Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:26-cv-01430NjdFeb 24, 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FRANKLIN ANTONIO PEREZ FABRE,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN TSOUKARIS, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 2:26-cv-01430 (BRM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M ARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Petitioner Franklin Antonio Perez Fabre’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his detention by
immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing. (ECF No. 1.) Respondents filed a
letter response. (ECF No. 4.)
Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States without
inspection in 2021. (Id. at 1.) On February 9, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration
Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id.) Petitioner has been in ICE detention since his
arrest. Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been afforded an
individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). (Id.)
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (ECF No. 2.) Respondents filed a letter
response. (ECF No. 4.)
The Petition contends Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates his
due process rights. (See ECF No. 1.) Respondents assert the same position they have in many other
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similar cases in this District, including the position they took before this Court in the recent matter
Sandhu v. Tsoukaris, Civ. A. No. 25-14607, 2025 WL 3240810 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2025). In Sandhu,
Respondents argued DHS has implemented a new policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered the United States
without admission or inspection and to render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that
the Board of Immigration Appeals recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec.
216 (B.I.A. 2025).
In Sandhu, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Sandhu,
2025 WL 3240810, at *6. In a factually similar situation, the Court held Sandhu was unlawfully
held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and needed to be treated as being held under the
discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In Sandhu, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)
or § 1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and
around the country. “The line historically drawn between these two
sections . . . is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens
‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section 1226 governs
detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’” Martinez v.
Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass. July
24, 2025) (citing [Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89
(2018)]); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at
*8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute
that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a
noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years
and was already within the United States when apprehended and
arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either
seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the
border, and § 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the
interior of the United States. The Supreme Court in Jennings
explicitly adopted this distinction, describing § 1225 as the detention
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statute for noncitizens affirmatively “seeking admission” into the
United States, and § 1226 as the detention statute for noncitizens
who are “already in the country.” 583 U.S. at 289. And although the
Jennings 	Court 	characterizes 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	as 	the 	“catchall”
detention provision for noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it
identifies § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for the arrest, detention,
and release of non-criminal aliens who are already present in the
United States. Id. at 303.
The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have
rejected 	Respondents’ 	interpretation, 	as 	well 	as 	the 	BIA’s
interpretation in Hurtado, as contradictory to the plain text of
§ 1225.[1] See, e.g., Soto [v. Soto, No. 25-cv-16200, 2025 WL
2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)] (finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively,
“seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners who
have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947[,] at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025)
(noting that “the government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b)
[is] at odds with the context and structure of the provisions
governing detention of noncitizens who are arriving at the border
and those who are already present in the country”); Zumba [v. Bondi,
Civ. A. No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,
2025)] (noting that “up until July 8 the predominant form of
detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens arrested in
the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v. Dedos,
No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe v.
Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D.
Nev. Sept. 23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025
WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-
cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v.
Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19,
2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408, 2025 WL 2682255
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–cv–01542,
2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting additional
cases].
Sandhu, 2025 WL 3240810, at *4–6.
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the
meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to
ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024)
(quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Sandhu, the Court finds the facts asserted
in the Petition establish Petitioners’ detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not
§ 1225(b)(2).
Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS on this 24th day of February 2026,
ORDERED that the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
and it is further
ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and it is further
ORDERED that within 3 business days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a
written notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order upon the parties electronically.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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