Herrera v. Maddox Management LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
______________________
JAMES B. HERRERA,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00658 KWR/JMR
MADDOX MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the following motions:
 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Doc. 18);
 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23);
 	Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 24);
 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 25);
 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Certain Exhibits (Doc. 26);
 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29);
 	Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and Escrow (Doc. 32); and
 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed Page Limits (Doc. 35).
Defendant moves to dismiss this case pursuant to Colorado River abstention or res
judicata. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss is not well-taken and, therefore, is DENIED. However, as explained below,
the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order
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why this case should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
BACKGROUND 1
This case follows Defendant Maddox Management, LLC’s eviction proceeding against
Plaintiff James Herrera. The Metropolitan Court granted the eviction. Plaintiff appealed that
decision to the Second Judicial District Court, which held a de novo bench trial, found in
Maddox’s favor, and awarded damages in Maddox’s favor.
Plaintiff subsequently filed Fair Housing Act cases in state court and in this court.
Generally, Plaintiff alleges that during the eviction proceedings he attempted to find alternative
housing and Maddox responded to rental verification checks by prospective landlords with
allegedly misleading or false information. He does not provide factual allegations describing the
alleged false information.
A. 	Eviction Proceedings.
The Metropolitan Court’s eviction decision was appealed to the Second Judicial District
Court. Following a de novo bench trial, the state district court made the following findings. See
Final Judgment on Appeal Following De Novo Trial, Award for Damages, Fees and Costs and
Closing and Dismissing Case, Maddox Management, LLC v. James B. Herrera, D-202-cv-2024-
02951 (Second Judicial District Court, April 9, 2025).
The state district court noted that Mr. Herrera failed to appear at trial and found that he no
longer resides on the premises at issue. Id. at 1. It found that the parties entered into a written
lease agreement. Rent was $795 per month. Mr. Herrera was served with a three-day notice on
September 5, 2023 for failure to pay August and September 2023 rent. Id. at 3. The parties
1 The court may take sua sponte judicial notice of the case filings in state court. Johnson v.
Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 705 (10th Cir. 2020).
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reached an agreement in Metropolitan Court in which Mr. Herrera would vacate the premises by
December 31, 2023 and the landlord would dismiss the eviction without prejudice. Mr. Herrera
did not vacate by the agreed date, and the landlord reopened the eviction case to enforce the
settlement agreement. Id. The Metropolitan Court granted the motion to enforce the settlement
agreement and entered a Judgment for Restitution on April 9, 2024. Id. Mr. Herrera voluntarily
vacated the premises on June 25, 2024, but appealed the eviction decision to state district court.
Id.
The state district court held a de novo bench trial on April 8, 2025 and found that Mr.
Herrera owed $9,152.86 in damages, including unpaid rent, late fees, other charges allowed by
the lease, as well as a replacement stove, broken window and cleaning fee. Id. Maddox
Management, LLC was also awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,130.16. Id. at 4.
The state district court entered its mandate on May 12, 2025, stating that the judgment
was final. Mandate to the Metropolitan Court, Maddox Management, LLC v. James B. Herrera,
D-202-cv-2024-02951(Second Judicial District Court, May 12, 2025).
B. 	Fair Housing Act cases.
On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court asserting a (1) Fair Housing Act
claim, (2) a procedural due process claim, and (3) a Rehabilitation Act claim. 	Plaintiff alleges
that his landlord – who was pursuing eviction proceedings against him in state court – responded
to rental verifications by prospective landlords with false or misleading information, impeding
his ability to find alternative housing and resulting in the loss of his Section 8 voucher. Plaintiff
summarily alleges as follows in his Amended Complaint (Doc. 6):
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
7. Plaintiff resided in a rental property managed by Maddox Management LLC
beginning in August 2021.
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8. Plaintiff received Section 8 housing assistance through the Albuquerque
Housing Authority (AHA).
9. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s attempt to relocate under his voucher by
submitting false or misleading information to prospective landlords, leading to
wrongful denials.
10. As a result, Plaintiff’s Section 8 voucher assistance was revoked, causing
financial hardship and job loss.
11. 	Defendant 	retaliated 	against 	Plaintiff 	for 	asserting 	his 	housing 	rights,
including pursuing inflated and excessive claims for property damages, refusing
to apply rent credits, and contributing to an unlawful eviction.
