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2:26-cv-00006NjdJan 15, 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
LIN KIANKANG, 	:
: 	Civil Action No. 26-006 (BRM)
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
:
TODD LYONS, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
:
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Juan Carlos Villa Morocho’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging his detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF
No. 1.) Respondents filed a letter response. (ECF No. 4.)
Petitioner, a citizen of China, who entered the United States without inspection in 2024.
(ECF No. 4 at 1.) On December 29, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration Customs and
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id.) Petitioner has been in ICE detention since his arrest. Following
Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing
because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF No. 1 at 1.)
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (ECF No. 2.) Respondents filed a letter
response. (ECF No. 4.)
The Petition contends Petitioner is unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
without a bond hearing. (See ECF No. 1.) Respondents assert the same position they have in many
other similar cases in this District, including the position they took before this Court in the recent
matter Sandhu v. Tsoukaris, No. 25-14607 (BRM). In Sandhu, Respondents argued DHS has
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implemented a new policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory
detention of noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection and to
render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals
recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In Sandhu, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Sandhu,
No. 25-14607, (ECF Nos. 7, 8). In a factually similar situation, the Court held that Sandhu was
unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and need to be treated as being held
the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In Sandhu, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or §
1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the
country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that
section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already
in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238,
at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see
also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this
country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival
at the border.”).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either
seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and
§ 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United
States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction,
describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively
“seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention
statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” [Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)]. And although the Jennings Court
characterizes 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	as 	the 	“catchall” 	detention 	provision 	for
noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it identifies § 1226(a) as the
“default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens
who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.
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The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado,
as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.[1] See, e.g., Soto [v. Soto, et al.,
No. 25-cv-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)] (finding
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e.,
affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners
who have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-
cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the
government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the
context and structure of the provisions governing detention of noncitizens
who are arriving at the border and those who are already present in the
country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at * 3 (noting that “up until July 8 the
predominant form of detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens
arrested in the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v.
Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe
v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept.
23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D.
Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL
2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408,
2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–
cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting
additional cases].
Sandhu, No. 25-14607 (ECF No. 7 at 7–11).
Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Sandhu, No. 25-14607, the Court finds the
facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioners’ detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2).2
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the
meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to
ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412
(2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
2 The Court notes that Petitioners ask the Court to find they are members of the bond eligible class
certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-1873 (SSS)(BFM) (C.D. Cal.). (See
ECF Nos. 1, 6.) As the Court finds Petitioners detained under Section 1226(a) and grants
Petitioners the relief of a bond hearing, the Court declines to address Petitioners’ class member
argument. If Petitioners seek further relief under Maldonado beyond what this Court granted, they
are free to file an enforcement motion with the Maldonado court.
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Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS on this 15th day of January 2026,
ORDERED the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and
it is further
ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and it is further
ORDERED within 3 business days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written
notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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