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2:25-cv-17095NjdJan 7, 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RONILTON MOREIRA DA SILVA,
Petitioner,
v.
JAMES LAFORGE, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 25cv17095 (EP)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
PADIN, District Judge.
Petitioner, a former immigration detainee, brings this Renewed Emergency Motion to
Enforce Court Order and to Ameliorate Conditions of Release, D.E. 11 (“Renewed Motion”).
Respondents 	filed 	a 	response 	in 	opposition 	to 	Petitioner’s 	Motion to 	Enforce, 	D.E. 	14
(“Response”). The Court will determine the Renewed Motion without oral argument, pursuant to
Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). 	For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT in part
Petitioner’s Renewed Motion and REMAND for further proceedings.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2025, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, D.E. 1 (“Petitioner”), in which he asserted that he was unlawfully detained by
immigration authorities without a bond hearing in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	The Court
subsequently ordered Respondents to file an expedited answer to the Petition. D.E. 2 (“Order to
Answer”). In lieu of answering, Respondents requested a teleconference with the Court, D.E. 3,
which the Court granted, D.E. 5. After the November 13, 2025 teleconference, the Court granted
the Petition and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing
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within 7 days. D.E. 6 (“Memorandum Order”). On November 20, 2025, Respondents advised the
Court that the Immigration Court granted Petitioner’s bond request, D.E. 7 (“Status Report”).1
On November 25, 2025, Petitioner filed this Renewed Motion, in which he seeks to compel
the removal of “all non-judicially ordered conditions of release” including his placement in U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) Intensive Supervision Appearance Program
(“ISAP III”), and for the return of all personal documents retained by ICE or its agents. Renewed
Motion at 1-2. In support of his Renewed Motion, Petitioner contends that: (1) ICE lacks authority
to impose conditions beyond the Immigration Judge’s Order; and (2) ICE’s policies and
Petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of movement require ICE to return his personal
documents, including his driver’s license, Employment Authorization Document/work permit,
Social Security card and bank card. Id. at 5-6. Petitioner cites to a recent decision in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, N-N- v. McShane, in which that court held that ICE’s release conditions,
which were not present in the Immigration Judge’s bond order,2 violated the petitioner’s due
process rights as well as the Accardi doctrine.3 Id. (citing No. 25-5494, 2025 WL 3143594 at *2
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2025)).
1 Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion to Quash/Compel/Enforce Court Order and for Immediate
Release on November 21, 2025, D.E. 9 (“First Motion to Enforce”) because he was not
immediately released from detention upon payment and acceptance of bond. This Court dismissed
the First Motion to Dismiss as moot after Petitioner notified the Court he had been released on
bond, D.E. 12 (“Nov. 25, 2025 Text Order”).
2 In N-N-, the petitioner did not allege his personal documents were confiscated in violation of the
Accardi doctrine or the Fifth Amendment.
3 In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy (“Accardi”), 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954), the
Supreme Court held that remand to an administrative agency was required where the agency failed
to follow its own regulations.
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In opposition to Petitioner’s Renewed Motion, Respondents argue that the Immigration
and Naturalization Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A), grants ICE discretion to impose terms
of supervised release. 	Response at 2. 	Furthermore, according to Respondents, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) recognized that § 1226(a)(2)(A) gives both the Attorney General
and the Secretary of Homeland Security the shared authority to “place conditions on an alien’s
release from custody when setting a monetary bond[.]” Id. (quoting Matter of Garcia-Garcia, 25
I & N Dec. 93, 96 (BIA 2009)). Respondents note that Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
regulations promulgated under § 1226 permit a noncitizen to appeal terms of release set by ICE to
the Immigration Court. Id. at 2, citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a). Respondents
also contend the Court lacks jurisdiction, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), over Petitioner’s
challenge to the necessity of the specific terms of release. Id. at 2, n.1. Finally, Respondents argue
that ICE is permitted to confiscate documents of noncitizens who are in removal proceedings
pursuant to ICE ERO4 Policy Directive 11311, Confiscation and Return of Original Documents
(Jan. 13, 2023) (“ERO Directive 11311” or “the Directive”). Id.5 Under ERO Directive 11311, a
noncitizen may request access to documents in ERO’s possession, and ERO will determine on a
case-by-case basis whether ICE has an operational need to retain the documents. Id. at 2-3.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Petitioner is not challenging ICE’s exercise of discretion, but rather, ICE’s lack of authority
under its own regulations to impose additional conditions of release on him after the Immigration
4 ERO refers to “Enforcement and Removal Operations” See supra, n. 3.
5 ERO Directive 11311 is available at
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/11311_OrgDocConfiscationReturn.pdf.
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Court released him on bond. Renewed Motion at 5. Petitioner also asserts that he has a due process
liberty interest in the return of his personal documents. Id. at 7. Therefore, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)—
which strips courts of jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding application of § 1226—does not bar judicial review over Petitioner’s regulatory
challenge under Accardi or his constitutional challenge to ERO Policy Directive 11311.
Petitioner asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), which provides that “[t]he writ of
habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	Most habeas cases involve challenges to
criminal judgments, but § 2241 applies to non-prisoner detainees as well. Hope v. Warden York
Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2020). 	Here, the Court must determine whether
Petitioner’s conditions of supervised release satisfy the “in custody” requirement of § 2241. As
explained below, the Court finds that they do.
“[I]n the United States the use of habeas corpus has not been restricted to situations in
which the applicant is in actual, physical custody.” 	Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239
(1963). “[T]he concept of ‘custody’ is expansive enough to encompass harms and remedies other
than immediate discharge from physical confinement.” United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374, 379
(3d Cir. 2015) (citing Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66-67 (1968)). There is “a three-part test for
deciding what constitutes custody: 	the restraints on the petitioner must be (1) severe, (2)
immediate (i.e., not speculative), and (3) not shared by the public generally.” 	Id. (citation
modified). 	Government authorities’ ability to compel a petitioner’s attendance is a significant
factor weighing in favor of a determination the petitioner is “in custody.” 	Piasecki v. Ct. of
Common Pleas, Bucks Cnty., PA, 917 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 2019). 	Likewise, compulsory
physical restraints that severely restrain freedom of movement—such as restrictions to a particular
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residence—weigh in favor of a conclusion that the petitioner is in custody. 	Id. at 170-71. 	The
threat of detention upon violation of any condition is another factor that weighs in favor of a
conclusion the petitioner is in custody under § 2241. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 242.
Petitioner’s conditions of supervised release contain elements of each of the factors that
weigh in favor of a determination that he is in custody for purposes of jurisdiction under § 2241.
Those conditions include electronic monitoring, two scheduled 9-hour home confinement days and
other 	unscheduled 	home 	visits, 	two 	mandatory 	residence 	verification 	appointments, 	five
mandatory in-person appointments through February 24, 2026, travel restrictions within a limited
geographic area and related notification requirements, and the threat of re-detention upon a
violation of any of the conditions. Renewed Motion at 3; D.E. 11-1, Exhibits to Renewed Motion.6
These conditions are both immediate and not shared by the public generally, thus satisfying
the latter two elements of the “in custody” test. The remaining question is whether these conditions
impose severe restraints on Petitioner. 	In the Court’s view, the combination of electronic
monitoring, compelled attendance at appointments, home confinement days, unscheduled home
visits, travel restrictions, and the threat of re-detention for any violation render the restraints
imposed on Petitioner’s liberty severe. See Orellana Juarez v. Moniz, 788 F. Supp. 3d 61, 68 (D.
Mass. 2025) (holding petitioner who was in ICE intensive supervision program satisfied the “in
custody” requirement for habeas jurisdiction); accord Hogarth v. Santacruz, No. 25-9472, 2025
WL 3211461, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025). As Petitioner himself notes, these conditions often
require him to miss full days of work. 	Renewed Motion at 3-4. 	Taking into account the
6 Counsel for Petitioner advised that filing of an English translation of ISAP documents issued to
Petitioner is forthcoming. Renewed Motion at 8 (referring to Exhibit C). Notably, Petitioner does
not speak or read Spanish. Id. at 4.
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confiscation of Petitioner’s personal documents based on ERO Directive 11311, the restraints on
Petitioner’s liberty are even more severe than in these cases.7 In sum, Petitioner’s conditions of
supervised release from ICE detention, even without confiscation of his personal documents,
satisfy the “in custody” requirement for habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. 	Legal Standard
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A), a noncitizen may be arrested and detained pending
a decision on whether the noncitizen will be removed from the United States, and the Attorney
General may release such detainees on bond, with security and conditions prescribed by the
Attorney General. The implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) and 1236.1(d)(1), which
govern 	“appeals 	from 	custody 	decisions,” 	each 	provide 	that 	“[a]fter 	an 	initial 	custody
determination . . . “the immigration judge is authorized to exercise the authority in section 236 of
the Act.” Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(3)(i), 1236.1(d)(3)(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f), either
party may appeal the immigration judge’s bond and custody determinations to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 	Id.8 	Alternatively, a detainee may request a subsequent bond
redetermination upon a showing that their “circumstances have changed materially since the prior
bond redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e).
7 The briefs in support of and in opposition to Petitioner’s Renewed Motion do not specifically
address whether ERO Directive 11311 derives from the Attorney General’s authority under 8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1226 	and 	its 	implementing 	regulations. 	Section 	7 	of 	the 	Directive 	states
“Authorities/References. 	None.” 	Supra, n.3. 	Section 9 of the Directive states, in part, “[t]his
guidance does not alter any provision of any statute or regulation that contains legally binding
requirements, and it is not itself a regulation.” Therefore, the Court concludes Petitioner’s Accardi
doctrine argument is inapplicable to his challenge to ERO Directive 11311.
8 The BIA has authority to stay an immigration judge’s custody decision when DHS appeals. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(I).
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It is a “long-settled principle that rules promulgated by a federal agency that regulate the
rights and interests of others are controlling upon the agency.” Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 611
F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407,
422 (1942)). In Accardi, the Supreme Court applied this principle without requiring the petitioner
to make a showing of prejudice. Id. (quoting Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268). Later, in American Farm
Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532 (1970), the Supreme Court “sharply limited
application of the Accardi doctrine when it imposed an explicit prejudice requirement.” Id. at 176.
Following 	American 	Farm 	Lines, 	the 	Third 	Circuit 	held 	“that 	violations 	of 	regulations
promulgated to protect fundamental statutory or constitutional rights need not be accompanied by
a showing of prejudice to warrant judicial relief.” 	Id. at 178. 	Thus “absent prejudice, when a
violation of immigration regulations implicates less than fundamental rights, wholesale remand”
is not warranted. Id. at 179. “[F]or a regulation to protect a fundamental right, a violation must
be a structural error that necessarily makes proceedings fundamentally unfair.” 	Aquino v. Att’y
Gen., 53 F.4th 761, 766 (3d Cir. 2022). And where a showing of prejudice is required, the standard
is “substantial prejudice to the complaining party.” Am. Farm Lines, 397 U.S. at 539; Leslie, 611
F.3d at 182.
C. 	Petitioner’s Supervised Release Conditions
At the outset, the Court rejects Respondents’ contention that the implementing regulations
of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) create a shared authority between the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security to impose conditions of supervised release under the circumstances presented
here. 	The implementing regulations for 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) create a two-level administrative
review over conditions of supervised release initially set by “any officer authorized to issue a
warrant of arrest.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8) and 1236.1(c)(8). The first level of review is before
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an Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1236.1(d)(1). The second level is an appeal to the
BIA. The authority to impose conditions of supervised release is not shared across the established
appeal procedures. 	Therefore, ICE violated its own regulations when, instead of appealing the
Immigration Court’s Order to the BIA as it should have, it 	imposed additional restrictions on
Petitioner’s supervised release. 	See N-N-, 2025 WL 3143594, at *3 (“This interconnected
regulatory scheme mirrors many other administrative appeal procedures, and the Court will not
embrace ICE's isolated reading of specific sentences it finds convenient.”).
In this case, it is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner is required to establish that
ICE’s failure to follow its own regulations substantially prejudiced him because Petitioner has
made such a showing. 	If Petitioner had been released under the conditions imposed by the
Immigration Court—payment of bond—his liberty interest in freedom of movement would not be
severely burdened by the restrictions imposed by ICE after the Immigration Court’s custody/bond
determination. Because Petitioner has established prejudice, the Court will REMAND this matter
to DHS/ICE to vacate the additional conditions of supervised release imposed by ICE. The Court
makes 	no 	determination 	whether 	the 	parties 	may 	now 	appeal 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s
determination to the BIA.
D. 	Return of Petitioner’s Personal Effects
Petitioner also seeks return of his personal documents. He contends that “ICE’s continued
retention of these essential tools of Petitioner’s life [his personal documents] is both a violation of
its own stated policy and a continuing violation of his liberty interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment, preventing him from obtaining and holding employment, accessing his money, and
fulfilling the conditions of his own release.” Renewed Motion at 7. Petitioner presents no further
argument in support of his constitutional challenge.
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It appears that Petitioner is raising an “as applied” challenge to the constitutionality of ERO
Directive 11311. 	Respondents submit “[b]ecause it does not appear that Petitioner has requested
ERO return the documents, ERO has not had an opportunity to make an individualized
determination under this Policy Directive.” 	Response at 3. 	Accordingly, the Court will order
supplemental briefing on whether Petitioner has an avenue under the Directive for the return of his
personal documents, and if not, for supplementation of the arguments in support of and opposition
to the constitutional challenge. 	Given the directive for additional information, the Court will
reserve ruling on Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to ERO Directive 11311. Accordingly,
IT IS on this 7th day of January, 2026,
ORDERED that Petitioner’s Renewed Motion, D.E. 11, is GRANTED in part; and it is
further
ORDERED that Clerk of Court shall REMAND this matter to DHS/ICE to vacate the
additional conditions of release imposed on Petitioner by ICE after the Immigration Judge released
Petitioner on bond; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer, within 10 days of this Order, on whether
Petitioner retains the opportunity to seek return of his personal documents under ERO Directive
11311; and upon the expiration of the 10-day period, Petitioner shall file a status report. 	If
necessary, the Court will enter a supplemental briefing schedule on Petitioner’s constitutional
challenge at that time.
Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.
/s/ Hon. Evelyn Padin
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