UNITED MERCHANT SERVICES, INC et al v. ROYAL WESTERN COMPUTER, INC et al

2:22-cv-04791NjdNov 25, 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED MERCHANT SERVICES,
INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROYAL 	WESTERN 	COMPUTER,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
22-cv-04791 (KSH) (JRA)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs, United Merchant Services, Inc. (“UMSI”) and Bluu Inc. (“Bluu,”
collectively with UMSI, “Plaintiffs”), move (1) to strike the Answer and Counterclaim
of Defendant Royal Western Computer Inc. (“Royal Western”) and Defendant Jong S.
Lim (“Mr. Lim,” collectively with Royal Western, “Defendants”), and (2) for the Clerk
to enter default against Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(a). Dkt. No. 111 (the “Motion”). Notably, this unopposed Motion is not directed at
the other Defendant, Tomorrow POS, Inc (“Tomorrow”), which remains an active
Defendant in this case.1 The Honorable Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J., referred this
Motion to me for a Report and Recommendation. I decide the Motion on the papers
and without oral argument. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). 	For the
1 Unless expressly noted otherwise, the term “Defendants” in this Opinion does not include
Tomorrow POS, Inc.
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reasons discussed below, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED as
to Defendants Jong S. Lim and Royal Western.
I. 	BACKGROUND
UMSI is a payment processing company that, through its affiliate, Bluu,
provides electronic payment services to merchants. 	See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–
14, Dkt. No. 79. 	Essentially, UMSI, through Bluu, provides the software and
hardware that enable merchants and retailers to accept payment from customers via
electronic means (i.e., credit cards and debit cards). 	Id. ¶ 15. 	Key to Plaintiffs’
services is “Royal Touch POS,” UMSI’s point-of-sale software that enables its
merchant customers to process customer payments. 	Id. ¶ 21. 	To reach various
merchants, UMSI contracts with third-party resellers, who agree to exclusively
market UMSI’s processing services and equipment, inclusive of its point-of-sale
terminals and software, to merchants who may benefit from UMSI’s services and
equipment. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 28, 2022, against one of these resellers,
Royal Western, because Royal Western, through its President and CEO, Mr. Lim,
marketed a competing software, “Rainbow POS,” while contractually obligated to
exclusively market Plaintiffs’ equipment to customers. 	See generally id. 	Plaintiffs
further allege that Defendants developed their own point-of-sale software, “Tomorrow
POS,” which Plaintiffs characterize as an illegal, unauthorized clone of Plaintiffs’
intellectual property. 	Id. ¶¶ 60–61. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring various claims for
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breach of contract, copyright infringement, fraud, and statutory violations against
Defendants and Tomorrow. 2 See generally id.
Throughout this litigation, the parties made various efforts to settle this
matter, but by February 28, 2024, it became apparent the parties would be unable to
do so. 	See Dkt. Nos. 34, 44, 52; February 28, 2024, Minute Entry. 	Thereafter, on
April 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, and Defendants filed
their Answer generally denying Plaintiffs’ allegations, asserting affirmative defenses,
and asserting two counterclaims (“Answer”). 	Dkt. Nos. 79–80. 	The parties then
proceeded with completing discovery. 	See Dkt. Nos. 84–85. 	However, on March 6,
2025, Defendants’ counsel, the Kim Law Firm, moved to withdraw as counsel because
Mr. Lim represented that Royal Western had ceased its operations and that he no
longer intended to fund the lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶¶ 6–8. The Kim Law Firm
represented that it “informed Mr. Lim of the consequences of the [Kim Law] Firm’s
withdrawal,” and despite this warning, “Mr. Lim indicated that he desire[d] to
terminate the [Kim Law] Firm’s representation of him and [Royal Western].” Id ¶¶
7–8. 	The Kim Law Firm also certified that it had served a copy of its motion to
withdraw upom Mr. Lim at his last known address and email. See Dkt. No. 100-4.
