Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Pierre Yves Beneche
v. Civil No. 26-cv-203-LM-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 038 P
FCI Berlin Warden et al.1
O R D E R
Pierre Yves Beneche petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, alleging that his present civil immigration detention violates his rights to
due process under the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, Beneche alleges that his
thirteen-month detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonably
prolonged. Respondents object. Doc. no. 9.2 For the following reasons, Beneche’s
petition (doc. no. 1) is granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). The petition “may be resolved on the merits without [an evidentiary]
1 The petition names only FCI Berlin’s Warden, but pursuant to this court’s
March 19 order (doc. no. 14), the court served Beneche’s petition on the Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Boston field office and added the Director
as a respondent in this case. Accordingly, the court will refer to the Warden and the
Director collectively as “Respondents.”
2 In ruling on the petition, the court also considered the government’s briefing
in doc. nos. 16 and 17.
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hearing when, as here, the material facts are not in dispute.” Cummings v. Fed.
Corr. Inst., Berlin, Civ. No. 22-cv-468-SM-AJ, 2024 WL 1256068, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar.
25, 2024). The petitioner has the burden of proving that his confinement is
unlawful. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009).
BACKGROUND3
Beneche is a twenty-nine-year-old Haitian national. On June 29, 2019,
Beneche first entered the United States and was apprehended by officials from the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Beneche subsequently applied for
asylum and for withholding of removal. An asylum officer concluded that Beneche
lacked a credible fear of persecution but determined that he had a credible fear of
facing torture if returned to his home country. Accordingly, Beneche was given a
Notice to Appear before an Immigration Judge (IJ) for further proceedings under 8
U.S.C. § 1229a. However, after a hearing on June 24, 2020, an IJ denied Beneche’s
application for asylum and for withholding of removal, and ordered him removed.
Beneche was subsequently removed to Haiti on September 9, 2020.
On or about February 12, 2023, Beneche reentered the country near San
Ysidro, California where he once again was apprehended by DHS. For reasons that
are not clear, DHS did not reinstate Benche’s prior removal order, but put him back
in removal proceedings under § 1229a and issued him a Notice to Appear before an
3 The following facts are drawn from the parties’ filings and the attachments
thereto. They are not in dispute.
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IJ on January 22, 2025 for the commencement of such proceedings.4 Rather than
continue to detain Beneche, DHS enrolled him in an “Alternatives to Detention
Program.” Under this program, Beneche had to complete weekly virtual check-ins, a
condition that was later changed to in-person reporting.
In January 2024, Beneche again applied for asylum and withholding of
removal.5 Beneche states that when he later appeared for the hearing scheduled for
January 22, 2025, the immigration court did not have any record of the 2023 Notice
to Appear and informed Beneche that he would be notified of a new hearing date
once his case was docketed. However, on March 10, 2025, at a routine check-in with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), ICE cancelled Beneche’s Notice to
Appear, reinstated Beneche’s prior final order of removal from 2020, and detained
him. Beneche was given a reasonable fear interview at which an asylum officer
determined that Beneche had not established either that he would be persecuted on
the basis of a protected ground or that he would be tortured if returned to Haiti.
However, on April 16, 2025, after hearing testimony from Beneche, an IJ vacated
the finding of the asylum officer and placed Beneche in “withholding-only”
proceedings.6
4 DHS charged that Beneche was inadmissible because he was an arriving
alien who lacked valid documentation to enter the country. See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
5 The record indicates that DHS received his application and it was pending as
of January 31, 2024.
6 “Withholding-only” proceedings are a form of “country-specific” relief, are
“limited to a determination of whether the alien is eligible for withholding or deferral
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On May 12, 2025, Beneche, through counsel, sent ICE a letter requesting
that he be released from custody on his own recognizance for the duration of his
removal proceedings. The letter described Beneche’s strong ties to the community
and his lack of criminal history. On June 8, 2025, ICE sent Beneche a letter
informing him that his custody status had been reviewed and that he would not be
released because ICE was “in receipt of or expects to receive” Beneche’s travel
documents and had determined that removal was both practicable and likely to
occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Doc. no. 17-8 at 1. The letter stated that
ICE determined that the criteria for release in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e) 7 had not been
satisfied, based on the following: (1) Beneche is a Haitian national with a final order
of removal; (2) he has a conviction for Illegal Entry; (3) ICE planned to submit a
travel document request to the Consulate of Haiti on his behalf; and (4) Beneche’s
removal would be scheduled pending receipt of that document.
