Garcia v. LHM SWH, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ANTONIO GARCIA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 1:25-cv-942-JMR-KRS
LHM SWH, LLC, doing business as
LHM SOUTHWEST HYUNDAI ALBUQUERQUE;
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
and HYUNDAI CAPITAL AMERICA, doing
business as HYUNDAI MOTOR FINANCE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion To Compel Defendant LHM
SWH, LLC To Provide Complete Responses To First Set Of Discovery (“Motion”) (Doc. 41). The
Court previously issued a partial ruling on the Motion, while taking the unresolved discovery
disputes under advisement. See Order entered on February 25, 2026 (Doc. 69). The portions of the
Motion previously taken under advisement are now granted in part and denied in part as set forth
below.
FACTUAL B ACKGROUND
The following background facts are taken from the allegations in the First Amended
Complaint For Damages. See (Doc. 1-2).
LHM SWH, LLC, d/b/a Southwest Hyundai Albuquerque (“LHM SWH” or “the
Dealership”) operates an automobile dealership in Albuquerque, New Mexico, which sells both
new and used vehicles. Plaintiff Antonio Garcia purchased a new 2025 Hyundai Palisades (“the
Vehicle”) from LHM SWH on or about November 29, 2024. The advertised, i.e., sticker sales
price for the Vehicle was $43,905.00. The sales contract listed the sales price as $43,905.00, plus
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 1 of 26

2
$647.00 in “optional accessories,” for a “Total Vehicle Purchase Price” of $44,552.00. The
optional accessories were identified on a separate document as including “door edge guards,”
“door cup guards,” and “window tint.” Plaintiff alleges that he told LHM SWH that he did not
want these optional accessories, but he was informed that the items were added by the
manufacturer and were not optional.
On November 30, 2024, Plaintiff noticed that the trim on the front right fender of the
Vehicle was faded and dull. Plaintiff contacted Jacqueline, the salesperson who sold him the
Vehicle, who said that the Dealership would replace the fender. Jacqueline made an appointment
for Plaintiff to bring the Vehicle in on December 4, 2026. When Plaintiff brought the Vehicle in
for the appointment, however, the Dealership “did nothing to the Vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff
made another appointment for December 20 to have the fender replaced. After bringing the Vehicle
in on December 20, Jacqueline called Plaintiff to tell him the Dealership “had found bondo on the
Vehicle, using a blue light.” (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff alleges that Jacqueline implied that Plaintiff had
damaged the Vehicle and repaired it, which Plaintiff denied. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30). The Dealership re-
touched the paint during this appointment and returned the car to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 28).
On December 28, Plaintiff met with Jacqueline and her manager, at which time Plaintiff
stated he wanted to return the Vehicle given the prior damage. LHM SWH refused to accept a
return of the Vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 31-33). On December 30, Plaintiff met with the Dealership’s General
Manager, Josh, who said he would send the Vehicle to a body shop for repairs. (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff
alleges that the Dealership sent the Vehicle to New Mexico Collision, and that, upon information
and belief, New Mexico Collision replaced the bumper and a bracket, and also did some paint
work. (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently complained to the Dealership that he was
still unhappy with the appearance of the Vehicle, and that the Dealership responded by sending
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 2 of 26

3
New Mexico Collision to Plaintiff’s house. (Id. ¶ 36). New Mexico Collision allegedly “indicated
[to Plaintiff] that ‘they’ had worked on the Vehicle prior to [Plaintiff’s] purchase of it, and that is
when the bondo was used on the Vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 37).
The First Amended Complaint alleges that LHM SWH misrepresented the sales price of
the Vehicle, and also misrepresented that the optional accessories were added by the manufacturer
rather than the Dealership. Additionally, the First Amended Complaint alleges that LHM SWH
sold Plaintiff a new vehicle that had suffered prior undisclosed damage. “The prior damage, repairs
and alterations to the Vehicle were in excess of 6% of the sales price, yet [the Dealership] did not
provide [Plaintiff] with an affidavit disclosing the repairs and alterations,” as allegedly required
under New Mexico law. Based on these allegations, the First Amended Complaint asserts claims
for fraud, violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (“UPA”), NMSA § 57-12-1 et seq.,
and violations of the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Dealer Franchise Act (“MVDFA”), NMSA § 57-
16-1 et seq.
PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
Plaintiff filed the Motion on January 19, 2026, seeking an order overruling LHM SWH’s
objections to Plaintiff’s written discovery requests, and compelling additional responses to ten
Interrogatories and eight Requests for Production (“RFP”). After Plaintiff filed the Motion, LHM
SWH served Plaintiff with three supplemental responses. See (Doc. 62 at 1). According to Plaintiff,
the supplemental responses resolved two of the disputed Interrogatories and two of the disputed
RFPs. (Id.). The Court held an informal discovery conference on February 23, 2026, to address the
remaining disputed discovery requests. During the conference, the Court made the following
partial ruling:
To the extent that there are objections interposed to any of the
discovery requests where it is not clear whether information or
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 3 of 26

4
documents were withheld based upon those objections, the Court
will order Defendant LHM SWH to make the withholding of
information or documents clear in the response. And if something is
withheld based upon an asserted privilege, LHM SWH must
produce a privilege log with the response. If no information or
documents were withheld based upon the objections, then the
response needs to make that clear as well.
(Doc. 64 (Clerk’s Minutes)); see also Doc. 69 (Order ¶ 2).
During the informal discovery conference, LHM SWH’s counsel stated that she would like
the opportunity to respond to arguments made in Plaintiff’s reply brief in support of the Motion. It
was determined at that time that LHM SWH would serve supplemental discovery responses in
compliance with the Court’s partial ruling, following which Plaintiff would file a Notice indicating
which discovery requests were still in dispute. After Plaintiff filed the Notice, LHM SWH would
file a written surreply to address any arguments in Plaintiff’s reply brief concerning discovery
requests that remained in dispute. The Court ordered LHM SWH to serve its supplemental
discovery responses by March 11, 2026; Plaintiff to file his Notice by March 27, 2026; and LHM
SWH to file its surreply brief by April 3, 2026. See (Docs. 64, 69). The Court stated in its February
25, 2026 Order summarizing what was decided at the February 23 discovery conference that it
would issue a written ruling on the remaining unresolved discovery issues following Plaintiff’s
filing of the Notice identifying those issues and LHM SWH’s filing of its surreply brief. (Doc. 69
¶ 8).
It appears that LHM SWH timely served Plaintiff with its supplemental responses, see
(Doc. 72), and Plaintiff filed his Notice as directed, see (Doc. 79). LHM SWH, however, did not
file a surreply by the April 3, 2026 deadline, and, to date, no surreply or other filing has been made
by LHM SWH on the Motion. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Motion is ripe for ruling.
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 4 of 26

