SILIPENA et al v. AMERICAN PULVERIZER COMPANY et al

1:16-cv-00711NjdMar 4, 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
EDWARD SILIPENA, 	et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN PULVERIZER CO.,
et al.,
Defendants.
Hon. Edward S. Kiel, U.S.D.J.
Civil Action No. 16-711
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Noel L. Hillman, Special Master
This matter arises from two large-scale fires in Millville, New
Jersey that Plaintiffs allege caused tens of millions of dollars in damages
and resulted in the total loss of their business. The first fire occurred on
April 22, 2012 (the “First Fire”) and the second fire occurred on December
8, 2012. Only the First Fire is at issue in this case.1 	Trial is set for March
30, 2026. This Report and Recommendation addresses Plaintiffs’ motions
in limine to preclude Defendants’2 	experts James Gallagher [ECF No.
1 	Plaintiffs’ motion to file a Second Amended Complaint to add the
December 8 fire to their claim was denied on March 17, 2019. [ECF No.
143.] The operative complaint in this matter is the Amended Complaint
filed on April 13, 2017. [ECF No. 51.]
2 	Of the original defendants, American Pulverizer Company, Cooper &
Associates, 	LLC, 	Eriez 	Manufacturing 	Company 	(“Eriez”), 	Hustler
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517], David Kircher [ECF No. 518], and David Guido [ECF No. 412] from
testifying at trial, Defendants’ oppositions to the motions [ECF Nos. 540,
541, and 428], and Plaintiffs’ reply briefs in support of their motions in
limine [ECF Nos. 549, 551, and 429]. The Special Master has considered
those written submissions of the parties.
For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the 	Special 	Master 	respectfully
recommends to the District Court that Plaintiffs’ motion to preclude
Gallagher’s testimony be granted in part and denied in part, Plaintiffs’
motion to preclude Kircher’s testimony be denied, and Plaintiffs’ motion
to preclude Guido be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND3
Senior U.S. District Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez, the now retired
Judge previously assigned to this matter, resolved similar motions to the
Conveyor 	Company 	(“Hustler”), 	and 	Pinnacle 	Engineering, 	Inc.
(“Pinnacle”), only Pinnacle and Eriez remain as Defendants. 	Judgment
was rendered against former defendants American Pulverizer Co. and
Hustler at ECF No. 555. 	And a Consent Order dismissing Cooper &
Associates with prejudice was docketed at ECF No. 572.
3 	The Special Master incorporates by reference the relevant background
information 	of 	this 	case 	that 	was 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation at ECF No. 519.
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ones at issue here. 	There, Defendants, separately, sought to preclude
Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	Patrick 	McGinley, 	Daniel 	Shapiro, 	Christopher
Brophy, 	and 	Victor 	Popp 	(collectively, 	“Plaintiffs’ 	Experts”) 	from
testifying at trial.4 	[ECF No. 390.] Judge Rodriguez denied the motions
as to experts McGinley, Shapiro, and Popp, and granted in part, and
denied in part, the motion as to Brophy.
II. 	FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 AND 	DAUBERT
The guiding principles that inform the Special Master’s judgment
are found in Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 702 and 	Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Rule 702 states as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than
not that: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert's opinion reflects a
reliable application of the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
4 	The Special Master incorporates by reference the descriptions and
summarization 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	Experts 	outlined 	in 	Judge 	Rodriguez’s
Opinion at ECF No. 390 addressing Defendants’ 	Daubert 	motions.
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Pursuant to 	Rule 702, the party offering expert testimony bears the
burden 	of 	establishing 	its 	admissibility 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the
evidence, consistent with Rule 104(a). 	Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 & n.10;
see 	Fed. R. Evid.104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is
admissible.”); Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee’s note to 2000
amendment (“[T]he admissibility of all expert testimony is governed by
the principles of Rule 104(a).”). 	“The preponderance standard ensures
that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely
than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the
Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence 	have 	been 	afforded 	due 	consideration.”
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
In 2023, Rule 	702 was amended to clarify the preponderance
standard 	asserted 	above. 	Specifically, 	before 	admitting 	expert
testimony, a court must ensure that the party offering the testimony has
established—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the testimony
will assist the trier of fact and that it is “based on sufficient facts or data,”
“the 	product of reliable principles and methods,” and is “a reliable
application of those principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed.
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R. Evid. 702(a)–(d). 	Notwithstanding, the Advisory Committee made
clear that the amendment to Rule 702 is limited in nature and stated
that: “Nothing in the amendment imposes any new, specific procedures.
Rather, the amendment is simply intended to clarify that Rule 104(a)’s
requirement applies to expert opinions under Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid.702
Advisory Committee’s Note to 2023 Amendment.
Thus, before and after the 2023 amendment, it is well settled that
“Rule 	702 	contains 	three 	distinct 	substantive 	restrictions 	on 	the
admission of expert testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit.” 	Cohen
v. Cohen, 125 F.4th 454, 460 (3d Cir. 2025); 	see Schneider v. Fried, 320
F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Rule 702 embodies a trilogy of restrictions
on expert testimony….”).
“First, the witness must be qualified to testify as an expert.”
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003).
“Qualification requires that the witness possess specialized expertise.”