12. Plaintiff moved out of the property on June 1, 2024, after filing an appeal in
state court.
13. Despite Plaintiff filing an excused absence for the hearing, the state court
entered judgment against Plaintiff in the appeal.
14. Plaintiff suffers from documented medical and psychological disabilities and
had requested reasonable accommodations from Defendant, which were ignored.
15. Plaintiff attempted to resolve the dispute through a good faith settlement offer,
which was dismissed by Defendant's attorney, who further instructed Plaintiff to
cease all future communication.
16. Plaintiff does not seek to vacate or overturn the state court judgment but seeks
prospective relief for ongoing and future harms stemming from Defendant's
conduct.
V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
Count I: Violation of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3604, § 3617)
17. Defendant unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff s housing rights and retaliated
against him for engaging in protected activity.
Count II: Violation of Procedural Due Process (U.S. Const. Amend. XIV)
18. Plaintiff was deprived of housing and benefits without due process of law
when his excused absence from state court proceedings was ignored, contributing
to wrongful judgment and eviction.
Count III: Disability Discrimination (Rehabilitation Act, Section 504)
19. Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff s disabilities and retaliated against
him for asserting those rights, resulting in additional housing instability and harm.
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Am. Compl., Doc. 6 at 2-3.
On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court, New
Mexico, asserting similar claims as he asserted in this case. See Compl., James B. Herrera v.
Maddox Management, LLC, D-202-cv-2025-03875 (Second Judicial District Court). In that case,
Plaintiff alleged that he applied to rent an apartment at Tesoro Apartments under a Section 8
Housing Choice Voucher program. 	Id. at 4. However, he alleges that Maddox Management,
LLC submitted a misleading and incomplete rental verification, causing Tesoro to deny Plaintiff
housing. He alleges that Tesoro management admitted the denial was based on an error and
indicated willingness to reconsider. However, Plaintiff lost his Section 8 voucher, housing
assistance, and employment. His complaint asserted a violation of the Fair Housing Act and a
Rehabilitation Act claim. He also cited to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but did not specify a claim under §
1983. Id. at 4.
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Court sets aside the default and denies default judgment.
Defendant moves to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default, while Plaintiff moves for entry
of default judgment. As explained below, the Court sets aside the default and denies entry of
default judgment. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 24) is granted and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 25) is denied.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that “[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for good
cause.” “In deciding whether to set aside an entry of default, courts may consider, among other
things, whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary,
and whether a meritorious defense is presented.” Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 316
Fed.Appx. 744, 750 (10th Cir. 2009), quoted in Watkins v. Donnelly, 551 F. App'x 953, 958
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(10th Cir. 2014). The Court finds good cause to set aside the entry of default, as explained
below.
First, it appears that Defendant’s response was not late. On August 12, 2025, Judge
Rozzoni issued an Order Regarding Service, directing the Clerk of Court to mail a notice and
waiver of service form to Defendant at its New Mexico address. See Doc. 11. The waiver of
service form was dated August 13, 2025 and provided that if the waiver form was signed and
filed on the docket, Defendant would have sixty days from the date the form was sent to answer
the complaint. Doc. 21 at 1. The form was signed and filed on the docket. See Docs. 20, 21.
Second, even assuming Defendant’s answer or response was late, any delay was not
willful or in bad faith. Rather, the delay appeared to have been caused by Defendant receiving,
and executing, two separate waiver of service forms with different deadlines for filing an answer
or response. Both Plaintiff and the Court sent Defendant notice and waiver of service forms.
Defendant received and executed a notice and waiver of service form which provided that the
answer was due 60 days from the date of the notice, August 13, 2025. Doc. 21 at 1. Defendant
also received and executed a different notice and waiver of service form, which provided that an
answer or response weas due within sixty days of July 11, 2025. Therefore, Defendant
reasonably believed that the deadline was October 11, 2025. Moreover, Defendant timely filed a
notice to set aside default, eleven days after the entry of default.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the delay. As explained above, Defendant’s answer was
due either on or about September 9, 2025 or October 11, 2025, depending on which signed
waiver of service form was effective. Here, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss on September
25, 2025 and its motion to set aside default on September 26, 2025. See Docs. 23, 24.
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Finally, Defendant disputes the merits and does not concede that Plaintiff’s case is
meritorious. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. As explained below, it appears that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Therefore, the Court concludes there is good cause to set aside default, and the Court
grants Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 24).
