Madera v. Taos Health Systems, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
____________________
GEORGE J. MADERA, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:22-cv-00285-MLG-SCY
TAOS HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
d/b/a HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSED MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff Dr. George J. Madera (“Madera”) was on the losing end of a civil trial. More than
a month after the verdict was announced, he filed a motion contesting the jury’s verdict, which he
characterizes as irreconcilably inconsistent and contrary to the evidence presented. That challenge
is at issue here. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies his motion and finds that the
request is untimely and that the jury’s verdict was entirely consistent with the evidence presented.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Madera was hired through a staffing agency, Delta Locum Tenens (“DLT”), to fill
workforce needs at Taos Health Systems, Inc. (“Taos”), d/b/a Holy Cross Hospital. Doc. 100 at 1.
His tenure there was brief. Following complaints of inappropriate workplace behavior, Taos fired
Madera in March of 2019 after he had been on the job a mere three months. See id. at 1-2 (citing
Doc. 78-2). Taos subsequently notified DLT of its decision, and the agency responded via email
that “Madera will be removed from [DLT’s] eligible list of providers.” Id. at 2 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Doc. 78-2 at 55). Taos administrators did not confirm that DLT had
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followed through on that course of action, and they subsequently learned that DLT had not
removed Madera from its service panel. Id. (citing Doc. 78-2 at 58).
A few weeks later, Taos was notified of additional patient care concerns that surfaced
during Madera’s time at Holy Cross. Id. (citing Doc. 78-2 at 11). Taos initiated a peer review and
referred the matter to the facility’s credentialing committee. Id. (citing Doc. 78 at 5 ¶ 11). They
voted unanimously to revoke Madera’s clinical privileges. Id. (citing Doc. 38 at 21 ¶ 62). Madera
was not notified of the committee’s actions. He was given neither notice nor opportunity to attend
the meeting or defend himself. Id. (citing Doc. 38 at 20 ¶¶ 57-58, 21 ¶ 60).
Taos subsequently filed an adverse action report with the National Practitioner Data Bank
(“NPDB”). Id. (citing Doc. 78-2 at 2-4 (NPDB report dated April 19, 2019); Doc. 38 at 23 ¶ 66).
That submission succinctly described the revocation of Madera’s clinical privileges and preceding
events, namely his unprofessional and inappropriate interactions with hospital staff. Id. (citing
Doc. 78-2 at 3). It also contained a mistake. Taos erroneously stated that DLT “had dropped him”
from its service panel. Id (citing Doc. 78-2 at 3). This report (error included) was sent to several
state licensing boards and the Federation of State Medical Boards. Id. (citing Doc. 37 at 14 ¶ 72;
Doc. 38 at 24 ¶ 72). Over a year later, Taos withdrew the report from the NPDB, citing concerns
that it had inaccurately recounted Madera’s status with DLT. Id. (citing Doc. 78 at 6-7 ¶ 15). When
the reporting service sought a reason for withdrawal of the report, Taos selected (from a dropdown
menu) that “[t]he report was not required to be filed; the action does not meet the legal reporting
criteria.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Doc. 84-1 at 1).
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Madera later learned of the NPDB report and litigation ensued. See Doc. 37. Madera
brought claims for intentional interference with prospective economic relations for which he
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sought resulting damages.1 See id. The matter ultimately went to trial. See Doc. 154. After the
presentation of evidence, a verdict form was provided to the jury.2 See id. It was titled “SPECIAL
VERDICT” and asked the jury to address the following question and subparts:
QUESTION 1: Has the Plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence each
of the following five elements of his claim for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations against the Defendant?
Answer (circle one):
Element 1: Existence of Prospective Economic Relationships
YES 	NO
Element 2: Intent
YES 	NO
Element 3: Improper Means
YES 	NO
Element 4: Causation
YES 	NO
Element 5: Damages
YES 	NO
If you answered “NO” to any of the elements in Question 1, please sign the Verdict
Form and do not answer the remaining questions.
