Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
SAMAT MENDIBAEV,
Petitioner,
v. 	1:25-cv-01308-DHU-GBW
TODD LYONS, JOEL GARCIA,
KRISTI NOEM, PAMELA BONDI,
and GEORGE DEDOS,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS PETITION
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Samat Mendibaev’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). Doc. 1. Petitioner alleges that he was unlawfully re-detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) after previously being paroled into the United
States to seek asylum, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Petition
asks the Court to order Petitioner’s immediate release. Having carefully considered the parties’
briefs, their oral arguments, and the relevant and applicable law, the Court finds that the Petition
should be GRANTED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Samat Mendibaev is a native and citizen of Kyrgyzstan who entered the United
States on August 16, 2023 with his spouse and two minor children to seek asylum. Doc. 1 at ¶ 20
(citing Ex. A). At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued him a Notice
to Appear (“NTA”) charging him with inadmissibility. Id. Petitioner and his family were paroled
into the United States to seek asylum, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Id. at ¶ 21 (citing Ex.
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C). During this time, Petitioner and his family developed deep ties with their community and,
consistent with the very purpose of their parole, pursued legal pathways to residency in this
country. Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Ex. D). On July 10, 2024, Petitioner filed an asylum application, which
remains pending. Id.
Petitioner’s parole was originally valid through August 15, 2025. Id. at ¶ 23; see also Ex.
C. However, according to Petitioner, it was terminated in April pursuant to a “nationwide, blanket
termination policy affecting noncitizens who entered at a land port of entry using the CBP One
application.” Id. On or about October 23, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner while he was working
as an Uber driver. Id. at ¶ 1. While Petitioner is detained, he remains separated from his two young
children and his wife, who are derivatives of his asylum application. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. In his absence,
the family faces significant financial hardship, as Petitioner’s wife has a disability due to a brain
tumor that prevents her from working. Id.
On December 28, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Petition
alleges that the government unlawfully re-detained Petitioner, after he was previously released on
parole and without showing a change in circumstances or another legal basis for re-detention. Id.
at ¶¶ 2-3. Petitioner argues this violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and asks that
this Court:
1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2) Order that Petitioner not be transferred outside the District of New Mexico or removed
from the United States during the pendency of this action;
3) Issue an order to show cause ordering Respondents to show cause why his Petition should
not be granted within three days;
4) Declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful;
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5) Issue a writ of habeas corpus and order Petitioner’s immediate release from ICE custody;
and
6) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.
Id. at 10-14.
On February 4, 2026, Respondents submitted their Response. In it, the Government asks
this Court to deny the Petition, as Petitioner is lawfully detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
Doc. 15 at 1, 7. Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner’s parole was revoked in April 2025. Id.
at 2. Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 140 (2020), Respondents argue that when parole ends, the noncitizen “shall forthwith
return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled” and “his case shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” Doc. 15 at 2.
Accordingly, the Government’s position is that Petitioner remains subject to mandatory detention.
Further, the Government asserts that as an “arriving alien,” Petitioner is not entitled to any
additional due process beyond that specifically prescribed by statute. Id. at 1, 7. Even if he was,
Respondents contend that the balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in favor of the Government
and does not support immediate release.
On February 5, 2026, the Court held a hearing on this matter. At the hearing, counsel for
Petitioner did not dispute that Petitioner is subject to § 1225, but she argued that Petitioner was
nevertheless denied the due process owed to him, via the regulations, because he was not given
proper notice of the revocation of his parole and it was not based on an individualized
determination. Counsel for the Government asserted that written notification did go out in April,
but even if this was not sufficient, when Petitioner was detained, the original term of his parole
had expired. As such, habeas relief is not warranted. In response, Petitioner’s counsel asserted that
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Petitioner developed a liberty interest in release and should have had an opportunity to be heard
on why parole should not be revoked. The Court took the parties’ arguments under advisement
and allowed a Reply brief from Petitioner.