Id. 	This requirement is liberally construed, and courts have held that “a
broad range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as such.”
Id.
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“Second, the testimony must be reliable.” 	Id. 	“Daubert’s 	reliability
requirement ensures that an expert’s testimony is based on the methods
and procedures of science, not on subjective belief and unsupported
speculation.” 	Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461-62. However, “admissibility does
not 	hinge 	on 	whether 	a 	particular 	scientific 	opinion 	has 	the 	best
foundation, 	or 	even 	whether 	the 	opinion 	is 	supported 	by 	the 	best
methodology or unassailable research.” 	Id. 	at 462. 	“The court instead
looks to whether the expert’s testimony is supported by good grounds.”
Id. 	“This inquiry applies to all aspects of an expert’s testimony: the
methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s opinion, [and] the link
between the facts and the conclusion.” 	Id. 	(alteration in original).
To determine whether an expert’s testimony is supported by good
grounds, the court may consider any of the following factors:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis;
(2) 	whether 	the 	method 	has 	been 	subject 	to 	peer
review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique’s 	operation; 	(5) 	whether 	the 	method 	is
generally 	accepted; 	(6) 	the 	relationship 	of 	the
technique to methods which have been established to
be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness
testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the non-
judicial uses to which the method has been put.
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Id. 	These factors are not a “definitive checklist or test.” 	Daubert, 	509
U.S. at 593. 	Rather, the court’s inquiry is a “flexible one” that focuses
“on 	principles 	and 	methodology, 	not 	on 	the 	conclusions 	that 	they
generate.” 	Id. 	at 594-95.
With that said, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another” and a court is not required “to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the 	ipse dixit 	of the
expert.” 	Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). “A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered.” 	Id. 	As such, it is appropriate for the court to
“examine the expert’s conclusions in order to determine whether they
could 	reliably 	follow 	from 	the 	facts 	known 	to 	the 	expert 	and 	the
methodology used.” 	Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d
Cir. 1999).
Third, and finally, “the expert testimony must fit, meaning the
expert’s testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must
assist the trier of fact.” 	Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321. 	“Fit is not always
obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific
validity for other, unrelated purposes.” 	Cohen, 125 F.4th at 464. The fit
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requirement “goes primarily to relevance, so an expert’s testimony will
be excluded if it is not scientific knowledge for purposes of the case.” 	Id.;
see 	In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating the fit standard is “higher than bare relevance”).
Rule 702 equally applies to rebuttal experts. 	See 	Fed. R. Evid.702;
Capri Sun GmbH v. Am. Beverage Corp., 595 F. Supp. 3d 83, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[R]ebuttal experts must [still] meet 	Daubert’s threshold
standards regarding the qualifications of the expert, sufficiency of the
data, reliability of the methodology, and relevance of the testimony.”)
(alterations in original); 	In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers.
Inj. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 3d 680, 696 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (noting that rebuttal
expert “testimony must still be based upon reliable science, as required
by 	Daubert.”)
Moreover, it is the court that serves as the gatekeeper of expert
evidence, not a rebuttal expert. 	To the extent that a rebuttal expert
usurps 	the 	court’s 	role 	in 	determining 	the 	admissibility 	of 	expert
evidence 	offered 	by 	the 	opposing 	party, 	those 	opinions 	may 	be
inadmissible. 	See T.N. Incorporation, Ltd. v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc.,
No. 18-5552, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240993, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17,
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2021) (“It is the role of the trial court, not expert witnesses, to act as
‘gatekeepers’ 	to 	ensure 	the 	relevance 	and 	reliability 	of 	all 	expert
testimony.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants 	retained 	Resolution 	Management 	Consultants
(“RMC”)–Gallagher 	is 	the 	Principal 	of 	RMC–“to 	offer 	liability 	and
damages opinions in this matter in rebuttal to those advanced” by
Plaintiffs’ Experts. 	[ECF No. 540 p. 7.] 	Kircher was retained for the
same purpose. [ECF No. 541 p. 13.] And Guido was retained to analyze
Shapiro’s report and opine on whether there were any codes or standards
governing Defendant Eriez’s obligations with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims
and whether other companies employ a downstream fire suppression
system in their shredding facilities. 	[ECF No. 412-3 pp. 13-14, Dep. Tr.
114:16-115:9.]
A. James Gallagher
Gallagher has over 32 years of experience in contract development,
construction/project management, and construction claims prevention
and 	resolution. 	[ECF 	No. 	540-2 	p. 	49.] 	He 	is 	also 	licensed 	as 	a
Professional Engineer in fifteen states. [Id.]
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Gallagher 	provided 	three 	reports: 	Volume 	I., 	which 	addresses
liability, Volume II, which addresses damages, and a Supplemental
Report, which is a response to Plaintiffs’ Expert Popp’s rebuttal report to
Volume I.5 	The Special Master will first address Gallagher’s liability
opinion.
i. 	Liability
The 	opinion 	of 	Shapiro, 	Plaintiffs’ 	expert, 	on 	the 	design,
construction 	and 	operation 	of 	Plaintiff 	American 	Iron 	& 	Metal
International, LLC’s (“AIMI”) automobile and shredding system (the
"System”) is summarized by Gallagher in his report in three categories:
(1) system bypass; (2) imbalanced process flow; and (3) the location of
Zurik6 	bins. 	[Id. 	p. 14.] Gallagher defines the “system bypass” category
as Shapiro’s opinion that the decision to use “inline”7 	without the addition
5 	Plaintiffs challenge the Supplemental Report on the same grounds as
Volumes I and II. 	Accordingly, the Special Master’s analysis of the
Volume I and II Reports also apply to the Supplemental Report, unless
noted otherwise.