5
L EGAL S TANDARD
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case[.]” F ED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(1). A matter is relevant if “it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and ... the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID . 401. Discovery is proportional to
the needs of the case based upon an evaluation of “the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(1).
Generally speaking, the scope of discovery is broad to empower parties “to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
501 (1947). The court “must weigh the factors ... so as not to ‘deprive a party of the fair opportunity
to develop and prepare a case.’” Smith v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 98-cv-4156-CM, 2000 WL 1679483, at
*2 (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2000) (citation omitted). When the relevancy of the discovery request is not
readily apparent on its face, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevancy
of the request. Moses v. Halstead, 236 F.R.D. 667, 671 (D. Kan. 2006). When the moving party
meets its initial burden of demonstrating relevance, or if the discovery appears relevant on its face,
the burden shifts to the party resisting the discovery to establish “that the requested discovery does
not come within the scope of relevance as defined under Rule 26(b)(1), or is of such marginal
relevance that the potential harm occasioned by the discovery would outweigh the ordinary
presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” Id. Ultimately, the Court “is afforded broad discretion
in the resolution of non-dispositive discovery disputes,” and its determination of whether to
compel discovery will be “overrule[d] only if this discretion is clearly abused.” Alsaadi v.
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 5 of 26

6
Saulsbury Indus., Inc., No. 2:23-CV-291 KG/KRS, 2024 WL 1617639, at *2 (D.N.M. Apr. 15,
2024).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s 	Notice 	states 	that 	the 	Motion 	has 	been 	resolved 	as 	to 	the 	following
Interrogatories: Nos. 2, 12, 13, and 15. See (Doc. 79). Accordingly, the Motion is denied without
prejudice as moot insofar as these written discovery requests are concerned. The Notice states that
the following discovery requests are still in dispute: Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4;
Interrogatory No. 6; Interrogatory No. 10 and RFP No. 2; Interrogatory No. 11; RFP Nos. 6 and 7
(partially resolved); and RFP No. 11. See (id.). The Court addresses the parties’ remaining disputes
concerning the listed discovery requests below.
A. 	S ALES T O O THER CUSTOMERS OF VEHICLES WITH PRIOR UNDISCLOSED
DAMAGE (I NTERROGATORY N O. 4 AND RFP NO. 4)
Interrogatory No. 4 asks LHM SWH to identify all customers to whom it sold vehicles that
suffered prior damage or alteration where the cost of repair or alteration exceeded 6% of the sales
price of the vehicle. The original requested time-frame for the disclosure was January 1, 2020 to
present. See (Doc. 42-1 at 5). RFP No. 4 asks that, for each customer identified in response to
Interrogatory No. 4, LHM SWH produce the following documents: (a) documents regarding LHM
SWH’s purchase of the vehicle; (b) documents regarding LHM SWH’s appraisal, inspection, and
repairs of the vehicle; (c) the sales contract, buyers order, and financing contract and/or lease; and
(d) all disclosures of prior damage. (Id. at 18). LHM SWH’s objected to Interrogatory No. 4 and
RFP No. 4 as being overly broad and unduly burdensome. LHM SWH also objected that
responding to the requests would reveal confidential customer information.
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 6 of 26

7
1. 	Overbreadth Objections
LHM SWH’s overbreadth objections are three-fold: (i) an objection that the covered time-
period exceeds five years; (ii) an objection that the information sought includes vehicle sales that
occurred after the transaction at issue; and (iii) an objection that the information sought includes
both old and new vehicles (the transaction here involved only a new vehicle). See (Doc. 42-1 at 5,
6, 18). LHM SWH argues that the scope of Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 should be limited
to (1) new vehicles (2) sold in the five year-period (3) preceding Plaintiff’s transaction, i.e., from
November 29, 2020, through November 29, 2024. See (Doc. 52 at 6). In his reply, Plaintiff has
offered to narrow the scope of Interrogatory 4 and RFP 4 to the time period of July 1, 2023 through
July 31, 2025. See (Doc. 62 at 5).
Plaintiff’s offer to narrow the scope of Interrogatory 4 and RFP 4 to an approximate twenty-
four month period renders LHM SWH’s first overbreadth objection moot. Turning to LHM SWH’s
second overbreadth objection, the Court rejects the argument that discovery should be limited to
new car sales. The purpose of Plaintiff seeking information about other sales transactions is to
show that LHM SWH acted intentionally and/or that its “actions were part of a pattern or practice
rather than the result of an innocent or isolated mistake.” Salmeron v. Highlands Ford Sales, Inc.,
220 F.R.D. 667, 671 (D.N.M. 2003). LHM SWH is correct that sales transactions are not relevant
unless they are similar to the sale at issue here. But similarity matters only insofar as the aspect or
detail of the transaction being compared bears some relation to Plaintiff’s claim or claims in the
case. Whether the car was old or new is a factual distinction that does not matter to Plaintiff’s
claims. In either case, according to Plaintiff, LHM SWH had a legal duty to disclose any material
damage to the car.1 Therefore, used car sales without prior disclosure of damage are just as relevant
1 See (Doc. 62 at 5 (citing Wirth v. Com. Res., Inc., 1981-NMCA-057, ¶ 12, 96 N.M. 340, 345, 630 P.2d 292, 297
(“To reveal some information on a subject triggers the duty to reveal all known material facts.”); Krupiak v. Payton,
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 7 of 26

