Flores v. Wood et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
__________________________
WALTER FLORES,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 24-cv-1230-KWR-GBW
MICHAEL T. WOOD, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sheriff Michael T. Wood’s Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) (Amended Complaint) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
(Doc. 21) (Motion to Dismiss). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 23), and Defendant filed a Reply
(Doc. 24). Having reviewed the relevant law and arguments, and because the Court has already
granted an opportunity to amend in this case, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND 1
This case stems from Plaintiff’s state criminal convictions. The state docket reflects that
Plaintiff was arrested in 2022 for aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon. See Warrant
in Case No. D-1226-CR-2022-091. A jury convicted Plaintiff of those charges, and the State Court
sentenced him to 14.5 years imprisonment. See Judgment in Case No. D-1226-CR-2022-091. The
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See Order Case No. S-1-SC-
40428.
1 The facts are taken from the original Complaint (Doc. 1), the Amended Complaint (Doc. 20), and the state dockets
cited by Plaintiff, Case Nos. D-1226-CR-2022-091 and S-1-SC-40428. See Mitchell v. Dowling, 672 Fed. App’x
792, 794 (10th Cir. 2016) (Habeas courts may take “judicial notice of the state-court docket sheet”).
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Plaintiff filed the instant action against two Defendants: (1) Sheriff Michael T. Wood; and
(2) State District Attorney Marcos Blais. See Doc. 1 at 1-2. His original Complaint raised civil
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that he did not receive due process in his state criminal
proceeding. 	See Doc. 1 at 2. 	He alleged the Sheriff’s Department failed to provide sufficient
evidence to support his convictions. Id. Although he referred to “Exhibit A fake gun residue test,”
there was no exhibit attached to the Complaint. Id. To support his claims, Plaintiff cited to two
criminal statutes and listed the New Mexico Supreme Court case associated with his criminal
appeal, No. S-1-SC-40428. 	Id. at 2-3. 	Plaintiff’s counseled brief in Case No. S-1-SC-40428
contained details about his insufficient-evidence claim. In that brief, counsel argued: (1) the victim
testified he did not believe Plaintiff was going to shoot a gun and was not scared; (2) there was
conflicting testimony about the number of shots fired; and (3) there was no physical evidence
demonstrating the shots actually caused the victim’s wounds. See Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in Case No. S-1-SC-40428. In the Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff asked the Court to vacate
his criminal convictions and sought an unspecified amount of damages for false imprisonment. Id.
at 5.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a letter and several procedural motions. The letter appeared to
be an attempt to supplement his Complaint as he argued that Plaintiff’s time of arrest contradicted
the window of time specified for a search of his property in the search warrant, thus, evidencing
“malicious intent in prosecutorial misconduct.” See Doc. 3 at 1. In his motions, Plaintiff sought
leave 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis; 	service 	of 	the 	Complaint; 	an 	Order 	deeming 	his
claims/allegations to be true; sanctions; a criminal investigation; and a hearing. See Docs. 2, 4, 9-
11, 17-18. Defendant Michael T. Wood entered an appearance, through counsel, and filed a Motion
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Doc. 8.
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On July 16, 2025, the Court reviewed all of the filings and issued an Order denying most
of Plaintiff’s procedural requests, permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis, granting
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and providing Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his
Complaint to cure his pleading deficiencies. 	Doc. 19. 	The Court agreed with Defendant that
Plaintiff had failed to include sufficient facts within his Complaint to link either Defendant Sheriff
Wood or Defendant District Attorney Blais to any wrongdoing that deprived Plaintiff of a civil
right. Id. at 5. Rather, Plaintiff relied “on collective allegations that certain departments violated
his rights, which are insufficient to survive review under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. The Court also found
that to the extent Plaintiff was attempting to invalidate his underlying state convictions by way of
a § 1983 action, such a strategy was prohibited by Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Id.
at 6-7. The Court advised Plaintiff that the appropriate means to challenge one’s conviction and
attack defects in a criminal investigation is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceeding. Id. at
7. Notably, Plaintiff has filed a Habeas Corpus Petition challenging his state assault and battery
convictions, which is currently pending. See Flores v. Sugg, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-00242-KWR-
JHR (filed Mar. 7, 2025).
