Human Rights Defense Center v. Lujan Grisham et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 1:24-cv-01091-SMD-KRS
MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, individually
and in her capacity as Governor of the State of
New Mexico; ALISHA TAFOYA LUCERO,
individually and in her capacity as Cabinet
Secretary of the New Mexico Corrections
Department; MELANIE MARTINEZ,
individually and in her capacity as Deputy
Secretary of the New Mexico Correction
Department; GARY MACIEL, individually and
in his capacity as Deputy Secretary of the New
Mexico Correction Department; BRIAN R. EVANS,
individually and in his capacity as
Chief Executive Officer of The GEO Group, Inc.;
WAYNE H. CALABRESE, individually
and in his capacity as President and
Chief Operating Officer of The GEO Group, Inc.;
THE GEO GROUP, INC. d/b/a LEA COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, a corporation;
SCOTT MARQUARDT, individually and in his
capacity as Chief Executive Officer of
Management & Training Corporation;
DANIEL MARQUARDT, individually and
in his capacity as President of Management & Training
Corporation; MANAGEMENT & TRAINING
CORPORATION d/b/a OTERO COUNTY
PRISON FACILITY, a corporation; JOHN
AND JANE DOES 1-20, individually and in
their official capacities; and ENTITIES 1-10,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Michelle Lujan Grisham’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims. Doc. 28 (“Mot. to Dismiss”). Plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center
(“HRDC”) filed its response on January 28, 2025. Doc. 34 (“Pl.’s Resp.”). Defendant filed her
reply on April 18, 2025. Doc 59 (“Def.’s Reply”). The Court also considers the allegations set
forth in the First Amended Complaint and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 76
(“FAC”); Doc. 3.
The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, and for
the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The New Mexico Corrections Department (“NMCD”) is a cabinet-level agency of the State
of New Mexico, organized and existing under New Mexico law. FAC ¶ 10. During the period
relevant to this action, NMCD oversaw ten correctional facilities in New Mexico. Id.
Plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center (“HRDC”) is a non-profit organization whose
mission is to provide incarcerated persons with reading materials relevant to constitutional and
human rights issues, as well as information concerning access to education. Doc. 3 at 4. In
furtherance of that mission, HRDC regularly mails magazines, books, and subscription renewal
notices to incarcerated individuals housed in correctional facilities nationwide, including the
NMCD facilities. Id.
HRDC alleges that NMCD’s mail policies are vague and overbroad, and that those policies
impose categorical prohibition on certain publications, including HRDC’s materials. Doc. 3 at 16.
According to HRDC, NMCD and its private contractors unconstitutionally censored more than
300 mailings sent by HRDC to incarcerated individuals. See id. at 20. Specifically, HRDC
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challenges a December 29, 2021 memorandum (“Memorandum”) that established a blanket ban
on all magazines at NMCD facilities. See Doc. 3-1 at 8. The Memorandum bears the joint
letterhead of Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham and Cabinet Secretary Alisha Tafoya Lucero. See
id. HRDC contends that the Governor was directly involved in promulgating the challenged
policies and is a proper party to this action. See Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 2.
Based on these allegations, HRDC brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Governor of New Mexico, officials of the NMCD (the “NMCD Defendants”), The Geo Group,
Inc. (“GEO”), Management & Training Corporation (“MTC”), and various employees of these
entities. See FAC. In response, the Governor now moves to dismiss the claims brought against
her in both her individual and official capacities, arguing that HRDC’s allegations fail to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mot. to Dismiss at 7.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). Facial plausibility exists “when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Consequently, a claim that fails to meet this standard must be dismissed.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090,
1098 (10th Cir. 2009). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pled
factual allegations as true, view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts.,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
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However, the court is not bound to accept conclusory or unsupported allegations. See Dunn
v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court’s review is generally
confined to the four corners of the pleading. See Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th
Cir. 1994). The “mere metaphysical possibility” that a plaintiff might prove some set of facts is
insufficient; rather, the complaint must provide “reason to believe that this plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v.
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
II. Individual Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Brown
v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011). For this reason, the Supreme Court has
suggested the term “supervisory liability” is “a misnomer.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. “Absent
vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his
or her own misconduct.” Id.