8
to demonstrating a pattern or practice of nondisclosure as new car sales without prior disclosure
of damage. For similar reasons, the Court also rejects LHM SWH’s third overbreadth objection
regarding sales of vehicles that occurred after the transaction at issue in this case. So long as the
post-transaction sales are not too remote in time, the fact that the sale might have occurred after
the transaction at issue here does not preclude a finding of relevance to the question of whether
LHM SWH acted intentionally in a previous transaction that took place.
In sum, the Court concludes that the scope of Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 should be
all (i.e., new and used) car sales in the approximately twenty-four month time-period stated in
Plaintiff’s reply (July 1, 2023 to July 31, 2025).
2. 	Objection To Disclosing Confidential Client Information
LHM SWH argues that Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 “seek[ ] non-party personal
contact information (telephone number and home address) of former customers, which could be
detrimental to the Dealership’s professional relationship with such individuals and considered to
be intrusive and/or harassing to such individuals.” (Doc. 42-1 at 6, 18). LHN SWH actually rolls
several different arguments into this one.
The first matter reflected in LHM SWH’s argument is the idea that requiring the disclosure
of contact information could be considered “intrusive and/or harassing.” “It appears that the
general basis for this inflammatory charge is that [Plaintiff’s] counsel may have the temerity to
1977-NMSC-024, ¶ 3, 90 N.M. 252, 253, 561 P.2d 1345, 1346 (“Actionable fraud is found if a party to a transaction
knows of material facts, has a duty to disclose, and remains silent. A duty to disclose may arise if there is knowledge
that the other party to a contemplated transaction is acting under a mistaken belief. A duty to disclose may also arise
if one has superior knowledge that is not within the reach of the other party or could not have been discovered by the
exercise of reasonable diligence.”); Everett v. Gilliland, 1943-NMSC-030, ¶ 12, 47 N.M. 269, 141 P.2d 326, 330
(“There is much authority to the effect that if one party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or
knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which he could not discover by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal
obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other party relies upon him to communicate
to him the true state of facts to enable him to judge of the expediency of the bargain.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted))).
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 8 of 26

9
attempt to speak to [the customers in question].” Ullman v. Denco, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-843-SMV-
GBW, 2015 WL 11111288, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2015). But “seeking to speak to potential
witnesses is not harassment,”2 even if “citizens often prefer not to become embroiled in litigation
(civil or criminal) as a witness or otherwise…. [Our] system of justice depends on citizens
testifying on matters to which they are witnesses.” Id.
The second argument LHM SWH is making is that disclosure of customer contact
information could damage the Dealership’s professional relationship with such individuals. A
similar argument was made and ultimately rejected in Salmeron v. Highland Ford Sales, Inc,
supra. On the one hand, the pretrial judge acknowledged the plaintiff’s need for evidence to show
that, like the defendant’s sale of a former rental vehicle to the plaintiff, the defendant sold former
rental vehicles to other customers without disclosing prior damage to the vehicle. But the pretrial
judge attempted to balance that need against the “damage” the judge thought could “be occasioned
to [the] [d]efendant’s business should [the] [p]laintiff’s attorneys contact [the] [d]efendant’s
former customers.” Salmeron v. Highland Ford Sales, Inc., Civil No. 01-432 MCA/LFG, Doc. 50,
Mem. Op. & Order at 3 (D.N.M. Dec. 11, 2001); see also id., Doc. 64, Order at 6-7 (Mar. 6, 2002).
On appeal to the presiding trial judge, however, the court held that limiting discovery as the pretrial
judge had done placed the defendant’s “interests in preventing harm to its business reputation
paramount to [the plaintiff’s] need for disclosure,” a result the court found particularly unfair
“[g]iven the high burdens of proof which [the plaintiff] must carry in order to prove her case.”
Salmeron, 	220 	F.R.D. 	at 	671. 	“Without 	evidence 	of 	similar 	failures 	to 	disclose 	or
misrepresentations,” the court said, “it would be virtually impossible for [the plaintiff] to meet her
2 See N.M. STAT . A NN. § 30-3A-2 (“Harassment consists of knowingly pursuing a pattern of conduct that is intended
to annoy, seriously alarm or terrorize another person and that serves no lawful purpose. The conduct must be such that
it would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.”).
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 9 of 26

10
burden of proving intentional behavior by clear and convincing evidence or to establish a pattern
or practice to support an award of punitive damages.” Id.
As in Salmeron, “[a]ccess to [LHM SWH’s] other customers is necessary in order for
Plaintiff to gather such evidence, if it exists.” Id. Furthermore, LHM SWH’s assertion that
disclosure of customer contact information could “cause irreparable harm to LHM’s ongoing
relationships with its customers” (Doc. 52 at 7) is conclusory. “[T]o shield [LHM SWH] from
having to answer Plaintiff’s discovery requests based on an abstract fear of lost future business is
not a path on which the Court is willing to tread.” Picasso Builders, LLC v. Roofing Wholesale
Co., No. 1:20-cv-539-GJF-JFR, 2020 WL 12739434, at *4 (D.N.M. Nov. 30, 2020) (observing
that “the risk of crippling economic fallout from [the] [p]laintiff contacting a limited number of
[the] [d]efendant’s customers does not appear great,” and concluding that the defendant’s concern
that it might lose future business did not outweigh the plaintiff’s need for the information).
Finally, the third— and wholly separate—concern raised by LHM SWH is expressed in
the Affidavit of LHM SWH’s General Manager, Christopher Harvey, which is that LHM SWH’s
“confidential information” of customer identities and related transactional information needs to be
protected from disclosure “to the public or competitors of LHM SWH.” (Doc. 52 at 45-48, ¶ 17
(emphasis added)).3 This argument makes little sense here, however, as Plaintiff is not LHM
SWH’s competitor.4 A concern “about confidentiality or the disclosure of private or sensitive
3 See also (Doc. 52 at 48, ¶ 18 (“Significant resources have been invested by LHM SWH in compiling the customer
list, which provides a competitive advantage by allowing LHM SWH to market to existing customers”); id. ¶ 20
(stating that LHM SWH’s “customer list … has immense monetary value,” and that “ [i]f third parties, including but
not limited to other automotive retailers, were permitted to access this information, the outcome would be ruinous to
LHM SWH”); id. ¶ 21 (stating that “LHM SWH has a trade secret protection policy, whereby LHM SWH requires
each and every employee to sign an agreement limiting their use of LHM SWH’s confidential information, including
trade secret customer lists”)).
4 As Plaintiff points out, this objection is also likely waived, as it was not made in LHM SWH’s written response to
the discovery request.
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 10 of 26