6 	Zurik is a combination of non-ferrous materials and waste, called fluff,
that is part of the output of a shredding facility. Fluff is known to be
flammable.
7 	Gallagher describes “inline” as follows: “In an inline process, the non-
ferrous 	downstream 	operates 	in 	tandem 	with, 	or 	in 	line 	with, 	the
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of a “bypass” created an unsafe System. [Id. 	pp. 14-15.] As to the second
category, Shapiro opined that the System had an imbalanced process
flow. 	[Id. 	p. 23.] 	With respect to the third category, Shapiro asserted
that Zurik bins indoors increased the likelihood that a fire could occur
through spontaneous combustion. [Id. 	pp. 33, 45.]
Volume I sought to rebut the aforementioned opinions by Shapiro
as to the reasons why defects in the System caused the First Fire.
Plaintiffs essentially argue that Gallagher is not qualified to provide
rebuttal opinions, he failed to use a reliable methodology when forming
his opinions, and his opinions do not fit with this case. 	[ECF No. 517-1
pp. 19-39.]
Concerning 	Gallagher’s 	qualifications, 	Plaintiffs 	focus 	on
Gallagher’s expertise in engineering and his position as an Engineer as
the reason he is not qualified to opine about the cause of the First Fire or
the operation or design of the System. [Id. 	pp. 25-28.]
shredder. This means that after material is shredded, it gets sorted into
ferrous and non-ferrous fractions by a magnet, and the non-ferrous (ASR)
travels along conveyors directly to the non-ferrous separation equipment
in the downstream in one continuous flow.” [ECF No. 540-2 p. 14.]
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Gallager 	has 	a 	demonstrated 	record 	of 	experience 	and
qualifications that far exceeds the low standard required for a potential
expert to be deemed as “qualified” under Rule 702. 	In addition to over
thirty years of hands-on experience in areas such as construction claims
prevention and resolution and registering as a Professional Engineer in
fifteen states, Gallagher has provided expert testimony in a number of
cases and provided presentations and training seminars for the past
twenty years on topics such as differing site conditions and minimizing
and managing risks and disputes. [ECF No. 540-10 p.1] (Gallagher’s CV).
Moreover, 	Gallagher’s 	experience 	in 	examining 	site 	conditions 	and
engineering qualifies him to rebut Shapiro’s opinion that the location of
Zurik bins increased the likelihood of a fire.
Turning first to reliability, then fit/relevance, the “lynchpins” of a
Daubert 	analysis, Plaintiffs argue that Gallagher failed to use a reliable
methodology when rendering his rebuttal opinions. 	See Yarchak v. Trek
Bicycle Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 470, 495 (D.N.J. 2002). 	For the reasons
stated 	below, 	the 	Special 	Master 	recommends 	a 	finding 	that 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence, Gallagher has shown, in part, that his
opinions were grounded by reliable methodologies.
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In the “Cause of Fire” section of the Volume I Report [ECF No. 540-
2 pp. 34-39], Gallagher counters Shapiro’s “spontaneous combustion”
theory, rather than opines on the direct cause of the fire himself. To the
extent Gallagher seeks to testify to the direct cause of the fire, that
testimony is unreliable, and thus, inadmissible under Rule 702, because
Gallagher has not asserted any methodology in the record supporting
such an opinion. 	See Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc., 148 F.4th 132, 137-38
(3d 	Cir. 	2025) 	(case 	details 	at 	infra 	pp. 	33-34 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation) .
As to the portion of the Supplemental Report in which Gallagher
opines that Popp’s opinion is deficient because that opinion relies on
another expert’s opinion [ECF No. 540-6 p. 32], Gallagher’s opinion is
inadmissible. 	See S.Y. v. Roman Cath. Diocese, No. 20-2605, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51171, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2024) (experts “are permitted
to rely on materials used by other experts in developing their own
opinions.”); 	Edmond v. Plainfield Bd. Of Educ., No. 11-2805, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158980, at *13 (D.N.J. Sep. 13, 2018) (“it is well settled law
that one expert may rely upon another expert’s opinion in formulating
his own.”); 	see also 	Fed R. Evid. 703 (“An expert may base an opinion on
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facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or
personally 	observed.”). 	The 	following 	opinions 	by 	Gallagher 	in 	the
Supplemental 	Report 	are 	also 	inadmissible 	because 	the 	Court 	has
already found that Popp used a reliable methodology: (1) Popp based his
opinion on his professional experience; and (2) Popp does not hold a New
Jersey engineering license, but states that his opinions are presented
with a reasonable degree of engineering certainty. [See 	ECF No. 390 p.
32.]