The letter indicated that Beneche could elect to have a personal interview to
review his custody status, which Beneche did. On August 20, 2025, two deportation
of removal, and as such, all parties are prohibited from raising or considering any
other issues, including but not limited to issues of admissibility, deportability,
eligibility for waivers, and eligibility for any other form of relief.” Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 531, 536 (2021) (quotation omitted).
7 Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e), before recommending release, ICE must conclude
that: “(1) Travel documents for the alien are not available or, in the opinion of the
Service, immediate removal, while proper, is otherwise not practicable or not in the
public interest; (2) The detainee is presently a non-violent person; (3) The detainee is
likely to remain nonviolent if released; (4) The detainee is not likely to pose a threat
to the community following release; (5) The detainee is not likely to violate the
conditions of release; and (6) The detainee does not pose a significant flight risk if
released.”
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officers interviewed Beneche. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i). Beneche informed the officers
that he had an aunt and uncle living in the United States and that he would live
with his stepsister in Cambridge, Massachusetts if released. However, the officers
determined that Beneche posed a flight risk “based on his past immigration history”
and recommended that he remain detained pending his removal from the United
States. Doc. no. 17-9 at 2.
Meanwhile, Beneche filed a motion for a custody redetermination before an IJ
at some point in the spring of 2025. The government argued in opposition that
Beneche was not eligible for bond because he was subject to a final order of removal,
had been served with a decision to reinstate the prior order, and was therefore
being held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. On June 18, 2025, an IJ issued an order
denying Beneche’s request for a custody redetermination, finding that he was
“statutorily ineligible.” Doc. no. 1-1 at 1.
On September 22, 2025, an IJ denied Beneche’s applications for withholding
of removal under the INA and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and his
application for deferral of removal under CAT. On October 16, 2025, Beneche
appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), where his
case remains pending.
On March 12, 2026, Beneche filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISCUSSION
Beneche argues that his detention has become unreasonably prolonged in
violation of his rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment. Before turning to
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the merits of Beneche’s claim, the court will provide a brief overview of the relevant
statutory structure.
I. Statutory Overview
“Congress has created an ‘expedited [removal] process’ for noncitizens who
reenter the United States unlawfully after having previously been removed.” G.P. v.
Garland, 103 F.4th 898, 900 (1st Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson
v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529-30 (2021)). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), “the
prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being
reopened or reviewed.” DHS must then remove the noncitizen within a ninety-day
“removal period.” G.P., 103 F.4th at 900. While detention is mandatory during the
removal period, it “may be extended into a ‘post-removal period’” if, among other
circumstances, a noncitizen is deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Id.
(brackets omitted) (quoting Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 528-29)); see 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6).
Notwithstanding this expedited process, “a noncitizen who is subject to a
reinstated removal order may seek to prevent removal to a specific country by
obtaining statutory withholding of removal or relief under CAT.” G.P., 103 F.4th at
900. The Supreme Court recently clarified that Ҥ 1231 governs the detention of a
noncitizen with a reinstated removal order while the noncitizen pursues these forms
of relief.” Id. (citing Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 526).
“Section 1231 ‘does not specify a time limit’ on how long DHS may detain a
noncitizen.” Id. (quoting Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 529). Nor does the statute
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require DHS to provide a noncitizen with a bond hearing before an IJ where DHS
bears the burden of justifying the noncitizen's continued detention beyond the
removal period. Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 580-81 (2022).
However, DHS regulations do require ICE to conduct periodic “custody reviews” to
determine whether to continue to detain a noncitizen beyond the removal period.
See generally 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. These reviews are not subject to appeal to an IJ and
place the burden on noncitizens to show that they are not a danger or a flight risk.
See id.
II. Beneche’s As-Applied Due Process Claim
Beneche argues that his detention of over thirteen months without a bond
hearing violates the INA and the Due Process Clause. The government counters
that Beneche’s detention is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and does not offend
the Constitution. Assuming without deciding that Beneche’s prolonged detention
without a bond hearing is authorized by § 1231(a)(6), the court finds that his
prolonged detention violates his rights to due process.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Due Process Clause applies to all
persons in the United States regardless of citizenship status. Id. at 693. And, as
relevant here, it provides “important constitutional limitations” on the
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“government's exercise of its power to detain immigrants pending removal.”
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting id. at 695).
Courts, including the First Circuit, have recognized that “the Due Process
Clause imposes some form of reasonableness limitation upon the duration of
detention” under the INA. Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotation
omitted). As Judge Laplante recently explained, prolonged detention without a bond
hearing pending removal “will at some point violate the right to due process.” Fils-
Aime v. FCI Berlin, Warden, 808 F. Supp. 3d 218, 224 (D.N.H. 2025); see id.
(holding that prolonged detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)
and 1231(a) violated noncitizen’s rights to due process and collecting cases holding
similarly).
In Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, the Supreme Court concluded that “the
plain language of § 1231(a)(6) does not support a claim that the statute ‘requires
bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention,’ [but]
expressly did not reach the petitioner's constitutional claim that due process
requires individualized bond hearings when detention under § 1231(a)(6) becomes
prolonged.” Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 938 (D. Colo.
2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-1377, 2025 WL 4673516 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025))
(quoting Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 580-81); see Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at
583 (leaving petitioner’s constitutional arguments “for the lower courts to consider
in the first instance”). Indeed, after Arteaga-Martinez, many courts have allowed
petitioners detained under § 1231(a)(6) to mount as-applied challenges to their
assertedly prolonged detentions under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Cruz v.
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Bondi, No. 25-cv-262-JJM-PAS, 2025 WL 3295485, at *7-10 (D.R.I. Nov. 26, 2025);
Caceres v. Joyce, 813 F. Supp. 3d 407, 415-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Trejo v. Warden of
ERO El Paso E. Montana, 807 F. Supp. 3d 697, 707-12 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Hilario
M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., No. 1:24-CV-00998-EPG-HC, 2025 WL
1158841, at *6-10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025); Chavez-Gonsalez v. Ball, No. 6:23-CV-
06238 EAW, 2024 WL 1268282, at *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2024); Cabrera
Galdamez v. Mayorkas, No. 22 CIV. 9847 (LGS), 2023 WL 1777310, at *4-8
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023).
G.P. v. Garland is not to the contrary. 103 F.4th at 902. There, the First
Circuit concluded that a noncitizen in withholding-only proceedings could not rely
on Zadvydas’s statutory interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) as containing an implicit limit
on the length of a noncitizen’s detention. Id. The First Circuit reasoned that, unlike
the petitioners in Zadvydas, who faced the prospect of indefinite and never-ending
detention because there was no country to which they could be removed, noncitizens
in withholding-only proceedings do not face the potential of indefinite detention
because their withholding-only proceedings will eventually conclude. Id. at 901-02.
G.P. expressly declined to address the possibility that a petitioner in withholding-
only proceedings may be entitled to a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause
as a remedy to an unreasonably prolonged detention. See id. at 902 n.3 (“G.P.
challenges his detention under only Zadvydas [so] we need not consider any
constitutional claim.”). Importantly, the petitioner in G.P. did not seek a bond
hearing, but outright release. Id. at 899.
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Where, as here, a petitioner challenges his or her prolonged detention
without a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause, the court will apply the same
four-factor, non-exhaustive reasonableness test that this court has applied to
similar challenges.8 See, e.g., Fils-Aime, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 224 (applying four-factor
test to prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1231(a)); K-S v. Warden,
FCI-Berlin, Civ. No. 25-cv-288-SE, 2025 WL 3671774, at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 17, 2025),
appeal filed, No. 26-1157 (1st Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (applying same test to prolonged
detention under § 1225(b)). This test “considers [1] length of detention, [2] likely
duration of future detention, [3] the reasons for the delay, and [4] whether the
conditions of confinement are ‘meaningfully different from criminal punishment,’ to
assess whether the petitioner's detention has become unreasonable under the Due
Process Clause.” Fils-Aime, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 224 (quoting A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F.
Supp. 3d 822, 826 (W.D. Pa. 2025)); see also Arostegui-Maldonado, 794 F. Supp. 3d
at 938-42 (applying a similar six-factor test to due process challenge to prolonged
detention under § 1231(a)).
“The remedy for a prolonged detention is a bond hearing before an
immigration judge at which the government bears the burden of proving that the
[noncitizen] should not be released on bond.” Fils-Aime, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 226
8 The government asserts that the standard set forth in Zadvydas controls and
that Beneche cannot succeed on his claim because he has not shown that he is subject
to potentially indefinite detention as his removal proceedings are ongoing. However,
this court has recognized that “[n]oncitizens who have been detained during lengthy
withholding-only proceedings retain the right to challenge their detention on
constitutional grounds even though their proceedings are ongoing.” G.P. v. Garland,
Civ. No. 1:23-cv-322-PB, 2024 WL 328435, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan. 29, 2024), aff'd, 103
F.4th 898 (1st Cir. 2024).
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(brackets omitted) (quoting Smorodska v. Strafford Cnty. Dep't of Corr., Civ. No.
