Snow v. BeyondTrust Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Kyle Snow,
Plaintiff
v.
Case No. 25-cv-548-SM-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 035
BeyondTrust Corporation,
Defendant
O R D E R
Kyle Snow brings this action against his former employer,
BeyondTrust, alleging that it interfered with his right to take
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (count
one), and then terminated his employment in retaliation for
having taken FMLA leave (count two). BeyondTrust moves to
dismiss Snow’s complaint, saying neither count plausibly alleges
the essential elements of a viable FMLA claim. See generally
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Snow objects.
For the reasons discussed, BeyondTrust’s motion to dismiss
is granted, albeit without prejudice to Snow’s ability to file
an amended complaint with respect to count two.
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Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true, disregards
legal labels and conclusions, and resolves reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor. See Galvin v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 852
F.3d 146, 155 (1st Cir. 2017). The court may also consider
documents referenced by or incorporated into the complaint, as
well as documents whose authenticity is not disputed by the
parties. See, e.g., Sierra v. Bisignano, 158 F.4th 43, 49 (1st
Cir. 2025); Newman v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 901 F.3d 19,
25 (1st Cir. 2018).
To avoid dismissal, the complaint must allege sufficient
facts to support a “plausible” claim for relief. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To satisfy that
plausibility standard, the factual allegations in the complaint,
along with reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations,
must show more than a mere possibility of liability – that is,
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). See also Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351, 359–60 (1st Cir.
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2020) (“For the purposes of our [12(b)(6)] review, we isolate
and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal
labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action
elements.”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
In other words, the complaint must include well-pled (i.e.,
non-conclusory, non-speculative) factual allegations as to each
of the essential elements of a viable claim that, if assumed to
be true, allow the court to draw the reasonable and plausible
inference that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought.
See Tasker v. DHL Retirement Savings Plan, 621 F.3d 34, 38-39
(1st Cir. 2010).
Background
Accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true - as
the court must at this juncture - the relevant background is as
follows. Snow worked for BeyondTrust for approximately seven
years as a technical support engineer. He performed his job
well and each year he received a merit-based salary increase.
In 2023, he suffered from serious mental health issues and
required medical leave. In September of that year, he “applied
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for leave under Defendant’s FMLA and short term disabilities
policies.” Complaint (document no. 1) at para. 20. That
request was processed through Symetra, BeyondTrust’s leave
administrator, and Snow was approved for FMLA leave for the
twelve-week period extending from September 14 through December
6, 2023.
On November 2, 2023, Snow was reminded that his FMLA leave
would expire on December 7, and unless he was approved for
additional leave, he might be expected to return to work on that
date. See Email entitled “Exhaustion of Leave” from Symetra to
Kyle Snow (document no. 9-3). On December 7, 2023, after Snow’s
FMLA leave had expired, BeyondTrust’s leave administrator
contacted Snow about his return to work. She noted that Snow’s
medical providers had not yet released him to work and she asked
about Snow’s anticipated return. She also requested additional
medical information from his healthcare providers. Complaint at
para. 26. See also Email entitled “Confirming Return to Work,”
from Rakeyla Young to Kyle Snow (document no. 1-3). Ms. Young
also recommended that Snow explore the availability of long-term
disability since “your healthcare provider hasn’t released you
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to return and is extending your leave past the supported time of
short-term disability.” Finally, she told Snow that she would
inform BeyondTrust’s human rights administrator of their
conversation to “figure out the next steps as a company.” Id.
There is no suggestion anywhere in the complaint that
BeyondTrust approved (or that Snow even sought) any additional
medical leave beyond the expiration of his FMLA leave.
The following day (December 8, 2023), Snow’s healthcare
provider completed a work release form, stating that Snow was
not yet able to return to work and would need an additional five
weeks of leave through January 15, 2024. Complaint at para. 30.
