Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
JUAN LAMAS AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Field Office Director,
JAMIE RAYE CARNES, Warden of Torrance County Detention Center,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1)
and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11). Having reviewed the Petition, briefings, exhibits,
and relevant law, the Court finds that the Petition is well-taken, and therefore, is GRANTED.
Respondents’ Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Juan Lamas Aguilar is a 28-year-old resident of New Mexico. Doc. 1 ¶ 1. In
2008, when he was 12 years old, Petitioner was sent to the United States. Id. ¶¶ 48–49. Since
then, he has remained in New Mexico and now has familial and community ties to Albuquerque.
Id. ¶¶ 49, 61. 	He is engaged to his fiancé, a U.S. citizen, and they have a one-year-old child
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 14

2
together. Id. ¶¶ 48, 54–55. Since he was old enough to work, Petitioner has been employed, most
recently by a company as a refrigerator repair person for the last four years. Id. ¶ 58.
On June 10, 2025, Petitioner went to a parole and probation office in compliance with a
recent misdemeanor conviction, previously his only arrest, for driving while intoxicated. Doc. 1
¶¶ 50, 60; Doc. 18 at 2. There, he encountered U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division (“ICE”) officers, who arrested him. Doc. 1 ¶ 50;
Doc. 18 at 2. 	Petitioner was charged with entering the United States without admission or
inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and DHS initiated removal proceedings in
immigration court. Doc. 1 ¶ 52.
Since then, Petitioner has remained in federal immigration custody without an opportunity
to post bond or request conditional release because his detention has been classified as mandatory
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 4, 62. Petitioner is detained at the Torrance County
Detention Center in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 14.
On December 12, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) held Petitioner’s final immigration
hearing and ordered his removal. Doc. 21 at 1. On January 5, 2026, Petitioner’s counsel informed
the Court that Petitioner had appealed the removal order on December 30, 2025. Doc. 25.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), Petitioner requests that the Court release him from
custody or order a bond hearing, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), to be conducted within
seven days. Doc. 1 ¶ 13. Additionally, he requests that the Court award attorney’s costs and fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 14

3
Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who
demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Section
2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality
of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes
challenges by noncitizens in immigration-related matters. 	See Ochieng v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d
1110, 1115 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)).
DISCUSSION
This matter arises from Petitioner’s mandatory detention without a bond hearing, pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Petitioner’s detention follows a 2025 DHS policy that requires
immigration judges to consider any noncitizen charged with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) to be an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and ineligible
for a bond hearing. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 228 (BIA Sep. 5, 2025).
Petitioner contends that the recently announced policy is contrary to the plain language of
§§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a), which prescribe different detention procedures for noncitizens
“seeking admission to” the United States and noncitizens who are “apprehended and detained”
while present in the United States. Doc. 1 ¶ 6–8. Since he was a longtime resident not seeking
admission at the time of his arrest, Petitioner argues that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a),
which allows for the release of noncitizens on bond or conditional parole. Id. ¶ 9. To that end,
Petitioner seeks habeas relief because his mandatory detention violates the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), INA bond regulations, and his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Id. at 17.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 14

4
In their Motion, Respondents request that the Court dismiss the Petition because the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Petition and mandatory detention is proper under §
1225(b)(2)(A). Doc. 11 at 10–11. The parties agree that the Petition may be decided from the
Petition and Motion’s briefing. Doc. 15 at 7–8; Doc. 18 at 2.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court declines to accept Respondents’ statutory
interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226. The Court finds that (1) it has jurisdiction over the Petition
until the removal order becomes final, (2) Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing
pursuant to § 1226, and (3) Petitioner may pursue attorney’s costs and fees under the EAJA.
I. 	Jurisdiction of the Court.
As an initial matter, the Court has jurisdiction over the Petition. Here, Petitioner argues
that he is challenging “the legality of his mandatory detention without a bond hearing,” not a
removal order. Doc. 15 at 4. Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the relevant jurisdictional-stripping
statutes do not prevent the Court from ruling on the Petition. Id. The Court agrees with Petitioner
and concludes that it has jurisdiction over this matter.1
A. 	The Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Petitioner is challenging his
mandatory detention without a bond hearing, not the order of removal.
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Section 2241(c)(3). 	“[W]here
Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be
clear.” 	Demore, 538 U.S. at 517. 	To preclude habeas review, Congress must be “particularly
1 In their Reply, Respondents withdrew their subject-matter jurisdiction argument as it relates to
1225(b) removal orders. Doc. 18 at 2. The Court agrees that the jurisdictional issue does not apply
to the Petition. Thus, the Court will not address Part II of Respondents’ argument. See Doc. 11 at
11–12.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 14

