Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Gislene Gomes Rodrigues
v. Civil No. 26-cv-136-LM-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 017 P
Christopher Brackett, et al.
O R D E R
In an order dated March 2, 2026, the court granted Gislene Gomes
Rodrigues's habeas petition and ordered respondents to provide her with a
constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) within 7
days. That hearing is currently scheduled to occur on March 5, 2026, in Chelmsford,
Massachusetts. On today's date, respondents provided notice that they intend to
transfer petitioner to the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona "in no less than 72
hours." Doc. no. 5. Petitioner objects and seeks a court order enjoining respondents
from transferring her from the District of New Hampshire.
Respondents admit that — earlier in the case — they had transferred
petitioner to Louisiana and had to return her after receiving this court’s initial
order barring them from transferring her out of the District without notice. See doc.
no. 4 at 1. Now, respondents seek to transfer petitioner hundreds of miles away
from her counsel and family while her petition is still before this court.
Prior to her detention, petitioner resided in Danvers, Massachusetts.
Petitioner has counsel from Marlborough, Massachusetts, and is currently in the
process of preparing for her March 5 bond hearing. Petitioner has a statutory right
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to select her own counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings before
an immigration judge . . . the person concerned shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the government) by such counsel . . . as he shall
choose”). The First Circuit has described § 1362 as an “integral part” of due process.
Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, under
First Circuit law, petitioner has both a statutory and constitutional right to counsel
now and at the upcoming bond hearing. See Sintuj v. Stamper, No. 2:26-CV-00027-
JAW, 2026 WL 232313, at *5-6 (D. Me. Jan. 28, 2026). At the scheduled bond
hearing, the IJ must assess petitioner’s risk of flight. See Hernandez Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). The evidence of her family ties (and other ties to this
area) will be crucial to a meaningful and constitutionally adequate bond hearing.
Respondents' proposed transfer would substantially interfere with
petitioner’s access to counsel and undermine her ability to meaningfully litigate her
habeas petition and bond hearing. Courts have recognized that detainees have a
fundamental constitutional right to access counsel and restricting that access is a
constitutional violation. See Sintuj, 2026 WL 232313, at *5-6 (ordering government
to return noncitizen to district where habeas petition was filed to in order to allow
petitioner to access local counsel); Cruz-Santana v. Gonzalez-Ramos, No. CV 26-
1028 (GMM), 2026 WL 172520, at *5 (D.P.R. Jan. 22, 2026) (barring the
government from transferring a detainee from Puerto Rico to a detention facility on
the mainland because of “grave concerns as to his [due process] right to access to
counsel”).
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Many federal courts have found that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,1 and
courts’ inherent equitable powers allow courts to prevent the government from
transferring a petitioner outside of their jurisdiction in order to facilitate resolution
of habeas petitions. See, e.g., Ozturk v. Trump, 779 F. Supp. 3d 462, 496 (D. Vt.),
amended sub nom. Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382 (2d Cir. 2025); L. S. M. v. Genalo,
No. 26-CV-00942 (JAV), 2026 WL 305208, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2026); Arostegui-
Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 945, 948 (D. Colo. 2025), appeal
docketed, No. 25-1377 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025); Oliveros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-7117
(BLF), 2025 WL 2677125, at *8-11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025); Perez y Perez v.
Noem, No. 25-CV-4828 (DEH), 2025 WL 1908284, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2025).
Moreover, petitioner alleges that the conditions at the Eloy Detention Center
raise constitutional concerns. Her brief includes allegations that multiple reports
and investigations have documented claims of medical neglect, abusive practices,
and inhumane conditions at that facility. Doc. no. 6 at 2. In her original petition,
petitioner requested that the court “issue a restraining order to prevent petitioner
from being transferred from the state of New Hampshire for the duration of these
proceedings.” Doc. no. 1 at 2.
The court finds that due process requires such an order. Accordingly,
pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the courts’ inherent equitable
1 The All Writs Act empowers courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
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powers, respondents are ordered not to transfer petitioner until such time as the
court closes petitioner’s case.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
March 3, 2026
cc: Counsel of Record
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