See also Work Release Form (document no. 1-3) at 5. According
to Snow, he “reasonably expected that, based on Ms. Young’s
email and the instructions he had received, Defendant would
review the updated medical information, consider options, and
work with him on a safe return to work plan when he was
medically able to return.” Id. at para. 32. That did not
happen. Instead, on December 19, 2023 - twelve days after
Snow’s FMLA leave had expired and while he remained unable to
return to work - BeyondTrust’s human resources representative
contacted Snow and told him that the company had decided to
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terminate his employment. Complaint at para. 33. Snow was told
that the decision to fire him was a “business decision only” and
not related to his performance. He was also told that
BeyondTrust had “already waited long enough” for him to return
to work, the technical support team needed to hire someone who
could perform his duties immediately, and the company could not
“work him back into the budget.” Id at paras. 34-35.
Snow acknowledges that BeyondTrust provided him with the
full twelve weeks of FMLA leave to which he was entitled and
terminated his employment only after that leave period had
expired. Id. at para. 52. He also acknowledges that he was
unable to return to work at the end of that leave period. See,
e.g., Complaint at paras. 4, 26, and 30. See also Plaintiff’s
Objection (document no. 11) at 4.
The Family and Medical Leave Act
The FMLA includes two types of provisions: “those
establishing substantive rights and those providing protection
for the exercise of those rights.” Colburn v. Parker
Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 330 (1st Cir.
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2005). Among those substantive rights is the right of a
qualified employee to take up to twelve weeks of leave during
any twelve-month period for a variety of reasons, including
those related to a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1)(D). Moreover, upon returning to work at the
expiration of FMLA leave, the employee must be restored to
either his or her former position or an alternate position with
equivalent pay, benefits, and working conditions, and without
loss of accrued seniority. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. §
825.100(c). As the court of appeals has noted,
These rights are essentially prescriptive, setting
substantive floors for conduct by employers, and
creating entitlements for employees. As to these
rights, therefore, the employee need not show that the
employer treated other employees less favorably, and
an employer may not defend its interference with the
FMLA’s substantive rights on the ground that it treats
all employees equally poorly without discriminating.
In such cases, the employer’s subjective intent is not
relevant. The issue is simply whether the employer
provided its employee the entitlements set forth in
the FMLA — for example, a twelve-week leave or
reinstatement after taking a medical leave.
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir.
1998) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
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In addition to providing the entitlements discussed above,
the FMLA also prohibits an employer from: (a) interfering with
an employee’s exercise of those rights, and (b) discriminating
against an employee for having exercised those rights. See 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a). See generally Pierce v. Alice Peck Day Mem’l
Hosp., No. CIV. 00-318-M, 2002 WL 467125, at *5 (D.N.H. Mar. 11,
2002) (“An employer may not interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise by employees of the rights conferred by the FMLA,
and may not discriminate against an employee for having
exercised those rights. Nor may employers use the taking of
FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as
hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.”) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted). So, if an employee claims his
employer unlawfully discriminated against him for having taken
FMLA leave, the employer’s subjective intent/motivation is
relevant. See, e.g. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160 (“Hodgens claims
that his termination violated the FMLA because it was prompted
by the fact that he took sick leave to which he was entitled
under the statute. In such a case, the employer’s motive is
relevant, and the issue is whether the employer took the adverse
action because of a prohibited reason or for a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.”).
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Importantly, however, “although an employee who properly
takes FMLA leave cannot be discharged for exercising a right
provided by the statute, she nevertheless can be discharged for
independent reasons.” Henry v. United Bank, 686 F.3d 50, 55
(1st Cir. 2012). See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c) (“If the
employee is unable to perform an essential function of the
position because of a physical or mental condition . . . the
employee has no right to restoration to another position under
the FMLA.”).
Discussion
As noted above, Snow brings two claims against his former
employer. First, he says BeyondTrust interfered with,
restrained, and/or denied his exercise of rights under the FMLA,
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Second, he claims
BeyondTrust retaliated against him for having exercised his FMLA
rights and used his invocation of those rights as a factor in
its decision to terminate his employment, in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).
