UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PAYSEUR et al

2:25-cv-00548NjdJan 7, 2026

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIET PAYSEUR and 20-22 MCGREGOR
AVENUE, LLC,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-00548 (BRM) (AME)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff-Intervenor Brittany Doyle’s (“Doyle”) Motion to Strike
(“Motion”) the first, second, fifth, eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth defenses (ECF No. 27) that
Defendants Juliet Payseur (“Payseur”) and 20-22 McGregor Avenue, LLC’s (“McGregor Ave.
LLC”) (together, “Defendants”) assert in their Answer to the Complaint-in-Intervention. (ECF No.
25). Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 29) on September 22, 2025,
and Doyle filed a Reply (ECF No. 30). Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in
connection with the Motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause having been
shown, Doyle’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
A. Factual History
This action arises under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). It was initiated as a civil
enforcement action by the United States of America (“United States”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 3612(o), based on allegations that Defendants “discriminated against Doyle, a mother who lived
in subsidized housing with her children, based on race by demanding a significant rent increase
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and by requiring burdensome lease terms for Doyle, a Black woman, while treating a white tenant
more favorably in both respects” and, further, that Defendants retaliated against Doyle after she
filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for violation of
her rights under the FHA. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 2.)
B. Procedural History
The United States reached a negotiated resolution of its claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief, but that settlement expressly did not resolve any claims Doyle may elect to pursue
against Defendants pursuant to the FHA, should she exercise her right to intervene in this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 3614(e). (See ECF No. 22-1 ¶¶ 9, 35.) On July 15, 2025, Doyle moved to
intervene (ECF No. 21), and the Hon. Andre M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J. granted her motion on August
22, 2025 (ECF No. 23). With leave of Court, Doyle filed her own Complaint-in-Intervention,
seeking damages and equitable relief for the same alleged housing discrimination underlying the
United States’s civil enforcement action. (ECF No. 21 at 4–6; ECF No. 24.)1 Specifically, Doyle’s
Complaint-in-Intervention alleges that after Doyle was offered tenancy at 20-22 McGregor Avenue
with a valid Section 8 housing voucher, “Defendants imposed discriminatory lease terms on [her]
and her children, including a shorter lease period and added conditions not applied to similarly
situated white tenants.” (ECF No. 24 ¶ 9.) She further alleges that when she questioned the unfair
treatment, Defendants launched a campaign of harassment and intimidation against her, including
installation of surveillance cameras pointed exclusively at her unit and depriving her unit of
heating oil. (Id. ¶ 10.) Doyle alleges Defendants’ discriminatory and retaliatory acts caused her to
lose her housing voucher, incur costs to live at a hotel, miss critical medical appointments, and
1 Judge Espinosa ordered the Clerk’s Office to “file, as a separate docket entry, [Doyle’s] proposed
Complaint-in-Intervention.” (ECF No. 23; see ECF No. 24.)
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suffer emotional trauma and anxiety, among other things. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) Her Complaint-in-
Intervention asserts a sole claim for violation of the FHA. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On September 2, 2025, Doyle filed a Motion to Strike the first, second, fifth, eighth,
thirteenth, and fourteenth defenses with prejudice. 2 (ECF No. 27) On September 22, 2025,
Defendants filed an Opposition to Doyle’s Motion. (ECF No. 29.) Doyle filed a Reply the next
day. (ECF No. 30.)
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
A. Rule 12(f)
A court may, upon motion or sua sponte, “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “An
affirmative defense is insufficient if it is not recognized as a legal defense to the cause of action.”
Huertas v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Civ. A. No. 08-3959, 2009 WL 2132429, at *1 (D.N.J. July 13,
2009). “The purpose of a motion to strike is to simplify the pleadings and save time and expense
by excising from a plaintiff’s complaint any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter which will not have any possible bearing on the outcome of the litigation.” Garlanger v.
Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 609 (D.N.J. 2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
However, “[b]ecause of the drastic nature of the remedy, . . . motions to strike are usually ‘viewed
with disfavor’ and will generally ‘be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the
2 While Doyle’s Motion mentions “Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses ¶¶ . . . 10–14,” the portion
of Doyle’s Motion attacking Defendants’ punitive damages defenses does not appear to
substantively address Defendants’ tenth, eleventh, and twelfth affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 27
at 2.) Additionally, Doyle mislabels Defendants’ unclean hands defense as the third affirmative
defense when it is actually Defendants’ eighth affirmative defense. (Compare ECF No. 25 at 4 of
6 (listing the unclean hands defense as part of the eighth affirmative defense), with ECF No. 27 at
2 (misidentifying the unclean hands defense as Defendants’ third affirmative defense).) As such,
the Court reads Doyle’s Motion to address only Defendants’ first, second, fifth, eighth, thirteenth,
and fourteenth defenses.
