EVANS v. NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT, MONMOUTH COUNTY et al

3:26-cv-01357NjdMar 5, 2026

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
REBECCA EVANS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT,
MONMOUTH COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 26-1357 (GC) (JTQ)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Rebecca Evans’ Complaint, (ECF
No. 1), and it appearing that the Honorable Stacey D. Adams of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey is named as Defendant, (id. at 1), and it further appearing that by
Order entered on February 11, 2026, this matter was assigned to the Undersigned by Order of the
Chief Judge, (ECF No. 3); and
WHEREAS pursuant to Local Civil Rule 40.1(g), the assignee Judge must determine
whether the suit is “patently frivolous, or if judicial immunity is plainly applicable” before making
any ruling in the matter. L. Civ. R. 40.1(g). If the Court finds that either of these apply to the
instant suit, the Court must “promptly notify the Chief Judge upon the issuance of an order
dismissing the defendant Judge” and “[t]he Chief Judge shall thereafter, if appropriate, reassign
the civil action to the originally assigned Judge.” L. Civ. R. 40.1(h); and
WHEREAS Plaintiff’s Complaint sues Judge Adams in her individual and official
capacities for conduct relating to Judge Adams’ former role as Judge of the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Monmouth County. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Judge Adams violated
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Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and otherwise harmed Plaintiff through Judge Adams’ adjudication
of Plaintiff’s post-judgment divorce proceedings and related child custody matters.1 (See ECF No.
1 at 15-28.)2 For example, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Adams “granted Defendant Peterson’s ex
parte OTSC and awarded him temporary sole physical custody of both children,” (id. ¶ 50),
“terminated Plaintiff’s parental rights,” (id. ¶ 70), and “upheld Defendant Peterson’s temporary
sole custody and continued the suspension of Plaintiff's parenting time,” (id. ¶ 80). The Complaint
is replete with allegations stemming from purported errors in these judgments and others; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff seeks $40,000,000 in damages, injunctive relief that would “restore
Plaintiff’s parental rights,” and declaratory relief. (Id. at 49-53); and
WHEREAS it is a “well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune from
a suit for money damages.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). Further, “immunity will not be lost merely because the
judge’s action is ‘unfair’ or controversial,” Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir.
2000), nor because it “was done maliciously, or was in excess of [her] authority,” Azubuko v. Royal,
443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)); and
1 Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action against Judge Adams. Count I asserts a violation
of Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Count II asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to § 1983; Count III asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment as they pertain to her right to parent pursuant to § 1983; Count IV
asserts First Amendment retaliation pursuant to § 1983; Count V asserts Judge Adams conspired
to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of § 1985; Count VI is not brought against Judge
Adams; and Counts VII and VIII assert torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and defamation, respectively.
2 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
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WHEREAS there are only two ways for judicial immunity to be overcome. “First, a judge
is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity[.] . . . Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Pinckney v. Bury, Civ.
No. 22-2408, 2023 WL 4108772, at *2 (D.N.J. June 21, 2023) (explaining the same); and
WHEREAS based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Judge Adams committed the challenged
conduct in the course of adjudicating Plaintiff’s post-divorce proceedings and custody dispute with
her former husband. The Court finds that Judge Adams was acting in a judicial capacity when she
undertook the challenged conduct. See Stephens v. Martini, Civ. No. 22-1971, 2022 WL 1237786,
at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2022) (“[W]hile [the p]laintiffs focus on [the judge’s] motives, the alleged
ignoring of evidence, and errors concerning evidence or findings in the case, the law is clear –
judges maintain immunity for actions taken in error, done maliciously, or in excess of his or her
authority.”). Moreover, there are no facts to suggest that Judge Adams acted in the absence of all
jurisdiction. As such, Judge Adams is entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for
monetary damages; and
WHEREAS because claims against Judge Adams in her official capacity are essentially
claims against the New Jersey Superior Court, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies as the
Superior Court is an entity of the state of New Jersey. See El v. Moore, Civ. No. 23-3255, 2024
WL 4299030, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2024) (finding a Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas judge immune from official capacity claims because the Court was an entity of the state of
Pennsylvania); Price El v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., Civ. No. 11-2213, 2012 WL 95210, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan.
12, 2012) (collecting cases regarding sovereign immunity); and
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WHEREAS to the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from Judge Adams, such
relief is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Third Circuit has consistently held that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits suits brought in federal court where, as here, [the p]laintiff
challenges the judgments of state family courts.”3 Adamo v. Jones, Civ. No. 15-1073, 2016 WL
356031, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2016) (collecting cases); see also Eisenstein v. Ebsworth, 148 F.
App’x 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the
plaintiff “was asking the District Court to review [the state court judge’s] order, or orders, and to
find that these orders were in error” because “[t]his is equivalent to using the federal courts as a
forum to appeal a state court judgment and falls squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”);
and
WHEREAS application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine mandates four prerequisites: “(1)
the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-
court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the
plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining &
Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original); and
WHEREAS the allegations against Judge Adams plainly meet these four requirements. As
described in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Judge Adams repeatedly ruled against Plaintiff prior to the
filing of the instant Complaint, and these allegations comprise the substance of the allegations
against Judge Adams. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31, 50, 65-66, 70, 80, 90-91, 92, 98.) Although
Plaintiff styles her claims for relief as constitutional in nature, the allegations and injunctive relief
sought within the Complaint indicate that Plaintiff’s true aim is to set aside purportedly erroneous
3 See generally Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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state court judgments. (See, e.g., id. at 17 (“Judge Adams relied exclusively on [a] terminated and
unfounded complaint to remove Plaintiff's custody of her children.”), 19 (“Judge Adams made
factually erroneous assumptions[.]”), 50 (seeking “sole physical and legal custody” of the
children), 51 (asking the Court to “order that the children be allowed to visit the Plaintiff freely
with no restrictions”), 52 (asking the Court to “suspend all child support, child support in arrears
requests, court fee reimbursement, court fee reimbursement in arrears, wage garnishment requests,
wage garnishments in arrears requests, tax reimbursement requests, and tax reimbursement in
arrears”).) As such, Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief against Judge Adams; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1 at 49-50.) However, “the
remedy [sought] is not intended to halt a present, continuing violation of federal law” as is required
to proceed. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Andrews
v. Hens-Greco, 641 F. App’x 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding the plaintiff lacked standing to
pursue a claim for declaratory relief against the judge where the relief was “solely retrospective in
nature”). Indeed, Plaintiff seeks, for example, declarations “that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
rights” and that Judge Adams’ prior orders “are unconstitutional, null, and void.” (ECF No. 1 at
49-50); and
WHEREAS as such, because the Court cannot grant Plaintiff the requested relief as to
Judge Adams for reasons including judicial immunity and that the claims against Judge Adams are
patently frivolous, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Adams must be dismissed with prejudice. See
Trapp v. New Jersey, 2019 WL 2067652, at *2 (D.N.J. May 10, 2019) (dismissing claims against
a judge as patently frivolous and barred by judicial immunity where the plaintiff’s “[a]mended
[c]omplaint, construed liberally, seem[ed] to allege that [the judge] violated his constitutional
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

