FERNANDEZ v. PALISADES INTERSTATE PARKWAY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

2:25-cv-03039NjdFeb 2, 2026

Full text

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document 16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16- Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JUNIOR FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,
No. 25cv3039 (EP) (JRA)
V.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
PALISADES INTERSTATE PARKWAY
POLICE DEPARTMENT et al.,

Defendants.

PADIN, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Junior Fernandez filed a complaint bringing various civil rights claims
against Defendants Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Department (“PIPPD”), PIPPD Sergeant
Raymond Walter, PIPPD Officers Matthew Hearon, Elizabeth J. Santon, Kevin Rodrigo, and
Anthony Engel, and various John Does. D.E. 15 (“Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”).
Because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, D.E. 14, the Court must screen the Second Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons explained below, the Court will
DISMISS Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his first complaint on April 17, 2025 without paying the required filing fee
under 28 U.S.C. §1914(a), nor the administrative fee required under Appendix K to the Local Civil
Rules. D.E. 1 “Complaint” or “Compl.”). Plaintiff then filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) on May 29, 2025 and filed an amended complaint on June 16, 2025. D.Es. 9

(“IFP Application”) & 10 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”). Because Plaintiff filed his First

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Amended Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1),
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint became his operative complaint. See D.E. 13. This Court
granted Plaintiff IFP Application and then screened and dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). D.E. 14. Plaintiff has now filed a proposed
Second Amended Complaint. D.E. 15.

B. Factual Background!

On September 9, 2019,” Officer Matthew Hearon stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle. FAC at 2;
Compl. at 12. Although Plaintiff had not been driving the vehicle himself, Officer Matthew Hearon
asked Plaintiff to step outside and subsequently kept him there for about an hour, FAC at 2, until
other police officers and a K-9 unit arrived on the scene, Compl. at 12. While Officer Matthew
Hearon waited for other officers to arrive, Plaintiff informed Officer Matthew Hearon that he had
a “bladder and abdominal condition” due to a previous gunshot wound and surgery, D.E. 6-4, and
that he needed to use the restroom, FAC at 2. Officer Matthew Hearon repeatedly denied
Plaintiffs requests. Compl. at 2.

After other police officers arrived and reviewed the outside of Plaintiff’s vehicle, a K-9

unit alerted on the vehicle, prompting the police officers to search the vehicle.* Jd. at 2. Plaintiff’s

' The Second Amended Complaint is Plaintiff’s current operative complaint. D.E. 15. However,
because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his Second Amended Complaint liberally
and looks to Plaintiff’s other submissions, such as his original complaint, D.E. 1 (“Compl.”), and
his First Amended Complaint, D.E. 10, to glean relevant details supporting the claims in his
operative complaint. See D.E. 14.

* The First Amended Complaint, D.E. 10, disclosed that Plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped on
September 4, 2019. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint provides that this occurred on
September 9, 2019.

> Plaintiffs statements are inconsistent regarding whether the K-9 unit alerted or not on the
vehicle. See Compl. at 2 (stating that the K-9 unit alerted); SAC at | (stating that Defendants
fabricated a claim that the K-9 unit alerted).

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16- Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>

submissions indicate that the police found what appeared to be marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
D.E. 6-9 at 1. The police officers charged Plaintiff with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10a(4), personal
use of cannabis items, and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:36-2, possession of drug paraphernalia. Jd. The
police did not provide Plaintiff with his Miranda rights.4 SAC at 1. The police then impounded
Plaintiff’s vehicle. FAC at 2. The charges against Plaintiff were later dismissed on September 9,
2020. Id.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts must review an IFP plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune.° 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under the screening determination,
complaints may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state claim
under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)).

To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff’s factual allegations

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

‘ Plaintiff’s exhibits include a signed declaration that he was provided with his Miranda rights.
Compare SAC at 1, with D.E. 6-13.

> The Court’s preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not determine whether the
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint would survive a properly supported motion to
dismiss filed by Defendants after service. See Richardson v. Cascade Skating Rink, No. 19-8935,
2020 WL 7383188, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2020) (“[T]his Court recognizes ‘[a] § 1915(e) screening
determination is a preliminary and interlocutory holding, subject to revision at any time prior to
entry of final judgment.’” quoting Magruder v. Grafton Corr. Inst., No. 19-1980, 2020 WL
2814532, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2020))).