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controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues.’”
Id. (citing Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 200, 217 (D.N.J. 1993)); see also
Weske v. Samsung Elecs., Am., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 698, 702 (D.N.J. 2013) (explaining that
motions to strike are extremely disfavored). Indeed, a “court should grant a motion to strike a
defense only where the ‘insufficiency of the defense is clearly apparent.’” Huertas, 2009 WL
2132429, at *1 (quoting United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (D.N.J.
2008)).
III. 	DECISION
Before addressing the merits of striking specific defenses, the Court addresses Doyle’s
timeliness argument. Doyle claims Defendants have filed an untimely opposition and, therefore,
asks the Court to disregard it. (ECF No. 30 at 1.) But Doyle’s invocation of Local Civil Rule
7.1(d)(2) is misplaced. Local Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2) requires “papers in opposition to a motion . . . be
filed . . . at least 14 days prior to the original motion day.” Here, Doyle’s Motion to Strike was set
for October 6, 2025, meaning Defendants had until September 22, 2025, to file a response to that
motion. (Clerk’s Entry dated September 4, 2025.) Defendants timely filed their Opposition on
September 22, 2025; as such, the Court will duly consider Defendants’ Opposition. (ECF No. 29.)
A. Affirmative Defenses at Issue3
1. 	Failure to State a Claim Defense
Doyle asks the Court to strike Defendants’ assertion that “[a]ll or portions of Intervenor’s
3 Without citing any authority, Doyle argues that she will be prejudiced if the Court fails to strike
Defendants’ first, second, fifth, eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth affirmative defenses. (ECF No.
27 at 3.) The Court need not specifically address Doyle’s prejudice argument regarding these
defenses because they are stricken on non-prejudice grounds. See infra Section III.A.2–5.
However, the Court will address Doyle’s prejudice argument with respect to Defendants’ first
affirmative defense, which survives Doyle’s Motion. The Court finds Doyle will not be
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Complaint fail to state a cause of action” because (ECF No. 25 at 3 of 6), according to Doyle,
“[t]his is not a proper affirmative defense but a Rule 12(b)(6) argument that should be raised in a
motion to dismiss, not in an Answer.” (ECF No. 27 at 2). In opposition, Defendants disagree and
point out that an omission of Rule 12(b)(6) from their responsive pleading would mean “forfeiting
their right to assert this affirmative defense.” (ECF No. 29 at 9 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)).) In
reply, Doyle makes several sweeping arguments: (1) she notes a lack of a factual basis for
Defendants’ asserted defenses, (2) refers to the settlement between the Defendants and the United
States as indicators of the defenses’ insufficiency, and (3), again, claims that having to defend
against the defenses at issue would prejudice her. (ECF No. 30 at 2.)
Defendants are correct—the Rules do not prevent Defendants from including a 12(b)(6)
defense in their Answer. See, e.g., Trs. of Univ. of Pennsylvania v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 97-1111, 1997 WL 598001, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1997) (“Where the defense offered
under Rule 12(b) previously had been included in the answer, a number of courts have treated a
post-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(6) as timely.”); see also Gray v. Gilmore, No. Civ. A. No.
2:18-cv-01414, 2019 WL 7046547, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2019) (“In civil lawsuits, defendants
sometimes include a series of boilerplate affirmative defenses in their answers. One of the more
common ones is: ‘Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.’”). Accordingly, the Court will not strike
Defendants’ first affirmative defense.
significantly prejudiced if the Court does not strike Defendants’ first affirmative defense. Wright
& Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1382 (“[T]here appears to be general judicial agreement . . . that
[motions to strike] should be denied unless the challenged allegations . . . may cause some form
of significant prejudice.” (emphasis added)). Doyle fails to show how she will face significant
prejudice. First, whether Doyle has stated a claim will not significantly impact the scope of
discovery and therefore not “forc[e] her to conduct unfocused discovery,” as she claims. (ECF No.
27 at 3.) Second, Defendants’ failure to state a claim defense is not patently baseless, nor does it
risk confusing a jury. See supra Section III.A.1.
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2. 	Causation Defense
In their second affirmative defense, Defendants contend that Doyle’s claims arise from
actions of persons “over whom Defendants had no authority or control.” (ECF No. 25 at 3 of 6.)