The plaintiff therefore must show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the
constitutional violation. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). This
requires more than “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s” conduct. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677. This notion is embodied in the three elements required to establish a successful § 1983
claim against a defendant based on his or her supervisory responsibilities: (1) personal
involvement; (2) causation; and (3) state of mind. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195; Schneider v. City of
Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
III. Summary of the Parties’ Arguments
In the First Amended Complaint, HRDC asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Governor
Lujan Grisham, alleging she violated HRDC’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as follows:
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Defendant MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM is the Governor of STATE OF NEW
MEXICO and the Chief Executive of the state government. As Governor she is
obligated under state law to supervise the official conduct of all executive branch
officers and to see that all offices are filled and their duties lawfully performed.
Defendant LUJAN GRISHAM has the authority to appoint and remove the
subordinate defendants named herein. Governor LUJAN GRISHAM retains the
ultimate state authority over the management and operations of NMCD facilities.
She is sued in her individual and official capacities.
FAC ¶ 9.
Not all of NMDC [sic]’s written policies, procedures, or practices are available
online. HRDC obtained a memorandum dated December 29, 2021, addressed to
“Offender Families” from NMCD, with the subject line “Re: Inmate Mail
Changes.” The memorandum is not signed by any individual but is on NMCD
letterhead bearing the names of Defendant LUJAN GRISHAM, Governor, and
Defendant TAFOYA LUCERO, Cabinet Secretary.
Id. ¶ 33.
In sum, HRDC bases Governor Grisham’s liability on two primary grounds. First, HRDC
points to her supervisory authority over the state prison system, contending that she oversees
facility management and has the power to appoint and remove NMCD officials. Second, HRDC
argues that the Governor was personally involved because the Memorandum detailing a challenged
policy was issued under her official letterhead.
HRDC’s response to the motion to dismiss further elaborates on the Governor’s role but
continues to rely on claims of supervisory liability and the Governor’s connection to the challenged
policy through the use of her letterhead. In particular, HRDC contends that the Governor is
responsible for ensuring that all public offices are filled, and their duties are lawfully performed,
and that she has the authority to appoint and remove each of the subordinate NMCD Defendants.
See Pl.’s Resp. at 6.
Neither the Amended Complaint nor the response alleges the Governor’s personal
involvement in devising or promulgating the challenged policies, aside from the appearance of her
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letterhead on the Memorandum. Rather than providing additional factual support, HRDC attempts
to distinguish the cases cited by the Governor in her motion. See Pl.’s Resp. at 8–12.
The Governor argues that to establish a claim of liability under § 1983, HRDC must
demonstrate more than a general supervisory responsibility or a broad duty to uphold the law.
Mot. to Dismiss at 8. Instead, HRDC must plead affirmative acts or specific unconstitutional
conduct the Governor personally undertook. Id. at 10. Regarding the Memorandum, the Governor
characterizes the use of her letterhead as “unremarkable,” noting that it is a form letterhead used
by all cabinet-level secretaries. Def.’s Reply at 4. She further maintains that the letterhead does
not indicate any personal participation in the policy’s creation. Id.
IV. HRDC Fails to State a Claim for Relief
a. HRDC’s Invocation of the Governor’s General Supervisory Capacity Fails to Establish
Liability Under § 1983.
Even when viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to HRDC and
drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through his own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
663. Consistent with the standard of review discussed above, the plaintiff must show an
“affirmative link” between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195. It is insufficient to allege that a government official’s liability stems
from a generalized role as chief executive or a broad “obligation to ensure that the laws, including
the U.S. Constitution, are faithfully enforced.” See Williams v. Gordon, No. 24-8067, 2025 WL
1637732, at *2 (10th Cir. June 10, 2025). The Tenth Circuit “has explicitly held that Ex parte
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Young requires something ‘more than a mere general duty to enforce the law.’” Free Speech Coal.,
Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 739 (10th Cir. 2024).
HRDC’s first category of allegations, that the Governor has a duty to supervise executive
branch officers and has the authority to appoint or remove NMCD officials, falls squarely within
the realm of general supervisory responsibilities that courts have rejected as a basis for § 1983
liability. See FAC ¶ 9. While HRDC attempts to address these allegations in more specific
language, claiming that the Governor has the “ultimate state authority” over the management and
operations of NMCD facilities, these assertions remain mere reiterations of her broad executive
duties. Id. Such allegations are insufficient to establish the “affirmative link” between the
Governor’s own conduct and the alleged constitutional violations. See Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195.