11
information” to a non-competitor party is generally “not a sufficient basis to withhold discovery,”
but instead is “best addressed in the form of a protective order.” In re Bank of Am. Wage & Hour
Emp. Pracs. Litig., 275 F.R.D. 534, 541 (D. Kan. 2011). For all of the above-discussed reasons,
the Court rejects LHM SWH’s objection to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 based on the fact
that those discovery requests require the disclosure of contact information for the customers
identified by LHM SWH’s response.
3. 	Objection Regarding Undue Burden
Finally, LHM SWH objects to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 on the ground that “LHM
SWH does not have a record-keeping practice, system, or searchable database capable of
categorizing or generating an automatic retrieval of specific information such as vehicles ‘which
had suffered prior damage or alteration, where the cost of repair or alteration exceeded 6% of the
sales price of the vehicle.’” (Doc. 52 at 46 (Harvey Affidavit, ¶ 6)). As a result, according to LHM
SWH, in order to respond to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4, it would have to perform the
“herculean task” of
(i) … review[ing] thousands of individual deal jackets maintained
in electronic format on a transaction by transaction basis, as LHM
SWH does not record or maintain transaction data in a manner by
which it might identify sales where the cost of repair or alteration
exceeded 6% of the sale price of the vehicle except through manual
review of each individual deal jacket; and (ii) … physical[ly]
inspecti[ng] … hundreds of boxes containing deal jackets currently
stored offsite, in order to determine whether those deal jackets,
which are not maintained electronically, include sales responsive to
the discovery request.
(Doc. 42-1 at 6 (emphasis added)).
As far as the Court can tell, the parties have not actually met and conferred over this
discovery request. “[T]he meet and confer requirement requires a simultaneous exchange of views,
usually during a face to face, or at a minimum, a telephonic conference wherein counsel try in
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 11 of 26

12
good faith to resolve the dispute by comparing views, further explaining or clarifying their
position, and if appropriate, offering a compromise in order to resolve the dispute.” T.H. v.
Martinez, No. 2:24-CV-887-MIS-KRS, 2026 WL 752643, at *1 (D.N.M. Mar. 17, 2026)( internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). A face-to-face or telephonic discussion would have been
helpful here, given the lack of clarity regarding LHM SMH’s written explanation of the undue
burden it claims that responding to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 would impose on it.
For instance, in addition to its objections, LHM SWH stated in its response to Interrogatory
No. 4 that, “from November 29, 2020 through the date of the transaction at issue, and with respect
to sales of new vehicles with preexisting damage in excess of 6% of the sales price of such vehicle,
… to the best of [LHM SWH’s] knowledge, there were no such transactions/sales.” (Doc. 42-1 at
6-7). That statement begs the question of how LHM SWH determined that there were no such
transactions/sales, when making such a determination is at tension with LHM SWH’s objection
that it would involve a “herculean effort” for it to determine which vehicles it sold in a specific
time-period suffered prior damage that exceeded 6% of the sales price.
In addition, LHM SMH’s written response contradicts itself in stating in part (i) that the
deal jackets are maintained in electronic format, while stating in part (ii) that the deal jackets “are
not maintained electronically” (Doc. 42-1 at 6 (emphasis added)); as well as by suggesting with
the use of the connector “and” between parts (i) and (ii) that two separate stages of review would
have to be conducted. Although it has never clarified whether its written response to Interrogatory
No. 4 is accurate as written, in its response to the Motion LHM SMH seems to indicate that a
review of either electronic files of the deal jackets, or the off-site paper files, would be required.
See (Doc. 52 at 5 (LHM SMH Response Brief) (“the production Plaintiff seeks requires a manual
review of each transaction on the file or a manual review of the hard copies”); see also (Doc 52 at
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 12 of 26

13
46 (Harvey Affidavit, ¶ 8 (stating that “documents for the Relevant Period exist in digital format,”
but that to extract the relevant files would require manual review of each transaction, either “on
this file [i.e., the electronic file], or a manual review of the hard copies”)). Still, according to LHM
SMH, “[r]eview under either format is a monumental task as each deal jacket can only be pulled
on an individual basis,” which “would take several months” to accomplish assuming “a full-time
team of employees dedicated solely to this task working standard business hours.” (Doc 52 at 46
(Harvey Affidavit, Id. ¶¶ 8, 9)). Plaintiff, on the other hand, responds in his reply brief that the
asserted undue burden is “questionable” because “LHM uses a dealer management system called
CDK Global,” which is “the national market leader for dealer case management systems” and
“provides a comprehensive, complex platform that covers all aspects of a dealership.” (Doc. 62 at
3 (citing www.ckdglobal.com)).
In light of the lack of clarity in LHM SWH’s response, the Court finds that LHM SWH has
not met its burden of demonstrating that the task of responding to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP
No. 4 is too burdensome and hence is not proportional to the needs of the case. The Court also
finds LHM SWH’s objection unconvincing because LHM SWH appears to have done nothing by
way of seeking a compromise solution that would minimize or lessen the burden to it from
responding. As previously discussed, LHM SWH cannot argue that the information sought is of
marginal relevance so that the discovery could be disallowed altogether on that basis; the
information is in fact crucial to Plaintiff’s case. See Salmeron, 220 F.R.D. at 670. Therefore, LHM
SWH has a duty to work with Plaintiff to obtain the information he seeks through the least
burdensome means possible. Plaintiff mentioned in his reply brief that he may need to depose
Mr. Harvey to get more information about the burden LHM SWH claims searching for the relevant
information would entail. (Id.). Plaintiff also pointed out that, according to Mr. Harvey, LHM
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 13 of 26

