USA v. Gonsalez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cr-01819 KWR
MARIO GONSALEZ, JR.,
GUILLERMO GARCIA, JR., and
CRUZ ZERMENO,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF HSI
SPECIAL AGENT AVILA
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of HSI Special Agent Avila (Doc. 75). Doc. 78; Doc. 82. Defendants argue that much
of the proposed testimony is irrelevant. Doc. 75 ¶¶ 9–11. In the alternative, Defendants request a
hearing to ensure that Special Agent (“SA”) Avila’s testimony meets the requirements of Federal
Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 702. Id. ¶ 20. In isolation, the Government’s notice of intent to offer
SA Avila’s testimony does not provide sufficient grounds for establishing the reliability of his
testimony. Therefore, the Court will hear evidence regarding the reliability of the proposed expert
testimony at a pretrial hearing.
Having reviewed the parties’ pleadings, exhibits, and the relevant law, the Court finds that
the motion is well-taken, and therefore, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
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BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2024, Mario Gonsalez, Jr., Guillermo Garcia, Jr., and Cruz Zermeno
(“Defendants”) were arrested after law enforcement discovered approximately twenty-five pounds
of methamphetamine in the trunk of the vehicle in which they traveled. Doc. 74-1 at 6–7.
Defendants are charged with several drug violations relating to this seizure. Doc. 58.
On March 7, 2025, the Government gave notice of its intent to offer the testimony of SA
Avila (Doc. 49). The Government intends to elicit expert testimony from SA Avila about
methamphetamine trafficking methods and whether the amount of methamphetamine seized is
consistent with distribution amounts. Id. at 4. The Government posits that SA Avila has “accrued
specialized knowledge regarding . . . the manner and means of contemporary methamphetamine
trafficking, through [fourteen] years of law enforcement investigations and operations involving
drug trafficking.” Id. The Government’s notice provides that SA Avila has conducted “multiple
investigations of drug trafficking” and served as a task force officer with the DEA. Id. at 3.
On July 1, 2025, Defendant Garcia moved to exclude SA Avila’s proposed testimony and
set an evidentiary hearing in the alternative. Doc. 75 ¶¶ 12–13, 21. Defendants Gonsalez and
Zermeno joined the Motion in Limine respectively. Doc. 78; Doc. 82. The Government opposes
the Motion in full. See Doc. 83 at 1.
LEGAL STANDARD
The admissibility of expert witness testimony is governed by Rule 702. Pursuant to Rule
702, a witness who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education” may testify if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
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(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods
to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. District courts operate as a “gatekeeper” in admitting or excluding expert
testimony. United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
In light of the strong preference for admitting evidence that potentially helps the jury, Rule
702 is a liberal standard. See United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1526 (10th Cir. 1995). The
proponent of the expert bears the burden to establish admissibility by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Nacchio, 555 F.3d at 1251.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that SA Avila’s proposed testimony should be excluded because it is
irrelevant. Doc. 75 ¶¶ 9–12. Alternatively, Defendants request a hearing at which evidence will
be presented on the reliability of SA Avila’s proposed testimony. Id. ¶ 20. Defendants also argue
that SA Avila’s testimony should be excluded on Rule 403 grounds. Id. ¶ 13. The Government
argues that the proposed testimony is admissible and that a Daubert hearing is unnecessary. Doc.
83 at 2–4.
I. 	Whether SA Avila’s expert testimony is admissible.
In carrying out its gatekeeping function, a court first determines whether the expert is
sufficiently qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to give her opinion.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Proper expert testimony must be relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also United
States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1297 (10th Cir. 2013). If the expert is sufficiently qualified
and the proposed testimony is relevant, a court determines whether the expert’s opinion is reliable.
See Nacchio, 555 F.3d at 1241. The Court addresses each inquiry in turn.
A. SA Avila is sufficiently qualified.
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Defendants do not object to SA Avila’s qualifications. See Doc. 75. In light of SA Avila’s
professional experience investigating drug trafficking along the Southwestern border, the Court
finds that SA Avila is sufficiently qualified as an expert in the subject matter of contemporary
methamphetamine trafficking.1
In determining whether a non-scientific expert is sufficiently qualified, courts consider
whether the expert has “sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the
particular issues in the case.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999) (citation
modified). The purpose of the qualifications requirement is to ensure that an expert, “whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”
United States v. Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kumho Tire Co.,
526 U.S. at 157).
Here, 	SA Avila 	has 	served 	in 	federal 	law 	enforcement 	along 	the 	United 	States’
Southwestern border for fourteen years. Doc. 49 at 3. He participated in investigations and seizures
of controlled substances that were smuggled into the United States from Mexico for six years. Id.