Because the Court has set aside default, default judgment is not appropriate and the Court
denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 25). Rule 55 mandates a two-step process
for entering a default judgment. First, a party must obtain a Clerk’s entry of default. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(a). Second, the party must request a default judgment. 	Id. Here, because the Court set
aside default, default judgment is not appropriate. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment (Doc. 25) is denied.
II. 	The Court declines to abstain under Colorado River.
Defendant moves to dismiss this case under Colorado River abstention. See Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss, Doc. 23. Defendant argues that Plaintiff previously filed a state court case asserting the
same claims as in this case. Under Colorado River abstention, a federal district court may stay or
dismiss a case when there is a prior, parallel state court proceeding pending. As explained below,
the cases are not parallel, or alternatively, the Colorado River factors do not weigh in favor of
abstention.
Generally, federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the
jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that “the
pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in
the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
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280, 292 (2005) (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). However, it is well-
established that “federal courts have the power to refrain from hearing,” among other things,
“cases which are duplicative of a pending state proceeding.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996).
First, the Court must examine whether the state and federal proceedings are parallel. See
Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994). A suit is considered parallel “if
substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different forums.” Id.
(quoting New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, UMWA, 946 F. 2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir.
1991)). The Court must determine whether state and federal cases are parallel as “to grant a stay
or dismissal under the Colorado River doctrine would be ‘a serious abuse of discretion’ unless
‘the parallel state-court litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt
resolution of the issue between the parties.’ ” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983)). A decision to abstain based on the Colorado
River doctrine “necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do in
resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses.” Id. at 1082 (quoting
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 28).
Here, the Court concludes that the two cases are not parallel. They both assert FHA and
Rehabilitation Act claims stemming from Defendant Maddox’s alleged response to rental
verifications from prospective landlords. 	In this case, however, Plaintiff asserts a claim which
was not brought in state court. Under Count II, Plaintiff alleges his procedural Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. Thus, it appears these cases are not parallel.
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Alternatively, even assuming the cases were parallel, the Court concludes that abstention
is not warranted. If a court concludes that there are parallel proceedings, the court must consider
the following factors in deciding whether to abstain:
1. the possibility that one of the two courts has exercised jurisdiction over property
2. the inconvenience from litigating in the federal forum
3. the avoidance of piecemeal litigation
4. the sequence in which the courts obtained jurisdiction
5. the “vexatious or reactive nature” of either case
6. the applicability of federal law
7. the potential for the state-court action to provide an effective remedy for the federal
plaintiff
8. the possibility of forum shopping.
Wakaya Perfection, LLC v. Youngevity Int'l, Inc., 910 F.3d 1118, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2018). As
explained below, these factors do not weigh in favor of abstention.
The first factor is not relevant here, as there is no property at issue. Plaintiff voluntarily
surrendered possession of the rental property and the eviction proceeding is closed. 	Plaintiff
generally seeks damages in this case and the pending state court case for conduct which is
separate from the eviction proceeding.
As to the second factor, there is no inconvenience in litigating in federal court as opposed
to state court.
As to the third factor, the court must evaluate the risk of piecemeal litigation. “The
paramount consideration in Colorado River was the third factor: the danger of piecemeal
litigation.” D.A. Osguthorpe Fam. P'ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir.
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2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). This factor focuses on the extent of litigation in state
court. Where extensive, years-long litigation has occurred in state court, a federal court may
abstain. Id. Here, both cases were filed close together and both are on approximately the same
litigation track. This Court issued an order to show cause and now this dispositive opinion. The
state court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on November 6, 2025. 	Moreover, this case
has a claim which was not asserted in the state court proceeding. Although a prior eviction
proceeding was resolved and closed in state court, most of the claims in this case do not involve
the 	eviction 	proceeding. 	Rather, 	they 	challenge 	Defendant’s 	alleged 	response 	to 	rental
verifications from prospective landlords. If the Court abstained from this case, Plaintiff’s Due
Process claim would not be heard or adjudicated. Thus, it would not further the goal of avoiding
piecemeal litigation to abstain from this case.