5
clear” in its intent to do so. Id. Under the INA, Congress included provisions preventing district
courts from reviewing certain immigration-related matters. Relevant here is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9),
known as a “zipper” clause. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 316 (Thomas, J., concurring). 	For the
reasons below, the provision does not prevent habeas review of the Petition.
Section 1252(b)(9) states that “judicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” It further
prevents habeas corpus jurisdiction “to review such an order or such questions of law or fact”
unless otherwise provided. Section 1252(b)(9).
Here, Petitioner is challenging his mandatory detention, not the removal order. The Tenth
Circuit has previously determined a habeas corpus proceeding was the appropriate avenue for a
petitioner a challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). Ochieng, 520 F.3d at 1115 (citing
Demore, 538 U.S. at 517). The petitioner was not precluded by § 1252(b)(9) because a challenge
to mandatory detention was distinct from an order of removal. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)
(2025) (“Consideration by the Immigration Judge of an application or request of a respondent
regarding custody or bond . . . shall be separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any
deportation or removal hearing or proceeding.”). Further, the Supreme Court has rejected a broad
interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) that would expand “arising from any action taken” to include the
mandatory detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. 281, 293
(2018) (determining that interpreting § 1252(b)(9) to apply to any injury that would not have
occurred but for a noncitizen’s detention status would lead to “absurd” results); see also
Mukantagara v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 67 F.4th 1113, 1116 (10th Cir. 2023) (“A claim
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 14

6
only arises from a removal proceeding when the parties in fact are challenging removal
proceedings.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that § 1252(b)(9) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction to
consider the Petition.2
B. 	The Court retains jurisdiction until Petitioner’s “final” removal order.
On December 12, 2025, an IJ issued an order of removal. Doc. 21. 	On January 5, 2026,
Petitioner’s counsel informed the Court that Petitioner appealed the removal order on December
30, 2025, and was unable to request a bond hearing at that time. Doc. 25. Because Petitioner’s
appeal is pending, Petitioner’s challenge to his mandatory detention under § 1225 is not moot.
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings.
See Jennings, 583 at 289 (stating that the INA authorizes detention “pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”). 	Section 1231 governs the detention of
noncitizens “during” and “beyond” the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)–(6). Generally,
when a noncitizen is “ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove [him] within 90 days.”
Section 1231(a)(1)(A). This is known as the “removal period.” Id. The “removal period” begins
once a noncitizen’s removal order “becomes administratively final,” § 1231(a)(1)(B), meaning
that the order has been affirmed by the BIA or the time to seek review has expired, 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(47)(B); see also Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 267 (2025).
2 The Court further finds that § 1252(g) does not bar this action. The Supreme Court requires §
1252(g) be read narrowly and applied to just “the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
482–83 (1999). 	Petitioner asks the Court to answer a legal question: whether he is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or discretionary detention under § 1226(a). He does
not ask the Court to second-guess Respondents’ discretionary decision to commence removal
proceedings against him. Section 1252(g) does not bar this action.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 14

7
Since Petitioner filed an appeal within 30 days of the order of removal, the Court finds that
§ 1231 does not yet apply to Petitioner. 	Until his appeal is final, the authority governing his
detention will not shift to § 1231. Therefore, this matter is not moot; the Court retains jurisdiction
to rule on Petitioner’s challenge to his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
For the above reasons, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter.
II. 	Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).
Turning to the merits of the Petition, at issue here is whether Petitioner is a noncitizen
detained under § 1225 or § 1226. 	According to Respondents, Congress intended the term
“applicant for admission” to be defined broadly to include all noncitizens “present in the United
States who have not been admitted.” Doc. 11 at 10–11. To that end, Petitioner is properly detained
under § 1225 pursuant to Hurtado. 	Id. 	Petitioner disagrees, arguing that his detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A) contradicts the plain text of the INA and existing precedent. 	Doc. 15 at 6–7.
Rather, his case is governed by § 1226(a). Id. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s interpretation.
A. 	Section 1226(a) governs the detention of presently residing noncitizens who
are not seeking admission to the United States.
First, the Court considers whether § 1225 or § 1226 applies to noncitizens who are arrested
and detained while already present in the United States.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Hurtado is not binding on the Court. The agency’s
interpretation carries only the “power to persuade.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
369, 402 (2024) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Thus, the Court
begins its analysis with the plain text and structure of the INA. See Ceco Concrete Constr., LLC
v. Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust, 821 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Our first
step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 14

