KIRMSER v. UNITY BANCORP, INC. et al

3:24-cv-10663NjdFeb 2, 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHELLE S. KIRMSER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-10663 (MAS) (TJB)
. MEMORANDUM OPINION
UNITY BANCORP, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Unity Bancorp., Inc. “‘UBI”), Unity
Bank (“Unity”), and Unity Bank Board of Directors’ (the “Board’’) (collectively, “Defendants’’)
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) Plaintiff Michelle S. Kirmser’s (‘Plaintiff’) Complaint (ECF
No. 1). Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 9), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 12). The Court has
carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the motion without oral argument under
Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background!
Plaintiff is an individual from Warren, New Jersey, who was employed by Unity, a New

Jersey-chartered bank, from December 2006 through September 2023. (Compl. 1, {9 1, 5, ECF

' Tn considering the instant Motion to Dismiss, this Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

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No. 1.) The Board is the Administrator of an Executive Life Insurance Plan with Split Dollar Policy
Endorsement (the “Plan”’) that Unity offered to its employees, including Plaintiff. dd. J{ 1, 7.) UBI
is a publicly traded financial services organization that was “organized at the direction of the
Board. . . for the purpose of acquiring all the capital stock of [Unity], and it serves as a holding
company for [Unity].” Ud. { 6.)
1. The Plan
In 2010, as an employee of Unity, Plaintiff elected to participate in the Plan. Ud. {J 24-25;
see generally Ex. A to Compl. (the “Plan’”’), ECF No. 1; Ex. C. to Compl., ECF No. 1.) Under the
Plan, participants have a right to designate a beneficiary for certain death benefits, including certain
benefits for “those Participants who are Executive Vice Presidents and above” and a different set
of death benefits for “[a]ll other Participants[.]” (Compl. {§ 13-14 (first alteration in original)
(quoting Plan § 3.1).) Ina July 1, 2013, amendment to the Plan, the “maximum benefit” for certain
participants, including Plaintiff, was amended to $250,000. (Compl. {ff 15-16 (citing Ex. B to
Compl., ECF No. 1).)
Under § 2.2 of the Plan, “[a] Participant’s rights under this Plan shall cease and his or her
participation in this Plan shall terminate” if any of the following occurs:
(a) [i]f the Participant is Terminated for Cause’; (b) [i]f the

Participant’s employment with [Unity] is terminated prior to [her]
Early Retirement Age? for reasons other than Disability .. . ; or (c)

* “Terminated for Cause” is defined by the Plan to mean “termination because of the [e]mployee’s
personal dishonesty, incompetence, willful misconduct, breach of fiduciary duty involving
personal profit, intentional failure to perform stated duties, willful violation of any law, rule or
regulation (other than traffic violations or similar infractions) or a final cease-and-desist order.”
(Plan 2.)

3“Rarly Retirement Age” is defined by the Plan to mean “the Participant has attained an age such
that the sum of the Participant’s age and Years of Service (rounded up to the next full year) at
termination totals at least [sixty-five].” (Plan 2.)

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[i]f the Participant terminates employment due to Disability and
thereafter becomes gainfully employed with an entity other than

[Unity].
(Compl. § 18 (quoting Plan § 2.2).) The Plan also provides that Unity shall maintain the policy and

“in no event, shall [Unity] amend, terminate or otherwise abrogate the Participant’s interest in the
Policy, unless the Participant agrees[,] . . . [i]f the Participant’s employment with [Unity] is
terminated due to Disability, .. . [or] [i]f the Participant’s employment with [Unity] is terminated
on or after Early Retirement Age.” (Plan § 2.3; Compl. § 19.) At the time her employment with
Unity terminated in 2023, Plaintiff was fifty-nine years old and had more than sixteen years of
service with Unity. (Compl. § 22.) Plaintiff alleges she became “disabled” in March 2023, and,
therefore, “her employment was terminated after Early Retirement Age due to Disability[.]” Ud.
{ 23.) Plaintiff further alleges that her termination of employment with Unity was not “for cause.”
(Id. ¥ 20.)
2. LTD Benefits

While employed by Unity, Plaintiff also paid for Executive Long-Term Disability
Insurance’ (the “EX LTD Plan”) through payroll deductions made by Unity. Ud. § 28.) Unity
instructed Plaintiff that her premiums “were being paid in such a manner that she would not be
taxed on the benefits she received in the event that she ever needed to utilize the EX LTD
[Benefits].” Ud.) Plaintiff relied on “[Unity’s] statements that her EX LTD [B]enefits would not
be taxable, and[,] therefore[,] she refrained from purchasing additional long-term disability
insurance outside of work.” Ud. { 30.)