Petitioner submitted his Reply on February 19, 2026. In the Reply, Petitioner argues that
because he has been living in the United States for an extended period, his rights are not limited in
the same way as other noncitizens actively “arriving” or “seeking admission,” and the authority
for his detention has shifted to § 1226. Doc. 17 at 2 (citing Walizada v. Trump, 2025 WL 3551972
(D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025); Hyppolite v. Noem, 808 F.Supp.3d 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2025)). Even assuming
Respondents can invoke § 1225(b), Petitioner argues that Thuraissigiam does not apply to limit
Petitioner’s due process rights because that case was limited to challenges to admission and
admissibility—not detention-related due process claims. Id. Petitioner therefore argues that he is
entitled to immediate release because he was re-detained without notice and an opportunity to be
heard on why he should not be re-detained. Id. at 14. Alternatively, Petitioner asks for a prompt
custody hearing consistent with § 1226(a) and procedural due process. Id. at 17.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Habeas relief is available when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause prohibits the Government from depriving any person of liberty without due process
of law. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001). The Due Process Clause’s protections extend to all persons
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in the United States, including noncitizens, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations outline the
appropriate procedures for the detention and removal of noncitizens without legal status in the
U.S. “Noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry documents . . . are
deemed ‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7).” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F.Supp.3d 1123,
1132 n.7 (D. Or. 2025). Once a noncitizen is deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must
order the noncitizen’s removal unless the noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or
fear of persecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the
noncitizen into expedited removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may
place the noncitizen into regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See id.
Two provisions of the INA govern the detention of noncitizens with pending removal
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. Section 1225 mandates detention of noncitizens subject
to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1) and certain “applicant[s] for admission” under §
1225(b)(2). “[I]n the case of [a noncitizen] who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen] shall be detained” for removal proceedings, absent
some extraordinary circumstances not applicable here. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
However, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), “applicants for admission may be temporarily
released [into the United States] on parole ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018). The decision to grant parole is
determined “on a case-by-case basis” and rests within the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland
Security. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then, “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
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Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the [noncitizen] shall forthwith return or be
returned to the custody from which he was paroled[.]” Id. Termination of parole under these
circumstances requires notice, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2), unless the noncitizen parolee departs from
the United States or the time for which parole was authorized expires, in which cases parole
automatically terminates without notice, § 212.5(e)(1).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner’s re-detention after the expiration of his parole was lawful.
Petitioner alleges that his parole was unlawfully revoked in April 2025 through a blanket
termination policy. Doc. 1 at ¶ 23. In addition to providing for parole, section 1182(d)(5)(A) states
that “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
have been served the [noncitizen] shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled[.]” This seemingly grants the executive branch broad discretion to determine when
the purposes of parole have been served and to revoke parole accordingly. However, Supreme
Court and Tenth Circuit precedent suggests parole decisions must be individualized, rendering a
blanket termination, sent out via mass email to thousands of parolees, invalid. See Jean v. Nelson,
472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985) (requiring individualized determinations as to parole under §
1182(d)(5)(A)); Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 515 (10th Cir. 1992) (same).
However, Petitioner was detained in October 2025. At that point, whether his parole was
lawfully terminated in April 2025 was irrelevant because his parole term expired in August 2025.
Section 1182’s implementing regulations clarify that parole automatically terminates without
written notice upon a noncitizen’s departure from the United States or at the expiration of the
time for which parole was authorized. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1) (emphasis added). And the Tenth
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Circuit has made clear that the Due Process Clause does not provide noncitizens in Petitioner’s
position a liberty interest in being released on parole. Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.
2001). As a result, the only process with respect to admission or parole to which these noncitizens
are entitled is that provided for in the statute and/or regulations. See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. at 140 (Noncitizens who have not “effected an entry” into the country have “only those rights
regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.”). Because the statute and regulations
require no notice or additional process for parolees whose parole term expires, Petitioner was not
entitled to any additional process before his parole could end.