14
SWH sold approximately 3,356 new and used vehicles in the original time-period covered by
Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4, and that, by offering to narrow the scope of those discovery
requests to a twenty-four month time-period as he has done, Plaintiff has reduced the number of
new and used vehicle sales that would have to be examined to around only 1,368. (Doc. 62 at 5).
Still, LHM SWH continues to stand on its original objection, and, as far as the Court can tell, no
further efforts were made by the parties to resolve this dispute. Nor has LHM SWH clarified its
undue burden argument by filing a surreply brief, as it suggested it would do at the informal
discovery conference held in February. (Doc. 64 at 2).
“[A] party ‘may not excuse itself from compliance with Rule 34 ... by utilizing a system of
record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult
to identify or locate them, thus rendering the production of the documents an excessively
burdensome and costly expedition.’” Oklahoma, ex rel. Edmondson, No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ,
2007 WL 1498973, at *3 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (quoting Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976)). Given the importance of the information sought by Plaintiff,
LHM SWH is ordered to respond to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 for the reduced time period
suggested by Plaintiff of July 1, 2023 to July 31, 2025. LHM SWH may simply produce the
electronic files of the car sales in this time period, thereby transferring the burden of determining
which, if any, of those transactions involved sales where the cost of repair or alteration exceeded
6% of the sale price of the vehicle. The Court will enter an agreed confidentiality order to protect
LHM SWH’s confidential customer information. The parties may negotiate another method of
reducing the burden of responding to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 if they wish. For instance,
Plaintiff could agree to a “rolling” response whereby LHM SWH would initially search for
responsive information in a smaller subset of documents (e.g., a six-month or one year time
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 14 of 26

15
period), with additional productions open to negotiation based upon how many relevant
transactions in the initial time period were uncovered. But given that the production of the
electronic deal jackets for all car sales in the stated twenty-four month period should all but
eliminate LHM SWH’s undue burden objection, LHM SWH must proceed with responding to the
discovery requests in that manner unless doing so is impossible,5 in which case the parties will
need to meet and confer to discuss other solutions, including LHM SWH allowing Plaintiff to
physically inspect the boxes containing the hard copies of deal jackets from the relevant time
period.
B. 	I DENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT FORMER E MPLOYEES (I NTERROGATORY
NO. 6)
Interrogatory No. 6 asks LHM SWH to provide the names and known contact information
for all former employees, including managers, who worked for LHM SWH in its body shop, sales
department, and finance department during the time-period of January 1, 2020 to the present. (Doc.
42-1 at 8). LHM SWH objects, arguing that Interrogatory No. 6 is overly broad and unduly
burdensome, and should be limited to “employees who were actively involved in the sales
transaction 	at 	issue 	and 	those 	who 	had 	some 	sort 	of 	role 	in 	addressing 	Plaintiff’s
concerns/complaints about the subject vehicle and work performed on the vehicle.” (Id.); see also
(Doc. 52 at 7).
Plaintiff argues that the identities of former employees beyond those who were associated
with the transaction at issue here are relevant to the claims in this matter because those employees
“can provide valuable testimony regarding a dealer’s regular practices.” (Doc. 42 at 9).
5 Electronic production may not be possible due to the need for proprietary software to access the information
electronically. In that case, the parties should investigate whether the data can be converted or made accessible
electronically through any other means.
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 15 of 26

16
Specifically, Plaintiff argues, former employees “can speak more freely than current employees
about dealer practices,” and may be able to “provide very valuable testimony about other
customers who purchased new vehicles with prior damage.” (Doc. 62 at 7); see also (id. at 8
(arguing that “[f]ormer employees are as important as other customers, for establishing a dealer’s
lack of mistake and intentional and willful behavior, and for supporting an award of punitive
damages”). Plaintiff argues that the request is limited to former employees in specific departments
who may have relevant information: employees who worked in the body shop may have
knowledge of other vehicles sold by LHM SWH with prior damage, while employees who worked
in the sales and finance departments could have had “access to information on LHM’s CDK system
about costs into a vehicle, including repair costs.” (Id. at 8). Plaintiff points out that LHM SWH
has not shown how responding to Interrogatory No. 6 would be unduly burdensome. But
recognizing that the time period covered by the Interrogatory may be overly broad, Plaintiff offers
to narrow the request to January 1, 2022 through November 29, 2024 (the date of the transaction
in this matter). See (Doc. 42 at 9). LHM SWH responds that a “temporal limitation alone does not
cure a lack of relevance,” and that the “Interrogatory still seeks identification of former employees
across multiple departments based solely on their prior employment with the Dealership, without
any showing that such individuals possess information relevant to Plaintiff’s claims or LHM’s
defenses.” (Doc. 52 at 7).
Even after the 2015 amendments to Rule 26(c) went into effect, “[r]elevance is still to be
construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other
matter that could bear on any party’s claim or defense.” Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C.,
323 F.R.D. 360, 380 (D.N.M. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court
finds that Interrogatory No. 6 satisfies that standard. See, e.g., Golden v. Quality Life Servs., LLC,
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 16 of 26

