LYLES v. BRANTLEY

2:23-cv-01034NjdFeb 2, 2026

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RONNIE LYLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
MALACHIA BRANTLEY,
Defendant.
No. 23-cv-1034 (MEF)(JBC)
OPINION
* 	* 	*
For the purposes of this brief Opinion, the Court largely
assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of
this case.
* 	* 	*
Some background:
A prisoner1 (“Prisoner”) was held at Northern State Prison, a
facility in Newark. 	See Complaint for Trial & Jury Demand
(“Complaint”) (ECF 1) at 1.
The Prisoner adheres to a Native American religion, see id. ¶ 6,
and contends that, in prison, his ability to freely practice his
faith has been improperly restricted.
For example, certain religious practices require dancing, but
dancing was not permitted to the Prisoner during the time
generally allocated by the facility for inmate prayer. 	See
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (ECF 29-2) ¶¶ 47-48. 	And
another example: religious observances that make use of
1 	Ronnie Lyles.
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kinnikinnick2 and smudging3 need to be undertaken outdoors, see
id. ¶¶ 16-17 --- but the outdoor sessions were sometimes
canceled or shortened. 	See id. ¶ 67; Plaintiff’s Deposition
(ECF 29-6) at 81:4–24, 84:22-86:24.
* 	* 	*
In light of the above, the Prisoner, acting without a lawyer,
sued the supervisor of religious services4 at Northern State
Prison (“Supervisor”).
The Prisoner pressed claims under (i) the First Amendment to the
Constitution, see Complaint ¶¶ 8-15, and (ii) the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. 	See id. ¶¶ 16-23.
The Prisoner sought, among other things, damages and an
injunction. 	See id. at 6.
The Supervisor has now moved for summary judgment. 	See Brief in
Support of the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 29-
1) at 24–26. 	Among other things, he contends that he is
entitled to qualified immunity on the Prisoner’s First Amendment
claims. 	See id. at 4-23, 26–29.
* 	* 	*
“Qualified 	immunity 	shields 	. 	. 	. 	state 	officials 	. 	. 	. 	unless 	a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a 	.
. . right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time 	of 	the 	challenged 	conduct.” 	Ashcroft 	v. 	al-Kidd, 	563 	U.S.
731, 735 (2011) (cleaned up).
2 	Kinnikinnick is a “mixture of items such as, but not limited
to, bark, dried leaves, sage, cedar, sweet grass, corn pollen
and/or sometimes tobacco,” which may be used with a prayer pipe.
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 13, 16–17.
3 	Smudging is “as an act of worship in Native American religion
which includes small amounts of cedar, kinnikinnick, sage,
sweet-grass and/or high-grade tobacco that are placed in an
abalone shell and lit. 	The worshipper lets the mixture smolder,
then draws the smoke toward the heart and over the head to
receive its blessing.” 	Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶
15.
4 	The Reverend Malachia Brantley.
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[O]nce 	the 	defendant[] 	ha[s] 	started 	things
off by raising qualified immunity, who has to
come 	forward 	and 	show 	what 	the 	“clearly
established” law actually is?
The plaintiff.
If 	[t]he 	[plaintiff] 	does 	not 	come 	forward
with 	sufficiently 	on-point 	indications5 	that
the 	relevant 	law 	is 	“clearly 	established,”
then the defendant gets qualified immunity.
Courney v. City of Englewood, 793 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621-22 (D.N.J.
2025) (citing numerous cases).
But 	this 	sort 	of 	legal 	research 	can 	be 	difficult 	for 	an
incarcerated pro se plaintiff to realistically do. 	Moreover, First
Amendment free exercise law, already fairly complex, has undergone
some 	meaningful 	changes 	in 	recent 	years. 	And 	how 	free 	exercise
law operates in prison --- that folds in another set of questions
to ask and answer.6
Against 	this 	backdrop, 	the 	Court 	will 	not 	now 	resolve 	the
Supervisor’s 	summary 	judgment 	motion. 	Rather, 	the 	Court 	will
administratively 	terminate 	the 	motion 	for 	now, 	with 	an 	eye 	to
possibly appointing pro bono counsel.
A 	lawyer 	would 	be 	able 	to 	more 	efficiently 	do 	any 	necessary
“clearly-established” legal research, and advise the Prisoner more
generally --- as to whether his backwards-looking damages claim is
viable, 	and 	as 	to 	practical-minded 	ways 	to 	ensure 	on 	a 	going-
forward 	basis 	that 	the 	Prisoner, 	now 	relocated 	to 	a 	different
facility, is able to practice his faith.7
5 	What is needed is “not . . . a case directly on point, but
existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional
question beyond debate.” 	Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12
(2015) (cleaned up).
6 	“[N]o one needs to come forward with any authority when the
alleged violation of law is entirely obvious.” 	Courney, 793 F.
Supp. 3d at 622 n.15. 	But that is not this case.
7 	As noted, the Prisoner has been moved to a new facility. 	See
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 9-10 (showing
transfer); Certification of the Defendant (ECF 29-14) ¶ 1. 	And
that may well mean that the Prisoner’s forward-looking claims
against the Supervisor are now moot. 	See, e.g., Banks v. Sec’y
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* 	* 	*
An 	appropriate 	order 	follows.
ON 	this 	2nd 	day 	of 	February, 	2026.
/
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
Pa. 	Dep't 	of 	Corr., 	601 	F. 	App'x 	101, 	103 	(3d 	Cir. 	2015); 	Sutton
v. 	Rasheed, 	323 	F.3d 	236, 	248 	(3d 	Cir. 	2003).
4
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