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16- Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>

(internal citation omitted). As Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court holds the Complaint to a less
stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
However, the Court need not “credit a pro se plaintiff’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’”
Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Courts may also sua sponte dismiss an IFP plaintiff’s complaint if the underlying causes
of action clearly fall outside the applicable statute of limitations. Rogers v. Perez, No. 25-1215,
2025 WL 847848, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2025) (citing Johnstone v. United States, 880 F. Supp
148, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
Il. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment,
Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional violations, and for malicious
prosecution.© SAC at 1. Plaintiff’s claims, however, are clearly outside the applicable statute of
limitations. Plaintiff complains about conduct that occurred in 2019. SAC at 1. Yet, § 1983 claims
must be brought within two years of the actionable event. O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d
125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2006). Therefore, the limitations period for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims expired
in 2021.

Plaintiff, however, argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because (1) the

COVID-19 pandemic made filing “materially impossible”; (2) he suffered periods of instability

® Plaintiff mentions he informed Defendants of his serious medical condition a that Defendants
ignored his requests for bathroom access, which caused him pain and injury. FAC at 2. The Court
construes this as a § 1983 claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff also mentions
“Negligent and Unlawful Impoundment.” Jd. Because Plaintiff does not allege any injury to his
vehicle, the Court construes this as a § 1983 claim for an unlawful seizure, a Fourth Amendment
violation. FAC at 2 (“The vehicle was impounded improperly, and Plaintiff]’]s due process rights
were violated throughout the incident and prosecution.”’).

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16- Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>

and homelessness; (3) Defendants’ conduct (i.e., refusing to provide bathroom access for an hour)
aggravated Plaintiffs medical complications, resulting in a hernia and required surgery;
(4) Plaintiff’s prior attorney’s conduct, which forced Plaintiff to proceed pro se, impeded him; and
(5) Plaintiff has spent years seeking records of his arrest and only recently obtained dash cam video
in 2025. SAC at 2.

Plaintiff’s documents and statements are internally inconsistent and indicate that Plaintiff
misrepresents material facts. For example, Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations should
be tolled four years because Plaintiff has been diligently requesting public records from the Police
Department but has only just recently, in 2025, received missing dash cam footage. SAC at 2. But
Plaintiff’s submissions indicate that he has had dash came footage since 2021. D.E. 6-14 (“I
already have my dash cam footage please do not include that.”). Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint alleges that Defendants fabricated that a K-9 unit alerted on Plaintiff’s car but Plaintiff’s
initial Complaint—where he provides a detailed summary of events—tepresents that the K-9 unit
did alert on his car. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also alleges that
Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with his Miranda rights, but Plaintiff’s exhibits include a
form—bearing his signature and the date of his arrest—listing the Miranda rights and indicating
that Plaintiff read them and that a police officer read them to him out loud. D.E. 6-13. These
contradictions concern material facts and do not permit the Court to determine what version of
events should apply. Nor can the Court solely rely on the Second Amended Complaint because it
incorporates other filings and does not provide enough detail on its own to survive dismissal.

Even considering Plaintiff’s filings liberally, the Court cannot accept as true Plaintiff's
allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that claims may be dismissed when they “are not

entitled to the assumption of truth”); see also Slabon v. Dart, 2018 WL 10498554, at *2 (N.D. III.

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Nov. 14, 2018) (dismissing IFP plaintiff’s complaint because it contained information inconsistent
with his other submissions). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. However, the Court will PERMIT Plaintiff 45 days to submit an amended proposed
complaint. Plaintiff must file the relevant exhibits and all material details concerning his
allegations in a single operative filing and must also therein address the deficiencies identified by
this Order.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Court cannot take as true Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court will DISMISS
without prejudice Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff will be given 45 days to
submit a proposed amended complaint, which the Court may use to determine whether Plaintiff’s
complaint may proceed. Accordingly,

IT IS on this 2" day of February 2026, for the foregoing reasons,

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, D.E. 15, is DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case; and it further

ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a proposed amended complaint within 45 days to cure
the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum Order; and it is further

ORDERED that any proposed amended complaint will be subject to this Court’s screening
pursuant to U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall REOPEN this action if the proposed amended
complaint passes the Court’s screening pursuant to U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is finally

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Order to

Plaintiff via regular mail.

Case 2:25-cv-03039-EP-JRA Document16- Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 7 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Sok, Ted

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.