However, with respect to the rest of the Volume I Report and
Supplemental Report, it is the view of the undersigned that 	those
opinions are “reliable” under Rule 702. The Volume I and Supplemental
Reports state the “findings and opinions are based upon a reasonable
degree of professional engineering certainty and on the practices and
standard common to the construction industry.” 	[ECF No. 540-2 p. 2;
ECF No. 540-6 p. 2.] Gallagher testified that he relied upon the “general
understanding for construction claims litigation,” which is a standard set
forth 	by 	the 	American 	Construction 	Institute 	(“ACI”) 	that 	is
“recommended best practices that [] [were] prepared by a group of
consultants that cover[] every single potential type of analysis that can
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be performed[.]” 	[ECF No. 540-11 pp. 5-6, Dep. Tr. 72:10-73:5.] He also
testified that he followed the “ASTM8 	standard” in this case. 	[ECF No.
540-13 pp. 5-6, Dep. Tr. 849:13-850:4.] Moreover, Gallagher outlined the
manner in which he reviews, then determined whether another expert’s
opinion is accurate or reliable. He stated the following:
We9 	review the way and the manner in which the other
expert first laid out and provides their basis, their
opinions, and the source documentation for what we're
relying on.
We then, to the extent that that source documentation
or other documentation or references is not available in
the report, we look to find that documentation.
We 	then 	review 	the 	project 	record 	for 	any 	other
documentation that we can find that may be relevant
to the issues or the analysis that was performed.
We will do research on line to find any other relevant
articles or relevant information that we can glean or
ascertain, 	again, 	about 	the 	specific 	project 	or 	the
specific matter or the specific issue.
Then we, from that point, then we will start compiling
our 	report 	and 	any 	other 	supporting 	graphs 	or
attachments or documentation.
[Id. 	pp. 3-4, Dep. Tr. 847:8-848:2.]
8 	“ASTM” stands for American Society for Testing and Materials.
9 	Gallagher testified that “we” refers to RMC. [ECF No. 540-13 p. 3, Dep.
Tr. 847:3-7.]
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The record shows that with regard to Volume I Gallagher conducted
a thorough process when evaluating and rebutting the expert opinions in
question and used generally reliable standards to execute that process.
Moreover, as referenced above, Gallagher has extensive experience and
specialized knowledge in examining construction sites. And Gallagher
reviewed several exhibits and attachments, such as the Millville Fire
Department Fire Incident Report and the Loss Report by Hartford
Insurance, in support of the opinions set forth in Volume I. 	[ECF No.
540-2 pp. 3-4.]
It is true that Gallagher could have been more explicit as to the
methodologies he used in his findings. 	Nonetheless, the undersigned
views this, in light of the other indicia of reliability set forth above
including reliance of established industry standards, as more of an issue
of weight than admissibility. 	Plaintiffs should be free to vigorously
cross-examine of any deficiencies in Gallagher’s findings including which
standards or methodologies he relied upon for any given opinion. 	See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
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evidence.”). 	Overall, 	as set forth in more detail above, the evidence in
the record is sufficient here to show the “reliability” of Gallagher’s
opinions in Volume 1.
Finally, as to 	whether Gallagher’s rebuttal opinion “fits” with the
facts of this case, Plaintiffs argue that Gallagher attempts to conflate “his
role as a proffered expert in this case with that of both the judge and the
jury by impermissibly and repeatedly offering legal conclusions and/or
purporting to opine that Plaintiffs and their expert failed to establish
their case.” 	[ECF No. 517-1 pp. 20-21.] The Special Master agrees with
Plaintiffs that to the extent Gallagher attempts to make findings of law,
those findings/opinions are barred by Rule 702. Therefore, those portions
of Gallagher’s opinion, only, are inadmissible. 	See S.Y., 2024 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51171, at *11 (“While the ‘fit’ prerequisite is not a high bar to
meet, it does restrict an expert from testifying as to a legal standard or
whether a party’s conduct meets the standard.”) (internal quotations
omitted); 	Toscano v. Case, No. 11-4121, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135918,
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at *25-26 (D.N.J. Sep. 20, 2013) (legal conclusions on the ultimate issues
in a case “improperly invade the province of the court and the jury.”).
ii. 	Damages
Gallagher, in the Volume II Report, sought to rebut the damages,
and the calculation of those damages, that AIMI, through its expert
Brophy, quantifies as the amount AIMI lost due to the First Fire. [ECF
No. 540-6 p. 5.]
Plaintiffs’ 	arguments, 	generally, 	concerning 	qualifications,
reliability, and fit, are identical to the ones summarized 	supra 	p. 11. As
to reliability, Plaintiffs argue that Gallagher’s damages opinions are
conclusory and supported solely by Gallagher’s opinion on Brophy’s
calculation 	damages, 	and 	thus, 	Gallagher 	“did 	not 	use 	a 	reliable
methodology in rendering his damages opinions.” [ECF No. 517-1 pp. 35-
36.] 	For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	next, 	the 	Special 	Master 	agrees 	with
Plaintiffs.