On May 19, 2025, the Court granted the Kim Law Firm’s motion to withdraw
as counsel for Defendants. 	See Dkt. No. 106 ¶ 1.3 	Per the Court’s Order, Mr. Lim
2 According to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Tomorrow is a shell company set up by Mr. Lim
to market Tomorrow POS and avoid Royal Western’s exclusivity obligations. See Second Am. Compl.
¶ 64.
3 The Kim Law Firm remains counsel for Tomorrow.
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was to retain new representation for Royal Western,4 and inform the Court whether
he would be representing himself pro se or obtaining new counsel. 	Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 	Mr.
Lim failed to do so. Moreover, the Kim Law Firm was ordered to serve Mr. Lim with
Plaintiffs’ updated deposition notices via his email, to notify Mr. Lim of his deposition
telephonically, and to provide Plaintiffs with Mr. Lim’s last known address and
contact information. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. The Kim Law Firm represented via status letter to
the Court that, in compliance with the Order, they,
contacted 	[Mr. 	Lim] 	via 	electronic 	mail 	to 	inform 	of 	this 	firm’s
withdrawal as his legal representative, advising him of the potential
consequences of said withdrawal and further informed him that he is
required [to appear] for the deposition that Plaintiffs noticed for July 1,
2025. Furthermore, the [the Kim Law Firm] made attempts to contact
[Mr. Lim] at his last known telephone number on May 19, 2025 and June
11, 2025, to no avail.
Dkt. No. 108 at 1. 	Despite these attempts, the Kim Law Firm has had “no further
communication with [Mr. Lim],” id., and Defendants subsequently failed to appear
for their respective depositions scheduled on June 27, 2025, and July 1, 2025. 	Dkt.
No. 111-1 at 3.
For all intents and purposes, Defendants have abandoned this litigation,
having failed to participate in completing the remaining discovery or otherwise
appear on this matter, despite the parties’ efforts to communicate with Mr. Lim. See
Dkt. No. 108. Following a status conference on July 1, 2025, I granted Plaintiffs leave
4 Royal Western, as a corporate entity, may only appear in federal court through a licensed attorney.
See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the
better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through
licensed counsel.”) (citations modified); accord Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 374 (3d
Cir. 1966); see also Buschmeier v. G&G Invs., Inc., 222 F. App’x 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2007).
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to file the appropriate motion to resolve this matter as to Defendants. Dkt. No. 110.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion seeking to strike Defendants’
Answer for failure to comply and obey pretrial orders pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 16(f) and 37(b). Plaintiffs have certified that the instant Motion was
“served via this Court’s electronic filing system, via email, and overnight mail upon
[Defendants].” Dkt. No. 111-11 at 1.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to sanction
a party that fails to comply with a court order. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). 	Regarding
sanctions, the Court may generally “issue any just orders, including those authorized
by Rule 37(b)(2)(A) (ii)-(vii)[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1). Specifically, Rule 37(b)(2)(A)
states in relevant part:
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, . . .
the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They
may include the following:
. . .
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
. . .
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
The Court uses its sound discretion in deciding what sanctions to impose. See
Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007). In Poulis
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit identified
six factors for courts to evaluate when deciding whether to impose a sanction such as
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striking a pleading: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the
prejudice to the adversary; (3) whether there has been a history of dilatoriness; (4)
whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or
defense. 	Id. at 868. 	No Poulis factor is dispositive, and dismissal or default can be
granted even when some of the factors are not met. 	See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc.,
322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). However, “dismissals with prejudice or defaults are
drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court, . . . and are to be reserved
for [such] cases.” 	Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867–68 (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro.
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	I 	note 	that 	this 	Motion 	follows 	Defendants’
abandonment of the case. 	After I granted the Kim Law Firm leave to withdraw,
Defendants were ordered to obtain new counsel, or in Mr. Lim’s case, notify the Court
if he would be proceeding pro se. See Dkt. No. 106 ¶¶ 5–6. Neither Defendant did so.