1 The Court granted summary judgment on Madera’s defamation claim. See Doc. 100. That
decision is not relevant to the instant question.
2 The parties concurred as to the jury verdict form. Notably, Madera did not suggest that the jury
could potentially resolve the matter inconsistently, and he did not raise concerns that the jury must
award damages upon a finding of causation. See Doc. 160-1 at 4-5; Doc. 126 at 49 (Plaintiff’s
Proposed Jury Instruction regarding the elements of intentional interference) (citing M & M Rental
Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 1980-NMCA-072, 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 when proposing a fifth
element of damages). Had he believed that to be the case, Madera should have raised that matter
during trial.
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Doc. 151 at 2. The jury circled “YES” to Elements 1 through 4 but circled “NO” as to Element 5:
Damages. Id. Apparently, the jury found that Taos’s conduct was tortious, but that Madera did not
suffer damages.3
DISCUSSION
Madera now moves the Court for a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s verdict is
irreconcilably inconsistent and the jury’s finding that Madera suffered no economic damages is
against the weight of the evidence. Doc. 155. For the reasons given below, the Court denies the
motion.
I. 	Madera’s objection is untimely and therefore waived.
Madera did not question the verdict before the jury was discharged. See Doc. 160-2 at 3:22-
6:24. Instead, he lodged his objections months later as part of a motion for new trial. Doc. 155.
The timing matters because claims that a general jury verdict is internally inconsistent are subject
to different deadlines than those associated with special verdicts. Specifically, “unless the verdict
is inconsistent on its face such that the entry of judgment upon the verdict is plain error,” objections
to general jury verdicts—including ones utilizing special interrogatories—are waived if the party
does not raise the issue before the jury is discharged. Johnson v. ABLT Trucking Co., 412 F.3d
1138, 1141 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Stone,
3 That result makes sense given the evidence proffered during trial. It showed that Madera did little
to mitigate damages. He refused to be vaccinated during the apex of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which precluded his hiring at many medical facilities. See Doc. 160-3 at 18 (“Dr. Madera elected
not to be vaccinated. As a physician and healthcare worker with mandates in place, vaccination
was required unless an individual had a medical or religious reason.”). There was also expert
testimony regarding how Madera’s lack of interpersonal skills made it difficult for him to maintain
employment. Doc. 160-3 at 13-14 (“Individuals [found] out that he was . . . difficult to work with
. . . mak[ing] it difficult . . . to maintain employment . . . . Had there not been behavioral issues
and inappropriate conduct, then there were no issues, to my understanding, of his skills and his
ability to perform the duties as a cardiologist.”).
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998 F.2d 1534, 1545 (10th Cir. 1993)), abrogated on other grounds by, Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S.
40 (2016), as recognized in, Culp v. Remington of Montrose Golf Club, LLC, 133 F.4th 968, 990-
91 (10th Cir. 2025); Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932, 944 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding an objection as to inconsistency of a general jury verdict with interrogatories was waived
since it was raised a week after the jury was discharged). By contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not provide for a specific deadline to challenge a special verdict.4 Johnson, 412 F.3d
at 1141 (citing Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1545 (10th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other
grounds by, Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009)); Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208
F.3d 847, 851 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Although a party waives a claim of inconsistent verdicts based
on a general jury verdict under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b), if not timely raised, this rule does not apply
to special verdicts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).”)). Accordingly, whether Madera’s objections are
timely turns on whether the verdict here is characterized as a general or special verdict.
A. 	Distinguishing between a general and special verdict
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate three forms of verdicts: the general
verdict, the special verdict, and the general verdict with answers to written questions.” Toney v.
Sullivan, No. 15-3209-EFM, 2022 WL 1044920, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 2022). Each form requires
something different from the jury.