Next, under the fourth factor the Court looks to the order in which the state and federal
courts obtained jurisdiction over the matter. In applying this factor, “priority should not be
measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much
progress has been made in the two actions.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21 (1983); D.A. Osguthorpe Fam. P'ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223,
1235 (10th Cir. 2013). The state court matter was filed on April 24, 2025, and this matter was
filed on July 11, 2025. This Court already issued a prior order to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed, and now issues this opinion proposing dismissal of all claims. The state
court held a hearing on a motion to dismiss on November 6, 2025. Thus, unlike in Colorado
River or D.A. Osguthorpe, 705 F.3d at 1235, there has not been extensive state court litigation
prior to the filing of the federal case, and the state court litigation is not ahead of this case.
Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of abstention.
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As to the fifth factor, the Court must consider the vexatious or reactive nature of either
case. 	To be sure, Plaintiff has filed multiple cases, but that is so whenever Colorado River
abstention is at issue. This factor does not appear to be relevant or weigh in either direction.
As to the sixth factor, Plaintiff has asserted federal claims. State courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over these claims, but these types of claims are often filed in or removed to federal
court.
As to the seventh factor, the state court has the same ability to provide an effective
remedy as this court.
As to the eighth factor, there does not appear to be forum shopping. This case was filed
shortly after the state court case, before any decisions were issued or judicial actions taken in that
case.
In sum, the factors are generally neutral or do not weigh in favor of abstention. The Court
in Colorado River emphasized that “[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.”
424 U.S. at 819. Here, the Court does not find the clearest of justifications warranting dismissal.
Therefore, this is not an exceptional case warranting Colorado River abstention.
III. 	The Court declines to dismiss this case on res judicata grounds.
Defendant summarily asserts that this case should be dismissed on res judicata grounds.
See Doc. 23. The Court concludes that Defendant has not adequately briefed res judicata, and the
Court denies the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) without prejudice.
IV. 	The Court directs Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed.
As explained below, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
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A. 	Relevant legal standards.
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court granted. See
Docs. 2, 7, 9. Section 1915(e) of Title 28 requires the Court to conduct a sua sponte review of all
in forma pauperis complaints. The Court must dismiss “at any time” any complaint that is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that… the action… fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted…”) (emphasis added). The Court may also dismiss a
complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) if “it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing [plaintiff] an opportunity to amend [the] complaint
would be futile.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted).
The plaintiff must frame a complaint that contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
All complaints filed in Federal court must also comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under
that rule, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement” of the grounds for relief, and
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 8(a)(2). “Rule 8 serves the
important purpose of requiring plaintiffs to state their claims intelligibly so as to inform the
defendants of the legal claims being asserted.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th
Cir. 2007).
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Many of Plaintiff's allegations are vague or conclusory, or he does not provide sufficient
factual allegations to state a plausible claim. Vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient
to state a claim. See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021)
(“we disregard conclusory statements and look to the remaining factual allegations to see
whether Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim”); Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at
Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]o state a claim in
federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the
defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the
plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”). A district court reviews a complaint as follows:
We use the Iqbal/Twombly standard to determine whether Plaintiffs have stated a
plausible claim. Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2011). In
applying this standard, we take Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded facts as true, view them in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and draw all reasonable inferences from the
facts in favor of Plaintiffs. Id. at 1162.
A plausible claim includes facts from which we may reasonably infer Defendant's
liability. Id. at 1163. Plaintiffs must nudge the claim across the line from
conceivable or speculative to plausible. Id. Allegations that are “ ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant's liability” stop short of that line. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
Labels, conclusions, formulaic recitations of elements, and naked assertions will
not suffice. Id. An allegation is conclusory where it states an inference without
stating underlying facts or is devoid of any factual enhancement. Kellum v.
Mares, 657 Fed. App'x 763, 770 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (citing Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Conclusory allegations are “not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir.
2012). In fact, we disregard conclusory statements and look to the remaining
factual allegations to see whether Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim. Waller
v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2019).
Brooks, 985 F.3d at 1281 (footnote omitted).
B. 	The voluminous record violates Rule 8 and the Court will not consider
Plaintiff’s evidence presented outside of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 6).
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Plaintiff has filed numerous documents, including exhibits, in support of various
pleadings or motions. See, e.g., Docs. 17, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41. His Notice of Filing Exhibits A-H
(Doc. 17) is 240 pages. He also filed a supplemental declaration with apparently new evidence.