As Royal Westen is a corporate entity that may only appear in federal court through
a licensed attorney, failure to do so justifies the imposition of sanctions. 	See N.J.
Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund v. Innovative Design & Dev., Inc., No. 22-
2470 (JKS) (JSA), 2024 WL 6078306, at *2, *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 6078307 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2024). 	Moreover, the
record makes clear that both Defendants have eschewed their discovery obligations.
Despite the parties’ best efforts to reach Defendants, Royal Western failed to produce
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a corporate representative for a deposition noticed for June 27, 2025, and Mr. Lim,
who is allowed to proceed pro se, also failed to appear at his deposition noticed for
July 1, 2025. See Dkt. No. 108 at 1; Dkt. No. 111-1 at 3–4.
Defendants had sufficient notice of both depositions and this Motion. The Kim
Law Firm represented that they made attempts to contact Mr. Lim regarding
Defendants’ 	depositions 	via 	their 	usual 	means 	of 	communication, 	email 	and
telephone, as ordered by the Court. 	See Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶¶ 6–8; Dkt. No. 106; Dkt.
No. 108. 	However, their attempts went ignored. 	See Dkt. No. 108 at 1. In light of
that, tendering new deposition notices would be futile. 	Plaintiffs also attempted to
give Mr. Lim notice of the instant Motion, having served the Motion on Mr. Lim via
email and overnight mail at the last known address provided to them by the Kim Law
Firm. See Dkt. No. 106 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 111-11. To this, Defendants failed to respond.
Defendants have disregarded all attempts made to contact them via known and
established 	means 	of 	communication—evidencing 	their 	intent 	to 	abandon 	this
litigation. 	By abandoning the case, Defendants “fail[ed] to obey [the] order[s] to
provide or permit discovery,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), warranting sanctions under
Rule 37.
Turning to the Poulis factors, I find that at least four of the six factors are
satisfied. The first factor—the extent of the party’s personal responsibility—requires
that I examine “whether the party [himself] has caused a delay as opposed to whether
counsel for the party is responsible.” 	Vittas v. Brooks Bros. Inc., Grp., No. 3:14-cv-
3617-BRM-LHG, 2017 WL 6316633, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2017). 	“[I]t is logical to
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hold a pro se plaintiff personally responsible for delays in his case because a pro se
plaintiff is solely responsible for the progress of his case, whereas a plaintiff
represented by counsel relies, at least in part, on his or her attorney.” 	Briscoe v.
Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2008). As the managing officer of Royal Western
and a pro se litigant in his individual capacity, Mr. Lim is solely responsible for
ensuring that Royal Western is represented by an attorney and that both he and
Royal Western meet their discovery obligations. 	Defendants’ failures to appear at
their respective depositions, follow Court orders, or otherwise litigate this case
establish a willing abandonment of their defense obligations. 	These actions, taken
after fair warning was already provided to Mr. Lim, Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶¶ 6–8, are only
attributable to Mr. Lim.
With respect to the second factor, prejudice towards the Plaintiffs, I find that
Defendants’ abandonment presents a clear prejudice to Plaintiffs. 	Prejudice in this
context does not mean “irremediable harm,” but rather, “the burden imposed by
impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy[.]”
Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; see also N.J. Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund, 2024
WL 6078306, at *3 (“[The defendant’s] failure to participate in this case and comply
with the Undersigned’s Orders has prejudiced Plaintiffs by halting the progress of
this 	action.”). 	Plaintiffs’ 	inability 	to 	conduct 	Defendants’ 	depositions 	renders
Plaintiffs unable to obtain discovery crucial to litigate their case on the merits and
further delays resolution of this already three-year-old action. 	This factor clearly
weighs in favor of striking the Defendants’ Answer.
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The 	third 	factor, 	which 	examines 	whether 	there 	has 	been 	a 	history 	of
dilatoriness, leans against striking Defendants’ Answer. 	“Extensive or repeated
delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-
response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.”