Citing Twombly and Iqbal in support of her Motion to Strike, Doyle argues that Defendants’
defense is “vague, conclusory, and provides no factual support.” (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Defendants
note the inapplicability of these standards to this Motion. (ECF No. 29 at 10, 7 (citing Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).) Additionally,
Defendants contend they have “pled an affirmative defense sounding in a superseding or
intervening cause resulting in [Doyle’s] alleged harm.” (Id. at 9.) In reply, Doyle repeats her
Twombly and Iqbal argument, even asserting that “[c]ourts in this District apply these standards to
affirmative defenses.”4 (ECF No. 30 at 2.)
Twombly and Iqbal are not the standards courts use to assess the factual sufficiency of
affirmative defenses. Vazquez v. Triad Media Sols., Inc., Civ. A. No. 15-cv-07220, 2016 WL
155044, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2016) (quoting Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp.
4 Doyle cites Vazquez v. Triad Media Solutions, Inc., Civ. A. No. 15-cv-07220, 2016 WL 155044,
at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2016), to support this assertion. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) However, using the
Westlaw database identifier, electronic report number, and case number included in Doyle’s
citation, the Court cannot locate an opinion applying the Twombly and Iqbal standards to
affirmative defenses. (Id.) Nor can the Court find such an opinion in this case issued on October
6, 2016—the decision date represented by Doyle. Indeed, in two opinions pertaining to Vazquez v.
Triad Media Solutions, Inc., the court used the following language: “[D]istrict courts within the
Third Circuit have held that the heightened Iqbal/Twombly requirement that a pleading ‘state a
claim . . . that is plausible on its face[]” . . . does not apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).” Civ. A. No. 15-cv-7220, 2016 WL 155044, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2016)
(collecting cases) (internal citations omitted); Civ. A. No. 15-cv-7220, 2016 WL 6090725, at *2
(D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2016) (same).
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2d 893, 900 (E.D. Pa. 2011)). A “defendant asserting a Rule 8(c) affirmative defense ‘must merely
provide fair notice of the issue involved.’” Id.
However, 	the 	Court 	will 	strike 	Defendants’ so-called 	second 	affirmative 	defense.
Defendants’ self-described “defense sounding in a superseding or intervening cause” (ECF No. 29
at 9) are “causation driven defenses because they either directly assert that someone else caused
the [harm], or indirectly challenge causation.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Moskowitz, Civ. A. No. 93-2080,
1994 WL 229812, at *26 (D.N.J. May 24, 1994), on reconsideration, Civ. A. No. 93-2028, 1994
WL 16190856 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 1994). In other words, “[t]hey are merely denials of liability.” Id.
(citing Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 713 F. Supp. 587, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). Accordingly, Doyle’s
motion to strike Defendants’ second affirmative defense is GRANTED. Moskowitz, 1994 WL
229812, at *26 (granting plaintiff’s motion to strike a mere denial of liability dressed up as an
affirmative defense).
3. 	Failure to Mitigate Defense
Defendants’ fifth affirmative defense is that “[Doyle] failed to mitigate her damages.”
Doyle asks the Court to strike this defense because it is “both conclusory and self-defeating.” (ECF
No. 27 at 2.) But according to Defendants, the Court should not strike this defense because “failure
to mitigate is a widely recognized affirmative defense.” (ECF No. 29 at 10 (citing RHJ Med. Ctr.,
Inc. v. City of Dubois, 564 Fed. App’x 660, 667 (3d Cir. 2014).)
Doyle is correct: Defendants’ failure to mitigate defense “is simply a bare bones conclusory
allegation.” 2109971 Ontario Inc. v. Best Deals Disc. Furniture LLC, Civ. A. No. 22-cv-3557,
2023 WL 3072756, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2023) (striking failure to mitigate damages defense
where defendant failed to provide any factual basis for this affirmative defense). And, as articulated
by Defendants, this defense “affords no notice whatsoever to [Doyle] and makes it impossible for
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[her] to adequately respond.” Innovative Sports, Mgmt., Inc. v. Neto, 2013 WL 5935982, at *2
(D.N.J. 2013) (“[D]efenses that are ‘nothing more than bare bones conclusory allegations can be
stricken.’” (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Modular Homes, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 117, 120–21 (D.N.J.1994)).
Accordingly, Doyle’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ failure to mitigate defense, Defendants’ fifth
defense, is GRANTED.
4. 	Unclean Hands Defense
As part of their eighth affirmative defense, Defendants contend that Doyle’s “claims are
barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine[] of Unclean Hands.” (ECF No. 25 at 4 of 6.) Doyle
argues the Court should strike Defendants’ unclean hands defense because it is “legally
insufficient” given that “Defendants have not alleged any specific misconduct by Plaintiff that
bears any connection to her claims of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.” (ECF No. 27 at
2 (citing Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d Cir. 2001) and In re
New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 525 (3d Cir. 1999)).) Defendants urge the Court not to strike this
defense because the Third Circuit recognizes the doctrine of unclean hands.5 (ECF No. 29 at 10.)