17
No. CV 22-579 GJF/GBW, 2023 WL 6540224, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 6, 2023) (finding the identities
of all nursing staff and house coordinators who worked for Defendants in the last few years”
relevant, and that “any minor privacy concerns that are implicated by the disclosure of [basic
information about these individuals including their name, address, email address, phone number,
job position, and dates of employment with Defendant] under a protective order are outweighed
by the relevance of the discovery”); Ullman, 2015 WL 11111288, at *2 (“The Court has no trouble
concluding that [employees and former employees of Defendant] may indeed have discoverable
information about Defendants’ wage practices which form the basis of this lawsuit.”); In re Bank
of Am. Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 275 F.R.D. at 543 (“Although the Bank’s former
employees may have a privacy interest in disclosure of their identities and contact information,
such disclosure does not pose a serious invasion of privacy in routine civil cases,” and “these
former employees likely have information about the Bank’s overtime policies, which … appears
relevant.”).6 In light of the broad scope of discovery and the fact that LHM SWH has not shown
that responding to Interrogatory No. 6 would be unduly burdensome in any way,7 the Court finds
Plaintiff’s time limitation appropriate, and hence the discovery request proportional,8 and
overrules LHM SWH’s overly broad and unduly burdensome objections.
6 Similar to its objection to providing contact information for current or former customers, LHM SWH objects to
providing contact information for former employees, asserting that “[s]uch individuals may be reached through
defense counsel.” As shown by the above cited case law, Plaintiff is correct that this objection is “groundless.” See
(Doc. 42 at 9 (“Defendant cannot produce these former employees for deposition or trial, and there is no ethical
prohibition on Plaintiff talking to former employees.”)).
7 See, e.g., Infinity Home Collection v. Coleman, No. 17-MC-00200-MSK-MEH, 2018 WL 1733262, at *3 (D. Colo.
Apr. 10, 2018) (“Regarding Infinity’s undue burden contention, Infinity does not specifically explain how responding
to this request will be burdensome.”); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Colo. 2004) (“An objecting
party cannot sustain [its] burden with boilerplate claims that the requested discovery is oppressive, burdensome or
harassing.”).
8 See, e.g., Clark v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., No. 1:20-CV-01236-RM-SKC, 2022 WL 19416, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2022)
(“While Defendants vaguely argue an undue burden to produce this information, the Court finds none. And in this
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 17 of 26

18
C. 	I DENTIFICATION AND P RODUCTION OF D OCUMENTS AND I NFORMATION
ABOUT THE VEHICLE (I NTERROGATORY N O. 10 AND RFP NO. 2)
Interrogatory No. 10 asks LHM SWH generally to identify all documents and electronically
stored information or data regarding the Vehicle. (Doc. 42-1 a 10). The Interrogatory then lists 19
non-exclusive categories of documents or information concerning the Vehicle that Plaintiff is
seeking. (Id. at 10-11). RFP No. 2 asks LHM SWH to produce the documents or information
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 10. (Id. at 16). LHM SWH’s response objected on
numerous grounds, and then, as to each of the 19 categories, cited specific documents that were
produced along with a general reference of “see also objections.” In its opening brief, Plaintiff
argued that it could not tell from LHM SWH’s written responses whether documents were being
withheld based on LHM SWH’s objections, a concern that was confirmed by LHM SWH’s
response brief, which defended its written responses by asserting, among other things, that it had
identified categories of documents for which it was continuing to search for responsive
information, and that that it had “not withdrawn its objections, which remain valid and appropriate
under Rule 26.” (Doc. 52 at 9). LHM SWH further argued that “the existence of ongoing, good-
faith efforts to locate additional responsive materials does not render LHM’s responses deficient
or justify compelled relief,” and that, to the extent it identified any additional responsive materials,
it would supplement its responses accordingly. (Id.).
Initially, the Court does not agree with LHM SWH that the lack of a specified date for
supplementation does not render its response to a discovery request inadequate. Rule 26(e) sets
forth a duty to supplement discovery responses, and the Court’s Scheduling Order provides that
supplementation is due within 30 days of receipt of the information giving rise to the need for
sense, the discovery sought is proportional to the needs of the case.” (internal citations omitted)), objections overruled,
No. 20-CV-01236-RM-SKC, 2022 WL 884282 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2022).
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 18 of 26

19
supplementation, see (Doc. 26 at 2). But neither Rule 26(e) nor the Scheduling Order is intended
to override the 30-day deadline for discovery responses. If Rule 26(e) were construed otherwise,
the 30-day response deadline would be meaningless. A certain amount of flexibility is accorded to
parties who, because of the volume of documents sought, need additional time to complete their
search for responsive documents. But parties may not rely on the ability to supplement to avoid
any deadline whatsoever for conducting a thorough search and producing all responsive documents
uncovered by that search.
Beyond the above, LHM SWH’s original response to this discovery request left confusion
over whether any relevant and responsive information or documents had been withheld on the
basis of LHM SWH’s objections, in violation of Rule 34(b)(2)(C). See City of Las Cruces v. United
States, No. CV 17-809 JCH/GBW, 2021 WL 5207098, at *23 (D.N.M. Nov. 9, 2021), objections
overruled, No. CV 17-809 JCH/GBW, 2022 WL 704123 (D.N.M. Mar. 9, 2022). Therefore, the
Court’s February 25, 2026 Order partially ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion directed LHM SWH to
serve a supplemental response making clear whether any information or documents were withheld
based upon LHM SWH’s objections. According to the Notice filed by Plaintiff as directed by the
Court’s previous Order (Doc. 79 at 1), LHM SWH’s supplemental response (which is not in the
record) states that LHM SWH is not withholding any responsive documents. Based on LHM
SWH’s representation in its supplemental response that, notwithstanding its previously asserted
objections, it has produced all documents responsive to Interrogatory No. 10/RFP No. 2, the Court
finds that those objections are moot and need not be addressed.
But that does not end the matter. Plaintiff’s Notice states that, despite LHM SWH’s
representation in its supplemental response, Plaintiff believes that all documents responsive to
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 19 of 26

20
Interrogatory No. 10/RFP No. 2 have not been produced. (Id.). Plaintiff gives three examples of
documents he believes should exist but have not been produced:
• 	Documents concerning “optional equipment” installed by LHM
SWH on the Vehicle. Plaintiff states that a former employee has
testified that a third-party business comes to the Dealership to install
the “optional equipment” on new vehicles, but that LHM SWH has
not produced any invoicing to show who did this work to the
Vehicle.
• 	A damage inspection report for the Vehicle. Plaintiff states that an
inspection would have been performed after the transport company
delivered the Vehicle to the Dealership, and a report prepared
following the inspection, but that none has been produced.
• 	Documents related to LHM SWH repairs to the Vehicle. Plaintiff
states that, prior to selling the Vehicle to Plaintiff, LHM SWH
replaced the right front fender on the Vehicle with a fender from
another vehicle, but has not produced any documents regarding that
repair.
(Id.).
As far as the Court can tell, the parties have not met and conferred regarding these
remaining matters. Further clarification from LHM SWH concerning the supposedly missing
documents might have led to a resolution of this issue without further Court intervention. For
instance, Plaintiff asserts in its Notice that a damage inspection report for the Vehicle has not been
produced, but the Court notes that LHM SWH’s First Supplemental Response, attached to
Plaintiff’s reply brief, refers to additional documents produced with the supplemental response,
including one called a “Muti-Point Inspection Form.” (Doc. 62-1 at 9). The Court also notes that,
regarding the third category of allegedly missing documents, LHM SWH produce a document
referred to as a “Repair Estimate RO# 297998.” (Id.). The matter of documents showing repairs to
the Vehicle gets more confusing in that LHM SWH states in its response brief that it “advised
[Plaintiff] that, prior to [Plaintiff’s] filing of suit, its employees communicated with New Mexico
Collision Center regarding Plaintiff’s complaints about the [V]ehicle and its services [whose
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 20 of 26

