LOVE, D.D.S et al v. RED RIVER TALC LLC et al

3:24-cv-06320NjdJan 29, 2026

Full text

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 9 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 10 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document 95 Filed 01/29/26 Page 11 of 11 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

REBECCA LOVE, D.D.S., et al.,
individually and on behalf of a proposed
class,

Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 24-6320 (MAS) (RLS)

v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

RED RIVER TALC, LLC f/k/a LLT
MANAGEMENT LLC f/k/a LTL
MANAGEMENT, LLC, ef al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Red River Talc, LLC (“Red River”),
Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”), Johnson & Johnson Holdco (NA), LLC, Janssen Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (“Janssen”), and Kenvue Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion’’)
(ECF No. 88) Plaintiffs Rebecca Love, D.D.S. (“Love”), Sharon Murphy, William A. Henry,
Alishia Gayle Davis, and Brandi Carl’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs’”) Amended Complaint (ECF No.
65). Plaintiffs opposed (ECF No. 90), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 91). After careful
consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court decides Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons outlined below,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

I. BACKGROUND!

This action arises out of the long-running multidistrict litigation captioned In re Johnson
& Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation
(the “Talc Litigation”). (MDL No. 16-2738.) Because the parties are familiar with the underlying
MDL, the Court recounts only those facts necessary to resolve the instant motion.

In October 2021, while the Talc Litigation was pending, J&J executed a divisional merger
under Texas law (the “Divisive Merger”), pursuant to which its subsidiary, Johnson & Johnson
Consumer, Inc. (“Old JJCI’), was split into two new entities: LTL Management, LLC (“LTL”)
and New JJCI. (Am. Compl. §§ 59-61, ECF No. 65.) In practical effect, the Divisive Merger
allowed J&J to assign its liabilities connected to the Tale Litigation to LTL, while all other
liabilities and assets were assigned to New JJCI. (Ud. § 62.) Shortly after the Divisive Merger, LTL
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (the “First Bankruptcy Action”),? triggering an automatic stay of
the Talc Litigation. Ud. { 67.)

The Official Committee of Talc Claimants and various other parties (collectively,
“Movants”) moved to dismiss the First Bankruptcy Action, arguing that it had been filed in bad
faith. See In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, 64 F Ath 84, 93 (3d Cir. 2023). The Bankruptcy Court for the
District Court of New Jersey denied the motion and extended the automatic stay, which Movants

appealed. Jd. While Movants’ appeal was pending, J&J transferred its consumer health business

' For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

* The First Bankruptcy Action was filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, and later transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. See In re
LTL Megmt., LLC, 64 F Ath 84, 93 (Gd Cir. 2023).

2

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

out of New JJCI and into Janssen, a J&J subsidiary that served as New JJCI’s corporate parent (the
“Janssen Transfer”). (Am Compl. {{ 73-74.)

The Third Circuit ultimately reversed the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey,
holding that the First Bankruptcy Action was not filed in good faith because LTL was not in
financial distress. In re LTL Mgmt., 64 F.4th at 110-11. Following that ruling, LTL expressed
concerns regarding the viability of a funding agreement it had with J&J (the “2021 Funding
Agreement”), and abandoned the agreement, releasing J&J and First HoldCo (a successor to New
JJCI) from their guarantees and obligations to satisfy claims against LTL. (Am. Compl. {ff 84-88.)
This release allegedly put LTL in financial distress and caused it to refile for bankruptcy (the
“Second Bankruptcy Action’) less than three hours after the dismissal of the First Bankruptcy
Action. (/d. §§ 91-92.) LTL subsequently entered a new funding agreement (the “2023 Funding
Agreement”), pursuant to which First HoldCo was to cover LTL’s liabilities. (/d. 90.) The Second
Bankruptcy Action, however, was similarly dismissed “due to LTL’s lack of imminent and
immediate financial distress.” In re LTL Mgmt. LLC, 652 B.R. 433, 456 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 28,
2023), aff'd, Nos. 23-2971 & 23-2972, 2024 WL 3540467 (3d Cir. July 25, 2024).