1 Defendants also contend that SA Avila is testifying to matters that require “no specialized
knowledge” which implicates United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008). Doc. 75 ¶ 22.
Mejia is inapposite for several reasons. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that police officers
may testify as experts based on their experience since the average juror is often “innocent of the
ways of the criminal underworld.” United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 998 (10th Cir. 2014);
see also United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that officers “can
acquire specialized knowledge of criminal practices and thus the expertise to opine on such
matters”). Further, SA Avila is not testifying to facts derived from this case as he was not a case
agent here. Rather, SA Avila’s proposed testimony is about his general knowledge acquired from
his experience and how that can provide context for the facts of this case. SA Avila is not “simply
disgorge[ing] his factual knowledge” to “satisfy the elements” of the crime. Mejia, 545 F.3d at
191. Rather, synthesized testimony from “various source materials” constitutes proper expert
testimony. 545 F.3d at 197. Here, SA Avila draws on experiences from numerous years of law
enforcement, not his experiences from a single source or the case at hand. Thus, Mejia is inapposite
to our case.
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For the past eight years, SA Avila has been a Criminal Investigator and Special Agent of Homeland
Security Investigations (“HSI”). Id. During his time with HSI, he has conducted multiple drug
trafficking investigations and served as a task force officer with the DEA. Id. The Tenth Circuit
has held that officers with similar levels of experience are sufficiently qualified to testify as
experts. See, e.g., United States v. Lovern, 590 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse
of discretion in allowing the testimony of a DEA investigator with fifteen years’ experience);
United States v. Duran, 941 F.3d 435, 452 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding no abuse of discretion in
allowing agent testimony on the coded language of intercepted calls because the agent had “over
16 years’ experience . . . including observation of 75 to 100 drug deals and more than 50 controlled
buys”). The Tenth Circuit has allowed expert testimony by agents with considerably less
experience as well. See, e.g., United States v. West, 671 F.3d 1195, 1201 n.6 (10th Cir. 2012)
(finding an officer with two years of experience dealing with drug cases to be qualified as an expert
in drug distribution); United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 775–76 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding an
FBI agent with four years of experience in the drug records analysis subunit qualified as an expert
on books and records involved in drug transactions). Accordingly, the Court finds that SA Avila’s
fourteen years of experience investigating drug trafficking qualifies him to testify as an expert in
the matter.
B. The proposed testimony is relevant.
Defendants argue that the following pieces of proposed expert testimony are irrelevant: (1)
any discussion of “methods” beyond smuggling methamphetamine in the trunk of a locked car;
and (2) how methamphetamine production and trade has evolved such that it is now primarily
manufactured in Mexico and trafficked across the Southwestern border. See Doc. 75 ¶¶ 9–12. The
Government contends that SA Avila’s specialized information will assist the jury in understanding
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the context in which the methamphetamine was found and the significance of the large quantity
seized from the trunk. Doc. 83 at 3. The Court addresses each of Defendants’ objections in turn.
Under Rule 702, the “touchstone of admissibility . . . is helpfulness to the trier of fact.”
Werth v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643, 648 (10th Cir. 1991). The inquiry of whether
expert testimony will assist the trier of fact is “essentially a question of relevance.” United States
v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 847 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 113). To determine whether
the testimony will assist the trier of fact, a court considers the following non-exclusive factors: (1)
whether the testimony is relevant; (2) whether the testimony is within the jury’s common
knowledge and experience; and (3) whether the testimony will usurp the jury’s role in evaluating
witness credibility. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1123 (10th Cir. 2006).
1. 	Testimony about methods of drug smuggling.
Defendants object to the proposed testimony about drug-trafficking methods and argue that
it is irrelevant. Doc. 75 ¶ 9. The Government argues that testimony about the means and methods
of methamphetamine distribution, being outside the common knowledge of the jury, serves to
assist the jury in deciding a key issue. See Doc. 83 at 2. Since the methods of methamphetamine
trafficking are not common knowledge to a jury, the Court finds that discussion of such methods
will assist the jury and provide helpful context in its determination of key issues.