In 2024, after Plaintiff became disabled and began receiving EX LTD Benefits, she learned

that the income was being reported as taxable. Ud. J 3, 31.) Thereafter, Plaintiff asked Unity to

4 Any benefits conferred on Plaintiff under the EX LTD Plan are collectively referred to herein as
the “EX LTD Benefits.”

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correct its reporting of her EX LTD Benefits as non-taxable, “on the grounds that [Plaintiff had
paid the premiums for her EX LTD insurance with after-tax dollars and that agents of [Unity] had
told her that any EX LTD [B]enefits she received would not be subject to taxation.” Ud. ¥ 32.)
Plaintiff alleges that Unity refused to correct its reporting of Plaintiff’s income resulting from the
EX LTD Benefits and has “further refused to provide any documentation showing on what basis it
reported [P]laintiff’s EX LTD [B]enefits as taxable.” Ud. J§ 33-34.)

B. Procedural History

In November 2024, Plaintiff filed the Complaint, alleging five causes of
action: (1) declaratory judgment seeking clarification of the status as a participant in, and right to
benefits under, the Plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”) (“Count One”); (2) breach of contract (“Count Two”); (3) breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (“Count Three”); (4) promissory estoppel (“Count Four’); and
(5) misrepresentation (“Count Five”). (See generally id.) On February 24, 2025, Defendants filed
the subject Motion to Dismiss. (See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff opposed (see
generally P1\.’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 9), and Defendants replied (see generally Defs.’ Reply Br.,
ECF No. 12).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure® 8(a)(2) “requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

> All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4

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A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009). Second, the court must identify all the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, accept
them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can
discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant
unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Third, the court must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim
has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

Il. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing
that: (1) UBI is not a proper party and should therefore be dismissed; (2) Count One fails as a
matter of law; and (3) Counts Two through Five are preempted by ERISA. (See generally Defs.’

Moving Br., ECF No. 7-1.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.

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A. Dismissal of UBI

Defendants first argue that UBI is not a proper party to this case because it “is not the
sponsor or fiduciary of any ERISA plan, nor is it the policyholder of any applicable insurance
policy.” Ud. at 1, 11.)

Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), a “civil action may be brought . . . by a participant or
beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan, to enforce [her] rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.|”
29 US.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). “In a claim for wrongful denial of benefits under ERISA, the proper
defendant is the plan itself or a person who controls the administration of benefits under the plan.”
Evans v. Emp. Benefit Plan, Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 311 F. App’x 556, 558 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); see also Rajpurohit v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., No. 22-7612,
2024 WL 1477652, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2024) (“In such lawsuits [brought under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)] . . . the proper defendants are the plan or plan administrators.” (citing Graden v.
Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 301 (3d Cir. 2007))). In evaluating whether an entity “controls
the administration of benefits under the plan[,]” courts may consider factors such as
whether: (1) communications about benefits were directed to the entity; (2) the entity was
responsible for administering the benefits; and (3) the entity determined benefit eligibility. See
Evans, 311 F. App’x at 558-59.

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that UBI is a “holding company” that was “organized at the
direction of the Board . . . for the purpose of acquiring all the capital stock of [Unity.]” (Compl.
4 6.) Plaintiff does not allege any other facts about UBI or its role in controlling the Plan or its

administration. (See generally id.) As Defendants also observe, UBI “is not named in the Plan

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Document as a sponsor, fiduciary, or administrator[.]”° (Defs.’ Moving Br. 3; see generally Plan.)
Without more from Plaintiff regarding UBI’s role and connection to the Plan, UBI cannot be
deemed a proper defendant to this action at this time.’ UBI is, accordingly, dismissed.*

B. Declaratory Judgment Claim (Count One)

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff is a participant in the Plan and,
therefore, “that her beneficiaries are entitled to benefits[.]” (Compl. § 36.A.) In support of Count
One, Plaintiff alleges that she is an ongoing participant in the Plan “because she satisfies the
requirements under two separate sections of the Plan”: (1) under § 2.3(a), “her employment
terminated due to disability and she has not become employed by another entity”; and (2) under
§ 2.3(b), “her employment terminated after she reached Early Retirement Age, and she was not
terminated for cause[.]” U/d. § 35.) Plaintiff further alleges that a judicial declaration “is necessary
and appropriate at this time so that the parties may ascertain their rights and obligations under the
Plan and settle the dispute prior to the expiration of any purported limitations period . . . , and to

ensure that the [policy] remains in effect to cover any claims by [P]laintiff’s beneficiaries.” (Ud.