REBECCA EVANS,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 26-1357 (GC) (JTQ)
V.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT,
MONMOUTH COUNTY, e¢ ai.,

Defendants.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Rebecca Evans’ Complaint, (ECF
No. 1), and it appearing that the Honorable Stacey D. Adams of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey is named as Defendant, (id. at 1), and it further appearing that by
Order entered on February 11, 2026, this matter was assigned to the Undersigned by Order of the
Chief Judge, (ECF No. 3); and

WHEREAS pursuant to Local Civil Rule 40.1(g), the assignee Judge must determine
whether the suit is “patently frivolous, or if judicial immunity is plainly applicable” before making
any ruling in the matter. L. Civ. R. 40.1(g). Ifthe Court finds that either of these apply to the
instant suit, the Court must “promptly notify the Chief Judge upon the issuance of an order
dismissing the defendant Judge” and “[t]he Chief Judge shall thereafter, if appropriate, reassign
the civil action to the originally assigned Judge.” L. Civ. R. 40.1(h); and

WHEREAS Plaintiff’s Complaint sues Judge Adams in her individual and official
capacities for conduct relating to Judge Adams’ former role as Judge of the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Monmouth County. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Judge Adams violated

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and otherwise harmed Plaintiff through Judge Adams’ adjudication
of Plaintiff’s post-judgment divorce proceedings and related child custody matters.1 (See ECF No.
1 at 15-28.)2 For example, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Adams “granted Defendant Peterson’s ex
parte OTSC and awarded him temporary sole physical custody of both children,” (id. ¶ 50),
“terminated Plaintiff’s parental rights,” (id. ¶ 70), and “upheld Defendant Peterson’s temporary
sole custody and continued the suspension of Plaintiff's parenting time,” (id. ¶ 80). The Complaint
is replete with allegations stemming from purported errors in these judgments and others; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff seeks $40,000,000 in damages, injunctive relief that would “restore
Plaintiff’s parental rights,” and declaratory relief. (Id. at 49-53); and
WHEREAS it is a “well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune from
a suit for money damages.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). Further, “immunity will not be lost merely because the
judge’s action is ‘unfair’ or controversial,” Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir.
2000), nor because it “was done maliciously, or was in excess of [her] authority,” Azubuko v. Royal,
443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)); and
1 Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action against Judge Adams. Count I asserts a violation
of Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Count II asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to § 1983; Count III asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment as they pertain to her right to parent pursuant to § 1983; Count IV
asserts First Amendment retaliation pursuant to § 1983; Count V asserts Judge Adams conspired
to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of § 1985; Count VI is not brought against Judge
Adams; and Counts VII and VIII assert torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and defamation, respectively.
2 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
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3
WHEREAS there are only two ways for judicial immunity to be overcome. “First, a judge
is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity[.] . . . Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Pinckney v. Bury, Civ.
No. 22-2408, 2023 WL 4108772, at *2 (D.N.J. June 21, 2023) (explaining the same); and
WHEREAS based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Judge Adams committed the challenged
conduct in the course of adjudicating Plaintiff’s post-divorce proceedings and custody dispute with
her former husband. The Court finds that Judge Adams was acting in a judicial capacity when she
undertook the challenged conduct. See Stephens v. Martini, Civ. No. 22-1971, 2022 WL 1237786,
at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2022) (“[W]hile [the p]laintiffs focus on [the judge’s] motives, the alleged
ignoring of evidence, and errors concerning evidence or findings in the case, the law is clear –
judges maintain immunity for actions taken in error, done maliciously, or in excess of his or her
authority.”). Moreover, there are no facts to suggest that Judge Adams acted in the absence of all
jurisdiction. As such, Judge Adams is entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for
monetary damages; and
WHEREAS because claims against Judge Adams in her official capacity are essentially
claims against the New Jersey Superior Court, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies as the
Superior Court is an entity of the state of New Jersey. See El v. Moore, Civ. No. 23-3255, 2024