B. Petitioner is an “arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1).
Petitioner entered the country at a port of entry and is therefore an “arriving alien” as
defined in the INA’s implementing regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. Before his parole, Petitioner was
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which states that noncitizens seeking
asylum who have passed a credible fear interview “shall be detained for further consideration of
the application for asylum” (emphasis added). The INA’s implementing regulations regarding
parole confirm that this same provision applies after Petitioner’s parole expires. When parole
expires or is terminated, the noncitizen “shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time
of parole.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. And 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 makes clear that parolees are “arriving aliens” and
remain so even after any such parole is terminated or revoked. At least one other court in this
district has found that a noncitizen detained by DHS upon revocation of his parole returned to his
previous status under § 1225 pending expedited removal. Valera-Marin v. Lyons, 2025 WL
3687978 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2025) (Gonzales, J.).
Petitioner cites some cases where courts found that a noncitizen who remains in the United
States after their parole expires or is terminated becomes subject to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. §
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1226. See Doc. 17 at 2 (citing Walizada v. Trump, 2025 WL 3551972 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025);
Hyppolite v. Noem, 808 F.Supp.3d 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2025)). But the Court in Walizada resolved the
case on constitutional grounds, declining to resolve the statutory question of whether a former
parolee can remain or revert to an “arriving alien.” 2025 WL 3551972, at *15. And in Hyppolite,
the Government’s own documentation on the date of the petitioner’s arrest stated that his detention
was authorized under § 1226(a), undermining any claim that that petitioner should be detained
under § 1225. 808 F.Supp.3d at 485. Further analysis undertaken by the Hyppolite court focuses
on § 1225(b)(2)(A), id. at 486-90, likely because the exact status of that petitioner’s parole was
unclear, see id. at 480 n.4. The Court finds the analysis in these cases insufficient to overcome the
plain language of the statute and regulations. The statutory language and case law makes clear that
after his parole ended, Petitioner once again became subject to this provision mandating his
detention.
C. The Due Process Clause applies to Petitioner and requires he be provided an
opportunity for release on bond.
1. The “entry fiction” limits Petitioner’s due process rights with respect to admission and
parole, not necessarily pre-removal detention.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
The Due Process Clause’s protections extend to all persons within the United States, including
noncitizens, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693
(emphasis added). However, under the “entry fiction,” noncitizens “who arrive at ports of entry—
even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are treated for due process
purposes as if stopped at the border.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139 (citation and internal
quotation omitted); accord Sierra, 258 F.3d at 1218. This is because such noncitizens cannot be
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said to have “effected an entry” into the country, so they have “only those rights regarding
admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140. In
Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court applied this principle to a noncitizen challenging his expedited
removal after he was detained just 25 yards over the border after entering without inspection. See
id.
The Tenth Circuit has also applied the entry fiction in the parole context, holding that
noncitizens possess no liberty interest in being released on parole and therefore limiting their due
process rights regarding parole to the procedures authorized by Congress. Sierra, 258 F.3d at 1218-
19. The facts in Sierra center around a Cuban citizen who was paroled into the United States, later
convicted of several crimes, ordered removed, and remained detained when Cuba would not accept
him back. Id. at 1216. After he was initially approved for parole, that approval was withdrawn after
an alleged fight while in prison. Id. He filed a habeas petition, arguing he was entitled to a hearing
on the withdrawal of his parole. Id. Applying the entry fiction and limiting his due process rights,
the Tenth Circuit dismissed his petition because “[n]either the statutes nor the governing
regulations require a hearing on parole withdrawal.” Id. at 1219.
Petitioner in this case has not “effected an entry” into the country, like the petitioner in
Thuraissigiam, and was instead paroled, like the petitioner in Sierra. Applied to Mr. Mendibaev,
the above-cited case law makes clear that Petitioner’s due process rights regarding his parole and
his admission into the country are limited to the procedures authorized by Congress in the relevant
statutes and regulations. However, the similarities stop there, and there are important distinctions
that limit the applicability of Thuraissigiam and Sierra. First, Petitioner does not challenge the
removal proceedings against him, nor does he argue he is entitled to be released on parole. Instead,
he argues that during his two years of living in the United States, he accrued a general liberty
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interest which entitles him to release, or at the very least, an opportunity to seek bond while his
removal proceedings are pending. Doc. 17 at 13-15. Some district courts grappling with similar
facts have more narrowly read Thuraissigiam as protecting Congress’s “sovereign prerogative”
over admission and exclusion and limiting noncitizens’ due process rights regarding admission,
not necessarily regarding pre-removal detention. See, e.g., Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F.Supp.3d 101,
110-11 (D. Mass. 2025); Walizada v. Trump, 2025 WL 3551972, at *16 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025).