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed a timely Amended Complaint naming Sheriff Wood in his official capacity
as the “‘chief executive officer’ of the Lincoln County Sherriff’s Office.” Doc. 20 at 1. He does
not list State District Attorney Marcos Blais in the caption of his Amended Complaint, and he does
not provide any facts related to his involvement in the claims presented. As such, the Court will
consider Mr. Blais to be voluntarily dismissed from this action.2
2 It is well-settled that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565
(10th Cir. 1991). Thus, when a petition is amended, “changes in parties, or changes in claims, effectively remake the
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In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that “[b]y not properly training his officers,
Michael T. Wood may be held liable.” Id. at 2. He argues that Defendant Sheriff Wood failed to
train Detective Bryce Bailey who “served the warrant before it was approved.” Id. at 3. He asserts
that the failure to train caused a violation to his “Constitutional right from unlawful search and
seizure” and denied him Due Process. 	Id. at 3-4. 	Plaintiff does not include a request for relief
section in his Amended Complaint and is therefore silent as to the damages he seeks.
Attached to the Amended Complaint is a one-page document marked, “Exhibit A,” which
Plaintiff describes as the “fake gun residue test.” Id. at 3, 6. Exhibit A appears to be a document
created by Plaintiff. It lists four videos: “Detective Bryce Bailey Video 9,” “Detective Bryce Bailey
Video 10,” “Detective Bryce Bailey Video 11,” and “Detective Bryce Bailey Video 12.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff describes the videos marked, 9, 11, and 12 to be “[i]rrelevant.” Id. As to the video marked
10, he writes: “Fake gun residue test and Walter Flores Statements. Taking pictures and execution
of Search Warrant.” Id. Assumably, Plaintiff is alleging that not only was he subject to an illegal
search, but that a portion of the evidence used against him was “fake.”
DISCUSSION
Defendant submitted the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 21). 	Defendant moves to dismiss arguing Plaintiff’s
amendment essentially “reasserts that certain aspects of the investigation which led to his
convictions were improper or illegal” and this Court cannot grant such relief “unless or until the
habeas matter is resolved in his favor” as directed by Heck v. Humphrey. Plaintiff’s Response to
the Motion to Dismiss is silent as to Defendant’s contention that Heck v. Humphrey bars relief. See
suit.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35-36 (2025).
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Doc. 23.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests
the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint.” Mobley v. McCormick,
40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). 	When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See
Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148 (2010).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.’” Id.
First, setting aside Defendant’s Heck v. Humphrey argument, Plaintiff contends Defendant
Sheriff Wood, in his official capacity, failed to train Detective Bailey on how to properly serve a
search warrant. 	Doc. 20 at 1-4. 	The deficiency in training allegedly subjected Plaintiff to an
unlawful search and seizure and deprivation of due process. Id. Lawsuits brought against public
officials in their official capacities “generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)
(citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). “As long
as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is,
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in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. (citing Brandon v.
Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)).
A failure to train or supervise employees may subject a municipal entity to liability under
§ 1983 if such a failure results from deliberate indifference. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388-91 (1989); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (“To establish a failure
to train claim, a plaintiff must show “essentially a complete failure to train, or training that is so
reckless or grossly negligent that future misconduct is almost inevitable.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In order to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff “must do more than merely
enumerate the multiple ways in which the officers were inadequately trained; rather, he must
proffer evidence of knowledge of the purported deficiencies on the part of the municipality.” Felts
v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Valencia Cnty., No. 13-CV-1094 MCA/SCY, 2016 WL 9778162,
at *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 23, 2016) (quoting Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003)
(citation modified). 	“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 	The
requirement to demonstrate “deliberate indifference” may also be satisfied where “the need for
more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. “Without notice that a course
of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately
chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. at 62. “Negligent
training alone does not establish § 1983 liability.” 	Corona v. City of Clovis, No. 2:17-CV-805
JCH/CG, 2019 WL 3779526, at *6 (D.N.M. Aug. 12, 2019).