The Volume II Report challenges the causal link between the First
Fire and alleged damages resulting from the First Fire. 	In that report,
Gallagher makes several conclusions, with data at points, concerning the
lack of harmony between each side of the purported causal chain and how
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Brophy calculated the amount in damages. However, unlike his opinions
expressed in Volume I and the Supplemental Report, Gallagher does not
support 	his 	conclusions 	with, 	as 	Plaintiffs 	assert, 	any 	“industry
standards, his education or expertise, his own independent analyses, or
any recognized methodology.” 	[See 	ECF No. 517-1 p. 36.] 	Gallagher’s
conclusions do not reliably connect to any methodology or articulated
standard, and thus, there is an insurmountable “analytical gap between
the data [presented in the Volume II Report] and the opinion proffered.”
See Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 146 (quote); 	see also Wartsila NSD N. Am.,
Inc. v. Hill Int’l, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 400, 406 (D.N.J. 2003) (excluding
the 	expert’s damages testimony 	because 	the expert’s assessment of
damages provided no methodology “except his own view of the merits.”);
Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding the
District Court’s decision to exclude an expert who “conducted no tests”
and “used little, if any, methodology beyond his own intuition.”).
In fact, Gallagher’s testimony demonstrates, by his own admission,
the lack of methodology used as a basis for the conclusions set forth in
the Volume II Report. 	The following question was asked by Plaintiffs’
counsel to Gallagher during a deposition: “So your analysis of Mr.
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Brophy's damages calculation is based solely upon your review of his
report as compared to the project record? [ECF No. 517-5 p. 14, Dep. Tr.
122:3-5.] Gallagher responded, “[h]is report and the project record.” [Id.,
Dep. Tr. 122:6.] Gallagher was also asked “[w]here have you provided in
your written report a statement of the methodology for how you arrive at
the conclusions in Volume II?” [Id. 	p. 27, Dep. Tr. 359:21-23.] Gallagher
did not directly answer the question and responded as follows:
Our conclusions were that we do not believe that the
defendants, that the three expert reports show an
entitlement 	to 	AIMI 	for 	the 	defendants 	being
responsible for the cause of the fires or the damages
that were alleged to have occurred. 	As such, if you're
asking why we don't have a methodology of an
independent calculation, it's because we did not
determine there to be liability on the defendants'
part.
[Id. 	pp. 27-28, Dep. Tr. 359:24-360-8] (emphasis added).
This 	admission 	is 	fatal 	to 	the 	admissibility 	of 	Volume 	II 	of
Gallagher’s report and rebuts Defendants’ claim that Gallagher merely
relied on the methodology of Plaintiffs’ expert, a methodology he had the
requisite experience and training to apply. Gallagher expressly disavows
any such intent, testifying instead that since he concluded Defendants
were not liable there could be, in a form of 	ipse dixit, 	no damages. 	That
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is hardly the application of a proven methodology or reliable standard
and 	Daubert 	plainly requires more. The issue presented is less whether
Gallagher used the methodology of Plaintiffs’ or applied one of his own
and more whether he used one at all. Absent some clear methodology or
standard, Gallagher’s proffered “opinions” devolve into a factual critique
of Plaintiffs damages expert akin to what Defendants’ lawyers would
seek to 	achieve 	during cross-examination. 	But 	it is precisely that
scenario – fact witness masquerading as an “expert” with all the risks of
confusing a jury – that Daubert was intended to prevent. 	Gallagher’s
opinions on damages fail this most basic test.10
Indeed, the role of trial courts are to act as “gatekeepers” to ensure
that experts meet the requirements under Rule 702. 	See UGI Sunbury
LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949 F.3d 825, 832 (3d
Cir. 2020). And the party offering the expert testimony bears the burden
10 	Gallagher’s testimony shows that he made numerical errors in his
calculations which highlights this point. 	Gallagher first testified that
Brophy used the amount $1,536.28, then acknowledged that Brophy may
have used $1,540, and testified that “we probably should have used the
1540 in this case.” 	[ECF No. 517-6 p. 7 Dep. Tr. 430:8-23.] He was also
unable to explain how he got to a number that he presented. 	[See id. 	p.
8, Dep. Tr. 432:3-17.] 	Gallagher’s inability to justify his assumptions
demonstrates the lack if a discernable methodology.
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of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is
admissible 	under 	Rule 	702. 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid. 	702. 	Gallagher’s
miscalculations of data and his inability to establish that he relied on any
methodology in support of his conclusions in Volume II demonstrate that
Defendants cannot meet their burden of proof under Rule 702. 	See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 & n.10; Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). 	Accordingly, the
Special Master recommends that Gallagher be precluded from testifying
about damages at trial.
B. David Kircher
Kircher is an Investigator and is Defendants’ fire origin and cause
rebuttal expert. He has extensive experience in fire and explosions,
including:
as a private sector investigator having investigated
1,487 	fires 	and 	explosions, 	as 	a 	public 	sector
investigator having investigated over 2,000 fires and
explosions, he conducted expert testimony in state and
federal cases in New Jersey, became a member in two
NFPA11 	associations, and has an over fifty-year career
in fire prevention.
[ECF No. 541-1 p. 2] (Kircher’s CV).
11 	“NFPA” stands for the National Fire Protection Association.
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Kircher was retained to rebut Robert Malanga and McGinley,
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the origin of the First Fire at AIMI’s
facility. 	Kircher conducted an investigation into the origin and cause of
the First Fire.
