Langworthy v. Chavez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
GENEVA LANGWORTHY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 1:25-cv-00409-SMD-LF
EMILIO CHAVEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE AND FOR NEW JUDGE
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff’s Motion to Re-Open Case
and for Change of Judge, Doc. 26, filed December 19, 2025 (“Motion”).
The Court dismissed this case without prejudice and entered its Final Judgment on
October 20, 2025. See Order of Dismissal at 2-3, Doc. 20 (noting that: (i) Judge Fashing entered
two orders notifying Plaintiff that the allegations in amended complaints must be numbered; (ii)
Judge Fashing notified Plaintiff that failure to comply with the orders and the Federal and Local
Rules of Civil Procedure may result in dismissal of this case; and (iii) Plaintiff failed to comply
with both orders); Final Judgment, Doc. 21. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on October 22, 2025.
See Doc. 22. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for
failure to prosecute and entered its mandate on January 8, 2026. 	See Doc. 27, filed January 8,
2026.
Plaintiff states this case “must be reopened because it is the only means for the restoration
of [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” and a “different judge (not appointed by any Democrat
regime) must be assigned.” Motion at 4.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to reopen this case. Rule 60 provides in relevant part:
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) 	fraud 	(whether 	previously 	called 	intrinsic 	or 	extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). 	The Court construes Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen as
seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). 	“Rule 60(b)(6) relief is ... appropriate only when it
offends justice to deny such relief.” Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th
Cir. 2005); Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2018) (“A
Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment is an extraordinary remedy and may be granted only
in exceptional circumstances”); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 74 F.4th 1208, 1215-16 (10th Cir.
2023) (“the party requesting relief from judgment bears the burden of showing that relief is
warranted”) (citing Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009).
Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that reopening this case is warranted. The dismissal
was without prejudice after Plaintiff failed to comply with Court orders and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and after Judge Fashing notified Plaintiff that failure to comply may result in
dismissal of this case. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal but failed to prosecute her appeal.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for a new Judge. Section 455 provides:
(a) 	Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) 	He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
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(1) 	Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
28 U.S.C. § 455(a and b(1)).
Judges not only have a strong duty to recuse when appropriate, but also a strong duty to
sit, and the statute “must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so
that recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.”
United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017).
[F]ederal law instructs that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “This
[recusal] requirement is intended ‘to promote confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.’” United States v.
Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mathis v. Huff & Puff
Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015)). “The standard is purely
objective. The inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom.” United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir.
1993); see id. (“In applying § 455(a), the judge's actual state of mind, purity of
heart, incorruptibility, or lack of partiality are not the issue.”); see also Charles
Gardner Geyh & Kris Markarian, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal
Law, § II.B.1.A, at 20 (3d ed. 2020) (“Section 455(a) makes clear that judges should
apply an objective standard in determining whether to disqualify.”). “In other
words, a judge's subjective state of mind is irrelevant; what matters is whether ‘the
public might reasonably believe that [the judge] knew’ of ‘facts creating an
appearance of impropriety.’” Wells, 873 F.3d at 1251 (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988)).
“In applying the [objective] test, the initial inquiry is whether a reasonable factual
basis exists for calling the judge's impartiality into question.”
. . . .
“In conducting this review, we must ask how these facts would appear to a well-
informed, thoughtful and objective observer,” who is “an average member of the
public,” not a “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Mathis, 787 F.3d at
1310 (emphasis added) (quoting Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 599 (5th Cir.
2004)). And courts must take into account that “cases within § 455(a) are extremely
fact driven ‘and must be judged on [their] unique facts and circumstances more than
by comparison to situations considered in prior jurisprudence.’” Nichols, 71 F.3d at
351 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th
Cir. 1995)); accord Wells, 873 F.3d at 1251.
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United States v. Martinez, 92 F.4th 1213, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff has not set forth any factual grounds that would cause a reasonable, objective
person, knowing all the relevant facts, to question the undersigned’s impartiality. 	Plaintiff’s
unsubstantiated statements that the undersigned “went to UNM School of Law, which is not a real
law school, like New Mexico is not really part of the United States,” “Judges who went to UNM
routinely violate the Constitution as if it doesn’t even exist” and the undersigned “is a Democrat
operative who refuses to recognize [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights because [Plaintiff] is white,
disabled, and a Patriot” are not sufficient to warrant disqualification. 	See Martinez, 92 F.4th at
1255 (“The inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom . . . the judge's actual state of mind, purity of heart, incorruptibility, or lack of partiality
are not the issue”).
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Re-Open Case and for Change of Judge,
Doc. 26, filed December 19, 2025, is DENIED.
_________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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