6 The Court may consider the Plan in its analysis because it is attached to the Complaint and is
integral to Plaintiff’s claims in the Complaint. See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resol., L.L.C.,
716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may “consider
only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents”
(quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010))).

7 The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s opposition contained only a one-footnote response to
Defendants’ argument on this point and did not otherwise fulsomely address this issue. (See Pl.’s
Opp’n Br. 19 n.8.) “[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued,
are considered waived.” John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int'l. Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6
(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Commonwealth of Pa. v. HHS, 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996)).

8 Given UBI’s dismissal from the case, references to “Defendants” hereinafter refer to Unity and
the Board.

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{ 36.) Defendants move to dismiss Count One on the basis that Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment
claim fails as a matter of law by the Plan’s terms. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 17-20.)

The Court, however, must dismiss this claim sua sponte for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Declaratory Judgment Act (the “DJA”) permits this Court to issue a declaratory
judgment “[i]Jn a case of actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The DJA does not create an
independent cause of action, but rather “is a procedural vehicle that creates a form of relief” and
serves as a “remedy for existing cases or controversies.” In re AZEK Bldg. Prods., Inc., Mktg. &
Sales Pracs. Litig., 82 F. Supp. 3d 608, 624-25 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. of
Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)). As a form of forward-looking relief, a
plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must demonstrate, among other things, a threat of “real and
immediate” future harm. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 1995). Without
a threat of real and immediate future harm, a plaintiff does not have standing. See Falcone v.
Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Without showing a likelihood or immediate threat
of future harm, a plaintiff cannot obtain standing for prospective relief.” (citing Brown v. Fauver,
819 F.2d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 1987))).

Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a real or immediate threat of future harm. (See
generally Compl.) Plaintiff alleges that she “has not made a claim for the life insurance benefits
under the [Plan] because such a claim may be made only by her designated beneficiaries upon her
death.” (Ud. § 27.) Rather, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that “her beneficiaries [would be] entitled
to benefits because [Plaintiff] is an insured” under the Plan. Ud. § 36.A.) While Plaintiff alleges a
theoretical future harm—that her beneficiaries would not recover any money upon a claim made
after her death—Plaintiff has not otherwise alleged that she or her beneficiaries face an immediate

threat of this occurring absent a declaration from this Court or that any purported limitations period

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is set to expire. (See id. § 36); Obusek, 72 F.3d at 1154. The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint
are insufficient to establish that Plaintiff has standing to bring such a claim at this time. See Krauter
vy. Siemens Corp., 725 F. App’x 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s dismissal where
plaintiff did not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action because “precedent is
conclusive: a risk of future adverse effects on benefits is not an injury in fact”); see also Pittsburgh
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190
(3d Cir. 2009) (“[The Third Circuit has] held that a potential harm that is ‘contingent’ on a future
event occurring will likely not satisfy this prong of the ripeness test.” (citations omitted)).

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Count One, but will give Plaintiff an opportunity to
amend her Complaint to bolster allegations related to the threat of imminent harm she may face.
See, e.g., In re Samsung Data Sec. Breach Litig., 761 F. Supp. 3d 781, 790 (D.N.J. 2025) (“When
a plaintiff fails to establish Article IIIT standing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and
dismissal is required[.]” (citations omitted)); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412,
420 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[The Court] can dismiss a suit sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
at any stage in the proceeding.”); Keith v. McCarthy, No. 25-02973, 2025 WL 3296813, at *6
(D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2025) (dismissing complaint for lack of standing to pursue declaratory relief
where future harm was speculative).

C. State Law Claims (Counts Two through Five)

Plaintiff asserts state law claims in Counts Two through Five, all of which relate to the EX

LTD Plan. (See Compl. §§ 37-50.) Defendants argue that Counts Two through Five should be

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dismissed because they are subject to express preemption under § 514(a) of ERISA.’ (See Defs.’
Moving Br. 2, 12-17.) The Court agrees.

The stated goal of ERISA is “‘to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries
in employee benefit plans’ by ensuring benefit plans [are] well managed and [will] not leave plan
participants short-changed.” Plastic Surgery Ctr, P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 225 (3d
Cir. 2020) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)). To ensure “that ERISA’s
mandates supplanted the patchwork of state law previously in place... Congress enacted [S]ection
514(a)—a broad express preemption provision, which ‘supersede[s] any and all [s]tate laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.’” Jd. at 226 (second alteration
in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). The reach of ERISA’s express preemption provision
applies not only to state statutes and regulations which “relate to” an ERISA-governed employee
benefit plan, but also to state “common law causes of action.”!° Jd. (citing Menkes v. Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 294 (3d Cir. 2014)).