Plaintiffs do not challenge Kircher’s substantial qualifications as an
expert in fire prevention. 	Nor do they dispute that the NFPA 921
methodology used by Kircher is reliable and widely accepted. 	[ECF No.
518-1 p. 14.] 	Rather, Plaintiffs solely argue that Kircher failed to reliably
apply the NFPA 921 methodology to the facts and data in this case.12 	[Id.]
The District of New Jersey defined this method as follows:
When investigating a fire or explosion, the NFPA 921
requires 	an 	investigator 	to 	first 	“determine 	and
establish origin(s)” and “then investigate the cause:
circumstances, conditions, or agencies that brought the
ignition source, fuel, and oxidant together.” [NFPA] §
4.1. 	The 	NFPA 	instructs 	investigators 	to 	use 	the
scientific method to make an origin determination.
[NFPA] 	§ 	18.2. 	NFPA’s 	scientific 	method 	involves
identifying and defining the problem, collecting data,
analyzing that data, developing hypotheses, testing the
hypotheses, 	and 	selecting 	a 	final 	hypothesis 	or
conclusion. [NFPA] § 4.3; see also [NFPA] § 18.2.
12 	Plaintiffs also challenge Kircher’s investigation of the second fire.
However, only the First Fire is at issue in this case. 	See supra 	p. 1.
Accordingly, the Special Master only considered Plaintiffs’ arguments as
to Kircher’s opinions on the First Fire.
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In re Soued, 689 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.N.J. 2023).
Specifically, Plaintiffs oppose Kircher’s conclusion that he agreed
with the Millville Fire Department and the insurance investigator from
Unified Investigations & Sciences, Inc. (“Unified”) that the cause of the
First Fire is undetermined. 	[See 	ECF No. 518-4 p. 42.] 	And that
therefore, arson, careless smoking, and spontaneous combustion cannot
be eliminated as potential causes. [See id. 	p. 14.]
As to Kircher’s arson hypothesis, Plaintiffs claim that Kircher’s
finding is “baseless” because it is grounded on “field notes” by Eric Baum,
an investigator for Hartford Insurance Company that was hired by
Unified, stating that “an employee at AIMI facility was fired a few days
prior and the 	mere possibility 	that the terminated employee 	could
have 	gained access to the building on the day of the fire through the
‘conveyor belt.’” 	[Id. 	p. 19] (emphasis in original). 	And that by using a
motive indicator when classifying the cause of the First Fire, as opposed
to after the fire origin and cause was determined, as required by NFPA
921 § 24.4.9.1 (2017 ed.), he did not properly apply NFPA 921. [ECF No.
518-1 p. 21.]
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With respect to Kircher’s careless smoking theory, Plaintiffs also
argue that this finding is “baseless” because “there is no evidence that
anyone at AIMI (i) ever smoked at the AIMI facility, (ii) smoked at AIMI
on the day of the fire, and (iii) taken a step further that any person
smoked and then also carelessly discarded smoking materials [id. 	p. 24];
and cites to NFPA § 4.3.6.1, which states that “[a]ny hypothesis that is
incapable of being tested either physically or analytically, is an invalid
hypothesis.”
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ cogent arguments, Kircher’s opinion as
to 	the 	First 	Fire 	is 	sufficiently 	reliable. 	Kircher 	stated 	that 	the
investigation of the First Fire was “conducted in accordance with the
principles and guidance provided by the … NFPA 921 	Guide for Fire and
Explosion Investigations.” (ECF No. 518-4 p. 43.] After using the NFPA
921 when conducting an independent investigation of the First Fire, he
testified that there was insufficient information to rule out arson and
careless smoking as potential causes to the First Fire. [ECF No. 541-2 p.
15, Dep. Tr. 54:15-56-13.] 	In his report, Kircher also stated that the
investigation was conducted in accordance with the “American Society
for 	Testing 	and 	Materials 	Standards 	ASTM 	E1188 	– 	11 	Standard
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Practice for Collection and Preservation of Information and Physical
Standard Practice for Evaluation of Scientific or Technical Data; ASTM
E620 – 11 Standard Practice for 	Reporting Opinions of Scientific or
Technical Experts.” [ECF No. 518-4 p. 3.] And in preparing his rebuttal
report, Kircher collected, reviewed, and considered various documents
including fire incident reports of the First Fire, documents prepared by
Baum, deposition transcripts, and Malanga and McGinley’s reports. [Id.
pp. 5-10.]
Moreover, Kircher’s reliance on Baum’s notes is permissible under
Rule 703. 	The Rule’s Advisory Committee Note stated that one of the
possible sources of “facts or data” an expert may rely on to form his or her
opinion is facts gathered “outside of court and other than by his own
perception.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid. 	703, 	Advisory 	Committee 	Note. 	When
considering Kircher’s wealth of experience in fire prevention, his detailed
report identifying specific sections of Malanga and McGinley’s reports
and subsequently providing comprehensive rebuttals, and his use of
NFPA 921 and ASTM standards as guides to his investigation of the First
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Fire, Kircher’s opinion is sufficiently based on “good grounds,” and thus,
reliable, and also fits the facts of this case. 	See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ arguments, which in essence assert that
Kircher misapplied the relevant standards, challenge weight, as opposed
to admissibility, and thus, Kircher’s opinions should be heard by a jury,
and undoubtedly, subject to rigorous cross-examination. 	See 	Fed. R.
Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note to 2023 Amendment (“once the court
has found it more likely than not that the admissibility requirement has
been met, any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of the
evidence.”); 	EcoFactor, Inc. 	v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 	1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2025) 	(“Determinations 	of 	admissibility, 	which 	fall 	within 	the
gatekeeping role of the court, are separate from determinations of weight
and credibility, which are within the province of the jury in a jury case.”);
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
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evidence.”). 	Therefore, the Special Master recommends that Kircher be
allowed to testify at trial.13
C. David Guido
Guido 	is 	an 	engineering 	consultant 	who 	is 	licensed 	as 	a
“Professional Engineer,” 	and is an 	Occupational Safety 	and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) specialist and completed a number of OSHA
courses for educational purposes. 	[ECF No. 412-4 p. 15.] 	Plaintiffs
challenge the following opinions set forth in Guido’s Report and signify
each paragraph below as Opinions 1-5, respectively:
The 4/22/12 and 12/8/12 fires that resulted in the
property damage at issue reportedly occurred in
the zurik bins. Eriez Manufacturing Company is a
component 	part 	manufacturer 	that 	sold 	metal
separation 	equipment 	and 	supplied 	non-heat
generating components to Hustler Conveyor for
the subject shredder line. Eriez Manufacturing
Company did not manufacture the conveyors for
the subject shredder line and was not involved in
the design, construction or supply of the zurik bins
and 	had 	no 	control 	over 	their 	placement, 	the
operation of the AIMI 	shredder system or the
speed at which it was operated (“Opinion 1”).
13 	Rule 702’s Advisory Committee Note explains that expert testimony “is
to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier of fact.” Kircher’s
opinion concerning the causes of the second fire would not assist the trier
of fact because, as stated 	supra 	p. 1, the First Fire is the only fire at issue
in this case.
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The Shapiro and Malanga reports did not offer any
evidential support establishing the existence of an
applicable 	code 	or 	standard 	that 	obligated 	a
component part manufacturer such as Eriez to
supply warnings for known fire risks to an end
user on a shredder system that was designed,
manufactured, installed, integrated, approved and
operated by others (“Opinion 2”).
AIMI facility manager Bob Kirk knew fires were
common. Plaintiffs do not know the fires’ cause.
Joseph Silipena and Edward Silipena testified in
deposition that a fire suppression system was not
required by the local fire marshal, the municipal
inspector or the City of Millville. Notwithstanding,
Eriez Manufacturing Company does not sell fire
suppression systems nor was Eriez requested to
provide a downstream fire suppression system.
Reviewed evidence indicated that there were no
known competitors that offered downstream fire
suppression systems circa 2010. Review of ISRI
fire 	prevention 	literature 	disclosed 	no
recommended 	safety 	practices 	pertaining 	to
downstream 	fire 	suppression 	systems. 	Garden
Street Iron & Metal Inc. does not employ any
downstream fire suppression system nor was it
aware 	of 	any 	available 	downstream 	fire
suppression systems (“Opinion 3”).
The 4/22/12 and 12/8/12 fires and the resulting
damage were not due to a failure to warn or a
failure to recommend a fire suppression system on
the part of Eriez Manufacturing Company. Rather,
those fires and the resulting damage occurred as a
result of the manner in which AIMI elected to
operate their facility and the absence of procedures
to 	control 	indoor accumulations of combustible
material. Reviewed evidence even indicated that
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despite knowing that zurik contained fluff and
that fluff was combustible and that zurik and fluff
fires were common, AIMI elected to accumulate
the 	zurik 	material 	indoors 	to 	maximize 	its
perceived market value (“Opinion 4”).
It is, therefore, the writer’s concluding opinion
that there is no engineering basis to reasonably
conclude that the subject property damage was
due 	to 	a 	wrongdoing 	on 	the 	part 	of 	Eriez
Manufacturing Company. Accordingly, there can
be 	no 	reasonable 	claim 	that 	a 	product 	defect
attributable to Eriez Manufacturing Company was
causal to the property damage sustained (“Opinion
5”).
[Id. 	pp. 11-12.]
i. 	Opinions 1 and 3
Plaintiffs argue that Opinions 1 and 3 are inadmissible recitations
of fact that do not fit with the facts of this case. 	[ECF No. 412-1 p. 14.]
For the reasons stated below, the Special Master agrees with Plaintiffs.
Guido’s opinions are net opinions, in that he asserts purported
expert opinions without any foundation to those opinions. 	See Smith v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 19-10319, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88209,
at *9 n.2 (D.N.J. May 19, 2023) (“While the net opinion rule is not part of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor is it an explicit factor enumerated by
Daubert, courts in this district have analyzed net opinion arguments
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under 	Daubert’s fit requirement[.]”). His opinions suffer from two critical
flaws: (1) the lack of foundation demonstrates Guido’s failure to base his
conclusions on a reliable methodology; and (2) his opinions, which as
Plaintiffs correctly assert are recitations of fact, rather than an expert
opinion, illustrate that Guido’s purported opinions would not be relevant
to this case.