HRDC’s second category of allegations against the Governor, that the Governor’s
letterhead appeared on a challenged policy, is more specific than its general supervisory claims,
yet it still fails to satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard. While a letterhead may contribute
to a finding of liability if coupled with evidence of personal involvement, such as executive orders,
budgetary directives, or records showing the Governor’s role in drafting the mail rules, it cannot
carry that burden alone. A letterhead, lacking even a signature, does not demonstrate the
Governor’s knowledge of or direct involvement in the policy’s creation. Consequently, this
allegation fails to “nudge the claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Duncan
v. Hickenlooper, 631 F. App’x 644, 649–50 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that “[w]ithout any facts to
imply the governor’s knowledge,” the plaintiff failed to state a claim).
The Supreme Court has held that even if a supervisor knows of a subordinate’s alleged
misconduct, that knowledge may be insufficient to establish liability under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677. HRDC’s allegations fall short of this threshold; the complaint fails to plead facts
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suggesting that the Governor has any knowledge of the challenged mail policies, let alone that she
participated in their creation or enforcement.
b. The Authorities Cited by HRDC are Distinguishable.
HRDC identifies a series of cases where courts declined to dismiss claims against
government officials, most notably Lewis v. New Mexico Dep’t of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217,
1240 (D.N.M. 2000). In that case, the court denied the Governor’s motion to dismiss because the
plaintiffs alleged specific, affirmative conduct rather than a generalized supervisory role. For
example, the Lewis plaintiffs alleged the Governor repeatedly refused to approve budget increases
for the specific services at issue, directed subordinates not to plan for growth in those areas, and
requested only 40% of the funding proposed by his secretaries. See id at 1239. Lewis was clear
that a governor cannot be held liable if the plaintiff alleges only “general budget and policy
recommendations.” Id. at 1240. Here, HRDC fails to allege any conduct by Governor Grisham
that approaches the level of specificity found in Lewis.
HRDC also relies on Hernandez v. Grisham, where the court denied the motion to dismiss
after finding it could “infer reasonably” that the Governor was responsible for issuing the
challenged policy. Pl.’s Resp. at 8; Hernandez v. Grisham, 499 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1057–58
(D.N.M. 2020). However, Hernandez drew that inference because the challenged school re-entry
plan was inextricably linked to the Governor’s official actions. For instance, the Governor’s own
website featured a press release titled “Governor announces revised emergency public health
order,” which detailed the challenged plan.1 Given that the Governor publicly claimed
1 A court may take judicial notice of public records as long as they constitute adjudicative facts under Federal Rules
of Evidence 201. The Court takes judicial notice of the August 27, 2020 press release published on the Governor’s
official website and titled “Governor announces revised emergency public health order.” See Press Release, Office
of the Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, Governor announces revised emergency public health order (Aug. 27,
2020), https://www.governor.state.nm.us/2020/08/27/governor-announces-revised-emergency-public-health-order/.
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responsibility for the “revised emergency public health order”, her personal involvement in
promulgating the school re-entry plan, a component of that order, was self-evident. In contrast,
HRDC here offers no such evidence, such as a press release or public announcement, and relies
solely on a letterhead that fails to support a similar inference of personal involvement.
Another Tenth Circuit case, Fowler v. Stitt, further illustrates the level of specificity
required to maintain a § 1983 claim against a government official. See 104 F.4th 770, 783 (10th
Cir. 2024).2 In Fowler, the court held that the Governor was a proper defendant because the
plaintiffs identified an executive order that allegedly set the challenged policy in motion.
Moreover, that order was invoked as the source of authority to deny the plaintiffs’ applications.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Fowler, HRDC fails to identify any such record, relying instead on a form
letterhead. See id.
HRDC proceeds to distinguish adverse cases and enumerate authorities from other circuits
that it contends are favorable to its position. However, none of the authorities HRDC relies on
recognize a claim against a government official based solely on general executive duties or
evidence as tenuous as a letterhead. To the contrary, persuasive authority holds that a governor’s
involvement cannot be inferred from a “a form letterhead for [a] department that bears his name.”
See Bojicic v. DeWine, 569 F. Supp. 3d 669, 683 (N.D. Ohio 2021), aff’d, No. 21-4123, 2022 WL
3585636 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2022).
2 Although the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and vacated the judgment in Fowler v. Stitt, 104 F.4th 770
(10th Cir. 2024), vacated and remanded sub nom. Stitt v. Fowler, No. 24-94 (June 30, 2025), it did so specifically to
require reconsideration in light of United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025) regarding Equal Protection claims.
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis regarding the Governor’s personal involvement remains persuasive authority.
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CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant Michelle Lujan
Grisham’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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