Doc. 41. These documents were filed well after he filed his Amended Complaint, were
apparently not referenced in his Amended Complaint, and go outside of the allegations in his
Amended Complaint. As explained below, the Court will not consider them in determining
whether his Amended Complaint states a claim.
“The usual rule is that a court should consider no evidence beyond the pleadings on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 932 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (2007)). But the Tenth
Circuit has held that “[a] district court may consider a document outside the four corners of a
complaint in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff's
claim, (2) referred to in the complaint, and (3) free of any genuine dispute over its authenticity.”
Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 107 F.4th 1121, 1131 (10th Cir.
2024) (emphasis added).
Moreover, “[i]t is not the role of ... the Court ... to sort through a ... complaint and
voluminous exhibits ... to construct [the movant’s] causes of action.” McNamara v. Brauchler,
570 Fed. App’x 741, 743 (10th Cir. 2014); see Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868
F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The law recognizes a significant difference between notice
pleading and ‘shotgun’ pleading.”). Piecemeal submissions violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which
requires movants to submit a short, plain statement setting forth the grounds for relief. 	See
Monument Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass’n of Kan., 891 F.2d 1473,
1480 (10th Cir. 1998) (The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give opposing parties fair notice of the basis
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of the claim against them so that they may respond to the complaint, and to apprise the court of
sufficient allegations to allow it to conclude, if the allegations are proved, that the claimant has a
legal right to relief.”) (quotations omitted).
Consistent with these authorities, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s numerous submissions
violate Rule 8 and the Court declines to consider the supplemental filings in determining whether
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states a claim. The Court will not attempt to piece together
factual allegations from various documents filed on the docket which were not attached to or
filed with the Amended Complaint. In analyzing whether Plaintiff states a claim, the Court limits
its analysis to the four corners of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 6).
C. 	Plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim (Count I) fails to state a claim.
Plaintiff summarily alleges that “Defendant unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff’s housing
rights and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity.” Doc. 6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant violated the Fair Housing Act, citing to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3617. He also
alleges as follows:
9. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s attempt to relocate under his voucher by
submitting false or misleading information to prospective landlords, leading to
wrongful denials.
10. As a result, Plaintiff’s Section 8 voucher assistance was revoked, causing
financial hardship and job loss.
11. 	Defendant 	retaliated 	against 	Plaintiff 	for 	asserting 	his 	housing 	rights,
including pursuing inflated and excessive claims for property damages, refusing
to apply rent credits, and contributing to an unlawful eviction.
12. Plaintiff moved out of the property on June 1, 2024, after filing an appeal in
state court.
Am. Compl., Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 9-12.
As explained below, Plaintiff fails to state a Fair Housing Act claim for disability
discrimination or retaliation
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Under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), “it is unlawful to discriminate against a ‘buyer or
renter because of a handicap,’ 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), or to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the FHA, id.,
§ 3617.” Morgan v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., 719 F. App'x 735, 743 (10th Cir. 2017). “To state
a plausible claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege a causal connection between [his]
disability or protected activity and the alleged adverse action.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Warren Cty.,
830 F.3d 464, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff
claiming violations of §§ 3604(f)(1) & 3617 failed to plausibly allege that adverse action was
“because of his disability”)).
Plaintiff does not plausibly allege discrimination. To prove a claim of discrimination
under the FHA or Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff may offer either direct evidence or may point to
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, thereby “invok[ing] the familiar McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting scheme originally spawned in the Title VII arena but long since equally
entrenched in the FHA, ADA, and RA contexts.” Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. St.
George City, 685 F.3d 917, 919 (10th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff bears the burden of putting forth a
prima facie case of discrimination, which must include factual allegations suggesting that the
defendant took the complained of action because of plaintiff's disability. Id. at 920. 	Here,
Plaintiff only summarily asserts discrimination.
Plaintiff alleges he is disabled, but his Amended Complaint does not assert any factual
allegations regarding his alleged disability. As the Court explained below in its analysis of the
Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that he is disabled.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him by responding to rental
verifications by prospective landlords with false or misleading information. But Plaintiff also
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does not allege that Defendant discriminated in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or otherwise
made unavailable or denied him a dwelling, because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A)
(it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter.”). Plaintiff does not
allege that Defendant denied him a rental or a dwelling. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
violated the Fair Housing Act when it provided an allegedly false or misleading response to
rental verification inquiries from prospective landlords, while the state court eviction proceeding
was pending. This type of claim does not appear to fall under the Fair Housing Act.
