Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:25-cv-18835NjdFeb 10, 2026

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
V.S.P.H.,
Petitioner,
v.
LUIS SOTO, et al.,
Respondents.
Civil Action No. 25-18835 (SDW)
OPINION
IT APPEARING THAT:
1. Presently before this Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (“Petition”) by Petitioner V.S.P.H. (ECF No. 1).
2. Respondents Delaney Hall Detention Facility Warden Luis Soto, Acting Director
of ICE Todd Lyons, Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary Kristi Noem, and
Attorney General Pamela Bondi oppose the Petition. (ECF No. 11).
3. Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 23). She entered the United States
without inspection on March 8, 2005. (ECF No. 12 at 1). She was arrested by the Border Patrol
that same day. (Id. at 2). She was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging her with being a
noncitizen present without being admitted pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i). (Id.) She was eventually released on an order of release on recognizance. (Id.
at 3).
4. An immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Honduras on August 8, 2005.
(Id.)
5. Petitioner surrendered on September 15, 2014 at the Newark ICE Field Office and
was released on an order of supervision (“OSUP”). (Id.)
Case 2:25-cv-18835-SDW Document 26 Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID: <pageID>
2
6. On August 8, 2018, Petitioner filed “an Application for Advance Permission to
Enter as a Non-Immigrant (Form I-192) and a Petition for U Non-Immigrant Status (Form I-918),
which are both currently pending.” (Id.)
7. On December 15, 2025, Petitioner was detained after a routine OSUP check-in.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 23).
8. Petitioner argues that Respondents violated her Due Process rights when they
revoked her OSUP without a change in her circumstances. (Id. ¶ 109). She asks this Court to
release her from custody “without any conditions imposed on Petitioner’s liberty and restore her
prior OSUP conditions unlawfully revoked under the same or substantially similar conditions as
previously imposed … .” (Id. at 62).
9. Respondents oppose the Petition, asserting that Petitioner is properly detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 as she is subject to a final order of removal. (ECF No. 11 at 1). They
further argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s challenges to the decision to commence removal proceedings. (Id. at 3).
10. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when
he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody”
and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).
11. Petitioner was detained within this Court’s jurisdiction and by a custodian within
this Court’s jurisdiction when she filed the Petition, and she asserts that her continued detention
violates due process. Therefore, this Court has habeas jurisdiction over her claims. Trump v. J.
Case 2:25-cv-18835-SDW Document 26 Filed 02/10/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID: <pageID>
3
G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (per curiam) (noting jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions” lies
in the district of confinement). Her later transfer does not divest this Court of habeas jurisdiction.
12. However, Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal, which limits this Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. See Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259,
265 (3d Cir. 2026) (distinguishing between habeas jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction).
13. Section 1252 of Title 8 instructs that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
14. However, “this bar ‘does not sweep broadly. It reaches only these three specific
actions, not everything that arises out of them.’” Mantilla Marcano, et al. v. Warden of
Philadelphia Fed. Det. Ctr., No. 26-cv-0239, 2026 WL 196504, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026)
(quoting Tazu v. Att’y Gen. United States, 975 F.3d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 2020)); see also Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 482 (1999) (“It is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to
deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.”)
15. The Third Circuit has “distinguished between detention-specific claims, which are
collateral to petitions for review, and detention claims which are ‘inextricably linked’ to removal
and must be channeled to petitions for review under § 1252(b)(9).” Mantilla Marcano, 2026 WL
196504, at *2 (citing Khalil, 164 F.4th at 274).
16. This Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that
Respondents failed to follow their own procedures before detaining Petitioner.
Case 2:25-cv-18835-SDW Document 26 Filed 02/10/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID: <pageID>
4
17. This question is a narrow claim that Respondents lack lawful authority to treat
Petitioner’s OSUP as terminated and to detain her on that basis absent compliance with
Respondents’ own regulations governing the termination of OSUP. See Mantilla Marcano, 2026
WL 196504, at *2 (finding that Khalil’s interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) did not prohibit court’s
examination of whether government complied with procedures to revoke parole). “This is a claim
about the legality of [Petitioner’s] detention, not a request to review the merits of a removal
proceeding. Therefore, § 1252(b)(9) does not bar the Court’s review.” Id.
18. Here, Petitioner’s argument that Respondents failed to follow their own procedures
before detaining her has no bearing on the validity of her removal order. Her “question is not ‘the
very issue decided through the PFR process,’ nor is it capable of review once the immigration
courts issue a final order on removal.” Kourouma v. Jamison, No. 26-cv-0182, 2026 WL 120208,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026) (quoting Khalil, 164 F.4th at 276).
19. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
20. It is undisputed that Petitioner has a final order of removal and that DHS released
her pursuant to an OSUP on September 15, 2014. (ECF No. 12 at 3). There is no allegation that
Petitioner violated the terms of her release.
21. A “decision to re-detain a noncitizen … who has been granted supervised release
is governed by ICE’s own regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that,
(3) based on changed circumstances, (4) removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2023); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13.
Case 2:25-cv-18835-SDW Document 26 Filed 02/10/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID: <pageID>
5
22. Section 241.13(i)(2) “clearly indicates, upon revocation of supervised release, it is
the Government’s burden to show a significant likelihood that the noncitizen may be removed.”
Pan v. Oddo, No. 3:25-cv-00265, 2025 WL 3960013, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-cv-265, 2025 WL 3701296 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2025).
23. Respondents have not met this burden. Petitioner was detained nearly two months
ago, but there is no documentation showing that DHS revoked Petitioner’s OSUP prior to detaining
her. This Court conducted a hearing on February 6, 2026, and Respondents were still unable to
produce documentation of revocation or even a reason behind Petitioner’s detention.
24. Therefore, this Court finds that Respondents failed to comply with their own
procedures before detaining Petitioner in violation of her due process rights.1
25. Respondents shall be ordered to release Petitioner within 24 hours, subject to and
in accordance with the conditions of her preexisting order of supervision. Respondents shall
coordinate with Petitioner regarding a return to Petitioner’s home.
26. An appropriate order follows.
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton,
United States District Judge
1 As this Court is granting relief on Petitioner’s due process argument, it need not consider her
other arguments. The motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction at ECF
No. 3 will be dismissed as moot.
Dated: February 10, 2026
Case 2:25-cv-18835-SDW Document 26 Filed 02/10/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID: <pageID>

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.