Marshall does not show a “hindrance” preventing third-
party attorneys from bringing their claims. Id. While Marshall contends that the NMSC could
apply the rules from Marshall I and Marshall II against another attorney, Marshall says almost
nothing to show that such a prosecution is imminent or at all likely.3 Thus, a supposed chilling
threat is unlikely. Compare Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1090
(10th Cir. 2006) (endorsing chilling theory when past actions and proposed future actions were
directly inhibited by a law interfering with speech) with Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1972)
(no standing based on chilling theory when government action was speculative and discretionary).
Similar to Laird, Marshall has shown no plausible reason to believe that a chilling effect exists or
that future parties face unconstitutional penalties. In conclusion, Marshall fails to establish
standing against the Board Defendants under any of his theories.
B. Marshall does not have standing to bring claims against Raul Torrez and Ryan
Ellison
Marshall says almost nothing about Raul Torrez and Ryan Ellison in his Complaint or other
briefing. In his Complaint, Marshall references Raul Torrez and Ryan Ellison by name once each.
He simply notes that they are defendants that he sues in their official capacities. Compl. at ¶ 24
3 Marshall relies on inapposite cases like Olivier and Wooley in which he insists that the Supreme
Court allowed lawsuits for prospective relief to proceed on First Amendment grounds even though
the plaintiff had been subjected to a conviction that may otherwise render the First Amendment
challenge not viable. Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, 607 U.S. 552 (2026); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). These cases do not alter the Court’s determinations regarding the
lack of third party standing.
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(“Defendant Raul Torrez is the Attorney General of New Mexico. He is sued in his official capacity
only.”); Compl. at ¶ 26 (“Defendant Ryan Ellison is First Assistant United States Attorney for the
District of New Mexico. He is sued in his official capacity only.”).
Read generously, Marshall envisions a scenario where the AG and First AUSA are forced
to use the NMSC’s “censorship rules” in federal court. Compl. ¶ 29. Marshall details the
supposedly drastic consequences. Marshall points to the Rules Enabling Act and the corresponding
McDade Amendment that, combined, flesh out the rule that federal prosecutors should typically
follow state ethics rules except when those rules violate the Constitution or would impede justice.
Doc. 43 at 1, 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2072; 28 U.S.C. § 530B. Marshall envisions a violation of these laws
and federal prosecutors who are compelled by the NMSC to use unconstitutional state ethics rules.
This is a hypothetical scenario. Marshall gives no examples or officials forced to comply
with these rules. Worse, it is an imaginary scenario that Marshall envisions happening to the AG,
not to himself. Even if this problem actually occurred, it would not affect Marshall, only
government officials who are subject to the McDade Amendment. Without an active controversy,
Marshall is writing to the Court to request a ruling for the future about what the law is regarding
the NMSC’s rules in federal court. He seems to ask that the Court inform the AG and First AUSA
that they may or should not use the “censorship rules” as these rules violate the Constitution.
Compl. ¶ 14.
Abstract legal questions are not properly before the Court. As Justice Jay wrote to President
Washington responding to his request for legal advice, “the [imp]ropriety of our extra-judicially
deciding the questions alluded to” is well established. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme
Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793).4 Marshall does not allege a sufficient injury
4 https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0263
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caused to him by either the AG or First AUSA. Marshall also does not allege that these Defendants
caused him an injury. For redressability on the personal injuries Marshall does allege like
disbarment, the AG or First AUSA also would have no power to force the NMSC to retract a
disbarment. Therefore, Marshall fails to establish any of the elements for standing against the AG
and the First AUSA.
Marshall’s suggestions to the contrary are not persuasive. Marshall primarily argues based
on United States v. Colorado Supreme Court where the Tenth Circuit found standing for
government attorneys who would be subject to potentially problematic state ethics rules. United
States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 1996). Notably, the state court had
shown a willingness to apply these ethics rules to federal attorneys and the federal attorneys
themselves expressed disapproval with the rules and claimed they interfered with their duties. Id.
at 1164. Here, Marshall has not shown the state court has the propensity to apply their ethics rules
to federal attorneys, the federal attorneys have not expressed an issue with the NMSC rules, and
Marshall, not the federal employees, is bringing the suit. Here, the federal attorneys are actually
Defendants and express disagreement with Marshall about these claims. Marshall’s contention is
that standing exists on behalf of chilled government attorneys who also happen to be Defendants.
This is not compelling.
In sum, Marshall has not demonstrated grounds for standing with respect to any of the
Defendants. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Marshall’s claim under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
jurisdiction.
II. Marshall fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
Alternatively, Defendants argue that Marshall has failed to state a claim and argue for
dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Docs. 31, 36. The Court agrees with Defendants. Similar to
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the standing analysis above, Marshall alleges many generalized grievances and legal conclusions
that NMSC rules are unconstitutional but does not provide sufficient factual allegations. Legal
conclusions are not enough to state a claim. Additionally, factual allegations must be something
that the Defendants did, listing generalized grievances with non-parties fails to state a claim. See,
e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 56, 153, 182, 202.
First, the vast majority of the Complaint is spent listing constitutional arguments as to why
various NMSC actions or rules are problematic. These legal conclusions are typically not attached
to specific actions that Marshall was harmed by. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 50–52. Legal conclusions
alleging unconstitutionality are insufficient to state a claim.
Second, Marshall does raise some specific allegations, but these are aimed at non-parties.
For example, Marshall takes with the NMSC’s “letter to the public” that “vow[s] to oppose the
Trump administration’s initiatives against DEI, gender identity, and trans ideology.” Compl. ¶ 56.