? ERISA applies to “any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained . . . by any
employer engaged in commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1). Here, the EX LTD Plan, which provides
long term disability benefits, is an “employee welfare benefit plan” as defined by ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) (defining “employee welfare benefit plan” as “any plan, fund, or
program... established or maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, .. . benefits in
the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment”).

'0 Courts have found state law claims such as breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and misrepresentation to be preempted by ERISA
where the claims have some connection with or reference to an employee benefit plan. See, e.g.,
Ford v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 351 F. App’x 703, 706 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating a breach of
contract claim “fall[s] within the scope of ERISA preemption, if the claim[] relate[s] to an
ERISA-governed benefits plan”); Crumley v. Stonhard, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.N.J. 1996)
(finding that misrepresentation and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claims related to a plan governed by ERISA and were therefore preempted); Labus v. Navistar Int’l
Transp. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1053, 1065 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding promissory estoppel claim
preempted by ERISA because the “claim relates to an employee benefit plan”).

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For purposes of express preemption, “a state law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan if it
has either (1) a ‘reference to’ or (2) a ‘connection with’ that plan[.]” Plastic Surgery Ctr, 967 F.3d
at 226 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97). Claims that make “reference to” an ERISA plan include
both claims that “‘act[] immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans’” and those that are
““nremised on’” a plan. Jd. at 230 (alternation in original) (first quoting Gobeille v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 577 U.S. 312, 319-20 (2016); and then quoting /ngersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U.S. 133, 140 (1990)). Claims have a “connection with” an ERISA plan if they: “[(1)] ‘directly
affect the relationship among the traditional ERISA entities—the employer, the plan and its
fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries’[; (2)| interfere with plan administration[;] or
[(3)] undercut ERISA’s stated purpose[.]” Jd. at 235 (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff, an ERISA participant, brings state law claims regarding her entitlement to
EX LTD Benefits on a non-taxable basis, alleging that: (1) Unity’s statements that Plaintiff’s EX
LTD Benefits would not be subject to federal income tax “constituted an enforceable contract” and
Unity breached that contract “resulting in [P]laintiff having federal taxes withheld from her EX
LTD [B]enefits” (Count Two) (Compl. {J 38-40); (2) Unity’s purported breach of contract also
constitutes breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Three) (id.
4 42-43); (3) Unity is liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because “Plaintiff
reasonably relied to her detriment upon [Unity’s] promises that she would receive EX LTD
[Benefits on an after-tax basis” under the EX LTD Plan (Count Four) (id. J] 45-46); and (4) Unity
is liable for misrepresentation because Plaintiff performed services for Unity based on Unity’s
representations that her EX LTD Benefits would not be taxable when they were paid to her (Count
Five) (id. §§ 48-51). Despite the Complaint’s allegations, Plaintiff argues that the state law claims

“do not seek benefits under any ERISA plan,” but rather “ask only that the Court require [Unity]

11°

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to make good on various representations that were made to [P]laintiff.. . [regarding her payment
of] premiums for her long-term disability insurance in such a manner that she would not be taxed
on the benefits were she ever to receive those benefits.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 14.)

These state law claims, however, clearly require an analysis of the EX LTD Plan itself, and
its administration, to discern the responsibility for paying premiums for coverage, and thus,
whether Plaintiff should be taxed on the EX LTD Benefits as she receives them. (See Defs.’ Moving
Br. 14-17.) The Court, therefore, finds that Counts Two through Five are preempted by ERISA
because they are premised upon and interfere with the administration of the EX LTD Plan. See
Plastic Surgery Ctr, 967 F.3d 218 at 235, 240; see also Turner v. CIGNA Grp. Ins., No. 10-4103,
2011 WL 2038751, at *4-5 (D.N.J. May 24, 2011) (finding plaintiff’s state law claims were
preempted by ERISA because they required the court to determine what was covered under the

(4

terms of the plan and, therefore, the plan was “‘a critical factor in establishing liability’ for
[p]laintiff’s misrepresentation claim],]” as well as plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims); O’Rourke v. Farmers Grp. Inc.
Transitional Supplemental Exec. Ret. Plan, No. 17-279, 2017 WL 10354733, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 24, 2017) (finding negligent misrepresentation claims related to statements about plaintiff’s
pension were preempted by ERISA because the allegations “‘relate to’ [plaintiff’s] employee

benefit and are thus preempted”).

Counts Two through Five are, accordingly, dismissed.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. The Court will

issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MICHAELA.SHipp /
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: 2/2/2026

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