A general verdict does not require the jury to make factual findings; it requires only that
they “announce the ‘ultimate legal result of each claim.’” Johnson, 412 F.3d at 1142 (quoting
Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Simply put, a general
verdict permits the jury to decide who wins.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This remains true
4 Because a party challenging a special verdict is typically requesting a new trial, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59 will apply, which requires a motion for new trial be filed within twenty-eight
days after entry of the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
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even when the jury resolves written questions as part of completing the verdict form. In that
circumstance—a general verdict with special interrogatories—“the court may submit to the jury
forms for a general verdict, together with written questions on one or more issues of fact that the
jury must decide.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b); see also Thompson, 34 F.3d at 944 (finding questions
regarding 	damages, 	bad 	faith, 	and 	violation 	of 	specific 	policy 	provisions 	were 	special
interrogatories that accompanied the general verdict form requesting whether plaintiffs should
recover on their contract claim).
Special verdicts are different. They present the jury with “specific questions of fact. After
the jury returns its verdict, the court applies the law to the facts found by the jury and enters
judgment accordingly.” Johnson, 412 F.3d at 1142 (citing Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1031); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 49(a) (noting for special verdicts “[t]he court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding on each issue of fact”).
The title of the verdict form is not dispositive. Johnson, 412 F.3d at 1143 (discussing with
approval Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (ruling a verdict form
was a general verdict even with the title of “Special Verdict Form” because the jury did not just
answer questions of fact but also made conclusions of law about who prevailed on each count));
Chavez v. Stomp, Civ. No. 10-205 JCH/ACT, 2014 WL 12798375, at *16 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2014)
(finding a verdict form titled “Special Verdict” was a general verdict because the jury determined
which party prevailed on each claim and there was no application of law left for the trial judge to
administer). The salient consideration is the role of the jury in determining the verdict. See
Johnson, 412 F.3d at 1143; Thompson, 34 F.3d at 944-45; Stone, 998 F.2d at 1546-47.
B. 	The verdict form submitted to the jury in this case was a general verdict with
special interrogatories
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The verdict form in this case requires the jury to first determine whether Madera proved
by a preponderance of the evidence the elements of intentional interference with prospective
economic relations. Doc 151 at 2. That inquiry mirrors other general verdict forms that inquired
whether a plaintiff has met their burden in proving a claim. Stone, 998 F.2d at 1546 n.11
(concluding the response to the question “Do you find that defendant Professional Investors
Insurance Group, Inc. has liability to the plaintiff under Count 13?” to be a general verdict);
Babcock, 299 F.3d at 63 (finding the responses to the questions “Has plaintiff proved her
negligence claim by a preponderance of the evidence?” and “Has plaintiff proved her product
liability claim by a preponderance of the evidence?” to be general verdicts); Chavez, 2014 WL
12798375, at *13-14, *16 (finding the question “Did plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he was not selected for a promotion due to his religious beliefs in violation of Title
VII?” to be general verdicts); id. at *14, *16 (finding the same about the question “Did plaintiff
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant Stomp retaliated against him for exercise
of his First Amendment rights by preventing his promotion?”). Although the verdict form in this
case required a “YES” or “NO” answer as to each element, the jury’s responses determined the
ultimate result—i.e., whether Madera prevailed on his claim.5 See Johnson, 412 F.3d at 1142;
Stone, 998 F.2d at 1546-47 n.11 (concluding the verdicts at issue were general verdicts because
the jury’s response to the initial question on each verdict established the party that prevailed on
the relevant count). No further legal analysis was required from the Court once the jury determined
Madera had not met his burden at trial. See Doc. 154.
5 The ultimate legal conclusion reached by the jury’s verdict is reflected in the verdict form’s
instruction to the jury, “You must apply the law in the instructions that the Court gave you to the
facts that were proved by the evidence.” Doc. 151 at 1 (emphasis omitted).