In May 2024, J&J announced plans for a third bankruptcy, this time as a prepackaged
bankruptcy plan to be filed by a new corporate entity, Red River. (Am. Compl. { 96.) The
prepackaged Chapter 11 plan, as amended, proposed to pay approximately $9 billion to resolve all
current and future ovarian and other gynecological-cancer claims. Jn re Red River Talc LLC, No.
24-90505, 670 B.R. 251, 257 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2025). Moreover, Defendants stated they
would not proceed with the proposed bankruptcy filing unless 75% of claimants voted in favor of

the plan. (See Am. Compl. § 179.)

3 In December 2023, LTL was renamed to LLT Management, LLC (“LLT”). (Am. Compl. § 95.)
3

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

On May 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant action and moved for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from pursuing a new bankruptcy filing.
(See generally Compl., ECF No. 1; ECF No. 6.) The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for lack of
standing and found that the claims were not ripe for adjudication. (Order, ECF No. 31.)*

In August 2024, J&J executed a series of corporate restructurings (the “2024 Texas
Two-Step”) to create three new entities: Red River, Pecos River Tale, LLC, and Johnson &
Johnson Holdco (NA) LLC.> (Am. Compl. § 106.) Red River thereafter filed for bankruptcy (the
“Third Bankruptcy Action”) in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas,
contending that 83% of claimants in the Talc Litigation had voted in favor of the prepackaged
plan. In re Red River Talc LLC, 670 B.R. at 258. In light of the Third Bankruptcy Action, and
pursuant to an order from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, this action was
stayed. (ECF No. 53.)

On March 31, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied the
Third Bankruptcy Action, citing “voting and solicitation irregularities,” and finding it was in the
“best interest” of Red River, its estate, J&J, and creditors to dismiss the case for cause. In re Red
River Talc LLC, 670 B.R. at 307.

The Court thereafter lifted its stay in this action (ECF No. 54), and Plaintiffs filed an

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 65). The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants’ various

* Plaintiffs appealed and sought an emergency injunction pending appeal. (ECF No. 37); Love v.
LLT Mgmt. LLC, No. 24-2214 (3d Cir. July 5, 2024), Dkt. 5 (Ex. G). The Third Circuit summarily
denied the motion for an emergency injunction, and Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal.
(Order Den. Mot. for Inj., 3d Cir. App., Dkt. 26 (Ex. H); Stip. of Dismissal, 3d Cir. App., Dkt.
36 (Ex. I.)

> As part of this restructuring, LLT allocated its ovarian and gynecological cancer liabilities to Red
River, and its mesothelioma, governmental, and Canadian claims to Pecos River Talc, LLC. (Am.

Compl. {§ 94, 98 n.7.)
4

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

corporate restructurings constitute fraudulent transfers, as they were undertaken to “hinder[],
delay[], and/or defraud[] tort victims by precluding recovery against J&J and its operating
subsidiaries.” (Am. Compl. § 21.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’: (1) Divisive
Merger; (2) Janssen Transfer; (3) termination of the 2021 Funding Agreement; and (4) 2024 Texas
Two-Step, individually and collectively constitute fraudulent transfers, and that Defendants’
pursuit of the Third Bankruptcy Action without receiving “the requisite 75% vote in favor”
constitutes malicious abuse of process. (/d.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 88). The Motion is now ripe for disposition.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure® 8(a)(2) “requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations, accept
them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare
legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully

harmed the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court

6 All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Jgbal, 556
U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). On a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.
v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

B. Justiciability

Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judiciary’s authority to exercise its “judicial
Power” to “Cases” and “Controversies” over which the federal judiciary is empowered to decide.
Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S. Const. art.
Il, § 2). “This case-or-controversy limitation, in turn, is crucial in ‘ensuring that the Federal
Judiciary respects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.””
Id. at 539 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). The existence of
a case or controversy, therefore, is a necessary “prerequisite to all federal actions.” Phila. Fed’n
of Teachers. v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 322 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox
Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 Gd Cir. 1994)).