5 In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
equitable defense of employee misconduct could not preclude employer liability for violating the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). 513 U.S. 352, 356–57, 360 (1995). The Court
observed the unclean hands defense “has not been applied where Congress authorizes broad
equitable relief to serve important national policies.” Id. at 360. Several out-of-district courts have
applied the rationale from the Supreme Court’s McKennon decision to bar the unclean hands
defense in FHA claims. Mancuso v. Douglas Elliman LLC, 808 F. Supp. 2d 606, 631–32 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (finding the doctrine of unclean hands inapplicable to the liability issues in an FHA case);
Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 627, 638 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (same); Utah
Labor Comm’n v. Paradise Town, 660 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 (D. Utah 2009) (same). However,
no court in the Third Circuit appears to have considered the question of whether the rationale of
McKennon bars the unclean hands doctrine in FHA cases. See Branch v. Temple Univ., Civ. A. No.
21-3099, 2023 WL 3993016, at *2 (3d Cir. June 14, 2023) (embracing McKennon in a Title VII
case). Here, because Defendant’s unclean hands defense is stricken on alternative grounds, the
Court need not decide and does not now decide whether McKennon bars the unclean hands defense
in FHA cases.
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Just as Defendants’ failure to mitigate defense is “nothing more than bare bones conclusory
allegations,” Neto, 2013 WL 5935982, at *2 (quoting F.D.I.C., 859 F. Supp. at 120–21), so too is
Defendants’ unclean hands defense. Defendants contend that Doyle’s claims are barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands but have not described with any detail what Doyle has done to trigger
this defense. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Roggio, Civ. A. No. 19-06330, 2023 WL
1456782, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2023) (“Defenses that are mere conclusions should be stricken.”)
(striking an affirmative defense that merely stated that the complaint was barred by the Statute of
Frauds). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Doyle’s Motion to strike the unclean hands part of the
eighth defense from Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint-in-Intervention.
5. 	Punitive Damages Defense
Defendants’ argue that an award of punitive damages would “violate[] [both] . . . the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and
violate[] Defendants’ right to substantive due process as provided in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of New Jersey.” (ECF No. 25
at 4 of 6.) Doyle asks the Court to strike this defense because “[c]ourts have consistently upheld
the availability of punitive damages under the [FHA] and state tort law.” (ECF No. 27 at 2 (citing
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 (1983)).)6 But, according to Defendants,
they “are entitled to reserve their right to assert that [potential] punitive damages may be excessive
in violation of the federal and state constitutions.” (ECF No. 29 at 11.)
Defendants’ defense that Doyle’s claim for punitive damages violates their “right to
protection from ‘excessive fines’ as provided in . . . the United States Constitution and the
6 Herman & MacLean is not a case about the FHA. 459 U.S. at 377. It is a case concerning Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
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Constitution of the State of New Jersey[] and violates Defendants’ right to substantive due process
as provided in . . . the United States Constitution and the Constitution of New Jersey” (ECF No.
25 at 4 of 6) does not constitute an affirmative defense because it will not defeat Doyle’s claims if
proven. Greiff v. T.I.C. Enters., L.L.C., Civ. A. No. 03-882, 2004 WL 115553, at *3 (D. Del. Jan.
9, 2004) (striking affirmative defense alleging that any excessive punitive damages sought by
defendants are barred by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution because they focus solely on relief, not liability).
Likewise, Defendants’ defense that Doyle’s “claim for punitive damages violates Defendants’ right
to procedural due process as provided in the . . . United States Constitution and the Constitution
of New Jersey” (ECF No. 25 at 4 of 6) cannot defeat Doyle’s claims if proven. Greiff, 2004 WL
115553, at *3. Simply stated, Defendants’ punitive damages “defenses” are not affirmative
defenses; instead, these so-called defenses “entirely overlook liability and focus solely on potential
relief.” Id. As such, Doyle’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ thirteenth and fourteenth affirmative
defenses is GRANTED.
B. Request for Sanctions
In 	Defendants’ 	response 	to 	Doyle’s 	Motion, 	Defendants 	point 	out 	the 	numerous
misrepresentations in Doyle’s Motion and ask the Court to impose sanctions on Doyle for failing
to comport with Rule 11. (ECF No. 29 at 11–15.) Defendants also accuse Doyle of utilizing
artificial intelligence 7 in drafting her Motion, which Defendants contend caused “frivolous
litigation, wasteful motion practice, [and] unnecessary cost to Defendants.” (Id. at 15–18.) Doyle
does not deny using Gen. AI. (ECF No. 30 at 2–3.) Instead, she observes the ubiquity of artificial
7 Based on the parties’ descriptions of the alleged artificial intelligence at issue, the Court reads
Defendants’ argument to mean Defendants suspect Doyle misused generative artificial intelligence
(“Gen. AI”).
