3:24-cv-10428•BETHUNE v. INTERSTATE WASTE SERVICES, INC.
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Case 3:24-cv-10428-MAS-RLS Document13_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 1 of 6 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LISA BETHUNE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-10428 (MAS) (RLS)
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
INTERSTATE WASTE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Interstate Waste Services, Inc.’s
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) the Second Cause of Action of Plaintiff Lisa
Bethune’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 9), and Defendant
replied (ECF No. 10). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the
matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below,
the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND!
A. Factual Background
On or about May 17, 2021, Plaintiff, an African American woman, began her employment
as a maintenance administrator at Solterra Recycling Solutions, which was acquired by Defendant
on or about June 15, 2022. (Compl. ff 10-11, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff reported harassment and
discrimination from July 2022 to September 2022 to Michael Alexander (“Alexander”),
' For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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Defendant’s Human Resources Officer. Ud. J 11.) Specifically, she reported that Robert Bryson
(“Bryson”), Site Manager for Defendant’s Ewing operations, accused her of stealing company
property. Ud. § 11(a).) As a result, Bill Falletta (“Falletta”), Defendant’s Safety Manager,
conducted an investigation. (/d.) Plaintiff also reported that Bryson: (1) refused to give her the
women’s bathroom key, preventing her access to the restroom at her worksite and forcing her to
rely on public restrooms; (2) required her to take a drug test—even though she does not drive as
part of her job—while white employees who do not drive were not required to undergo drug
testing; and (3) instructed one of Defendant’s employee’s, Mustafa Battle (“Battle’’), to follow her
while she was working. (/d. §§ 11(b)-(d).)
Plaintiff, Alexander, and Karen Brown (“Brown”), Defendant’s Senior Director of Human
Resources, met on September 22, 2022. Ud. § 12.) During that meeting, Plaintiff again detailed her
allegations of harassment and discrimination, and Brown stated that Defendant would investigate
Plaintiff’s complaints. Ud. 9 12-13.) Plaintiff, Alexander, and Brown again met on October 14,
2022. Ud. | 14.) During that meeting, they “presented [Plaintiff] with a termination letter and
severance package signed by Tom Farinaro” (“Farinaro”), Defendant’s interim Market Vice
President of Central Jersey. (/d.) Plaintiff refused to sign the termination letter, so Brown proposed
that they meet again on October 16, 2022. Ud. { 15.) Plaintiff, however, contracted COVID-19 and
was sick from October 16, 2022, to October 31, 2022. (id. § 16.) On October 29, 2022, Plaintiff
emailed a “Harassment and Complaint Form” detailing the allegations outlined above to Brown
and Alexander. (/d. § 17.) Plaintiff returned to work on November 1, 2022. (/d. § 18.) “Immediately
upon return, Bryson and LeVan Bryant[] (‘Bryant’)[, Defendant’s] Route Supervisor, told
[Plaintiff] to leave and stay off [Defendant’s] property.” (/d.) Plaintiff called Alexander and her
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supervisor “multiple times over several days, but they did not respond.” Ud. { 19.) Plaintiff was
not permitted back on Defendant’s property or to return to work. Ud. § 20.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff timely filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on December 28, 2022, and received her Notice of Right to Sue from the
EEOC on August 13, 2024. Ud. § 9.) Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 11, 2024, within
ninety days of the issuance of the Notice of Right to Sue, asserting two claims for relief:
(1) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “CRA”) (“First Cause
of Action”); and (2) retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (the
“NJLAD”) (“Second Cause of Action”). (Compl. {J 22-29.)
Defendant thereafter filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 8), Plaintiff opposed (Pl.’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 9), and Defendant replied (Def.’s Reply Br.,
ECF No. 12).