Plaintiff also does not allege any facts 	supporting his conclusory allegation that
Defendant responded to rental verifications with a false or misleading statement. He does not
explain or state the alleged misleading or false statement.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege causation. “To state a plausible claim under
the FHA, a plaintiff must allege a causal connection between her disability or protected activity
and the alleged adverse action.” 	Morgan v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., 719 F. App'x 735, 743
(10th Cir. 2017). Here, Plaintiff failed to identify a connection between his protected activity or
disability and the alleged adverse action. Plaintiff failed to identify a protected activity, and he
failed to state that Defendant was aware of his disability. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint fails to identify when the alleged false statements occurred.
Plaintiff alleges that he received Section 8 housing assistance and Defendant “interfered
with Plaintiff’s attempt to relocate under his voucher by submitting false or misleading
information to prospective landlords” during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. 	Am.
Compl., Doc. 6 at 2. It is unclear why Defendant would intentionally interfere with his use of a
Section 8 voucher with another landlord, especially when it appears that interfering with
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Plaintiff’s attempt to move left Defendant with a non-paying tenant and greater uncollected
damages.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant retaliated against him. The FHA prohibits retaliation
against individuals on the basis of their exercise of their rights under the FHA:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed,
or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise
or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 803, 804, 805, or 806
[42 U.S.C. § 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606].
42 U.S.C. § 3617. “To prove a 3617 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) [he] is a
protected individual under the FHA, (2) [he] was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of her
fair housing rights, (3) the defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered with the
plaintiff on account of [his] protected activity under the FHA, and (4) the defendants were
motivated by an intent to discriminate.’ ” Hatfield v. Cottages on 78th Cmty. Ass'n, No. 21-4035,
2022 WL 2452379, at *8 (10th Cir. July 6, 2022) (quoting Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771,
783 (7th Cir. 2009)). As explained above, Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant was motivated
by an intent to discriminate. Moreover, he does not assert sufficient factual allegations to
plausibly allege that Defendant interfered with his protected activity under the FHA or a right
under § 3604. He also does not plausibly allege causation.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant pursued damages in the state court eviction proceeding
because of his protected activity. He does not assert factual allegations plausibly supporting this
allegation. He does not identify his protected activity or plausibly allege that the state court
issued damages because of his protected activity or disability. Rather, the state court held a
bench trial, heard evidence, and issued a damages judgment for unpaid rent, late fees, damages to
the property, and attorney’s fees.
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Moreover, 	he 	does 	not 	allege 	any 	factual 	allegations supporting 	his 	assertion 	of
harassment, surveillance, and property interference. He asserts that his home was broken into on
March 6, 2025 and that he has been surveilled. But he does not assert that Defendant was
involved at all or assert facts plausibly alleging that Defendant Maddox was involved in the
break-in or surveillance.
Finally, Plaintiff does not identify when he engaged in his alleged protected activity, and
whether it was before or after Defendant filed the eviction proceedings. Defendant Maddox
Management won the eviction proceedings in Metropolitan Court following a bench trial at
which it presented evidence on April 9, 2024. See Morgan v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., 719 F.
App'x 735, 744 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff failed to show causation when they
engaged in protected activity only after mortgagor successfully foreclosed on loan).
Therefore, Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a Fair Housing Act claim under Count I.
D. 	The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due
Process Claim (Count II).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim as to the
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim (Count II).
First, Rooker-Feldman bars the Court from concluding that the state court judgment was
“wrongfully” entered, or that his procedural due process rights were violated when the state court
allegedly held his absence from a bench trial against him and entered judgment against him.
Generally, the avenue to challenge a wrongfully issued judgment is an appeal. As the Court
explained in a prior order to show cause, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
bars federal district courts from hearing cases “brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
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544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Where the relief
requested would necessarily undo the state court’s judgment, Rooker-Feldman
deprives the district court of jurisdiction.
