Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
HECTOR GEOVANNY RIVERA MUNOZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 2. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record,
and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Hector Geovanny Rivera Munoz, a citizen of Ecuador, is currently in the custody
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Cibola County Correctional Center in
Milan, New Mexico. Doc. 2 ¶¶ 4, 5. Petitioner first entered the United States nearly 29 years ago
and has resided here continuously ever since. Id. ¶ 30. Since then, Petitioner has built a life, he
married a United States citizen and together they had two children. Petitioner’s spouse filed an
immediate-relative visa petition on his behalf.
On September 12, 2024, ICE arrested and detained Petitioner near Boston, Massachusetts.
Id. ¶ 33. Just under two weeks later, Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge as part of
his removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 34. The immigration judge issued a notice to appear, alleging that
Petitioner entered the United States without admission or parole. Id. Petitioner requested a bond
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the case caption shall be updated to reflect that Markwayne Mullin
is the Secretary of Homeland Security. All future filings should be in the name of the substituted party.
Case 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF Document 11 Filed 06/01/26 Page 1 of 6

2
hearing, which the immigration court denied it on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction. Id. Petitioner
has no criminal history and no known history of failure to comply with immigration requirements.
Id. ¶ 37. He now challenges his detention as a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 55.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). While he was detained in
El Paso, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition with the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas. See Rivera Munoz v. Noem et al., No. 3:25-CV-00571-LS (W.D. Tex., filed
Nov. 21, 2025). That case remains pending. Though the Texas petition was filed first, the Tenth
Circuit has explained that the first-to-file rule “is a ‘general rule’ and that the first court to acquire
jurisdiction may not be ideally suited to decide the merits.” Wakaya Perfection, LLC v. Youngevity
Int’l, Inc., 910 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2018). Petitioner is no longer held in the Western District of
Texas. This Court now has jurisdiction because this District is where Petitioner is confined and
where his immediate custodian is located. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004).
I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Case 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF Document 11 Filed 06/01/26 Page 2 of 6

3
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
Mass. 2025); see also, Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
Petitioner entered the United States nearly three decades ago, has lived here continuously since
then, and was detained in the U.S. interior. Doc. 2 ¶¶ 1–2. He is therefore not subject to the
mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, which apply to those seeking admission, specifically
noncitizens who present at a port of entry or are apprehended immediately after entering.
Petitioner is instead entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). See Requejo Roman v. Castro,
816 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1282 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, 811 F. Supp. 3d
1287, 1296 (D.N.M. 2025); Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835, 2025 WL 2676729,
at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031, 2025 WL
3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025); Ayala v. Moniz, et al, __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL
1031167, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2026); Wuilmer v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3236, 2026 WL 458457,
at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026); Villatoro v. Ripa, No. 2:26-CV-00213, 2026 WL 452432, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2026).
Case 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF Document 11 Filed 06/01/26 Page 3 of 6

4
II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights.
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018).
The United States’ power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and was deprived
of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
The Government has offered neither justification nor process for the deprivation of
Case 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF Document 11 Filed 06/01/26 Page 4 of 6

5
Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. While the Court recognizes that the length of residency does
not constitute legal authorization to remain in the country, the prevailing interpretation of Sections
1225 and 1226, both by this Court and a majority of courts nationwide, indicates that noncitizens
apprehended within the U.S. interior are entitled to certain constitutional procedural safeguards.
Petitioner has lived in the United States for 29 years. There is no evidence that he is a flight risk
nor a threat to the community. To the contrary, he has a every incentive to remain in the country
with his spouse and children. The Government does not dispute these facts. See Doc. 8 at 2. Yet,
despite this incontrovertible evidence, the Government has held Petitioner in custody for over eight
months. The Government has therefore violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights by keeping
him detained indefinitely without sufficient process or any proffered explanation for what purpose
detention serves. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981)
(“Detention pending deportation seems properly analogized to incarceration pending trial or other
disposition of a criminal charge, and is, thus, justifiable only as a necessary, temporary measure.”).
The Government also concedes that the material facts of this case are similar from those in
Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026).
See Doc. 8 at 2. Furthermore, the Government acknowledges that Martin Ramirez controls the
outcome here should the Court adhere to that precedent. See id. Because Respondents have
offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to
§ 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869; Cortez-Gonzalez, 811 F. Supp. 3d at 1296.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2) is GRANTED;
2) Petitioner’s Motion for Prompt Habeas Determination (Doc. 6) and Motion to
Case 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF Document 11 Filed 06/01/26 Page 5 of 6

6
Expedite Issuance of Order (Doc. 10) are DENIED as moot.
3) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 48 hours of this Order being entered;
4) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by providing all necessary identity and travel documents to return to his primary
address;
5) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
6) Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
7) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
8) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order and to entertain
any motions for attorneys’ fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-01287-SMD-GJF Document 11 Filed 06/01/26 Page 6 of 6