Federal courts ensure that they are properly enforcing the case-or-controversy limitation
through “‘several justiciability doctrines that cluster about Article III,’ including ‘standing,
ripeness, mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition on advisory opinions.””
Plains, 866 F.3d at 539 (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137

(3d Cir. 2009)). Where a justiciability doctrine, like ripeness or standing, is implicated, “[f]ederal

courts lack [subject-matter] jurisdiction to hear” parties’ claims, and the claims must be dismissed.

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

See Battou v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 811 F. App’x 729, 732 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. ex rel Wolfson v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1992)).’
Il. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of
standing and for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 88) Because standing implicates the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court addresses Article III standing as a threshold issue. See Blunt
y. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014).

“To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show[:] (1) an ‘injury in fact[;]’ (2) a
sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of[;]’ and (3) a
‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-58 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). This injury must be an “invasion of a legally protected interest
which is[:] (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” West v. Health Net of the Ne., 217 F.R.D. 163, 173 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560). For an injury to be imminent, as opposed to actual, it must be “certainly
impending to constitute [an] injury in fact.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409
(2013) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). “[A]llegations of possible
future injury” are not “certainly impending,” and therefore, are not imminent. See Clapper, 568
U.S. at 400 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158). As the party invoking federal

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

7“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have an obligation to establish subject
matter jurisdiction, even if they must decide the issue sua sponte.” Cepulevicius v. Arbella Mut.
Ins., No. 21-20332, 2022 WL 17131579, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2022) (emphasis omitted) (citing
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Co., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Council
Tree Commce’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 2007).

7

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Plaintiffs contend that they were harmed by Defendants’ fraudulent transfers because
Defendants’ “bad-faith Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings” triggered repeated stays in the Talc
Litigation, which resulted in Plaintiffs “los[ing] the time value of any money that could have been
paid as a judgment.” (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 13, 20-21, ECF No. 90; see also id. 20-21 (arguing Plaintiffs
have “endured waits [of] up to four years” as a result of Defendants’ conduct).) Plaintiffs’ asserted
injury, however, is insufficient to confer Article III standing.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority holding that a delay in litigation—
whether caused by a bankruptcy stay or otherwise—constitutes a cognizable injury for the
purposes of Article III standing. (See Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 11-30.) While Plaintiffs expend much ink
citing to treatises and historical records from “the law of the 13th year of the reign of Queen
Elizabeth” to the modern era, none of these authorities support the proposition that a litigation
delay alone constitutes an injury in fact. (See id.) At most, these authorities stand for the
unremarkable proposition that a transfer intended to hinder or delay a creditor’s collection of an
existing debt may constitute a fraudulent transfer. See Firmani v. Firmani, 752 A.2d 854, 858 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (finding there was a fraudulent conveyance where the defendant
transferred an asset to greatly hinder and delay plaintiff's ability to “collect the debt [defendant]
owe[d] [plaintiff]”). Here, however, Plaintiffs do not allege that the alleged transfers delayed their
collection of an existing debt—rather, they allege that the litigation stays that were mandated due
to Defendants’ bankruptcy filings delayed their collection of a potential judgment in the Talc
Litigation. (See Am. Compl. § 115-119 (arguing Plaintiffs were harmed because their cases “were
subject to stays imposed as a result of Defendants’ . . . wrongful conduct”).)

Even assuming protracted litigation due to a bankruptcy stay could constitute a cognizable

injury, Plaintiffs’ alleged harm is too speculative to confer standing. Lujan, 504 US. at 560-61.

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 9 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Plaintiffs generally allege that “Defendants have shorted Plaintiffs of their ultimate recoveries in
order to hoard Defendants’ corporate free cash flow” by the time value of money. (Pls.’ Opp’n Br.
2, 20-21.) Plaintiffs, however, do not quantify such harm, nor can the Court plausibly infer any
actual harm as a result of Defendants’ conduct. Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding that a plaintiff must do more than offer conclusory assertions of economic
injury in order to establish standing).