Velasquez v. Utah, 775 F. App’x 420, 422 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); Knox v. Bland,
632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Under [the Rooker-Feldman] doctrine, ‘a party losing in
state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005-06 (1994)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was “deprived of housing and benefits
without due process of law when his excused absence from state court proceedings was ignored,
contributing 	to 	wrongful 	judgment 	and 	eviction.” 	Am. 	Compl., Doc. 	6 	at 	2. 	He 	seeks
compensatory damages of $25,000, punitive damages, and “prospective” injunctive relief
prohibiting Defendant from continuing “retaliatory and discriminatory housing practices.” Id. at
3. Plaintiff expressly states that the state court judgment in his eviction proceedings was
“wrongful.” Id. at 2. Although his complaint is terse, he appears to assert that his procedural due
process rights were violated by the state court entering judgment against him after it allegedly
held his absence from a hearing against him. But he does not appear to plead any wrongful acts
by Defendant Maddox which violated his procedural due process rights.
The Court issued an order to show cause why this claim should not be dismissed, and
Plaintiff only argued in response that he was not seeking to vacate the state court judgment. See
Doc. 4. But Rooker-Feldman may still apply where a party asserts that a state court judgment
was wrongfully entered and it violated their procedural due process rights. See Dillard v. Bank of
New York, 476 F. App'x 690, 691 (10th Cir. 2012) (procedural due process claim alleging her
due process rights were violated during foreclosure proceedings barred by Rooker-Feldman
doctrine); Rodriguez v. Nationwide Homes, Inc., 756 F. App'x 782, 784 (10th Cir. 2018)
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(Rooker-Feldman barred due process claim asserting that state court’s entry of judgment violated
due process rights). This is the case even when the desired remedy is “unclear”, but the claim is
nonetheless based on an allegation that “the state court’s judgment was defective.” 	Rodriguez,
756 F. App'x at 784. Thus, Rooker-Feldman bars Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim (Count II).
Alternatively, assuming the Court has jurisdiction over the due process claim, Plaintiff
fails to allege that Defendant Maddox Management is a state actor. Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim, which is analyzed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 is the “remedial vehicle for raising claims based on the violation of [federal] constitutional
rights.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016). “A cause of action under
section 1983 requires the deprivation of a civil right by a ‘person’ acting under color of state
law.” McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees, 215 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff must
allege that each government official, through the official's own individual actions, has personally
violated the Constitution. See Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 1998). There must
also be a connection between the official conduct and the constitutional violation. See Fogarty v.
Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008); Trask, 446 F.3d at 1046.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant was a state actor or acted under the color of
law during the eviction proceedings. 	Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege a connection between
Defendant’s conduct and the alleged due process violation. Plaintiff alleges that the state district
court, not Defendant, wrongfully entered judgment after Plaintiff failed to appear at the bench
trial. The state court held the bench trial, took evidence, and entered judgment. Defendant
Maddox was a landlord pursuing an eviction proceeding in state court for failure to pay rent, not
a state actor.
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Next, Plaintiff does not plead any facts stating how Defendant violated his due process
rights. 	Plaintiff alleges that the state court wrongfully entered judgment against him after he
failed to appear at a hearing. But he does not allege any acts by the Defendant in violating his
due process rights. Plaintiff cannot assert a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the
state court in this federal case. The state district court has sovereign immunity in federal court as
to § 1983 claims. Springer v. Seventh Judicial District Court, No. 24-2174, 2025 WL 3121605,
at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025).
Therefore, the Court dismisses the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (Count II).
E. 	Count III – Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff asserted a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified under 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). He summarily alleged that “Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s
disabilities and retaliated against him for asserting those rights, resulting in additional housing
instability and harm.” Am. Compl., Doc. 6 at ¶ 19.
Under the Rehabilitation Act, “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of
the Rehabilitation Act. He was required to establish that ‘(1) that [he] is disabled under the Act’;
(2) that [he] would be ‘otherwise qualified’ to participate in the program; (3) that the program
receives federal financial assistance (or is a federal agency ...); and (4) that the program has
discriminated against the plaintiff.” Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Here, Plaintiff summarily alleges that he is disabled, but he does not plausibly allege facts
suggesting he is disabled. The Rehabilitation Act defines the term “disability” to mean any of the
following:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12102(2); 	see 	also 	EEOC 	Interpretive 	Guidelines 	for 	the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b). To be substantially limited in a
major life activity, “an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely 	restricts 	the 	individual 	from 	doing 	activities 	that 	are 	of 	central
importance to most people's daily lives.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). The
impairment's impact must “be permanent or long term.” Id. In analyzing whether
something is a disability the court looks to whether it is a “physiological disorder
or condition affecting one or more body systems, or any mental or psychological
disorder.” Enwonwu v. Fulton–Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 286 Fed.Appx. 586, 603 (11th
Cir.2008) 	(citing 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1630.2(h)(1), 	(2)). 	A 	medical 	diagnosis 	is
insufficient, rather, “the ADA requires plaintiffs to offer evidence that the extent
of the limitation caused by their impairment in terms of their own experience is
substantial.” Id.
Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff asserts no factual
allegations regarding his alleged disability.
Plaintiff also does not assert any factual allegations plausibly alleging that Defendant
Maddox is a “program or activity” under § 794(a) or a recipient of federal financial assistance.
See, e.g., Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 974 (10th Cir.2002) (“Unlike the
blanket involuntary coverage of the ADA, however, the Rehabilitation Act's coverage extends
only to entities that choose to receive federal assistance.”); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3) (a corporation
or other private organization is a ‘program or activity’ under 794(a) if assistance is extended to
the entity as a whole or it is principally engaged in the business of providing housing).
Next, he does not assert factual allegation establishing that he was otherwise qualified
under the Section 8 program at the time of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff failed to assert
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factual allegations plausibly alleging that he was denied a Section 8 voucher because of
discrimination rather than some other reason.
Thus, Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
F. 	Conclusion and Order to Show Cause.
In sum, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The Court directs Plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed within
twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order. If Plaintiff chooses to fix the defects in his
Amended Complaint so that it states a claim, he is granted leave to file a single pleading (with
exhibits) within that time. This combined document must not exceed thirty pages. 	If Plaintiff
fails to timely show cause or timely file an Amended Complaint which states a plausible claim,
the Court may dismiss this case without further notice.
V. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed Page Limits (Doc. 35).
Plaintiff filed a motion to exceed page limits as to certain exhibits. He has filed multiple
exhibits, which do not appear to relate to any specific motion. The motion is denied, as the Court
does not consider the exhibits in determining whether Plaintiff states a claim in his Amended
Complaint.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed Page Limits for Exhibits (Doc. 35) is denied.
VI. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29).
Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See Doc. 29. Plaintiff asserts the
Motion to Dismiss is improper, as default has been entered.
Because the Court has set aside the default, the Court declines to strike the Motion to
Dismiss. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as Improper Post-Default
Filing (Doc. 29) is therefore DENIED.
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VII. 	The Court denies Plaintiff emergency relief.
In various filings Plaintiff requested that the Court enter emergency relief. Plaintiff
requests that the Court (1) order Defendant to deposit into escrow Plaintiff’s requested monetary
damages and (2) enter injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from retaliating against Plaintiff.
Doc. 32 at 3; Docs. 48, 49.
As explained above, the Court has set aside default and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment. Moreover, it appears at this time that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim. Finally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that ordering Defendant to place
money in escrow or in the Court’s registry is warranted. Therefore, the Court declines to issue
emergency relief or preliminary injunctive relief.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s Supplemental Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and
Escrow (Doc. 32).
VIII. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Exhibits (Docs. 18, 26).
Plaintiff filed two motions to seal exhibits. Docs. 18, 26. Plaintiff does not identify the
specific docket entry he wants sealed, but it appears that Plaintiff seeks to seal certain exhibits in
his Notice of Filing Exhibits A-H, Doc. 17. Because these documents appear to include personal
information, including personal medical records, the Court SEALS the following document from
public view, to be accessible by case participants:
 	Notice of Filing Exhibits A-H (Doc. 17).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motions to Seal Exhibits (Docs. 18, 26) are granted.
CONCLUSION
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As explained above, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23).
However, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not dismiss his case
within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
23) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause why the Court should not
dismiss this case for the reasons identified herein within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of
this opinion. As explained above, if Plaintiff seeks to file a new amended complaint, he may file
one pleading with exhibits attached, limited to thirty (30) pages. Failure to timely show cause or
timely file an amended complaint which states a plausible claim for relief may result in dismissal
of this case without further notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 24)
is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 25) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss as Improper Post-Default Filing (Doc. 29) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Protective Relief
and Escrow (Doc. 32) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed Page Limits for
Exhibits (Doc. 35) is DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s two Motions to Seal Certain Exhibits
(Docs. 18, 26) are GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to seal Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing
Exhibits A-H, Doc. 17.
_____/S/__________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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