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2:25-cv-17603NjdJan 8, 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
JUAN CARLOS VILLA MOROCHO, 	:
: 	Civil Action No. 25-17603 (BRM)
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
:
LUIS SOTO, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
:
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Juan Carlos Villa Morocho’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging his detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF
No. 1.) Respondents filed a letter response (ECF No. 7) and Petitioner replied (ECF No. 8).
Petitioner, a citizen of Ecuador, who has been living in the United States who entered the
United States without inspection in 2012. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) On November 9, 2025, Petitioner was
arrested by Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id.) Petitioner has been in
ICE detention since his arrest. Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been
afforded an individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8
U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF No. 1 at 1.)
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed a letter
response (ECF No. 7) and Petitioner replied (ECF No. 8).
The Petition contends Petitioner is unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without
a bond hearing. (See ECF No. 1.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is lawfully mandatorily
detained under § 1225(b)(1). (See ECF No. 7.) Respondents claim that in 2012 Petitioner was
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placed in expedited removal proceedings and then was paroled into the United States based on an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) setting Petitioner’s bond at $8,000. (See id. at 4.) Respondents submit
that once Petitioner’s parole was revoked, eleven years later, he returned to his status as detained
under § 1225(b)(1). This argument is unconvincing and unsupported.
Respondents fail provide the Court with a Notice of Expedited Removal from 2012, nor do
they provide the Court with any documentation from 2012 indicating that Petitioner was paroled
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, Respondents submit only Petitioner’s recent November
2025 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, I-213 Form. The I-213 Form does not support
Respondents’ position that Petitioner was paroled into the United States in 2012. The I-213 Form
submits that Petitioner “was processed as an expedited removal” and “claimed fear of returning to
Ecuador.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 2.) The I-213 Form further indicates, as Respondents argue, that an IJ
then released Petitioner on $8,000.00 bond. (See ECF No. 7-1 at 2; see also ECF No. 7 at 4.) There
is nothing in the 1-213 Form indicating that Petitioner’s was paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A) in
2012.
The fact that Petitioner was released by an IJ on bond does not support Respondents claim
that Petitioner was paroled in the country in 2012. Under § 1225(b)(1) expedited removal
proceedings, an immigration officer, not an IJ, conducts the initial fact-finding. 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(2)(i). If the noncitizen claim asserts an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of
persecution, the inspecting officer must refer them to a “credible fear interview,” to be conducted
by an asylum officer. 8 C.F.R. 235.3(b)(4). If that asylum officer finds the noncitizen to have a
credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen will be moved either to full section 240 removal
proceedings or to USCIS administrative asylum proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f). During this
process, the noncitizen remains mandatorily detained under § 1225.
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However, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) allows the Secretary of the Department Homeland
Security (“DHS”) to exercise its discretion to temporarily allow into the United States noncitizens
who are applying for admission instead of holding them in detention.1 Parole may be granted
“under such conditions as [the DHS Secretary] may prescribe” and “only on a case-by-case basis
for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id. The I-213 Form does not indicate
that Petitioner was paroled into the country by the DHS Secretary, as would be required under
Section 1882(d)(5)(A). Instead, the Form submits that Petitioner was placed on bond by an IJ.
Respondents have failed to provide the Court with any documentation that the Secretary of DHS
determined that Petitioner was to be paroled into the United States for an urgent humanitarian
reason or based on a significant public benefit.
Additionally, the DHS Secretary may, in their discretion, terminate any grant of parole and
return the noncitizen “to the custody from which he was paroled.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). DHS
may terminate a noncitizen’s parole either “automatically” or “[o]n notice.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1),
(e)(2). A grant of parole terminates automatically, without written notice, (a) when the noncitizen
departs the United States, or (b) “if not departed, at the expiration of the time for which parole was
authorized.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). In all other cases, parole “shall be terminated upon written
notice to the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2). Those other cases include when the “purpose for which
parole was authorized” is “accomplish[ed]” or “when in the opinion of” the DHS Secretary or their
delegee “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the
alien in the United States.” Id. Again, Respondents have failed to provide evidentiary support to
show that DHS has now made an individual determination that, after Petitioner was present in the
1 The Secretary has further delegated that authority by regulation to various officials below them,
none of which are the IJs. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a).
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United States for eleven years, there is no longer a humanitarian reason, nor does public benefit
warrant Petitioner’s continue parole into the United States.
Finally, the Court notes that there are several types of “parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
allows for humanitarian parole by DHS of noncitizens detained under §1225(b), while 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) allow for “conditional parole” of noncitizens detained under §1226(a). Additionally,
§ 1226(a) also allows for the release of a noncitizen on “bond of at least § 1,500.” The record
contains only the I-213 Form, which indicates that Petitioner was released on bond, not paroled
under § 1182(d)(5)(A) in 2012. As Respondents have failed to offer any support for their position
that Petitioner was paroled into this country eleven years ago as noncitizen detained under
§1225(b)(1), the Court finds Petitioner similar to the countless number of noncitizens who have
been recently unlawfully detained under § 1225.
Courts in this District, including this Court in the recent matter Sandhu v. Tsoukaris, No.
25-14607 (BRM), have considered whether noncitizens who are detained after having already been
in this country are unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and need to be treated
as being held the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In Sandhu, Respondents argued
DHS has implemented a new policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require
mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection
and to render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals
recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In Sandhu, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Sandhu,
No. 25-14607 (ECF Nos. 7, 8). The Court held that Sandhu was unlawfully held in mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) and need to be treated as being held the discretionary authority of 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a).
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In Sandhu, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or §
1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the
country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that
section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already
in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238,
at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see
also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this
country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival
at the border.”).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either
seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and
§ 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United
States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction,
describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively
“seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention
statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” [Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)]. And although the Jennings Court
characterizes 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	as 	the 	“catchall” 	detention 	provision 	for
noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it identifies § 1226(a) as the
“default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens
who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.
The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado,
as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.[2] See, e.g., Soto [v. Soto, et al.,
No. 25-cv-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)] (finding
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e.,
affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners
who have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-
cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the
government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the
context and structure of the provisions governing detention of noncitizens
2 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the
meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to
ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412
(2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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who are arriving at the border and those who are already present in the
country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at * 3 (noting that “up until July 8 the
predominant form of detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens
arrested in the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v.
Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe
v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept.
23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D.
Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL
2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408,
2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–
cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting
additional cases].
Sandhu, No. 25-14607 (ECF No. 7 at 7–11).
Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Sandhu, No. 25-14607, the Court finds the
facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner was detained after being present in the United
States and his detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b).
Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS on this 8th day of January, 2026
ORDERED the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and
it is further
ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and it is further
ORDERED within 3 business days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written
notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
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ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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