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The questions addressing the specific elements necessary to prove up the claim of
international interference with prospective economic relations were simply special interrogatories
attendant to a general verdict. See Thompson, 34 F.3d 944. Madera asserts that because some of
those elements—such as improper means and intent—are factual questions under New Mexico
law, the verdict must therefore be special. See Doc. 167 at 4-5 (citing Belleview Valley Land Co.
v. Walterscheid Trucking & Farms, No. 97-2307, 1998 WL 487018, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 10,
1998)). This reasoning is incorrect. Rule 49(b) expressly contemplates that “written questions on
one or more issues of fact that the jury must decide” can be submitted to the jury together with the
general verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(1). That the jury (at the parties’ request) was asked to address
the specific elements of the claim does not convert a general verdict into a special verdict.6
Given that the verdict was a general verdict with special interrogatories, Madera waived
his claims of inconsistency by failing to object before the jury was discharged. See Johnson, 412
F.3d at 1141. The Court therefore reviews only for plain error—error that is facially inconsistent
and “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Royal
Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106, 1118
(10th Cir. 2004)). This standard sets a high bar. “Plain error review presents ‘an extraordinary,
nearly insurmountable burden.’” Id. at 1181 (quoting Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790,
6 Madera’s argument that the Court’s entry of a final judgment indicates there was a special verdict
similarly fails. See Doc. 167 at 5 (citing Doc. 154). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
58, judgments are entered as separate documents on the docket when juries return a general verdict,
special verdict, or general verdict with answers to written questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), (b)(1)-
(2). The Court approves the form of the judgment for special verdicts and for general verdicts with
special interrogatories. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2)(A). Therefore, the entry of a final judgment does
not indicate there was a special verdict in this case.
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802 (10th Cir. 2001)). “[A] party must demonstrate (1) an error, (2) that is plain or obvious under
existing law, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. (citing Beaudry v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 331
F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Madera argues that the jury erred in failing to award damages because the harm at issue in
his claim is to prospective economic relations. He contends that because the jury found harm
occurred to his prospective economic relations, it follows that economic damages must have
occurred. See Doc. 155 at 3-4. This argument is unsupported. He offers no legal authority holding
that harm to prospective economic relations must be monetary or that a finding of causation
necessarily compels a damages award. See Doc. 155 at 3-4; Doc. 167.7 Madera therefore fails to
establish any error under existing law, let alone an obvious one.
New Mexico recognizes the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic
relations. The claim includes distinct elements, including damages.8 Clary v. Total Facility Sols.,
Inc., No. 20-768 JAP/LF, 2021 WL 1754196, at *4 (D.N.M. May 4, 2021) (citing Guest v.
7 Madera’s general reliance on two Tenth Circuit cases regarding irreconcilably inconsistent
verdicts does not advance his position. See Doc. 155 at 5 (discussing Cheney v. Moler, 285 F.2d
116 (10th Cir. 1960); Bonin v. Tour West, Inc., 896 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1990)). First, neither case
addresses New Mexico law or the claim of intentional interference with prospective economic
relations. See Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting a federal court
sitting in diversity must apply the law of the forum state); Cheney, 285 F.2d at 117 (analyzing jury
verdict regarding Kansas law for assault and battery); Bonin, 896 F.2d at 1263 (analyzing jury
verdict regarding a negligence claim from the District of Utah). Second, neither case applies the
plain error standard to the verdicts at issue. See Cheney, 285 F.2d 116; Bonin, 896 F.2d 1260.
8 New Mexico courts generally refer to this tort as “intentional interference with prospective
contractual relations.” See M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 1980-NMCA-072, ¶¶ 12-
14, 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (noting that intentional interference with prospective contractual
relations is an appropriate tort claim for interference with “business relations” or “economic
expectancies” when there is no contract). The Tenth Circuit has therefore looked to New Mexico
case law on prospective contractual relations when analyzing claims for interference with
prospective economic relations. See Simon v. Taylor, 794 F. App’x 703, 712-13 (10th Cir. 2019).