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intelligence in legal practice and affirms that she drafted and reviewed the Motion. (Id. at 2.)
According to Doyle, “[e]very case and quotation in the [M]otion is real, verifiable, and drawn from
legitimate legal sources.” (Id.)
The use of Gen. AI in litigation, as an assistive tool and with proper review, is not a
sanctionable act. See Mattox v. Prod. Innovations Rsch., LLC, Civ. A. No. 24-235, 2025 WL
3012828, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 22, 2025) (“[A] lawyer who wishes to use AI ethically must ensure
that the legal propositions and authority generated are trustworthy.”). As Doyle points out, the use
of Gen. AI is “increasingly common in modern[,] [legal] practice.” (ECF No. 30 at 3.) However,
“courts around the country have begun confronting the phenomenon of so-called ‘hallucinated’
citations in court papers—that is, citations to legal authority that are either partly or wholly
nonexistent.” Cojom v. Roblen, LLC, Civ. A. No. 23-1669, 2025 WL 3205930, at *2 (D. Conn.
Nov. 17, 2025) (collecting cases); Gardner v. Combs, Civ. A. No. 24-07729, 2025 WL 3632704,
at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2025) (“Unfortunately, the use of AI without proper oversight has become
a prevalent issue for courts across the country.”). Therefore, “[g]iven the ethical obligations
[litigants and their] lawyers must honor, it is imperative that [those before the court] use [Gen.] AI
with diligence and care.” Cojom, 2025 WL 3205930 at *3. While courts have an obligation to
conduct their own legal research and probe the factual representations made to them, litigants and
their attorneys are nonetheless expected and, in fact, required to make legal arguments and factual
representations in good faith. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see, e.g., NJ RPC 3.1, 3.3, 8.4(c) Indeed,
litigants and their attorneys, who imprudently rely on Gen. AI tools to create legal filings, often
“slow[] court proceedings and saddle[] . . . courts with the time costs and . . . burdens associated
with detecting and responding to the errors.” Shelton v. Parkland Health, Civ. A. No. 24-2190,
2025 WL 3141108, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025).
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That said, “sanctions are prescribed ‘only in the “exceptional circumstance” where a claim
or motion is patently unmeritous or frivolous.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930
F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d
191, 194 (3d Cir.1988)). Because the Court strikes several of Defendants’ defenses identified in
Doyle’s Motion, it cannot be said that her Motion is unmeritorious or frivolous. See, e.g., Zelma
v. Wonder Grp. Inc., Civ. A. No. 25-3232, 2025 WL 2976546, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)
(“Defendant’s position that Plaintiff’s arguments are frivolous is severely undercut by the fact that
Counts II and III survive the Motion.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ request for sanctions is
DENIED as it must “resolve[] all doubts in favor” of Doyle. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d
at *9).
However, for the remainder of this litigation—given numerous citations to cases that in no
way represent the propositions for which they are cited—Doyle is forewarned and must read the
cases she cites with greater care to ensure she is not only citing real cases but also accurately
characterizing what those cases say. (See contra, e.g., ECF No. 27 at 2 (citing Herman & MacLean
for an incorrect proposition)). The Court takes the ethical obligations required of all litigants
seriously—even those appearing pro se. See Robinson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, Civ. A. No. 25-289-
D, 2025 WL 2609573, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 2025) (“While courts afford pro se litigants
considerable leeway, that leeway does not relieve pro se litigants of their obligation under Rule 11
to confirm the validity of any cited legal authority.” (quoting Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed.
Cl. 163, 169 (2025)). In short, all litigants are dutybound “to check all . . . cases and quotations for
accuracy. Anything less is to abdicate one’s duty, waste legal resources, and lower the public’s
respect for the legal profession and judicial proceedings.” ByoPlanet Int’l, LLC v. Johansson, 792
F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2025).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause having been shown, Doyle’s Motion to
Strike (ECF No. 27) is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.8 An appropriate order
follows.
Date: January 7, 2025 	/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 Defendants’ second, fifth, eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth defenses are STRICKEN without
prejudice, but Defendants are cautioned not to re-assert affirmative defenses absent a legitimate
basis in fact and law for doing so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Defendants’ eighth affirmative
defense is only stricken insofar as it raises an unclean hands defense.
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