21
services? New Mexico Collision Center’s?] in an effort to address those concerns,” and that, “[i]n
its response to Plaintiff’s good faith letter, LHM committed to determining whether any
information is available with respect to communication with the manufacturer, transport company,
lender, or Collision Center of New Mexico and supplement with any additional information
obtained.” (Doc. 52 at 9-10). These representations leave the Court wondering what additional
information was discovered by LHM SWH following these additional efforts, and if no additional
information was discovered, why not and/or what conclusions did LHM SWH draw from those
results?
It seems that LHM SWH may not have produced any documents regarding repairs to the
Vehicle performed by New Mexico Collision Center because it has concluded that no such
documents exist. See (Doc. 62-1 at 10 (LHM SWH’s First Supplemental Response to Interrogatory
No. 11) (stating that New Mexico Collision did not perform any repairs to the vehicle at issue prior
to the sale of the Vehicle to Plaintiff, and that any repairs it performed on the Vehicle after the sale
at issue “were not invoiced by such company, so the nature and extent of the repairs are currently
unknown to LHM”).9 Plaintiff apparently believes, based on other information in his possession,
that New Mexico Collision did in fact repair the Vehicle prior to the sale. But if LHM SWH claims
otherwise, that is a merits issue. Insofar as Plaintiff’s Motion is concerned, absent “information
that calls into question the veracity of [LHM SWH’s] representation,” F.D.I.C. v. McCaffree, 289
F.R.D. 331, 338 (D. Kan. 2012), the Court cannot compel LHM SWH to produce documents that
it claims do not exist. See, e.g., Sonnino v. Univ. Kansas Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 640 (D. Kan.
2004). Plaintiff is entitled to clarity on the issue, however, as well as some explanation concerning
9 See also (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 35 (First Amended Complaint, alleging that New Mexico Collision replaced the bumper and
bracket on the Vehicle and did some paint work); Doc. 18 ¶ 35 (LHM SWH Answer, denying ¶ 35 “upon information
and belief”)).
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 21 of 26

22
the reasons why no documents in the specified categories were produced. See, e.g., Wuhan
Healthgen Biotechnology Corp. v. ExpressTec LLC, No. 21-4008-KHV-ADM, 2025 WL 2430535,
at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 22, 2025). The Court therefore will require LHM SWH to serve a supplemental
written response that clarifies LHM SWH’s production, or lack thereof, for each of the three
categories cited in the Notice and listed above. The supplemental response must be signed under
oath by LHM SWH’s counsel and a client representative with decision-making authority over this
litigation. The supplemental response must certify that LHM SWH has conducted a complete and
thorough search for documents in the three listed categories. The supplemental response then must
state for each of the above listed categories either (1) that all responsive documents have been
produced, identifying the responsive documents by Bates number, with any additional responsive
documents being produced simultaneous with the supplemental response; or (2) that no responsive
documents exist, together with an explanation for the absence of such documents.10 LHM SWH’s
supplemental response should specifically address Plaintiff’s representation in the Notice that he
has “evidence from other sources that the right front fender that was replaced on the Vehicle—
which Plaintiff alleges was replaced prior to his purchase—was taken from another new vehicle
that had been in Defendant’s inventory around the same time,” and that “it appears that Defendant
performed ‘body service’ to that other vehicle on October 1, 2024, which was prior to Defendant
selling Plaintiff the Vehicle.” (Doc. 79 at 1-2). It should also address Plaintiff’s representation in
the Notice that a former employee has testified that a third-party business comes to Defendant’s
lot to install the “optional” equipment on new vehicles. (Id. at 1).
10 Possible explanations might include: “no repairs prior to the sale of the Vehicle to Plaintiff were ever done to the
Vehicle”; “repairs to the Vehicle performed after the sale to Plaintiff were performed by Collision Center of New
Mexico at no charge and LHM SWH does not have any documents in its possession or control that refer or reflect
those repairs”; a damage inspection report for the Vehicle should have been performed but we cannot find it in our
records”; “the only non-manufacturer installed options were installed by the Dealership without any third-party
involvement,” etc.
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 22 of 26

23
D. 	DESCRIPTION O F ANY A PPRAISALS , I NSPECTIONS , REPAIRS , S ERVICING,
OR RECONDITIONING P ERFORMED O N T HE VEHICLE (I NTERROGATORY
NO. 11)
Plaintiff’s Notice states that Interrogatory No. 11 has been resolved with one exception:
LHM SWH “has not identified the third party who added the ‘optional’ equipment to the vehicle
before it was sold to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 79 at 2). Once again, the parties have not met and conferred
regarding this remaining issue. At the very least, LHM SWH could have provided some
clarification concerning why it has not identified a third party who added the optional equipment
to the vehicle. From the documents before the Court, it appears that optional equipment was added
by either the manufacturer,11 or by the Dealership.12 But Plaintiff contends that a third-party was
involved. See (Doc. 79 at 1 (stating that a former employee has testified that a third-party business
comes to Defendant’s lot to install the “optional” equipment on new vehicles)).13 In any event,
clarification is in order. Accordingly, the Court orders LHM SWH to serve a supplemental
response, certified as indicated above, and identifying each piece of optional equipment added to
the Vehicle, with a statement identifying the person and/or entity who added that particular item,
including all optional items whether added by the manufacturer, the Dealership, or some third
party. LHM SWH’s supplemental response should specifically address the testimony of the former
employee referenced in Plaintiff’s Notice. LHM SWH may combine this supplemental response
with its supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 10 and RFP No. 2 to avoid any overlap.
11 See (Doc. 52 at 53 (identifying features added by the manufacturer, including carpeted floor mats, cargo tray, and
tow hitch).
12 See id. at 54 (identifying tint, door edge guards, and door handle cup guards, as “Dealer Installed Options”).
13 LHM SWH’s answer to the First Amended Complaint could be interpreted as denying that a third-party added any
optional equipment to the Vehicle. See (Doc. 1-2 at 3 (First Amended Complaint ¶ 17 (alleging that LHM SWH told
Plaintiff that the optional items were added by the manufacturer and were not optional, but that this statement was a
misrepresentation”); Doc. 18 at 3 (LHM SWH Answer ¶ 17 (denying paragraph 17 “upon information and belief”)).
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 23 of 26