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Berardinelli, 2008-NMCA-144, ¶ 32, 145 N.M. 186, 195 P.3d 353); see also M & M Rental Tools,
Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 1980-NMCA-072, ¶ 20, 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (adopting the claim of
intentional interference with prospective contractual relations set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 766B (A.L.I. 1979)). Madera was required to prove each of those elements to sustain
his claim.9 See Guest, 2008-NMCA-144 at ¶ 32 (“To prove intentional interference with
prospective contractual relations, [Plaintiff] must show that Defendants damaged [him]by either
(1) inducing or otherwise causing [Defendant] not to enter into or continue a prospective relation
with [Plaintiff] or (2) preventing [Plaintiff] from acquiring or continuing a prospective relation
with [Defendant].” (emphasis added)). And like all claims sounding in tort, liability and damages
are separate inquiries. See UJI 13-1801 NMRA (instructing jurors “not to engage in any discussion
of damages unless you have first determined that there is liability, as elsewhere covered in these
instructions”).
The jury instructions note this distinction. See Doc. 140 at 20 (Jury Instruction No. 15).
The jurors were told to first determine liability and then consider any damages consistent with the
evidence. See id. They were also instructed on the various elements relevant to economic,
noneconomic, and punitive damages. Id. at 23-24, 26. But nothing required them (nor was there
any legal obligation) to find damages if liability was demonstrated. Accordingly, a jury could find
(and this one did) that Madera proved liability, including causation, but failed to prove damages.
The result is neither facially inconsistent nor plainly erroneous.
9 Here, Madera specifically requested the Court list damages as a distinct element for his
intentional interference with prospective economic relations claim. See Doc. 126 at 49; Doc. 132
at 3. Taos asserts that Madera’s Motion for a New Trial is a disguised challenge to jury instructions
he cannot now contest after trial. Doc. 160 at 1-7. Madera, however, does not assert that he should
not have to prove the distinct element of damages. Doc. 167 at 1. The Court therefore declines to
address Taos’s argument that the Motion for New Trial is a challenge to jury instructions.
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II. 	Madera offers no evidence to demonstrate the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.
“A motion for a new trial made on the ground that the verdict of the jury is against the
weight of the evidence normally presents a question of fact and not of law and is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.” Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Richardson v. City of Albuquerque, 857 F.2d 727, 730 (10th Cir. 1988)). “When a new trial motion
asserts that the jury verdict is not supported by the evidence, the verdict must stand unless it is
clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.” Burke v. Regalado, 935
F.3d 960, 991 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ryan Dev. Co. v. Ind.
Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 711 F,3d 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2013)). The court draws all inferences
from the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (quoting Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235,
1238 (10th Cir. 2011)). The court is not to weigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id.
Applying this standard here, Madera fails to demonstrate—even prima facie—that the
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence in this case. His motion asserts that he presented
evidence of economic damages in the form of lost past and future income to the jury, and the “jury
apparently disregarded this evidence completely.” Doc. 155 at 6-8; Doc. 167 at 6. That claim is
unsubstantiated. He provides no citations to the trial record, and he did not submit any exhibits to
support his claims. See Docs. 155, 167. The scant support he provides is based entirely on counsel’s
recollections. More is required. The Court cannot evaluate Madera’s contention without some
evidentiary support. See Owen v. Sw. Airlines, No. 92-2176, 1993 WL 214568, at *1 (10th Cir.
June 18, 1993) (stating the court was unable to review a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim because
the movant failed to include a transcript of the trial) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2)). Regardless,
even assuming arguendo that Madera presented evidence of damages, it may be that the jury simply
found that evidence unpersuasive. The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
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judgment for the jury. Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F.3d 1497, 1503 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Tennant v.
Peoria & Pekin Underground R.R., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Plaintiff Dr. George Madera’s Motion for a New Trial, Doc. 155, is denied
in its entirety.
It is so ordered.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MATTHEW L. GARCIA
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