I. Count One - Unlawful Interference.
To withstand BeyondTrust’s motion to dismiss his FMLA
interference claim, Snow’s complaint must plausibly allege that:
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(1) he was eligible for the FMLA’s protections; (2) BeyondTrust
was covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to leave under the
FMLA; (4) he gave BeyondTrust notice of his intention to take
leave; and (5) BeyondTrust denied him FMLA benefits to which he
was entitled. See Gallagher v. Unitil Serv. Corp., No. 14-CV-
20-SM, 2015 WL 5521794, at *13 (D.N.H. Sept. 17, 2015). See
also See Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755
F.3d 711, 722 (1st Cir. 2014)); Chacon v. Brigham & Women’s
Hosp., 99 F. Supp. 3d 207, 213 (D. Mass. 2015).
Critically, however, Snow’s complaint lacks any plausible
allegation(s) relating to that fifth essential element: that
BeyondTrust denied him any FMLA benefits to which he was
entitled. Indeed, the complaint acknowledges that BeyondTrust
afforded Snow the full twelve weeks of leave it was obligated to
provide. See, e.g., Complaint at paras. 51-52 (noting that
BeyondTrust terminated his employment after he completed his 12-
week FMLA leave period and remained unable to return to work).
Consequently, Snow’s FMLA interference claim (count one)
must necessarily be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See, e.g., Limoli v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 18-CV-10561-FDS,
2019 WL 6253269, at *5–6 (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2019) (“[B]ecause
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she received all the FMLA benefits to which she was entitled,
[plaintiff’s] FMLA interference claim must fail.”); Federico v.
Town of Rowley, No. CV 15-12360-FDS, 2016 WL 7155984, at *6 (D.
Mass. Dec. 7, 2016) (same).
II. Count Two - Unlawful Discrimination/ Retaliation.
Next, Snow alleges that BeyondTrust retaliated against him
for having taken FMLA leave and unlawfully terminated his
employment as a direct consequence of his having availed himself
of that FMLA benefit. To prevail upon an FMLA retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) he availed himself
of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between
that adverse action and his protected conduct.” McMillen v.
Concord Hosp., No. 12-CV-077-SM, 2014 WL 4715733, at *5 (D.N.H.
Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Orta–Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme
Quimica P.R., Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 113–14 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Parenthetically, the court notes that the elements listed
above are those necessary to establish a prima facie claim of
FMLA retaliation. See, e.g., Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 719.
But, the court of appeals has made clear a “plaintiff need not
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plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the
pleading stage.” Id. Rather, “the elements of a prima facie
case are useful as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility
of a plaintiff’s claim.” Id. (citations and internal
punctuation omitted). That is, to be sure, a subtle, if not
confusing, point. It is, however, sufficient to note that to
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging FMLA
retaliation must plausibly allege some causal connection between
an adverse employment action and their FMLA-protected conduct.
See, e.g., Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir.
2017); Haglund v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 3d
292, 298 (D. Mass. 2020).
Here, is support of his claim that there was a causal
connection between his having taken 12 weeks of FMLA leave and
his subsequent firing, Snow says:
The Complaint plausibly alleges that Plaintiff
requested and used protected leave, provided updated
medical documentation, sought additional medically
recommended time related to medication change and
mental health treatment, and was then terminated after
Defendant stated that it had waited long enough and
needed someone immediately. That is sufficient to
state an FMLA retaliation claim.
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. . . On December 7, 2023, Defendant requested updated
information and stated that HR would determine next
steps. On December 8. 2023, Plaintiff’s provider
completed the Work Release Form stating that Plaintiff
was unable to return until January 15, 2024. On
December 19, 2023, Defendant terminated Plaintiff and
allegedly referenced the amount of time it had already
“waited.” That is not a timing-only theory. It is a
factual theory that Defendant reacted adversely to
Plaintiff’s continued need for leave and inability to
return on Defendant’s preferred timeline.
Plaintiff’s Objection (document no. 11) at 5-6 (emphasis
supplied). See also Plaintiff’s Surreply (document no. 13) at
2. As Snow himself seems to concede, BeyondTrust was not
reacting to his having taken FMLA leave, but rather to his
inability to return to work at the completion of that leave.