1:20-cv-446-JL, doc. no. 31 at *5 (D.N.H. May 14, 2020)). Under First Circuit
precedent, “due process requires the government to either (1) prove by clear and
convincing evidence that [Beneche] poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that [he] poses a flight risk.” K-S, 2025 WL
3671774, at *5 (quoting Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41).
The court applies the four-factor test below.
A. Length of Detention
Beneche has been detained for over thirteen months which is far beyond the
ninety-day removal period under which detention is statutorily mandated,
§ 1231(a)(2), and is over twice as long as the presumptively reasonable six-month
period of detention articulated in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. While there is no
bright-line rule that courts apply to determine whether detention has become
unreasonably prolonged, “detention is likely to be unreasonable if it lasts for more
than one year during removal proceedings before the agency, excluding any delays
due to the [noncitizen’s] dilatory tactics.” Fils-Aime, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 225 (quoting
Smorodska, Civ. No. 1:20-cv-446-JL, doc. no. 31 at *3).
Here, Beneche has been detained for over a year, and there is nothing in the
record to suggest that Beneche has engaged in any delay tactics. Thus, the court
concludes that Beneche’s detention of over thirteen months without a bond hearing
weighs in favor of finding his detention unreasonably prolonged. See, e.g., id.
(fourteen month detention); Arostegui-Maldonado, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 939 (“roughly
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eight months . . . would still be sufficient to trigger scrutiny”); A.L., 761 F. Supp. 3d
at 826 (“Petitioner has been held in custody without a bond hearing for nearly ten
months.”); Lett v. Decker, 346 F. Supp. 3d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, No. 18-3714, 2020 WL 13558956 (2d Cir. July 30, 2020)
(ten months of detention).
B. Likely Duration of Future Detention
Beneche’s appeal of the IJ’s September 2025 order is still pending before the
BIA and, whatever the outcome of that appeal, Beneche’s case is likely to be
remanded to an IJ or appealed to the First Circuit. As explained above, both an
asylum officer (in 2019) and an IJ (in 2025) concluded that Benche has
demonstrated a legitimate fear of torture if returned to his home country. Thus, it is
likely that Beneche’s detention could extend for years as his case progresses
through the courts. See, e.g., G.P., 103 F.4th at 899-900 (describing nearly four-year
detention of noncitizen in withholding-only proceedings). This factor also weighs in
Beneche’s favor.
C. Reasons for Delay
As noted, Beneche has not caused any delay in his own case. While Beneche
has exercised his statutory right to seek withholding of removal, “[c]ourts generally
do not consider bona fide immigration proceedings, initiated by the [noncitizen], as
grounds to deny a bond hearing.” Fils-Aime, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (quoting
Smorodska, Civ. No. 1:20-cv-446-JL, doc. no. 31 at *4). The government does not
contest that Beneche diligently appeared for his scheduled hearing on January 22,
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2025 and otherwise complied with the conditions of his supervision between
February 12, 2023 (the day the Notice to Appear was issued) and March 10, 2025
(the day he was re-detained). On the other hand, there is nothing in the record
before the court to suggest that the government caused any delay prolonging
Beneche’s detention. Thus, this factor is neutral.
D. Conditions of Confinement
Finally, Beneche has been held at FCI Berlin, a medium security federal
prison, alongside convicted criminals for over thirteen months. Cf. Hernandez-Lara,
10 F.4th at 28 (holding that noncitizen’s “incarcerat[ion] alongside criminal
inmates” increased severity of liberty deprivation). Because Beneche is being held in
a penal facility, this factor weighs in favor of his petition. See Fils-Aime, 808 F.
Supp. 3d at 226.
Having considered the four factors, the court concludes that Beneche’s
detention of over thirteen months without a bond hearing has become unreasonably
prolonged in violation of his rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment. The
remedy for his prolonged detention is a bond hearing before an immigration judge
at which the government must prove (1) by clear and convincing evidence that
Beneche poses a danger to the community, or (2) by a preponderance of the evidence
that Beneche poses a flight risk. K-S, 2025 WL 3671774, at *5 (quoting Hernandez-
Lara, 10 F.4th at 41).
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CONCLUSION
Beneche’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (doc. no. 1) is granted.
Respondents are ordered to provide Beneche with a constitutionally adequate bond
hearing before an IJ within 7 days. Within 24 hours of the bond hearing’s
conclusion, the government shall file a status report notifying the court of the result
of the bond hearing.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
April 16, 2026
cc: Counsel of Record
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