WL 4299030, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2024) (finding a Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas judge immune from official capacity claims because the Court was an entity of the state of
Pennsylvania); Price El v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., Civ. No. 11-2213, 2012 WL 95210, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan.
12, 2012) (collecting cases regarding sovereign immunity); and
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4
WHEREAS to the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from Judge Adams, such
relief is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Third Circuit has consistently held that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits suits brought in federal court where, as here, [the p]laintiff
challenges the judgments of state family courts.”3 Adamo v. Jones, Civ. No. 15-1073, 2016 WL
356031, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2016) (collecting cases); see also Eisenstein v. Ebsworth, 148 F.
App’x 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the
plaintiff “was asking the District Court to review [the state court judge’s] order, or orders, and to
find that these orders were in error” because “[t]his is equivalent to using the federal courts as a
forum to appeal a state court judgment and falls squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”);
and
WHEREAS application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine mandates four prerequisites: “(1)
the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-
court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the
plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining &
Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original); and
WHEREAS the allegations against Judge Adams plainly meet these four requirements. As
described in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Judge Adams repeatedly ruled against Plaintiff prior to the
filing of the instant Complaint, and these allegations comprise the substance of the allegations
against Judge Adams. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31, 50, 65-66, 70, 80, 90-91, 92, 98.) Although
Plaintiff styles her claims for relief as constitutional in nature, the allegations and injunctive relief
sought within the Complaint indicate that Plaintiff’s true aim is to set aside purportedly erroneous
3 See generally Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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5
state court judgments. (See, e.g., id. at 17 (“Judge Adams relied exclusively on [a] terminated and
unfounded complaint to remove Plaintiff's custody of her children.”), 19 (“Judge Adams made
factually erroneous assumptions[.]”), 50 (seeking “sole physical and legal custody” of the
children), 51 (asking the Court to “order that the children be allowed to visit the Plaintiff freely
with no restrictions”), 52 (asking the Court to “suspend all child support, child support in arrears
requests, court fee reimbursement, court fee reimbursement in arrears, wage garnishment requests,
wage garnishments in arrears requests, tax reimbursement requests, and tax reimbursement in
arrears”).) As such, Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief against Judge Adams; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1 at 49-50.) However, “the
remedy [sought] is not intended to halt a present, continuing violation of federal law” as is required
to proceed. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Andrews
v. Hens-Greco, 641 F. App’x 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding the plaintiff lacked standing to
pursue a claim for declaratory relief against the judge where the relief was “solely retrospective in
nature”). Indeed, Plaintiff seeks, for example, declarations “that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
rights” and that Judge Adams’ prior orders “are unconstitutional, null, and void.” (ECF No. 1 at
49-50); and
WHEREAS as such, because the Court cannot grant Plaintiff the requested relief as to
Judge Adams for reasons including judicial immunity and that the claims against Judge Adams are
patently frivolous, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Adams must be dismissed with prejudice. See
Trapp v. New Jersey, 2019 WL 2067652, at *2 (D.N.J. May 10, 2019) (dismissing claims against
a judge as patently frivolous and barred by judicial immunity where the plaintiff’s “[a]mended
[c]omplaint, construed liberally, seem[ed] to allege that [the judge] violated his constitutional
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rights through various decisions that adversely impacted [the plaintiff’); and for other good cause
shown
IT IS on this 5th day of March, 2026 ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant Stacey D, Adams is DISMISSED from this case pursuant to Local Civil
Rule 40,1(h),
2. In accordance with Local Civil Rule 40.1(h), the Clerk of Court shail notify the
Chief Judge of this decision to allow for a determination as to the reassignment of

this case.

GEORGETTE CASTNER
TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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