Aside from the temporal proximity between Snow’s having
taken FMLA leave and his subsequent discharge, the complaint
includes no factual allegations arguably linking BeyondTrust’s
decision to fire him with his invocation of rights under the
FMLA. In that sense, Snow’s complaint is similar to that
presented in Carrero-Ojeda, which the court of appeals
determined was subject to dismissal for failure to plausibly
allege a viable FMLA retaliation claim:
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While temporal proximity is one factor from which an
employer’s bad motive can be inferred, by itself, it
is not enough — especially if the surrounding
circumstances undermine any claim of causation.
Carrero gives us no facts beyond the timing of her
discharge — e.g., no negative comments, complaints, or
expressions of reluctance by her superiors or co-
workers about her FMLA leave-taking, no discussion of
her FMLA leave status in performance reviews, etc. —
that would lead us to think that defendants took her
FMLA requests or leave status into account when
deciding to discharge her.
Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 720 (citations omitted).
According to the complaint, after Snow completed his FMLA
leave, he remained unable to return to work. But, BeyondTrust’s
support team “needed someone who could perform support duties
immediately.” Complaint at para. 35. There is no suggestion
that BeyondTrust was unprepared to have Snow return to his
position at the conclusion of his FMLA leave. But, when he was
unable to do so, BeyondTrust made the “business decision” to
terminate his employment. Id. at paras. 15, 34, 58. The only
plausible reading of the complaint suggests that it was Snow’s
inability to return to work at the end of his FMLA leave that
prompted BeyondTrust to terminate his employment - not any
retaliatory motive in response to Snow’s invocation of his FMLA
rights. Under such circumstances, an employer is permitted to
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fire an employee. See, e.g., Bellone v. Southwick-Tolland Reg'l
Sch. Dist., 748 F.3d 418, 424–25 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We have held
that an employee is not entitled to reinstatement under the FMLA
if he is unable to return to work until after the expiration of
his leave.”); Brown v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d
235, 239 (D. Mass. 2019) (“An employee has no right to
reinstatement, however, if she does not return when her leave
period expires.”); Green v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 182
F. Supp. 2d 128, 140 (D. Me. 2002) (“By the same token there is
no remedy under the FMLA for Plaintiff’s termination, since
Defendant had the right to terminate her once she did not return
to work after her leave had expired.”). See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.216(c).
Here, as in Carrero-Ojeda, Snow “calling [his] discharge
FMLA retaliation does not make it so,” id. at 720, and his
complaint “offers too little to connect [his] taking of FMLA
leave and [his] termination to push [his] claim across the
plausibility threshold,” id. at 719.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Snow’s claim that BeyondTrust
interfered with his rights under the FMLA (count one) must,
necessarily, be dismissed for failure to state a claim. His
claim that BeyondTrust retaliated against him for having invoked
his FMLA rights (count two) similarly fails to plausibly allege
all the essential elements of a viable claim. Necessarily,
then, that claim must also be dismissed - albeit without
prejudice. Given Snow’s pro se status, he will be afforded the
opportunity to amend his complaint to adequately and plausibly
assert the essential elements of a viable FMLA retaliation
claim, focusing, in particular, on evidence of a causal
connection between his invocation of his FMLA rights and
BeyondTrust’s subsequent decision to terminate his employment.
BeyondTrust’s Motion to Dismiss (document no. 8) is
granted, as follows: count one of Snow’s complaint (FMLA
interference) is dismissed with prejudice; count two of that
complaint (FMLA retaliation) is dismissed, without prejudice and
with leave to amend. Provided he can do so in a manner
consistent with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Snow may
file an amended complaint on or before April 30, 2026, that
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adequately and plausibly alleges facts sufficient to state a
viable FMLA retaliation claim.1
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
April 2, 2026
cc: Kyle Snow, pro se
Counsel of Record
1 For plaintiff’s benefit, the court notes that Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that by
filing a complaint, an attorney or unrepresented party certifies
to the court that “the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” In short, a party certifies that
there is evidentiary support for all factual claims made in the
complaint and that such claims are, to the best of that party’s
knowledge and belief, true. Sanctions apply for Rule 11
violations.
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