Here, Defendants concede that the alleged method of “smuggling [methamphetamine] in
the locked trunk of a car” is relevant. See Doc. 75 ¶ 9. Additionally, since “the average juror is
often innocent of the ways of the criminal underworld,” testimony about methods involving the
transport of methamphetamine across and along the Southwestern border would provide the jury
helpful context. See United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 477 (10th Cir. 2011). Further, testimony
about the methods of methamphetamine trafficking will not usurp the jury’s role in witness
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credibility. The Tenth Circuit has found “no problem with the nature” of qualified, expert testimony
that discusses “the movement of drugs and drug profit along I-40” and “common practices of
drug-trafficking organizations, including the use of scales . . . and how cars are typically
registered.” United States v. Cristerna-Gonzalez, 962 F.3d 1253, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2020); see
also Garcia, 635 F.3d at 477 (noting that pursuant to Rule 702, the Tenth Circuit “routinely allow[s]
law enforcement experts with ‘other specialized knowledge, to opine as to the means and methods
of the narcotics trade”). Accordingly, the Court finds that expert testimony discussing the methods
of methamphetamine trafficking, provided that the discussion continues to be helpful to the jury,
is relevant under Rule 702.
2. 	Testimony 	about 	how 	methamphetamine 	production 	and 	trade 	has
evolved.
Defendants contend that much of the proposed testimony that falls under the category of
the evolution of methamphetamine production and trade is irrelevant.2 Doc. 75 at 5. Specifically,
Defendants take issue with the following subjects of SA Avila’s intended testimony:
[H]ow 	the 	methamphetamine 	production 	and 	trade 	has 	evolved . . . that
methamphetamine is no longer manufactured in appreciable quantities in local
mobile 	homes, 	recreational 	vehicles, 	and 	clandestine 	laboratories . . . most
methamphetamine . . . has 	been 	manufactured 	in 	Mexico 	in 	highly 	pure
concentrations . . . drug 	traffickers 	smuggle 	methamphetamine 	across 	the
2 Defendants also argue that SA Avila’s testimony about “drug trafficking organizations and
activity derived from his education” is irrelevant under Rule 103 and 401. Doc. 75 at 5. The Court
notes that the Government does not state in its notice any intention to have SA Avila testify about
“drug trafficking organizations and activity derived from his education” as Defendants quote. See
Doc. 49. The Government intends to elicit testimony based on SA Avila’s “specialized knowledge
of drug trafficking methods” and his opinion about whether the amount of methamphetamine
seized is consistent with distribution amounts. Id. at 4. The Government gives notice of its intent
to elicit testimony from SA Avila about how methamphetamine production and trade has evolved
and practices that are contemporarily used. See id. at 5. To the extent that this is what Defendants
refer to as “activity derived from his education,” the Court finds the Government’s proposed
testimony relevant.
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southwestern border, and significant quantities of methamphetamine are smuggled
into California.
Id. ¶ 10.
Each 	of 	the 	subjects that 	Defendants 	contend 	are 	not 	relevant 	work 	together 	to
contextualize the case for the jury. As Defendants note, the relevant alleged “method” of
methamphetamine transportation here is smuggling by vehicle. Id. ¶ 9. More specifically, it is
alleged that Defendants were in a vehicle that, traveling east-bound on I-40, had a California
license plate and 11.74 kilograms of 98% pure methamphetamine in the trunk. See Doc. 49 at 1– 2.
Thus, the intended testimony that “methamphetamine is no longer manufactured in appreciable
quantities [locally]” and that most methamphetamine “has been manufactured in Mexico in highly
pure concentrations” before being smuggled across the Southwestern border to places like
California serves to contextualize the evidence that the Government plans to put before the jury.
See Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d at 1106 (finding expert testimony relevant that “contextualized the
evidence that the jury had already seen and provided a basis for the inference that, given the
quantity and purity of the methamphetamine,” it was less likely the defendants were unaware of
its presence); see also United States v. Martinez, 749 F. App’x 698, 710 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding
that a district court did not err in allowing testimony that did not expressly link a defendant to drug
trafficking but did contextualize the evidence already presented). Therefore, provided that the
evidence before the jury allows for such an inference to be made, the intended testimony provides
context and has at least some tendency to make it more or less likely that Defendants were engaged
in smuggling methamphetamine.
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Accordingly, the Court finds that SA Avila’s testimony that the Government intends to elicit
is relevant and will provide helpful context for the jury.3
C. Without more, the Court cannot find that the proposed testimony is reliable.
In asking for a pretrial hearing, Defendants seem to question the reliability of SA Avila’s
proposed testimony. See Doc. 75 ¶ 7. The Government contends that the proposed testimony is
reliable and a Daubert hearing is unnecessary. Doc. 83 at 3–4. Without more than the
Government’s expert notice, the Court cannot find that the proposed testimony is sufficiently
reliable under Rule 702.
Rule 702 requires a district court to assess “the underlying reasoning and methodology” of
the expert. Schulenberg v. BNSF Ry. Co., 911 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2018). The Daubert
inquiry extends to expert testimony that is not purely scientific because a district court has “‘the
same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its
ultimate reliability determination.’” Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Kumho Tire Co.,
526 U.S. at 142).
In some cases, the Daubert factors may be inapposite for assessing reliability due to the
“nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Garza, 566
F.3d at 1199. Thus, the Daubert factors are “not to be applied woodenly in all circumstances.” Id.
Where the Daubert factors are inapposite, a court may still certify an expert so long as the court
determines the testimony is sufficiently reliable. See id. The Tenth Circuit has held that law
3 Defendants take issue with SA Avila’s proposed testimony that he reviewed documents pertaining
to the methamphetamine seized from “defendants’ car” because the car was registered to
Defendant Gonsalez’s sister. Doc. 75 at 3. Since the statement “defendants’ car” may be
misleading, SA Avila should refrain from referring to the car as “defendants’ car,” and refer to the
car in a factually accurate manner such as “the car registered to Defendant Gonsalez’s sister” or
“the car defendants were in.”
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enforcement officers “can acquire specialized knowledge of criminal practices and thus the
expertise to opine on such matters.” Id. But witnesses that rely primarily on experience must
explain “how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient
basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” See Medina-Copete,
757 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000 Amendment)).
Here, SA Avila’s intended testimony is based on his fourteen years of experience in which
he has investigated drug trafficking and seized drugs smuggled into the United States from Mexico.
Doc. 49 at 3. The Government states that SA Avila has “accrued specialized knowledge” in “the
manner and means of contemporary methamphetamine trafficking, through years of law
enforcement investigations and operations.” Id. at 4. SA Avila will testify that “he has reviewed
law enforcement reports, photographs, and laboratory reports regarding the methamphetamine
seized in this case.” Id. at 5. The Government states that SA Avila is expected to opine that most
of the methamphetamine seized “exceeds personal use quantities, and that the packaging, location,
and quantity of the methamphetamine is consistent with distribution.” Id. at 6. The Government
contends that SA Avila’s opinions are “[d]rawing on his law enforcement experience” and his
“specialized knowledge accrued through years of experience investigating the criminal distribution
of methamphetamine.” Id. at 5–6. Thus, the Government asserts that SA Avila’s conclusions are
drawn from his years of experience. See United States v. Gutierrez, No. 22-8045, 2023 WL
7103979, at *5 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2023) (finding an expert’s experience led to his conclusions
when the expert had twelve years of related experience and “repeatedly affirmed that his
interpretations were based on his training and experience”); see also Cristerna-Gonzalez, 962 F.3d
at 1260 (“Courts have repeatedly admitted similar testimony from qualified law-enforcement
witnesses.”).
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However, the Government’s notice does not explicitly explain why SA Avila’s experience
is a sufficient basis for his opinion. The Court is led to assume that SA Avila’s fourteen years of
experience in drug interdiction forms a sufficient basis for his opinions. But the Court will not
assume that there are specific instances within those years of experience that form a sufficient basis
to opine on the methamphetamine in this case. Additionally, the Government posits that SA Avila
“will testify that he has reviewed law enforcement reports, photographs, and laboratory reports”
regarding the methamphetamine seized in this case. Doc. 49 at 5. Without hearing SA Avila’s
testimony, the Court will not assume that it will sufficiently demonstrate how his experience is
reliably applied to these facts. While “Medina-Copete is the exception not the rule,” see United
States v. 	Vann, 776 F.3d 746, 759 (10th Cir. 2015), the Court is still required to find that the
proposed testimony is reliable. Accordingly, based on the Government’s expert notice alone, the
Court cannot yet find that SA Avila’s intended testimony is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Rule
702 inquiry.