As to the first flaw, like Gallagher’s damages opinion (supra 	pp. 18-
22), Guido does not assert any methodology or discernable standard as
the basis for Opinions 1 and 3. 	As stated above (id.), 	Daubert 	requires
much more. 	Indeed, it is the function of district courts to scrutinize
expert testimony that do not, by a preponderance of the evidence, pass
Rule 702’s and 	Daubert’s requirements. 	UGI Sunbury LLC, 949 F.3d at
832.
Next, expanding further on the second flaw, an expert’s testimony
must assist the trier of fact. 	Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321. 	Recitations of
fact based on evidence in the record raises questions as to whether
Guido’s purported opinions would assist the jury, or usurp their function
as fact-finders, or be used as a mechanism to enter hearsay testimony
into the trial. 	The record in the evidence and Guido’s report shows that
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Defendants 	have 	not 	sufficiently 	alleviated 	the 	concerns 	of 	those
questions. Accordingly, Opinions 1 and 3 do not meet 	Daubert.14
ii. 	Opinion 2
Plaintiffs 	claim 	that 	this 	opinion 	is 	an 	inadmissible 	legal
conclusion. 	[ECF No. 412-1 p. 22.] 	The manner in which Opinion 2 is
asserted is identical to the legal conclusions set forth in Gallagher’s
Volume I Report. 	See 	supra 	pp. 17-18. 	Here, Opinion 2 clearly, and
fatally, concludes that Shapiro and Malanga, on behalf of Plaintiffs,
failed to establish a portion of their case. 	As stated above (id.), expert
testimony that makes findings of law are barred by Rule 702. 	See S.Y.,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51171, at *11.
iii. 	Opinions 4 and 5
Guido makes causal conclusions in Opinions 4 and 5. The relevant
portion of Opinion 4 is as follows:
The 4/22/12 and 12/8/12 fires and the 	resulting
damage were not due 	to a failure to warn or a
failure to recommend a fire suppression system on
the part of Eriez Manufacturing Company. Rather,
those 	fires and the resulting damage 	occurred
as a result of the manner 	in which AIMI elected
to 	operate 	their 	facility 	and 	the 	absence 	of
14 	The analysis in this section also applies to Opinions 2, 4, and 5.
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procedures 	to 	control 	indoor 	accumulations 	of
combustible material.
(Emphasis Added).
As to Opinion 5, Guido stated that “[a]ccordingly, there can be no
reasonable 	claim 	that 	a 	product 	defect 	attributable 	to 	Eriez
Manufacturing Company was 	causal 	to the property damage sustained.”
(Emphasis Added). The Special Master cited to 	Slatowski 	at 	supra 	p. 13,
and this case is also instructive here.
There, the plaintiff, an officer, held a Sig Sauer P320 pistol in his
pocket that unintentionally discharged into his thigh and hip. 	Id. 	at 134-
35. The plaintiff sued Sig Sauer and alleged that Sig Sauer designed the
P320 	pistol 	defectively 	because 	very 	light 	pressure 	was 	enough 	to
discharge the firearm. 	Id. 	at 136. 	In support of the plaintiff’s case, the
plaintiff offered two firearm experts who testified what 	could 	have
caused the accident and what 	did 	cause the accident. 	Id. 	at 137-38
(emphasis added). 	The District Court allowed testimony on what could
have caused the accident and excluded testimony concerning what did
cause the accident. 	Id. 	The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court’s
decision as to the excluded testimony and stated that although the
experts “speak to whether the gun’s design caused the injury, they are
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not based on testing specific to the context of the shooting. Instead, they
are based on mere analysis that the gun 	could 	fire more easily in theory.”
Id. 	at 138 (emphasis in original). 	And that therefore, the experts were
not reliable under 	Daubert 	because the plaintiff “never bridges the gap
between theory and reality.” 	Id.
Guido’s opinions suffer from the same flaws. 	There is insufficient
evidence in the record establishing that Guido’s causation findings were
based on any reliable methodology. Guido testified that he did not use a
methodology when rendering these opinions, and instead, it was his
“personal opinions” based on “common sense[.]” (ECF No. 412-5 pp. 8-9,
11, Dep. Tr. 286:4-287:21, 297:10-18). 	Guido used his personal opinion
to establish his causation theory, and thus, failed to “bridge[] the gap
between theory and reality.” 	See Slatowski, 148 F.4th at 138. Therefore,
like the experts in 	Slatowski, Guido was not sufficiently reliable to testify
on the direct causes, or what were not the direct causes, of the incident
in question (the fire).15
15 	To the extent Plaintiffs seek to preclude any testimony made by Guido
concerning 	OSHA 	standards, 	that 	argument 	is 	mooted 	by 	Guido’s
testimony that he would not provide expert testimony that Plaintiffs
violated any OSHA regulations. [ECF No. 412-2 pp. 29, 30, Dep. Tr.
188:15-189:21.] 	Guido’s potential testimony on OSHA also lends to a
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion to preclude expert Gallagher be
granted in part, and denied in part, as set forth above, the motion to
preclude expert Kircher be denied, and the motion to preclude Guido be
granted.
Date: March 4, 2026
_s/ Noel L. Hillman____________
Noel L. Hillman, Special Master
finding that any testimony on OSHA is not “relevant” and would not be
helpful to a jury. 	Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321.
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