Second, Petitioner was not arrested 25 yards from the border shortly after entering, like the
petitioner in Thuraissigiam, but rather was arrested in Chicago after living there freely with his
family for over two years. And unlike the petitioner in Sierra, Mr. Mendibaev has no criminal
history and has not been ordered removed. These factual distinctions are important. To apply the
entry fiction in this case “requires a much greater sleight of hand than is provided for in those prior
cases.” Rincon, 810 F.Supp.3d at 112; see also Tenamasa-Lema v. Hyde, 810 F.Supp.3d 244, 253
(D. Mass. 2025) (“[E]ven without disturbing the metaphysical ‘entry fiction’ that may obstruct, in
some senses, our ability to admit that a non-citizen is really ‘here,’ one can still constitutionally
recognize Petitioner’s actual life in this country—his years as part of our community—[is] not so
easily set aside.”). These facts further support distinguishing Thuraissigiam and Sierra and finding
that Petitioner’s due process rights with respect to his detention pending removal proceedings
flow not from the entry fiction but from his geographic presence inside the country.
It is true that detention during removal proceedings has been upheld as “a constitutionally
valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Nevertheless,
the Due Process Clause imposes limits even on mandatory immigration detention; it must “bear[]
a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed.” Id. at 527 (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). The petitioners in Demore challenged their detention under 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1226(c), which at the time, mandated detention for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies.
The purpose of detention, the Supreme Court found, was to ensure that noncitizens convicted of
crimes appeared for immigration hearings and did not remain at large in the United States
unlawfully. Id. at 528. No such justification applies to noncitizens like Mr. Mendibaev, who have
no criminal history whatsoever, have pending applications for affirmative immigration relief, and
possess significant ties within the United States. See Rincon, 810 F.Supp.3d at 113-14
(distinguishing Demore). Nor has the Government articulated how mandatory detention of
formerly paroled asylum seekers is reasonably related to ensuring appearance in immigration court
or any other immigration purpose. See Doc. 15. Accordingly, just like any other noncitizen present
within the United States, the Court finds that Mr. Mendibaev’s detention is limited by the demands
of the Due Process Clause.
2. Petitioner accrued a liberty interest in freedom from immigration detention.1
Having established that Petitioner is protected by the Due Process Clause for the purposes
of his detention, we now must determine the contours of that protection in this case. Courts analyze
procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure
any deprivations of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See Ky. Dep’t of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
The Supreme Court has said multiple times that individuals have a liberty interest in their
conditional release. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). And courts have answered
1 The Court recognizes that Petitioner has no liberty interest in release on parole. See Sierra, 258
F.3d at 1218. However, the Court distinguishes between the specific interest in being paroled and
a more general liberty interest in freedom from immigration detention while removal proceedings
remain pending.
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the first question—whether there is a protected liberty interest—by comparing the facts of the case
before them to those in Morrissey, where release allowed the individual “to do a wide range of
things” characteristic of everyday life, including being “with family and friends and [forming] the
other enduring attachments of normal life.” Id. at 482.
Like the parolee in Morrissey, Mr. Mendibaev’s parole allowed him to do a wide range of
things. Petitioner lived in Chicago with his wife and their two young children, where he worked
lawfully to support his family with an Employment Authorization Document valid through 2030.
Doc. 1 at ¶ 24. He was active in his children’s school community, the Bateman School, and he
regularly attended mosque and developed strong ties within his religious community. Id. Petitioner
also sought lawful status in this country by filing an asylum application on behalf of himself and
his family. Id. at ¶ 22. These relationships and obligations are the very kind contemplated in
Morrissey and demonstrate the liberty interest accrued by Petitioner during the more than two
years he has lived with relative freedom in this country.
3. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge framework, the Due Process Clause requires that
Petitioner be provided a bond hearing.
In analyzing what procedures sufficiently protect due process in the immigration context,
courts have applied the framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See,
e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-
07 (9th Cir. 2022) (assuming without deciding that Mathew applies); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1990). Several
district courts within the Tenth Circuit, too, have applied Mathews when addressing due process
claims related to immigration detention. See, e.g., Hernandez-Parrilla v. de Anda-Ybarra, 2025
WL 3632769, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 15, 2025); Barreno v. Baltasar, 2025 WL 3190936, at *3 (D.
Colo. Nov. 14, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, 2025 WL 2652880, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025).
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To determine the process due an individual, Mathews requires the Court to balance (1) the private
interest affected by the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used and the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and
(3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures would entail. 424 U.S. at 335.
Turning to the first Mathews factor, the Court finds that Petitioner has a significant private
interest in remaining free from detention after living freely outside of immigration custody.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. As mentioned previously, Petitioner was out of immigration custody for over two
years before being re-detained by ICE, during which time his interest in release grew even stronger
as he worked and lived freely alongside family and other community members. His private interest
in freedom from detention is therefore substantial. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 5.
The second Mathews factor is a closer call. The risk of erroneous deprivation is
considerable in this case where ICE previously paroled Petitioner in order to seek asylum,
Petitioner’s affirmative asylum application remains pending, the Government attempted to
unlawfully terminate Petitioner’s parole early through a mass email, and the Government did not
extend Petitioner’s parole despite his pending asylum application, compliance with the conditions
of his parole, and significant family and community ties in the United States. On the other hand,
as the Government points out, Petitioner is properly subject to mandatory detention under the
statute. See Doc. 15 at 8. In considering the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards, the equities tip in favor of a bond hearing, rather than release, where the Petitioner still
bears the burden of showing why release on bond is warranted in this case. This helps ensure
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Petitioner is not erroneously deprived of his liberty interest in release while recognizing that
detention is mandated by the statute.
Finally, the third Mathews factor favors Petitioner as well. While the Government certainly
has a strong interest in enforcing its immigration laws, its interest in detaining noncitizens absent
a rational reason for doing so is low. The justification for mandatory detention of “arriving aliens”
subject to expedited removal carries little weight in this case, where Petitioner has developed
significant ties to the United States and where his removal proceedings are not being dealt with in
an expedited fashion. Requiring a bond hearing does not impose a significant fiscal or
administrative burden on the Government, nor does it undermine the Government’s “sovereign
prerogative . . . to decide which [noncitizens] to admit[,]” Landon, 459 U.S. at 32, as Petitioner’s
removal proceedings—and the Government’s discretion over them—will continue regardless of
his detention status.
On balance, the Court finds that under the three Mathews factors, the Due Process Clause
entitles Petitioner to an opportunity to seek release on bond at a custody redetermination hearing.
However, given that the statutory scheme applicable to Petitioner contemplates mandatory
detention, the Court declines to shift the burden of proof to the Government at said hearing. As is
typical of custody redetermination hearings in immigration court, the Petitioner will bear the
burden of demonstrating that he is not a flight risk or a danger to his community.
In requiring a bond hearing, this Court does not interfere with Petitioner’s removal
proceedings in immigration court or make any finding regarding his admissibility and/or eligibility
for parole. Instead, the Court limits itself to assessing Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional
rights regarding pre-removal detention, which falls well within its authority to do. See Zadvydas,
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533 U.S. at 687; Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Challenges to
immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.”).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondents provide Petitioner an individualized
bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge (“IJ”) within 7 days of entry of this Order. If
Petitioner does not receive such a hearing on or before Saturday, April 11, 2026, he shall be
immediately released. The assigned IJ is hereby ordered not to deny bond based solely on a lack
of jurisdiction under the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties submit a joint status report to the Court no
later than Monday, April 13, 2026, confirming whether a bond hearing was held and the result of
said hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HONORABLE DAVID HERRERA URIAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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