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260 (quoting Adams v. Trs. of New Jersey Brewery Employees’
Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)). 	However, “conduct that occurs
one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.” 	Id. at 261
(citation modified). 	Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants have a recent history of
dilatoriness and their failure to act seem[s] to be in conformity with Mr. Lim’s modus
operandi to no longer participate in this litigation.” 	Dkt. No. 111-1 at 8. 	But as
Plaintiffs recognize, Defendants’ misconduct is recent and only resulted in a few
instances of misconduct since the Kim Law Firm filed its motion to withdraw. While
Defendants clearly conveyed they no longer intend to participate in this litigation, I
cannot find that their recent abandonment of this case establishes a history of
dilatoriness.
Under the fourth factor, I must consider “whether the conduct was ‘the type of
willful or contumacious behavior which was characterized as flagrant bad faith.’”
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). “Generally, ‘[w]illfullness
involves intentional or self-serving behavior.’” 	Id. (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875).
However, merely negligent or inadvertent conduct will not suffice to satisfy this
factor. Id. Here, Defendants’ conduct is at least willful. Mr. Lim made clear he does
not intend to continue funding the litigation, Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶ 6, nor has he made any
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effort to comply with this Court’s orders or appear for depositions. 	Despite prior
counsel’s warnings to Mr. Lim, and the parties’ best efforts to communicate with him,
Mr. Lim has intentionally abandoned this case, and therefore, this factor weighs in
favor of striking Defendants’ Answer.
The fifth factor requires that I examine the effectiveness of alternative
sanctions. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. Recognizing that “striking a pleading must be a
sanction of last resort,” New Jersey Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund, 2024
WL 6078306, at *3, no lesser sanction is appropriate here. 	As discussed, Royal
Western, 	as 	a 	corporate 	entity, 	cannot 	proceed 	in 	this 	litigation 	without
representation of counsel, and appears to no longer be operating. 	Mr. Lim has also
abandoned this litigation and has not responded to this Court’s directives as it
pertains to obtaining new counsel, or the parties’ efforts to complete discovery.
Accordingly, 	there 	is 	no 	alternative 	sanction 	that 	can 	remedy 	Defendants’
abandonment.
Finally, the sixth factor requires that I examine the meritoriousness of the
claim or defense. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. 	“A claim, or defense, will be deemed
meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would
support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense.” Hildebrand v.
Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation modified). 	Nevertheless,
“the 	Court 	cannot 	meaningfully 	evaluate 	the 	potential 	merits” 	of 	Defendants’
defenses and counterclaims because fact discovery is incomplete, and Defendants
abandoned the litigation. 	Chilupuri v. Eagle IT Inc., No. 22-6718-SDW-AME, 2024
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WL 4363059, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024
WL 4366850 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2024). Therefore, this factor is, at best, neutral.
Balancing the Poulis factors, I find that striking Defendants’ Answer is an
appropriate sanction for the circumstances described above. 	See Ware, 322 F.3d at
221 (finding that each factor need not be satisfied for sanctions to be imposed); see
also Pro Custom Solar, LLC v. Castillo, 19-12469 (SDW) (LDW), 2021 WL 7842376,
at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2021) (finding the defendants’ apparent abandonment of the
action 	warranted 	striking 	their 	answer 	and 	entering 	default), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 11593795 (D.N.J. May 24, 2021).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Plaintiffs’ Motion be
GRANTED and that the District Court strike the Answer of Defendants Jong S. Lim
and Royal Western and provide Plaintiffs with leave to seek entry of default and
default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. By November 26,
2025, Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Defendants
Jong S. Lim and Royal Western at their email address and via certified mail at their
last known address. 	The parties have fourteen days to file and serve objections to
this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); L.Civ.R. 72.1(c)(2).
HON. J OSÉ R. ALMONTE
U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE
Dated: November 26, 2025
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