Rather, Plaintiffs’ allegations make clear that their claimed injury is entirely hypothetical,
as it is contingent on Plaintiffs first prevailing in the Talc Litigation. If, for example, Defendants
prevail on the cases in the Talc Litigation, Plaintiffs will not be entitled to any recovery and
therefore will not suffer any injury from the allegedly fraudulent transfers or by the “time-value of
money.’® (Am. Compl. { 3.) This sort of “tenuous chain of uncertain events” does not suffice to
establish the requisite injury. See Firearms Pol’y Coal., Inc. v. Barr, 419 F. Supp. 3d 118, 124
(D.D.C. 2019), aff'd sub nom., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives,
No. 19-5304, 2020 WL 6580046 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2020); see also Giordano v. Wachovia Secs.,
LLC, No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006) (“The mere possibility of future
harm fails to satisfy the standing requirements of the Supreme Court and Third Circuit Court of

Appeals.”); Patrick v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 860 F. App’x 828,

8 While Plaintiffs repeatedly suggest Defendants presently owe them a debt that they are entitled
to collect on, (see Am. Compl. § 22 (alleging Defendants engaged in the transfers to reduce the
amount Defendants “ultimately will pay all present and future talc claimants” (emphasis added));
id. ¥ 3 (alleging that Defendants sought to “reduce and limit what Defendants had to pay Plaintiffs
and other talc victims” (emphasis added))), the Court reminds Plaintiffs that the Talc Litigation
remains ongoing, and Defendants do not possess any adjudicated liability on Plaintiffs’ claims.
While Defendants have attempted to resolve these claims through prior bankruptcy proceedings,
those undertakings have no bearing on Defendants’ ultimate liability in the Talc Litigation and do
not establish that Plaintiffs are presently entitled to judgment or recovery.
9

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 10 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

834 (4th Cir. 2021) (describing the plaintiffs theory as a “string of hypothetical contingencies”
insufficient to establish a real and particularized injury for the purposes of standing).

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ theory of injury is fundamentally incompatible with
the structure and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy
courts to grant relief from automatic stays “for cause,” and the decision to lift or continue an
automatic stay “is committed to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.” Jn re Pacor, Inc.,
74 B.R. 20, 22 (E.D. Pa. 1987); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). Accepting Plaintiffs’ theory that delays
attributable to routine bankruptcy stays constitute an Article III injury would improperly
circumvent that framework and undermine the comprehensive and carefully calibrated regulatory
scheme governing bankruptcy proceedings. No court has endorsed such a theory, and the Court
declines to do so here. See, e.g., Bednar vy. Pierce & Assocs., P.C., 220 F. Supp. 3d 860, 863-64
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that state law claims were preempted by the Bankruptcy Code because
permitting such claims “would pile on additional state-law deterrent[s] that [are] improper given
the comprehensive regulations provided by the bankruptcy system’).

Because Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege even a “trifle of injury” stemming from
Defendants’ alleged conduct, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014); Lewis v. Casey, 518 US.
343, 349 (1996) (cautioning that the role of courts is to provide relief to claimants “who have

suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm”).?

° Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing, the Court does not reach
Defendants’ alternative arguments for dismissal. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Alcatel-Lucent
USA Inc., No. 15-8143, 2016 WL 7013463, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2016).

10

Case 3:24-cv-06320-MAS-RLS Document95_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 11 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion is granted, and Plaintiffs’ claims are
dismissed without prejudice.!° The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum

Opinion.

tA
MICHAEL A. SHIPP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: January 29, 2026

'0 Ordinarily, dismissals for lack of standing are without prejudice to a plaintiff's right to file an
amended complaint. Goode v. City of Phila., 539 F.3d 311, 327 (3d Cir. 2008).
11

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.