24
E. 	NET WORTH DOCUMENTS (RFP NOS . 6 & 7)
Plaintiff reports in his Notice that LHM SWH has agreed to produce the requested
documents “once a mutually acceptable protective order is entered,” and that “[t]he parties are
working on that confidentiality order now.” (Doc. 79 at 2). It has been over a month since Plaintiff
filed the Notice, but the parties have yet to seek entry of an agreed confidentiality order. To the
extent that the parties are having trouble reaching agreement concerning the provisions of an
agreed confidentiality order, they are advised to consult other cases before the undersigned in
which agreed or stipulated confidentiality orders were approved by this Court.14
F. 	DOCUMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT ’S PRICE REPRESENTATIONS ON
NEW VEHICLES (RFP N O. 11)
RFP No. 11 seeks the retail purchase agreement, any addendum to that agreement, the
Monroney sticker, and any supplemental dealer price sticker for each new vehicle LHM SWH sold
for a six-month period from August 1, 2024 until December 31, 2024. (Doc. 42-1 at 21). This
discovery request is related to Plaintiff’s claim that LHM SWH misrepresented the price of the
Vehicle. Plaintiff argues that, when selling a new vehicle, a dealer is required to post the
manufacturer’s suggested retail price, via the federally required Monroney sticker, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1231-1233, which will identify all equipment installed by the manufacturer of the vehicle. If a
dealer adds other equipment after receiving the vehicle, it is required to attach a dealer
supplemental price sticker, disclosing the additional price. See (Doc. 42 at 15; Doc. 62 at 11 (citing
N.M. Admin. Code §§ 12.2.4.21(D) and 12.2.4.27))). Plaintiff argues that LHM SWH added
equipment to the Vehicle, but failed to disclose the price increase in a supplemental dealer sticker.
(Id.). LHM SWH argues that Plaintiff’s claim that it failed to disclose the price increase in a
14 See, e.g., Rawson v. Associated Metals, LLC, 2:24-cv-1012-JHR-KRS, Doc. 63 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2026); Logan v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 1:25-cv-01176-MIS-KRS, Doc. 25 (D.N.M. Jan. 29, 2026).
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 24 of 26

25
supplemental dealer sticker is without merit, and attaches to its response brief a copy of the
supplemental dealer vehicle with the required disclosure. See (Doc. 52 at 54). According to
Plaintiff, however, after LHM SWH produced the supplemental dealer pricing sticker in discovery,
his counsel asked to see the original deal file. And, after examining that file, his counsel
purportedly discovered that the original supplemental sticker was in that file, which, according to
Plaintiff, means that the supplemental sticker was not on the window of the Vehicle at the time
Plaintiff agreed to purchase it.
LHM SWH’s argument opposing this discovery request appears to be that the price
misrepresentation claim has no merit because the supplemental disclosure in fact was provided.
That merits issue has not been resolved yet. If in fact Plaintiff is correct and the added price from
the dealer installed options was not included in the advertised (displayed) price of the Vehicle,
then Plaintiff may have a valid claim that LHM SWH misrepresented the price of the Vehicle. The
existence in the file of a supplemental price sticker does not definitively disprove Plaintiff’s claim.
And if LHM SWH misrepresented the price of the Vehicle to Plaintiff, then it may have done so
to other customers as well, which would be relevant for the same reasons already discussed
concerning other customers to whom LHM SWH may have sold vehicles with prior damage. LHM
SWH’s objections to RFP No. 11 are similar to those it raised in response to Interrogatory No 4
and RFP No. 4. For the same reasons the Court rejected those objections earlier in this opinion, it
also rejects them now in relation to RFP No. 11. Furthermore, the Court notes that RFP No. 11 is
significantly more limited than RFP No. 4 in time scope; it seeks relevant documents in a six-
month period only. Also, unlike RFP No. 4, it is limited to new car sales only. LHM SWH has not
explained why it would be unduly burdensome for it to produce a limited number of documents
that would be needed for Plaintiff to determine if customers who purchased new vehicles in the
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 25 of 26

26
six-month period in question received an accurate price disclosure. Plaintiff asks that LHM SWH
be ordered to produce the requested documents and that the supplemental dealer sticker be scanned
and produced in color. The Court grants the request, but allows that, in the alternative, LHM SWH
may produce the documents in question electronically, or, if it prefers, it may allow Plaintiff to
inspect and make its own color copies of the original documents.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion To Compel Defendant LHM SWH,
LLC To Provide Complete Responses To First Set Of Discovery, Doc. 41, is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. Except with respect to Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4,
Defendant LHM SWH is ORDERED to serve Plaintiff with supplemental written responses and
produce supplemental documents pursuant to this order on or before May 25, 2026. The parties
are ordered to meet and confer regarding Interrogatory No. 4 and RFP No. 4 to attempt to reach
agreement on a reasonable time frame for LHM SWH to respond. For the reasons previously stated
on the record, the Court does not award fees and costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of May, 2026.
__________________________________
KEVIN R. SWEAZEA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00942-JMR-KRS Document 87 Filed 05/11/26 Page 26 of 26