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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FLORIDALMA CORONADO AGUSTIN,

Petitioner,
V.

WARDEN ELIZABETH DETENTION
FACILITY, et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-11533 (MAS)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

SHIPP, District Judge

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Petitioner Floridalma Coronado
Agustin's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1); and the
Court having entered an Order on September 7, 2026, enjoining Respondents from transferring
Petitioner from New Jersey pending further Order of the Court (ECF No. 2); and

WHEREAS, Respondents submitted correspondence addressing Petitioner's detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner submitted a response and supplemental
evidence (ECF No. 6); and

WHEREAS, the Court thereafter directed Respondents to address, inter alia, the statutory
basis for Petitioner's current detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the effect of Petitioner's prior
release under an Order of Supervision and the passage of the removal period, whether Petitioner
received the process required following revocation of her release, the factual basis for
Respondents' assertion that removal is reasonably foreseeable, and the applicability of Egharevba

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v. Benzel, No. 26-CV-10628, 2026 WL 2655018 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2026), and Santamaria-Mejia v.
ICE, No. 26-CV-07437, 2026 WL 2018107 (D.N.J. July 13, 2026); and

WHEREAS, in response, Respondents submitted a supplemental response and
documentary evidence addressing, among other things, the asserted mechanism for effectuating
Petitioner's removal to Guatemala, including Guatemala's participation in the Electronic
Nationality Verification program and Respondents' contention that Petitioner may be removed
without obtaining a travel document, as well as ICE's representation concerning the timeframe
within which removal could be effectuated if the Court's September 7, 2026 Order is lifted (ECF
No. 10); and

WHEREAS, the record reflects that an immigration judge granted Petitioner voluntary
departure on June 18, 2002, with a departure deadline of October 16, 2002, and that, when
Petitioner failed to depart within the voluntary-departure period, the alternate order of removal
took effect (ECF No. 5 at 1-2); and

WHEREAS, Respondents acknowledge that the mandatory ninety-day removal period
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) has expired and that Petitioner was subsequently released from
physical custody pursuant to an Order of Supervision, under which she remained outside physical
custody until her re-detention on September 4, 2026 (ECF Nos. 5, 8, 10); and

WHEREAS, Respondents contend that Petitioner's present detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) is lawful because Petitioner was most recently taken into immigration custody on
September 4, 2026, and therefore has not been detained for six months since her re-detention,
which Respondents contend is the presumptively reasonable period discussed in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (ECF No. 8 at 5); and

WHEREAS, the six-month period identified in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 701, is a guide
for determining whether detention has exceeded the period reasonably necessary to effectuate

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removal, rather than an absolute safe harbor from judicial review, and courts have recognized
substantial doubt as to whether the six-month presumption applies anew when detention begins
years after the entry of a final removal order, particularly following years of supervised release,
see Santamaria-Mejia, No. 26-CV-07437, 2026 WL 2018107, at *3-5; Egharevba,
No. 26-CV-10628, 2026 WL 2655018, at *4-6; and

WHEREAS, Respondents further represent that Petitioner's removal to Guatemala is
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future because Guatemala participates in the
Electronic Nationality Verification program, which Respondents assert permits ICE to effectuate
Petitioner's removal without obtaining a travel document, and because ICE represents that it can
effectuate Petitioner's removal within a reasonably short timeframe if the Court's September 7,
2026 Order is lifted (ECF No. 10); and

WHEREAS, those facts demonstrate that a mechanism for removal exists, but the
existence of a mechanism for removal is not the same as evidence that Petitioner's removal is
significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future; and

WHEREAS, the record contains no evidence that Petitioner has been assigned to a
particular flight, that a particular flight has been identified for her removal, that a date for her
removal has been established, or that any Petitioner-specific administrative step has been
completed such that she can be placed on a flight upon dissolution of the Court's September 7,
2026 Order; and

WHEREAS, Respondents' evidence therefore establishes, at most, that ICE believes it can
begin or resume the process of arranging Petitioner's removal if the Court's September 7, 2026
Order is lifted; it does not establish when that process will result in an actual removal; and

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WHEREAS, this distinction is significant under Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, which does
not ask merely whether removal is theoretically possible, but whether there is a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future; and

WHEREAS, as detention continues, the relevant period of reasonable foreseeability
necessarily becomes increasingly immediate. See id. at 701; see also Egharevba,
No. 26-CV-10628, 2026 WL 2655018, at *6; W.A.C. v. Rokosky, 836 F. Supp. 3d 577, 588-89
(D.N.J. 2026); and

WHEREAS, the Government's evidence falls short of that standard on the present record;
and

WHEREAS, recent decisions from this District support the distinction between evidence
establishing that a mechanism for removal exists and evidence establishing that removal is
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future; and

WHEREAS, in Egharevba v. Benzel, the Government relied on an ICE declaration
representing that, if a transfer restriction were lifted, ICE would remove the petitioner and that
removal was likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, yet the court concluded that the
Government had not provided sufficient evidence bearing on the foreseeability of removal and that
a bare representation that removal would occur was insufficient to justify continued detention. No.
26-CV-10628, 2026 WL 2655018, at *6; and

WHEREAS, similarly, in W.A.C. v. Rokosky, the court concluded that continued detention
violated Zadvydas where the Government had not demonstrated that removal was reasonably
foreseeable and ordered the petitioner's release. 836 F. Supp. 3d 577, 588-89; and

WHEREAS, the Court recognizes that Zadvydas does not require Respondents to provide
an exact date certain for removal, and the absence of a precise removal date is not, standing alone,
dispositive; rather, the absence of a precise date is one circumstance to be considered in

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determining whether the record, taken as a whole, demonstrates a significant likelihood of removal
within the reasonably foreseeable future; and

WHEREAS, here, however, the deficiency is not simply that Respondents cannot identify
an exact date. Rather, despite the substantial passage of time since the removal order became
effective and the expiration of the mandatory removal period, Respondents have not identified any
particular flight, scheduled placement, anticipated removal date, or other concrete event that would
bring Petitioner's detention to an end; and

WHEREAS, the Court's September 7, 2026, Order does not alter this conclusion.
Although Respondents contend that dissolution of that Order would permit ICE to proceed with
Petitioner's removal, the Order does not itself prevent Respondents from demonstrating the
existence of a concrete and sufficiently imminent removal arrangement. The absence of such
evidence therefore cannot be attributed solely to the Court's transfer restriction; and

WHEREAS, in light of the substantial passage of time since the removal order became
effective, the expiration of the ninety-day removal period, Petitioner's intervening release from
physical custody pursuant to an Order of Supervision, and her subsequent re-detention, the Court
declines to treat the September 4, 2026, re-detention date, standing alone, as establishing a new
presumptively reasonable period of detention; and

WHEREAS, the Court concludes, on the present record, that Respondents have not
demonstrated a significant likelihood that Petitioner's removal to Guatemala will be effectuated in
the reasonably foreseeable future sufficient to justify her continued detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6); and

WHEREAS, the Court has considered the parties' submissions and the entire record,
including the circumstances of Petitioner's prior release from custody, the substantial passage of

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time since the removal order became effective, and Respondents' representations concerning the
anticipated timing and manner of Petitioner's removal;

IT IS on this 13th day of October 2026, ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED to the extent that Respondents shall release Petitioner
from immigration custody, subject to any reasonable conditions of supervision authorized by law,
within seven (7) days of entry of this Order;

ORDERED that Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner's release and shall advise the Court
by e-filed correspondence when release has occurred; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court's September 7, 2026, Order (ECF No. 2) shall remain in effect
pending further Order of the Court.

mashipp

MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE