CHAPMAN v. SALESFORCE, INC. et al

2:25-cv-12363NjdJan 9, 2026

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JACALYN CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALESFORCE, INC. LORI CASTILLO
MARTINEZ and JOHN DOES 1–10
(said names being fictitious);
and ABC CORPORATIONS 1–10(said
corporations being fictitious),
Defendants.
No. 2:25-cv-12363
(MEF)(MAH)
OPINION and ORDER
Table of Contents
I. 	Background
II. 	A Valid Agreement?
A. 	The Law
B. 	The Agreements
C. 	Analysis
III. Scope
IV. 	Conclusion
* 	* 	*
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I. 	Background
A woman1 (“the Plaintiff”) sued her former employer2 and
supervisor3 (together, “the Defendants”) for workplace
discrimination and retaliation. 	See Complaint, Jury Demand and
Designation of Trial Counsel (“Complaint”) (ECF 1-1) ¶¶ 70, 73,
78, 82.
In response, the Defendants have moved to compel arbitration,
citing the Plaintiff’s employment contract. 	See Notice of
Defendants Salesforce, Inc. and Lori Castillo Martinez’s Motion
to Compel Arbitration (ECF 8) at 2; Defendants Salesforce, Inc.
and Lori Castillo Martinez’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Defendants’ Brief”) (ECF 8-1) at
1-3.
The motion is granted.
* 	* 	*
Whether a dispute should be sent to arbitration is mainly a
matter of answering one question and then maybe another.
The first question: does “a valid agreement to arbitrate
exist[]?” 	Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d
156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009).
If the answer is “yes,” then there is a second question: whether
“the particular dispute falls within the scope of that [valid]
agreement.” 	Id.
Take up these questions in turn: the first question in Part II,
and the second in Part III.
II. 	A Valid Agreement?
A. 	The Law
Deciding whether a supposed agreement to arbitrate is “valid,”
id., requires a look to the “ordinary state-law principles that
govern the formation of contracts.” 	First Options of Chi., Inc.
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
1 	Jacalyn Chapman.
2 	Salesforce, Inc.
3 	Lori Castillo Martinez.
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The parties’ briefs assume that the state law in play here is
New Jersey’s. 	See Defendants’ Brief at 8 & n.2; Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration
(“Plaintiff’s Brief”) (ECF 9) at 3.
So the Court applies New Jersey law. 	See, e.g., Marino v.
Brighton Gardens of Mountainside, 697 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229
(D.N.J. 2023).4
4 	Are there outer limits to the idea that the parties’ assent,
through their legal briefs, can fix the law that applies?
Consider two reasons to answer “yes.” 	First, parties cannot
generally stipulate what the law is and expect a court to follow
along if they get it wrong. 	See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991); Est. of Sanford v. Comm’r,
308 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1939); 83 C.J.S. Stipulations § 28 (2000).
And if a party cannot stipulate that Florida law is A when it is
really B, does it make sense for a party to be allowed to take
what might be a more dramatic step --- to stipulate (through its
legal brief) that Florida law applies in the first place, when
it is really Oregon law or Texas law that should control?
Second, choice of law provisions built into contracts are
generally enforced --- but typically only if there is at least
some connection between the subject of the underlying contract
and the law chosen. 	See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 187(2); John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-
Law Clause, 91 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1147, 1175-76 (2020). 	This
might suggest that even when the parties’ briefs assume that,
say, Florida law applies, the court should kick the tires ---
and opt not to apply Florida law if it has no connection to the
case.
The two above points might imply limits on parties’ ability to
establish choice of law through the statements or assumptions in
their briefs. 	But to come to a non-tentative conclusion ---
that would likely require answering additional questions. 	Take
three.
[1] Questions about the proper balance between the federal
courts’ law-declaring and dispute-resolving responsibilities ---
and its implications for resolving the tension between (a)
ignoring the parties’ wrongful legal stipulations (because
courts have a duty to say what the law (actually) is, see Amanda
Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 470-85 (2009)),
and (b) going along with the parties’ erroneous stipulations
(because of the party-presentation principle). 	Compare Indep.
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J.), with id. at 1078 (Sentelle, J.); see
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also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 514-23 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Gary Lawson,
Stipulating the Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1191, 1205-06, 1217-18
(2011).
[2] Questions about the underlying reason why statements made in
legal briefs can establish choice of law in the first place.
Maybe the reason is a desire to honor the affirmative choice-of-
law decisions made by the parties --- which may imply that the
court should bring to bear the limits on honoring affirmative
choice-of-law decisions made by parties in their contracts. 	Or
maybe it is more passive than that. 	Maybe legal briefs can
establish choice-of-law because by going along with its
adversary’s choice-of-law assumption, the responding party has
forfeited any objection to its adversary’s approach. 	That may
imply that a court should undo the parties’ shared choice of law
based only on the doctrines governing when a party should be
relieved from its forfeiture.
And [3] questions about the reason we have the classic no-
stipulating-the-law rule in the first place. 	The underlying
idea may be that Article III disables a federal court from
issuing an advisory opinion. 	An interpretation or application
of a law whose content is (wrongly) stipulated as A might amount
to advice as to how things would look if (counterfactually) the
content of the law was, indeed, A. 	See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or.
v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993).
If this is the main basis of the rule, is it not just as
advisory to interpret Florida law (because of the litigating
parties’ assumption) when it is really Oregon law that applies?
Or maybe the basis of the classic no-stipulating rule is
something else. 	An interpretation of a law whose content is
(wrongly) stipulated may warp the broader fabric of our law ---
because how one part of a law is understood can alter how other
parts of the law are understood (both in a subsequent case, see
Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, at 492-94, or in the case at
bar). 	If that is the animating concern, does it apply when the
parties do not attempt to stipulate the content of the law, but
rather which body of law applies? 	Choosing Florida law (when
Oregon law should have been selected) does not seem to carry
especially pointed risks of warping Florida law.
Questions [1], [2], are [3] are not the only relevant ones, and
answering them is not straightforward. 	But here, all of this
can be put aside, because the parties’ assumption that New
Jersey law governs is sensible enough. 	While the Plaintiff was
working at the Defendant-company and experienced the alleged
discrimination at issue in this suit, she was living in and
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* 	* 	*
Under New Jersey law, a valid “agreement to arbitrate, like any
other contract, must be the product of mutual assent.” 	Atalese
v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014)
(cleaned up).5
And when it comes to mutual assent to arbitrate, the bar is set
relatively high.
Per the New Jersey Supreme Court, parties must “have full
knowledge of [their] legal rights and intent to surrender those
rights.” 	Id. at 442 (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177
(2003)). 	To establish this, there must be contractual language
that “clearly and unambiguously signal[s] . . . 	that [the
relevant party is] surrendering her right to pursue her . . .
claims in court.” 	Atalese, 219 N.J. at 448. 	Put another way,
the contract must “in some general and sufficiently broad way .
. . explain that the [relevant party] is giving up her right to
bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute.”
Id. at 447.
“No particular form of words is necessary,” id. at 444, but
there needs to be “language that explains that a party who
agrees to arbitration waives the right to sue in court and makes
clear that arbitration and civil litigation are distinct
proceedings.” 	Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 137
(2020).6x
working from New Jersey. 	See Defendants Salesforce, Inc. and
Lori Castillo Martinez’s Notice of Removal (ECF 1) ¶ 14.
5 	There are other necessary ingredients for a valid contract
under New Jersey law. 	See Stabile v. Macy’s, Inc., 751 F. Supp.
3d 429, 433 (D.N.J. 2024). 	But the parties’ back-and-forth
concerns only the mutual assent requirement, so the Court zeroes
in there.
6 	No one argues that New Jersey’s law as to what counts as
mutual assent in the arbitration context is at odds with the
Federal Arbitration Act --- such that New Jersey law must be
pushed aside as preempted. 	The Court is unaware of any
obligation to raise that issue sua sponte. 	See Stabile, 751 F.
Supp. 3d at 441 n.22.
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B. 	The Agreements
Against the above legal backdrop, look now to the relevant
materials --- and ask whether they reflect the required mutual
assent, such that they add up to a valid agreement to arbitrate.
The Plaintiff signed two agreements7 at the start of her work.
The first was an offer letter. 	It states, in relevant part:
In the event of any dispute or claim relating to or
arising out of your employment relationship . . .
(including but not limited to, any claims of . . .
discrimination), you . . . agree that all such
disputes shall be fully and finally resolved by
binding arbitration conducted before a single
neutral arbitrator pursuant to the rules for
arbitration of employment disputes by the American
Arbitration Association (available at www.adr.org or
from Human Resources) 	. . . . By executing this
Agreement, you and the Company are both waiving the
right to a jury trial with respect to any such
disputes . . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing,
nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the Company
or you from bringing proceedings before the courts
of any competent jurisdiction to enforce
intellectual property rights . . . .
You will also be required to sign an Employee
Inventions and Proprietary Rights Assignment
Agreement and the Company’s Code of Conduct as a
condition of your employment. 	. . .
Offer Letter at 2-3.
The document referenced in the offer letter, the “Employee
Inventions and Proprietary Rights Assignment Agreement,”
included identical operative language, see Assignment Agreement
at 5–6 (¶ 19), but was formatted a bit differently --- in the
assignment agreement, the relevant language was offset in a
7 	See Declaration of Quincy E. Johnson in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Compel Arbitration, Exhibit 1 (“Offer Letter”) (ECF 8-
3) at 3; Declaration of Quincy E. Johnson in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, Exhibit 2 (“Assignment
Agreement”) (ECF 8-4) at 6.
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numbered paragraph with a bolded label of “Arbitration
Agreement.” 	See id. at 5.
C. 	Analysis
The language set out above seems to check all the boxes.
To establish mutual assent, as noted in Part II.A, New Jersey
law requires the relevant contract to “explain that the
[relevant party] is giving up her right to bring her claims in
court or have a jury resolve the dispute,” 	Atalese, 219 N.J. at
447, with “language that explains that a party who agrees to
arbitration waives the right to sue in court and makes clear
that arbitration and civil litigation are distinct proceedings.”
Flanzman, 244 N.J. at 137.
And the two agreements here do just that:
In the event of any . . . claim relating to . . . [her]
employment . . . 	(including . . . any claim[] of . . .
discrimination), [the Plaintiff] . . . agree[s] that all
such disputes shall be fully and finally resolved by
binding arbitration conducted before a single neutral
arbitrator[, and that] . . . . [b]y executing this
Agreement, [the Plaintiff] . . . [is] . . . waiving the
right to a jury trial. . . .
Offer Letter at 3; Assignment Agreement at 5 (¶ 19).
* 	* 	*
Against this clear language, the Plaintiff argues that there was
no mutual assent for four reasons.
But this argument does not work.
* 	* 	*
First, as to the assignment agreement, the Plaintiff contends
that there was no mutual assent because the arbitration
provision was “buried” in the nineteenth paragraph of an eight-
page document. 	Plaintiff’s Brief at 4.
But courts applying New Jersey law routinely uphold arbitration
agreements that are part of similarly long (or longer)
contracts. 	See, e.g., Noonan v. Comcast Corp., 2017 WL 4799795,
at *1, *7-8 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017) (upholding an arbitration
agreement within a larger “thirty page[]” commercial contract
that was “over 3,000 words, and single spaced with no table of
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contents”); Russo v. Chugai Pharma USA, Inc., 2021 WL 420498, at
*1, *4-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 16, 2021) (rejecting
the argument that an arbitration clause was “buried” when it
appeared two-thirds of the way through a six-page “Proprietary
Information and Inventions” agreement); Colon v. Strategic
Delivery Sols., LCC, 459 N.J. Super. 349, 356-57, 360-62 (App.
Div. 2019) (upholding an arbitration provision in paragraph 20
of a 27-paragraph, nine-page services agreement, see Motion
Dismissing Complaint, No. L-003994-16, at 8-16 (N.J. Super. Ct.
L. Div. July 20, 2017)), aff’d sub nom in Arafa v. Health
Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147, 154-55, 172 (2020) (concluding that
“the Appellate Division [in Colon] properly found plaintiffs
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to pursue their
statutory wage claims in court”); see also, e.g., Foulke Mgmt.
Corp. v. Domestic Linen Supply Co., 2020 WL 1062867, at *3-5
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 5, 2020) (upholding an
arbitration clause in paragraph 15 of a broader commercial
services agreement); see generally Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.,
173 N.J. 76, 81-82, 92 (2002) (concluding that valid arbitration
agreements can exist as part of a larger employment contract).
* 	* 	*
Second, the Plaintiff asserts in her legal brief that because
she was hired as a Human Resources Specialist, “it would not be
surprising if [she] . . . paid [the assignment agreement] short
shrift,” since, based on its title8 and IP-focused subject
matter, it “seems clearly aimed at employees functioning in more
technical fields.” 	Plaintiff’s Brief at 4, 7.
But even if the Plaintiff skipped over the agreement, and signed
it without reading it --- that would not undermine mutual
assent.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has so held. 	In general. 	See
Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 54 (2020) (“[O]ne who does
not choose to read a contract before signing it cannot later
relieve himself of its burdens.”) (cleaned up). 	And as to
arbitration agreements in particular. 	See Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt.
Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 212 (2019) (“[T]he argument that [a]
plaintiff did not understand the import of the arbitration
agreement and did not have it explained to her by the dealership
8 	Employee Inventions and Proprietary Rights Assignment
Agreement.
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is simply inadequate to avoid enforcement of [a] clear and
conspicuous arbitration agreement[] that [she] signed.”); see
also Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 162.
There is no reason to disregard these principles here.
The Plaintiff, an HR professional, see Plaintiff’s Brief at 7,
was presumably more familiar with employment contracts than
most. 	And before she signed the assignment agreement, the
Plaintiff agreed that she had “carefully read all of [its]
provisions.” 	Assignment Agreement at 6. 	Moreover, the
arbitration part of the assumption agreement was specially and
clearly labelled --- a fact that affirmatively supports a mutual
assent conclusion. 	See Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla.,
Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 325-26 (2019) (reasoning from the title of a
section as to whether there is mutual assent to arbitrate).
And finally, there was back up. 	The arbitration language was in
the assignment agreement that assertedly may have been glossed
over by the Plaintiff. 	But it was also in another contract the
Plaintiff signed: the offer letter. 	See Offer Letter at 2. 	And
there is no suggestion she may have given “short shrift” to that
second agreement.
* 	* 	*
Third, the Plaintiff notes that “the agreement contains
provisions both for claims subject to [a]rbitration and not
subject to [a]rbitration” --- and that is said to “add[] to the
confusion” of the arbitration provision. 	Plaintiff’s Brief at
4.
But the argument from confusion does not move the needle.
The arbitration language is clear and plainspoken, not
confusing.
In addition, the underlying idea expressed by the contract is
not itself confusing. 	There is nothing complex or hard to grasp
about the dividing line set down by the agreements --- between
what must be arbitrated (discrimination claims, for example) and
what does not need to be arbitrated (IP claims).
More fundamentally, laying out the different ways in which
different circumstances will be treated --- that does not
somehow import a kind of intrinsic confusion. 	Rather, it is
basic, what all but the most simple contracts do. 	Mutual assent
is not undermined by an agreement that certain claims (like
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discrimination claims) must be treated in one way (arbitrated)
while other claims (IP claims) are to be treated in another way
(not arbitrated)--- any more than mutual assent would be
undermined by an agreement that certain widgets (the first 100)
will be treated in one way (bought for $2 each) while other
widgets (the next 100) will be treated in another way (bought
for $1 apiece).
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld arbitration
agreements that, as here, encompass certain claims but not
others.
In Skuse v. Pfizer, for example, the Court upheld an agreement
that said this:
Except as expressly set forth in section 3, titled,
“Claims Not Covered by this Agreement,” all
disputes, claims, complaints, or controversies
(“Claims”) that you have now or at any time in the
future may have against . . . the Company . . . will
be resolved by arbitration . . . .
244 N.J. at 38. 	The fact of “[e]xcept[ions]” did not prevent
the New Jersey Supreme Court from concluding that the quoted
arbitration agreement “met the standard of clarity . . . in all
respects.” 	Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
* 	* 	*
Fourth and finally, the Plaintiff argues that mutual assent was
missing because the two agreements here “do[] not explain how
arbitration works or how it is different from a court
proceeding.” 	Plaintiff’s Brief at 5.
But the agreements refer to the “rules for arbitration of
employment disputes by the American Arbitration Association.”
See Offer Letter at 2; Assignment Agreement at 5 (¶ 19). 	And
those AAA rules --- readily available online, as noted in the
agreements --- lay out in detail how arbitration will go. 	See
Documents for Employment Arbitration and Mediation, Am. Arb.
Ass’n, https://www.adr.org/industries/employment/#rules-forms-
and-fees (last visited Jan. 7, 2026).
That clears things up. 	See, e.g., Skuse, 244 N.J. at 51-52
(determining that providing the link to an FAQ page that
explained the arbitration process supported mutual assent).
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Moreover, putting aside the AAA rules that are referred to, the
agreements themselves spell out a key difference between
arbitration and litigation --- who the decisionmaker will be.
Per the agreements, “arbitration [will be] conducted before a
single neutral arbitrator,” and the contrast with adjudication
is explicitly drawn--- the alternative, taken off the table by
the agreed-to arbitration clause, is “a jury trial.” 	Offer
Letter at 2; Assignment Agreement at 5 (¶ 19).9
And finally, the Plaintiff’s argument runs aground on the
caselaw.
In Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that “[a]lthough the Agreement provides only a
general concept of the arbitration proceeding that would replace
a judicial determination of [the plaintiff’s] claims,” that was
enough --- because the provision “makes clear that the
contemplated arbitration would be very different from a court
proceeding.” 	244 N.J. at 138.
The agreement in Flanzman, see id. at 126, was about as specific
as to the arbitration agreements in play here.
9 	Two things here. 	First, for more ways in which the agreements
explain what arbitration is, see the offer letter at 2
(describing the arbitrator’s ability to “permit adequate
discovery” and “award all remedies otherwise available in a
court of competent jurisdiction,” and the arbitrator’s
responsibility to “issue an award in writing and state the
essential findings and conclusions on which the award is
based”), plus the mirror-image language in the assignment
agreement. 	Second, the agreements note that arbitration
decisions may need to be enforced in court. 	This does not blur
the line between arbitration and adjudication. 	If anything, it
emphasizes that arbitration and adjudication are separate. 	And
courts applying New Jersey law routinely enforce arbitration
agreements that note that judicial involvement may be necessary
to enforce an arbitration decision. 	See, e.g., Griffoul v. NRG
Residential Solar Sols., LLC, 2018 WL 2071252, at *1,6 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. May 4, 2018); DiValerio v. Best Care Lab’y,
LLC, 2021 WL 4704963, at *2, *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2021) (similar);
see also Delaney v. Dickey, 244 N.J. 466, 262, 273-74 (2020)
(stating in dicta that an arbitration agreement with similar
language “would be enforceable”).
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So if the Flanzman agreement cleared the bar, then the
agreements here do, too. 	See also Frederick v. Law Off. of Fox
Kohler & Assocs. PLLC, 852 F. App’x 673, 675-78 (3d Cir. 2021)
(upholding an arbitration agreement with similar language to the
ones at issue in this case).10
* 	* 	*
Bottom line: there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, and that
conclusion is not undone by the Plaintiff’s four arguments as to
why there was assertedly no mutual assent here.
III. Scope
Given that there was a “valid” arbitration agreement, move now
to the next question: does “the particular dispute [raised by
the lawsuit] fall[] within the scope of [the] agreement [to
arbitrate]”? 	Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 160.
If yes, it is over to arbitration. 	If no, the case keeps going
before the court.
And there is a third possibility, too, implicated by this case:
arbitration is compelled not because the dispute in question
fits within the arbitration agreement --- but because whether
the dispute fits within the agreement is the arbitrator’s call
to make in the first place.
* 	* 	*
Does a dispute sit within the scope of the arbitration agreement
such that it must be arbitrated --- that question can be
lawfully delegated by the agreement to the arbitrator, for her
to resolve. 	See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,
Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 65 (2019).
How to know whether the agreement delegates this question to the
arbitrator?
10 	And note: the Flanzman agreement was much less specific as to
what arbitration entails when weight is given to the fact that
the agreements in this case incorporate by reference the AAA
rules --- and those rules, as noted, explain in close detail how
arbitration can be expected to go.
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“[C]ourts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts.” 	First
Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
But per the Supreme Court, there is an “important qualification”
to this. 	Id. 	Namely, “[c]ourts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear
and unmistakable evidence that they did so.” 	Id. (cleaned up)
(emphasis added).11
* 	* 	*
The two arbitration agreements here do not expressly delegate to
the arbitrator the should-this-dispute-be-arbitrated question.
But the agreements explicitly incorporate the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. 	See Offer Letter at 2;
Assignment Agreement at 5.
And the AAA rules are plain: they give the arbitrator the power
to decide whether a particular dispute must be arbitrated. 	See,
e.g., Am. Arb. Ass’n, Employment Workplace Arbitration Rules &
Mediation Procedures, R-7(a) (2025) (“The arbitrator shall have
the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, including any
11 	It seems that the Supreme Court was applying the “clear and
unmistakable” standard as a matter of federal common law. 	Does
state law nonetheless have a role to play? 	No, if delegation is
a purely federal-law question. 	See, e.g., Blanton v. Domino’s
Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 846-47 (6th Cir. 2020)
(concluding as much); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1129-
31 (9th Cir. 2015) (suggesting the same). 	Yes, if delegation is
something of a mixed question of federal and state law. 	Cf. In
re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515,
520 (3d Cir. 2019) (where “[t]he parties disagree[d] as to the
applicable body of law” to be used in addressing the scope of an
arbitration agreement, concluding that “[t]he truth . . . lies
somewhere in between” state and federal law). 	But here, none of
this matters --- because the New Jersey Supreme Court has
adopted the “clear and unmistakable” approach for itself as a
matter of New Jersey law. 	See Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.,
225 N.J. 289, 304-05, 312 (2016); see also Moon v. Breathless
Inc., 868 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2017). 	So the standard to
apply (“clear and unmistakable”) is the same here --- whether
federal law governs on its own, or whether state law (New Jersey
law, in this case) also gets a seat at the table.
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objection with respect . . . the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim”).
Against this backdrop, “‘[v]irtually every circuit to have
considered the issue12 has determined that [an arbitration
agreement’s] incorporation [by reference] of the [AAA]
arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence
that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.’”
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petrol., LLC, 809 F.3d 746,
763-64 (3d Cir. 2016) (first and fourth alterations in original)
(quoting Oracle Am. Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069,
1074 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol. Co.,
398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005); Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott
Petrol. Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); Fallo
v. High–Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2009);
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir.
2006), abrogated on other grounds by Henry Schein, 586 U.S. 63;
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch LP, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2005); Blanton, 962 F.3d at 844-46; Awuah v. Coverall N.
Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Belnap v.
Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2017)
(holding similarly where JAMS rules were incorporated into an
agreement); Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 877 F.3d
522, 527-29 (4th Cir. 2017) (same), abrogated on other grounds
by Henry Schein, 586 U.S. 63; Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d
200, 207-08 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding similarly where UNCITRAL
arbitration rules were incorporated).
Does this principle apply even where, as here, the arbitration
contract is not part of a commercial contract --- but rather is
part of a contract in the employment context?
“Yes” is the answer from New Jersey district courts. 	See, e.g.,
Solecitto v. Axon Enter., Inc., 2025 WL 2803382, at *5-6 (D.N.J.
Oct 2, 2025); Solecitto v. Axon Enter., Inc., 2024 WL 4213684,
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2024); Dorset v. United Healthcare
Servs., Inc., 2025 WL 2779224, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2025);
Carrone v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 2020 WL 4530032, at *3
(D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2020).
12 	The Third Circuit has not yet weighed in. 	See Field Intel.
Inc. v. Xylem Dewatering Sols. Inc., 49 F.4th 351, 356 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2022) (opting to “save [the question] for another day”).
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15
And from district courts around the country. 	See, e.g., Fischer
v. Kelly Servs. Glob., LLC, 2024 WL 382181, at *11-14 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 31, 2024); Crooms v. Sw. Airlines Co., 459 F. Supp. 3d
1041, at 1055-56 (N.D. Ill. 2020); Snow v. Pepsi MidAmerica Co.,
2022 WL 2106249, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. June 10, 2022); Bonner v.
Point72 Asset Mgmt., L.P., 2018 WL 11223154, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 5, 2018); Getzelman v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014 WL
3809736, at *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2014); Durkee v. NBT Bancorp,
Inc., 2024 WL 1859385, at *4 (D. Vt. Apr. 29, 2024).
Three courts of appeals have gone the same way. 	See Blanton,
962 F.3d at 843-46; Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130-31
(9th Cir. 2015); Belnap, 844 F.3d at 1274-76, 1281-83 (applying
the referenced principle to an independent contractor’s
agreement to provide “management and consulting services”)
(cleaned up).
Pulling all this together, the overwhelming weight of authority
supports this legal principle:
It is generally for the arbitrator to decide whether a given
dispute must be arbitrated when (i) an arbitration agreement
that is part of an employment contract explicitly incorporates
the rules of an arbitration association, and (ii) the
association rules give the arbitrator the power to decide
whether a particular dispute falls within the arbitration
agreement.
Applying this principle here, the Court holds that given (i) the
arbitration agreements’ reference to the AAA rules, and (ii)
what those rules say --- the question of whether the Plaintiff’s
claims must be arbitrated is for the arbitrator to resolve.
* 	* 	*
To be sure, there are exceptions to the broad legal principle
set out above.
First, if the underlying arbitration association rules are not
themselves “clear,” First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (cleaned up),
then those rules cannot be a basis for delegating the whether-
to-arbitrate question to the arbitrator.
But here, the association rules, quoted above, are
straightforward. 	See Am. Arb. Ass’n, Employment Workplace
Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures, R-1, R-7 (2025).
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Second, there may be an exception to the arbitrator-decides
principle where the arbitration association rules are not
readily available online --- such that their content cannot be
treated as “unmistakable.” 	First Options, 514 U.S. at 944
(cleaned up).
But that is not this case. 	The relevant AAA rules are easy to
find. 	See Assignment Agreement at 5 (language pointing to the
website where the AAA rules are); See Offer Letter at 2 (same).
Third, there may also be an exception to the above-cited
principle where the person who signed the arbitration agreement
is “unsophisticated” in a relevant way. 	Some courts have made
this suggestion. 	See, e.g., Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1075 (seeming to
limit its holding to agreements “between sophisticated parties
to commercial contracts”).13
But that cannot get off the ground here. 	The Plaintiff does not
assert that she was inexperienced when it comes to employment
contracts. 	And it is hard to know how she could make such an
argument --- she is an HR professional.
A fourth and final exception: 	Sometimes, (1) the arbitration
agreement points to (2) arbitration association rules, and those
association rules point to (3) another document --- and it is
only at the last step, (3), that it is made clear that it is the
arbitrator who will decide what goes to arbitration. 	That can
sometimes be too much hopscotching to pass the “clear and
unmistakable” test. 	See Chesapeake Appalachia, 809 F.3d at 761;
see also Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 811 F. App’x 100,
103 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).
But there is nothing like that here. 	The association rules
themselves, on the website that is expressly referred to in the
arbitration agreements, indicate what the arbitrator’s role will
13 	But cf. Brennan, 796 F.3d at 1131 (“the vast majority of the
circuits that hold that incorporation of the AAA rules
constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’
intent do so without explicitly limiting that holding to
sophisticated parties or to commercial contracts”) (citing
Petrofac, 687 F.3d at 675; Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 665
F.3d 1363, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds in
555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Fallo, 559 F.3d at 878;
Qualcomm, 466 F.3d at 1373; Terminix, 432 F.3d at 1332; Contec
Corp., 398 F.3d at 208; and Awuah, 554 F.3d at 10–12).
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be. 	There 	is 	not, 	here, 	the 	sort 	of 	"'daisy-chain' 	of
inferences" 	that 	causes 	concern. 	Richardson, 	811 	F. 	App'x 	at
103 	n.2 	(quoting 	Chesapeake 	Appalachia, 	809 	F.3d 	at 	761)).
* 	* 	*
"When 	the 	parties' 	contract 	delegates 	the 	arbitrability 	question
to 	an 	arbitrator, 	. 	a 	court 	possesses 	no 	power 	to 	decide 	the
arbitrability 	issue." 	Henry 	Schein, 	586 	U.S. 	at 	68.
That 	is 	this 	case. 	By 	referring 	to 	the 	AAA 	rules, 	the
arbitration 	agreements 	buck 	the 	arbitrability 	question 	to 	the
arbitrator. 	Whether 	the 	Plaintiff's 	claims 	must 	be 	arbitrated
is 	for 	the 	arbitrator 	to 	decide.
IV. 	Conclusion
The 	Defendants' 	motion 	to 	compel 	arbitration 	is 	granted. 14
This 	case 	is 	stayed pending 	the 	outcome 	of 	arbitration.
Within 	fourteen 	calendar 	days 	of 	any 	final 	decision 	by 	the
arbitrator 	as 	to 	whether 	the 	claims 	here 	must 	be 	arbitrated,
and/or 	as 	to 	liability, 	counsel 	shall 	file 	a 	joint 	status 	update
detailing 	the 	status 	of 	this 	litigation 	and 	whether 	the 	stay
should be 	lifted.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	9th 	day 	of 	January, 	2026, 	s0iORDERED.	__/'
_,/:Z~~}/~
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
14 	The 	Defendants' 	request 	for 	attorney's 	fees, 	see 	Defendants'
Brief 	at 	16, 	is 	denied. 	The 	Plaintiff's 	arguments 	here 	were 	not
"so 	lacking 	in 	merit 	that 	costs 	and 	attorney's 	fees 	should 	be
[imposed] 	against 	[her]." 	Mobil 	Oil 	Corp. 	v. 	Indep. 	Oil 	Workers
Union, 	679 	F.2d 	299, 	305 	(3d 	Cir. 	1982) 	(first 	alteration 	in
original).
17
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