II. 	The Court will hold a hearing on the reliability of SA Avila’s proposed testimony.
Defendants request a hearing intending to ensure that SA Avila’s testimony is “based on
sufficient facts or data,” the “product of reliable principles and methods,” and that it will assist the
jury. Doc. 75 ¶¶ 19–21. The Government contends that a Daubert hearing is not necessary because
the proposed testimony is not extraordinary or controversial. Doc. 83 at 4. While not extraordinary
or controversial, the Court will hold a hearing to establish the reliability of SA Avila’s testimony
The Tenth Circuit has found that a district court may decline to hold a Daubert hearing
where the disputed evidence does not involve a “new scientific theory and the testing
methodologies [are] not new or novel.” United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir.
1999); see also United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that district
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courts are “granted great latitude . . . in deciding whether to hold a formal hearing”). While a
district court is afforded broad discretion in deciding how to conduct its reliability analysis, the
district court must perform its gatekeeping function. See Goebel v. Denv. and Rio Grande Western
R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 158–59 (Scalia,
J., concurring)); see also United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
court must, on the record, make some kind of reliability determination.”).
Here, the Court notes that the reliability analysis is mandatory. In its expert notice, the
Government provides information pertaining to SA Avila’s fourteen years’ experience, but nothing
about his education or training.4 See Doc. 49. Thus, the Court must characterize SA Avila as an
expert relying primarily on experience. See Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d at 1104 (noting that an expert
that relies primarily on experience must explain “how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts”). In assessing the reliability of SA Avila based solely off the
Government’s expert notice, the Court cannot find that SA Avila’s fourteen years of experience in
drug interdiction, without more detail, form a sufficient basis for his opinions. Additionally, the
Court cannot find that SA Avila’s expected testimony that he reviewed reports and photographs
regarding the methamphetamine in this case sufficiently demonstrates how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts. Accordingly, the Court will wait to determine the reliability of SA
Avila’s proposed testimony until hearing further evidence on SA Avila’s experience, training, and
education.
4 The Government states that it provided SA Avila’s resume separately to Defendants, see Doc. 49
at 7, but the Court is not in possession of SA Avila’s resume. SA Avila’s resume, in addition to
testimony at a hearing prior to trial, will assist the Court in determining the reliability of the
proposed testimony.
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III. 	Rule 403 does not warrant excluding the proposed testimony.
Defendants argue that SA Avila’s proposed testimony is more prejudicial than probative
because he was “not a witness to the events.” Doc. 75 ¶ 13. The Court disagrees.
Under Rule 403, evidence “is unfairly prejudicial if it makes a conviction more likely
because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the
jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or [innocence]
of the crime charged.” United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation
modified). Even if unfair “prejudice is found, it must substantially outweigh the probative value
of the evidence in order to be excluded.” Id.
Here, the Court finds that the probative value of assisting the jury understand the context
of the evidence is not outweighed by any unfair prejudice. It is immaterial that SA Avila was “not
a witness to the events” since he will offer expert testimony about methamphetamine trafficking
methods and whether the amount seized is consistent with distribution amounts based on his
experience. See Doc. 49 at 3–6; see also Garza, 566 F.3d at 1199 (finding that officers “can acquire
specialized knowledge of criminal practices and thus the expertise to opine on such matters”). If
SA Avila’s testimony crosses into Rule 403 territory, the Court will consider objections. Therefore,
at this time, the Court finds that the probative value of SA Avila’s proposed testimony is not
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of HSI Special Agent Avila (Doc. 75) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART for reasons described in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
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The Court will schedule and hold a hearing to hear evidence on the reliability of SA Avila’s
proposed testimony in light of his experience, training, and education. After the hearing, the Court
will determine whether the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable.
____/S/_______________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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