8
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))).
Under the INA, two statutes govern the detention of noncitizens pending a final order of
removal: §§ 1225 and 1226. Looking first to § 1226, it provides for the arrest and detention of
noncitizens during removal proceedings. 	Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained” pending a removal decision. Unless a noncitizen “shall” be detained under § 1226(c),
and pending such a decision, the Attorney General “may continue to detain” the noncitizen and
“may release” the noncitizen on bond and conditions or conditional parole. Section 1226(a)(1)–
(2), (c). Importantly, one reason for mandatory detention under § 1226(c) applies to a noncitizen
who is (1) “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General” and (2)
“charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed” certain criminal acts.
Section 1226(c)(1)(E); § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
Next, as relevant here, under § 1225, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 	An “applicant for
admission” is defined as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States.” Section 1225(a)(1). 	And the INA defines “admission” and
“admitted” to mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” Section 1101(a)(13)(A).
Based on a plain and natural reading of the provision, § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that the
“applicants for admission” be presently seeking lawful admission when they encounter an
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 14

9
immigration officer. 	Respondents’ argument, which focuses on the definition of “applicant for
admission,” ignores the phrase “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A). Even if the Court was to
agree with Respondents’ interpretation of “applicant for admission,” a plain and natural reading of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) limits the mandatory detention requirement to a subset of noncitizens seeking
admission to the United States. 	Cf. § 1225(a)(3) (distinguishing between noncitizens “who are
applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission” (emphasis added)). 	Noncitizens who
have been present in the country for more than a decade are no longer seeking admission—they
are already living here. 	Therefore, they are not “seeking admission.” There is no ambiguity as to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s meaning in this respect.
Further, if the Court accepted Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225, it would render
portions of § 1226(c) superfluous. Under “one of the most basic interpretive canons . . . [a] statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (citation
modified); see also Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2018).
Specifically, the Court looks to § 1226(c)(1)(E)’s detention requirement for inadmissible
noncitizens who are implicated in a listed crime, including those “present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled” under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). If § 1225 includes all noncitizens
“present in the United States who have not been admitted,” Section 1226(c)(1)(E)(i) would be
meaningless because those noncitizens would already be governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A). Therefore,
the Court rejects Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225.
Accordingly, the Court declines to follow Hurtado and finds that § 1226(a)’s discretionary
detention procedures apply to noncitizens already present in the United States.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 14

10
This Court’s decision is consistent with Supreme Court’s interpretation of §§ 1225 and
1226 in Jennings. Although the Court did not contemplate the presence of residing noncitizens not
seeking lawful entry in its analysis, it described the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226. 583
U.S. at 287, 297. 	As relevant here, the Court noted that, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and
(b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending
the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id. at 289. The Jenning Court’s
description of the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226 is consistent with the Court’s conclusion.
Additionally, the Court is persuaded by a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, which
similarly found that the text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) limited mandatory detention to an “applicant for
admission” who is “seeking admission.” Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-
3050, 2025 WL 3552514, at *9 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025). There, the Seventh Circuit further rejected
the defendants’ argument that “applicant for admission” had the same definition as “seeking
admission.” Id. 	Although the court recognized that the interpretation has “some superficial
appeal,” it concluded that Congress chose to not to include “seeking admission” within the
definition of “applicant for admission.” Id. Furthermore, interpreting the phrases as synonymous
would “render ‘seeking admission’ superfluous,” in violation of a basic canon of statutory
construction. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419,
432 (2023)). 	Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was compelled to presume that the defendants’
interpretation was incorrect. 	Id. 	Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendants were not
likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that the arrested noncitizens were subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 14