However, the NMSC is not a defendant.
To support his claims for prospective relief, Marshall’s Complaint alleges that he “is facing
the immediate threat of incarceration and unlimited fines.” Compl. at 6. This claim refers to a
proceeding in a state court for a seemingly unrelated contempt issue. Doc. 2. (Ex-1) at 3–6.
Marshall does essentially nothing to show how that state court case is related to his disbarment, to
any other content alleged in the Complaint, or to any of the Defendants here. Thus, Marshall fails
to adequately show future harm he faces as this legal action does not adequately allege a claim
against his named Defendants.
Marshall does mention specific actions of the Defendants in passing, but these minimal
acknowledgments do not state a claim. Marshall notes that “the Disciplinary Board can investigate,
warn, and sanction attorneys without creating a public record.” Compl. ¶ 55. The generality of
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this language, only asserting that attorneys could be improperly investigated, is far from enough.
Unsupported, general statements of possible actions do not state a claim.
In sum, Marshall’s Complaint fails to make specific factual allegations sufficient to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, in addition to the above-mentioned lack of standing, the
Court dismisses Marshall’s Complaint for failure to state a claim.
III. With respect to the Board Defendants, Marshall’s Complaint poses serious
Rooker-Feldman issues
While the above explanations sufficiently explain the standing and 12(b)(6) issues, Rooker-
Feldman provides an additional, and potent, reason. To the extent Marshall raises challenges to
his disbarment on his proceedings before the Board and the NMSC, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars his claims. In Marshall’s previous (and similar) federal lawsuit, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of his claims against Justice Bacon under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Marshall v. Bacon, 2025 WL 369436 at * 6. Rooker-Feldman “prevents federal courts .
. . from exercising jurisdiction over ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes,
II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 514 (10th Cir. 2023). The Tenth Circuit found that, despite his protestations
that the rules “affect[ed] all the lawyers in New Mexico,” Marshall’s challenge “require[d] a
determination that the NMSC’s [final] decisions were wrongfully entered.” Marshall v. Bacon,
2025 WL 369436 at * 6. Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that Rooker-Feldman barred these claims.
Marshall cannot evade this conclusion simply by naming different Defendants. While the
Board Defendants raise Rooker-Feldman this time, Marshall’s challenges to rules allegedly
affecting all lawyers in New Mexico hinge on contesting the NMSC’s final decisions in Marshall
I and Marshall II. Doc. 31 at 4. To the extent Marshall appears to raise challenges to collateral
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proceedings from Marshall I and Marshall II, “ongoing proceedings collateral to a [state supreme
court] decision that has become final do not affect application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine to that
decision.” Marshall v. Bacon, 2025 WL 369436 at *7 (citation modified). As the Tenth Circuit
explained in Marshall’s initial federal lawsuit, the identity of the defendant is not paramount to
Rooker-Feldman but whether a plaintiff’s lawsuit requires a determination that a state court’s final
decision was incorrect. Marshall v. Bacon, 2025 WL 369436 at * 6. Again, Marshall is making
challenges to the NMSC’s final decisions on behalf of himself and lawyers in New Mexico at
large. The Tenth Circuit considered this and found the supposed generality of his claims to all
lawyers did not affect the Rooker-Feldman analysis. When review of these sorts of claims is
permitted, the United States Supreme Court alone has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Marshall attempts to weave his way out of this problem by claiming that he faces future
disciplinary actions. Compl. ¶ 19. As discussed above, the future legal action that Marshall faces
appears to pertain to an entirely unrelated case involving a Florida domestic dispute. Doc. 2. (Ex-
1) at 3–6. Notably, if Marshall’s pending case was collateral to his disbarment proceedings
conducted by the NMSC, Rooker-Feldman would still be implicated. Denying the application of
NMSC rules in a collateral case to Marshall I and Marshall II would still require challenging the
state supreme court’s final decision. See Marshall v. Bacon, 2025 WL 369436 at * 6. Therefore,
Marshall’s suggestion of a future, collateral proceeding is unavailing. In sum, the Court finds that
the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit’s prior opinion on the Rooker-Feldman issue applies here.
Marshall’s Complaint is dismissed for lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and for the Rooker-
Feldman issues.
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IV. As the Court lacks jurisdiction, Marshall’s additional Motions for Partial
Declaratory Relief and Preliminary Injunction are moot
Marshall filed a Motion for Partial Declaratory Relief (Doc. 5) and a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 37). These Motions are predicated on Marshall’s Complaint. Motions
for “temporary, preliminary relief pending resolution of the underlying claims” are mooted when
the underlying claims are dismissed. Rose v. Utah State Bar, 444 Fed. App’x 298, 299 (10th Cir.
2011) (citing United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502, 1512 (10th Cir. 1988)); see
Baker v. Bray, 701 F.2d 119, 122 (10th Cir. 1983). As the Court dismisses Marshall’s Complaint,
both Motions for preliminary relief are, therefore, moot.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that it does not have standing, that Marshall fails to state a claim, and that
Rooker-Feldman bars many of Marshall’s claims. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Marshall’s
Complaint. The Court additionally holds that Marshall’s outstanding Motions (Docs. 5, 37) are
mooted by the Court’s dismissal of Marshall’s Complaint. Last, the Board Defendants’ and
Defendant Torrez’s Opposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer (Doc. 29) is mooted
by the dismissal of the Complaint.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 31, 36) are
GRANTED. Subsequently, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
______/S/_________________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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