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Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint provides only a conclusory allegation that Defendant
Sheriff Wood did not properly train his officers. See Doc. 1 at 2. Such a bare bones allegation is
insufficient to establish a plausible failure to train claim. See Lemmons v. Clymer, 609 Fed. Appx.
949, 956-57 (10th Cir. 2015) (conclusory argument “fails to demonstrate a complete failure to train
or training that is objectively unreasonable”); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991) (“conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a
claim on which relief can be based . . . [and] in analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint,
the court need accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his
conclusory allegations”). 	Here, the Amended Complaint is devoid of factual support to show a
pre-existing pattern of violations by other untrained employees as Plaintiff limits the facts to one
incident in which one Detective allegedly served a warrant before it was approved. Plaintiff also
does not provide any facts to demonstrate that the need for more or different training should have
been obvious to the municipal policymakers. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s failure to
train claim against Defendant Sheriff Wood, in his official capacity, is conclusory and must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.3
Even if Plaintiff’s allegations were not conclusory, his argument fails for a second reason
– it is precluded on Heck v. Humphrey grounds as argued by Defendant. 	Pursuant to Heck v.
Humphrey, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action may not “recover damages for alleged[ ] . . . harm caused
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless the
conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
3 Although Defendant does not raise the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s failure to train claim as a basis for dismissal
in the instant Motion, the Court also reviews the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which
establishes that when a plaintiff files a complaint in forma pauperis, courts must review the pleading and dismiss if it
fails to state a claim.
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Here, the Amended Complaint asserts two arguments: (1) an unlawful search occurred due
to Defendant Sheriff Wood’s inadequate training; and (2) “fake gun residue” evidence was used
against Plaintiff to support his conviction. These arguments appear to rest on the premise that all
the evidence obtained against him either came from the unlawful search or was falsely
manufactured. This Court cannot issue a judgment concluding there was an issue with the evidence
obtained and used in his trial because Plaintiff’s state criminal conviction necessarily established
that the evidence used to convict him was proper. 	While Heck v. Humphrey may not be an
automatic bar to unreasonable search claims due to doctrines such as independent source, inevitable
discovery, and harmless error, see Laurino v. Tate, 220 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2000); Beck v.
City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999), the instant action appears to
allege that all of the evidence used against him was the result of the alleged illegal search, some of
which was fabricated. See Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (Heck can apply
to cases where all the evidence obtained was the result of an illegal search); Ventris v. Kansas, 516
Fed. App’x 688, 688-689 (10th Cir. 2013) (Heck bars civil “claims that [plaintiff] is incarcerated
for crimes he did not commit, that known perjured testimony was introduced at his trial, [and] that
evidence was manufactured”); Hernandez v. Agent David Corp, No. CIV-99-0895 BB/LCS, 1999
WL 35808318, at *2 (D.N.M. Nov. 5, 1999) (“The second claim, based on an allegedly illegal
search and fabricated evidence, appears to call into question the constitutionality of the criminal
conviction . . . . This claim is barred under the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss does not provide any reason for why Heck v.
Humphrey should not be applied here. Thus, the instant action cannot proceed as pled.
If Plaintiff prevails in his habeas action, which is currently pending before this Court, he
may then refile his § 1983 claims against Defendant Sheriff Wood. See Garza, 672 F.3d at 1218
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(A civil rights claim barred by Heck “does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are
dismissed without prejudice and may be raised in a future complaint if he prevails in Flores v.
Sugg, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-00242-KWR-JHR. Because the Court has already granted leave to
amend in the initial screening ruling – in other words, this is the second round of pro se review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule 12(b)(6) – and because the claims are currently not viable,
Plaintiff will not be sua sponte invited to file another amendment in this case. The Court will grant
the Motion to Dismiss and enter final judgment.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Michael Wood’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint For Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 21) is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (Doc. 20) is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a cognizable claim under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule 12(b)(6); and the Court will enter final judgment closing the civil case.
SO ORDERED.
_____/S/________________________________
HON. KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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