11
And finally, this Court notes that its conclusion is consistent with many other decisions
within the Tenth Circuit and across the nationwide. See, e.g., Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No.
2:25-CV-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that §
1226(a) governs long-term noncitizens already in the country); Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d
271, 282–85 (D. Mass. 2025) (engaging in in-depth analysis of plain text and statutory scheme of
§§ 1225 and 1226 to reach the same conclusion); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239,
1256–61 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (relying on further canons of statutory construction, like recent
legislative history of § 1226(c), to reach the same conclusion).3
Based on the above discussion, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs the detention of
noncitizens already present in the United States who have not sought admission before their arrest
and detention.
B. 	Because Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention, he must receive a bond
hearing.
Next, the Court turns to whether Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a), and
therefore, is entitled to a bond hearing.
As a threshold matter, § 1226 does not bar the Court from reviewing the Petition. Under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(e), a court may not review an Attorney General’s “discretionary judgment regarding
the application of this section . . . . No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney
3 To the extent that Petitioner asserts that Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-
BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), is “significant” authority as he appears to be
a member of the certified “Bond Eligible Class,” see Doc. 24, the Court finds that Maldonado
Bautista has no impact on this Court’s habeas decision. Although the Court notes that Petitioner
would be impacted by the court’s declaratory relief, habeas relief would only be afforded to class
members located within the boundaries of the Central District of California. Id. at *30 (citing
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004) for the proposition that habeas jurisdiction lies “in
only one district: the district of confinement”).
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 14

12
General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond
or parole.” Here, Petitioner is not challenging a discretionary judgment or decision—no decision
as to bond or release has been made. 	Rather, he is challenging Hurtado’s conclusion that
immigration judges do not have jurisdiction to set bond, resulting in his inability to request a bond
hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5, 12. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to consider
the Petition. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 516–17 (holding that § 1226(e) did not deprive courts of
habeas jurisdiction when petitioner challenged statutory framework that permitted his detention
without bail).
Turning to the merits of the Petition, Petitioner was arrested while already present in the
United States. At the time of his arrest, he had continually resided in the United States for more
than 15 years, and he had not previously sought legal entry into the country. He was not seeking
admission. Accordingly, his detention is governed by the discretionary detention procedures under
§ 1226(a) rather than by mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Based on the above discussion, the Court will grant the Petition. 	Under § 1226(a),
Petitioner is entitled to a prompt individualized bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge.
4 To that end, the Court determines that the appropriate remedy is for Petitioner to receive a bond
hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) within seven days. See Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435, 443 (10th
4 Because the Court will grant habeas relief on Count One, it need not address Petitioner’s other
claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (finding it unnecessary to address an
additional claim in a habeas petition after granting full relief on one claim because “any relief
[petitioner] could obtain on that claim would be cumulative.”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (stating that “[a] fundamental and longstanding
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in
advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002)
(declining to address the remaining claims in a habeas petition after already granting habeas relief
on one claim).
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 12 of 14

13
Cir. 2012) (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) for the proposition that district
courts have “broad discretion” to craft habeas relief “as law and justice require”).
III. 	Petitioner may pursue attorney’s costs and fees under the EAJA.
Finally, Petitioner requests that the Court award attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA.
Doc. 1 at 17. 	Respondents do not address Petitioner’s request for fees and costs. 	Considering
recent Tenth Circuit precedent and the relevant procedure, the Court finds that it may consider
Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs provided that Petitioner follows proper procedure.
The EAJA provides for the following procedure:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred
by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
28 U.S.C.§ 2412(d)(1)(A). Finding that “‘civil action’ unambiguously refers to any legal action
brought to enforce a private or civil right, or to redress a private wrong,” the Tenth Circuit recently
held that the EAJA “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging immigration
detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025).
A fee award is required if (1) the petitioner prevails, (2) the respondents’ position was not
“substantially justified,” and (3) there are no special circumstances rendering an award of fees
unjust. 	Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 2412(d)(1)(A)).
While fees are authorized, the EAJA requires that a petitioner, “within thirty days of final judgment
in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses,” and an allegation
demonstrating 	that 	“the 	position 	of 	the 	United 	States 	was 	not 	substantially 	justified.”
Section 2412(d)(1)(A), (B). 	Upon filing this application, the respondents must justify their
position in any underlying proceedings and district court litigation. See Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1170.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 13 of 14

14
Since the Court grants Petitioner’s habeas relief, should Petitioner continue to pursue costs
and fees, Petitioner is instructed to file an EAJA application following the appropriate procedure.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
hereby GRANTED for reasons described in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Respondents’
Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Respondents are directed to conduct an individualized bond hearing in accordance with §
1226(a) for Petitioner before the immigration court within seven (7) days of this Order’s entry.
Respondents shall not deny Petitioner bond on the basis that § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory
detention.
Further, the parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within fourteen (14) days
of this Order’s entry, confirming that Petitioner received a bond hearing.
____/S/_______________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 26 Filed 01/12/26 Page 14 of 14