COLLINS v. VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA DELAWARE VALLEY INC

1:25-cv-14328NjdMar 5, 2026

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MONTAE COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA
DELAWARE VALLEY, INC.,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-14328
(RMB-MJS)
OPINION
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Montae Collins’
Amended Complaint [Docket No. 6 (“Am. Compl.”)], which requires the Court to
conduct a screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons set forth
herein, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the Delaware Valley arm of Volunteers of
America (“Defendant”), a nonprofit organization that provides shelter services. [Am.
Compl.] He filed his initial Complaint and IFP application on August 7, 2025. [Docket
No. 1.] The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP application on August 8, 2025, but, upon
screening, dismissed his Complaint for failure to state a claim under the Rule 12(b)(6)
Standard. [Docket No. 4.] Plaintiff was afforded leave to amend. Plaintiff submitted
his Amended Complaint on August 14, 2025. 	In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
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purports to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for being removed from Defendant’s
shelter and a “proprietary program” theory alleging Defendants implemented a
wellness program he claims to have created. [Am. Compl. at 5-6.] In the alternative,
he brings a claim against Defendant for unjust enrichment. [Id. at 6.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
District courts must review a Complaint brought by a plaintiff proceeding
in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismiss any action that “(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“Whether a complaint should be dismissed under § 1915 because it fails to state a claim
is assessed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).” Rhoads v. Maryland Judiciary, 546 F. App’x 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2013).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts accept all factual allegations as
true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled
to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). A complaint survives a motion
to dismiss if it contains enough factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, courts conduct a three-part analysis. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note
of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” do not suffice. Id. at 131 (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement for relief.” Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Generally, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however in artfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For example, district courts should
be “willing to apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to
name it.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). However,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim,”
and “they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim
Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant violated
his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating his
housing placement and associated funding without notice or a hearing. [Am. Compl.
at 6.] This claim does not survive screening.
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1. 	State Action
Section 1983 imposes liability on individuals who deprive a person of a federal
constitutional or statutory right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage” of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983’s “under color of law”
requirement is “the equivalent of state action.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339
(3d Cir. 2005); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (“The ultimate
issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same
question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged
infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’” (quoting Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))). Thus, to avoid dismissal of his
Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must plead enough facts to show that he suffered a
deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor. Leshko,
423 F.3d at 339. To determine if state action exists, the Third Circuit has “outlined
three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence”:
(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally 	the 	exclusive 	prerogative 	of 	the 	state;
(2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in
concert with state officials; and (3) whether the [s]tate has so
far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
the 	acting 	party 	that 	it 	must 	be 	recognized 	as 	a 	joint
participant in the challenged activity.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Under any test, ‘[t]he inquiry is fact-specific.’”
Id. (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant acted under color of law.
He has not alleged that Defendant is a state agency, that it exercised powers
traditionally reserved exclusively to the state, nor that any state official directed or
participated in the alleged termination of his housing placement. At most, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant operates a shelter program funded through the Camden County
Navigation program and administered by the New Jersey Department of Human
Services [Am. Compl. at 3, 6]. But “[a]cts of private contractors do not become acts of
the State simply because they are performing public contracts.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 647.
Such allegations, without more, are insufficient to establish state action for purposes
of a Section 1983 claim. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-43.
2. 	Deprivation of a Protected Property Interest
Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant did act under color of law, Plaintiff has
not plausibly alleged the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest.
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Hill v.
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff asserts that he had a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
housing assistance and participation in Defendant’s program. [Am. Compl. at 5.]
However, Plaintiff has not identified any statute, regulation, or contractual provision
guaranteeing him either. [Id.] Plaintiff’s allegations regarding notices, tenders, and
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unilateral assertions of contractual or trust-based rights do not create a protected
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id.]; see Town of Castle Rock,
545U.S. at 756.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations repeatedly frame Defendant’s conduct as a
breach of contract or failure to honor asserted private agreements. [Am. Compl. at 5.]
Even if this were the case, “not every interest held by virtue of a contract implicates
[due] process.” Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1989). Absent plausible
allegations that Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected right to continued housing,
his procedural due process claim cannot proceed.
As Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant acted under color of law or that
he was deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest, his Section 1983
claim is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
B. 	Plaintiff’s “Proprietary Program” Claim
Plaintiff, acting as “Trustee of the House of Zion Trust,” next asserts a claim
labeled “Proprietary Program,” under which he alleges that Defendant partially
implemented or engaged with “a proprietary wellness and training program” he
created without acknowledging this or obtaining permission to do so. [Am. Compl.
at 6.] This too fails to state a cognizable cause of action.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not identify any recognized federal or state
statute that corresponds to this claim. [Id.] Although courts liberally construe the
pleadings of pro se litigants, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, they may not supply a legal theory
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where none is plausibly alleged. See Mala, 704 F.3d at 245. The Court therefore must
determine whether Plaintiff’s allegations as presented plausibly state any recognizable
claim.
After a liberal reading of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege
that Defendant misappropriated or improperly used intellectual materials associated
with a program that Plaintiff claims belongs to him as the “Trustee of the House of
Zion.” [Am. Compl. at 6.] However, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to support
such a claim. Notably absent from his Amended Complaint are any copyright
registrations, patents, trademarks, or other legally cognizable intellectual property
rights 	associated with 	this alleged 	program. Plaintiff 	also 	does not allege that
Defendant 	reproduced, 	distributed, 	or 	commercially 	exploited 	any 	protected
materials. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (Copyright Act of 1976). Instead, he stated that
Defendant posted flyers, facilitated sign-ups, and engaged in limited discussions
regarding the program. [Am. Compl. at 4.]
Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations as true, they fail to plausibly establish
misappropriation or unauthorized use of intellectual property. See Duffy v. Charles
Schwab & Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807-08 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that ideas, concepts,
and general program descriptions are not protectable, absent a recognized intellectual
property right). Plaintiff’s repeated references to “trust authority,” “standing,” and
unilateral notices do not substitute for factual allegations establishing enforceable
ownership rights or unlawful use by Defendant. [Am. Compl. at 6 (citing Pl. Ex. J).]
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Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	“Proprietary 	Program” 	claim 	is 	dismissed 	pursuant 	to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. 	Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment Claim
In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for unjust
enrichment. This Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to properly plead any
federal claims in the Amended Complaint. Thus, with no properly pled federal claims
appearing on the face of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and no other basis for this
Court’s original jurisdiction,1 the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any state law claims at this time. 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3) (district “may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims if the court “has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). The Court finds no extraordinary
circumstances warranting an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim. 	Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claim after all federal claims were dismissed and noting that district court “must
decline to decide [ ] pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing
1 	The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action based on diversity
of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Civil Cover Sheet submitted by
Plaintiff [Docket No. 1-1] indicates that both Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of
New Jersey, defeating the complete diversity requirement.
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so.”). Plaintiff is free to bring the claim in state court, although this Court makes no
finding as to the merits or procedural posture of such claim.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff will be afforded a final opportunity to amend his
pleadings within thirty (30) days to remedy the deficiencies identified herein. Should
he fail to timely do so, this matter will be deemed dismissed with prejudice. 	An
appropriate Order shall issue on this date.
March 5, 2026 	s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date 	RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
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