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure? 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
2 All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations, accept them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Fowler vy. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The
court can discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the
defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Third, the court must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint
are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Il. DISCUSSION
Defendant makes one argument in support of dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Cause of
Action: Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim is barred because it falls outside of NJLAD’s statute
of limitations. (Def.’s Moving Br. 2-4, ECF No. 8-1.) Plaintiff contends that: (1) the claim is not
time barred because she preserved her claim by timely filing her complaint with the EEOC;
(2) dismissal of the claim would be unjust and inefficient; and (3) Defendant cannot show
prejudice based on Plaintiff’s filing of her claim ten days after the statute of limitations expired.
(Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 2-5.)
At the outset, the Court notes that “[a] statute of limitations defense is usually unavailable
in a motion to dismiss under... Rule... 12(b)(6), [but] an exception arises ‘where the complaint
facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly
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appears on the face of the pleading.’” Hamza v. United Cont’l Holdings, LLC, No. 19-8971, 2021
WL 3206814, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2021) (second alteration in original) (quoting County of
Hudson vy. Janiszewski, 520 F. Supp. 2d 631, 649 (D.N.J. 2007)). “[T]he applicable statute of
limitations is governed by state law,” Janiszewski, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (citation omitted), and
under New Jersey law, “[t]he statute of limitations for NJLAD claims is two years[,|” Langan v.
Starbucks Corp., No. 23-5056, 2024 WL 3580760, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2024).
Plaintiff argues that equitable tolling may apply here because she actively pursued her
claims but was unable to file her Complaint on time due to administrative processes. (Pl.’s Opp’n
Br. 2.) Plaintiff's argument, however, is incorrect. Under New Jersey law, equitable tolling is
permitted where the plaintiff: (1) “has been induced or tricked by [her] adversary’s
misconduct .. .”; (2) has been “prevented . . . in some extraordinary way . . . from asserting [her]
rights[;]” or (3) “has timely asserted [her] rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the
wrong forum.” Langan, 2024 WL 3580760, at *4 (quoting Kates v. Bridgeton Police Dep t, No.
10-6386, 2011 WL 6720497, at *9-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2011). Plaintiff does not allege or argue
that she: (1) was tricked or induced by Defendant; (2) was prevented in some extraordinary way
from asserting her rights; or (3) mistakenly filed in the wrong forum. (See generally Comp1.; Pl.’s
Opp’n Br.)
Moreover, “[t]he statute of limitations for an NJLAD claim is not tolled by a plaintiff’s
pursuit of a federal administrative claim before the EEOC.” Cascina v. Hackensack Univ. Med.
Ctr, No. 19-17571, 2021 WL 4490249, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2021); Brown v. R.R. Grp. Ltd. Liab.
Co., No. 16-4602, 2017 WL 1365215, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2017) (“While a plaintiff may elect to
seek redress administratively instead of, or prior to, seeking judicial redress, the statute of
limitations for filing judicial claims is not tolled by the filing of an administrative claim.”); Taylor
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v. Comput. Scis. Corp., No. 20-1848, 2022 WL 2046887, at *5 (D.N.J. June 6, 2022) (noting that
“[t]he statute of limitations for NJLAD claims is not tolled by filing an administrative claim” and
that “even if the EEOC had initiated a state charge on [the] plaintiff’s behalf. . . [the] [p]laintiff
would have been required to withdraw any administrative charge and file suit prior to the
expiration of the two-year limitations period”).
Here, the fact that Plaintiff decided to file an EEOC charge does not toll the statute of
limitations on her NJLAD claim. Cascina, 2021 WL 4490249, at *4. Plaintiff was presented with
a termination letter on October 14, 2022. (Compl. { 14.) Plaintiff was subsequently told to leave
and not return to Defendant’s property on November 1, 2022. (/d. § 18.) The statute of limitations,
accordingly, began to run on or before November 1, 2022. See Langan, 2024 WL 3580760, at *4.
The two-year statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim therefore expired on November 1,
2024. Id. Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 11, 2024, ten days after the statute of
limitations expired. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is thus time-barred
and will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted, and Plaintiff’s
Second Cause of Action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court will issue an Order consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion.
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
/ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
af (7/ 2026
/
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