Pierce v. US Post Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
ROSEMARY D. PIERCE
v. Civil No. 25-cv-178-JL-TSM
U.S. POST OFFICE AND
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Self-represented Plaintiff, Rosemary D. Pierce, filed this lawsuit,1 seeking relief related to
the U.S. Post Office’s alleged failure to deliver her mail. Doc. No. 1. Liberally construed, Ms.
Pierce asserts three claims in her complaint: 1- breach of contract; 2- violation of her Fifth
Amendment due process right; and 3- negligent mail-handling.2 Doc. No. 4. Defendants move to
dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Doc. No.
12. The court heard argument on the motion on December 3, 2025. For the reasons that follow,
the court recommends that the district judge grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Ms. Pierce’s
Fifth Amendment due process claim and the claim for negligent mail-handling but deny the motion
as to the breach of contract claim.
1 The court liberally construed the Complaint as intending to name the United States Postal Service
(“USPS”) as a defendant, as well as the Concord (New Hampshire) U.S. Post Office and directed
the clerk’s office to update the docket accordingly. Doc. No. 4.
2 Although the negligence claim was not subject to the court’s preliminary review, see Doc. No. 4,
the court includes it as a claim and addresses it here because Defendants raised it in their motion
to dismiss. Doc. No. 12-1 at pg. 4.
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BACKGROUND
The facts are drawn from Ms. Pierce’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and addenda (Doc. Nos. 5,
8,18,19), which this court construes liberally and treats as one set of facts (collectively,
“Complaint”). See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating that a “pro se document is
to be liberally construed”).
Complaint
Ms. Pierce filed her original complaint on May 13, 2025.3 Doc. No. 1. She alleges that
she entered into an agreement with the Concord Post Office to rent a post office box (“PO Box”),
paying $100.00 for a six-month rental period. Id. at pg. 2. Ms. Pierce alleges that although she
received her mail at her PO Box for “over 6 months,” the “post office refused” to give her access
to her mail and has “held [her] mail [for] 2 months now.” Id. Rather than allow access to her mail,
Ms. Pierce alleges that the post office “gave [her] another application to fill out in order to receive
[her] mail.” Id.
On or about May 29, 2025, Ms. Pierce received an envelope from the Merrimack County
Sheriff’s Office. Doc. No. 5. Ms. Pierce alleges that this correspondence was the first letter she
received from the post office in over two months. Id. Ms. Pierce’s Complaint further describes
mail related to her pursuit of unclaimed funds in Massachusetts to which she is allegedly entitled
and which the post office allegedly did not deliver to her.4 See Doc. No. 8. She also alleges that
3 The court conducted a preliminary review of Ms. Pierce’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(2), and concluded that, liberally construed, Ms. Pierce claimed “a
violation of her Fifth Amendment right to due process and a breach of the terms of her post office
box rental agreement.” Doc. No. 4 at pg. 2. Accordingly, the court directed service of the
complaint on Defendants. Id.
4 On July 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a handwritten note concerning a dispute over her deceased
father’s property in Marshfield, Massachusetts. Doc. No. 11. The note is unrelated to the present
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court will not address it further.
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when she went to the post office, “they told [her] . . . they will not deliver” her mail and will
“withhold [it] until [she] fill[s] out another application.” Id. at pg. 3.
Additionally, Ms. Pierce’s Complaint includes a “green paper note” that she allegedly
received after she “presented [the court’s order] to [the] postmaster general” at the Concord post
office.5 Doc. No. 18. The green paper note indicates that Ms. Pierce opened her PO Box on May
3, 2024, at which time Ms. Pierce paid $100.00. Id. The note further indicates that Ms. Pierce
renewed her box and again paid $100.00 on October 2, 2024. Id. Finally, the note indicates that
Ms. Pierce’s next rental renewal payment was due on April 30, 2025, but that the Post Office
“blocked” the PO Box on May 1, 2025, and ultimately “closed” it on May 11, 2025. Id.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants moved to dismiss Ms. Pierce’s claims. Doc. No. 12. Ms. Pierce filed two
separate responses (Doc. Nos. 13, 14), which the court construed collectively, as objections to the
motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 16. Following a review of the pleadings, the court issued an
Order taking Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under advisement. Doc. No. 16. In the Order, the
court noted that Ms. Pierce’s allegations were “confusing or contradictory,” and directed her to file
a written statement clarifying details regarding the execution, payment, and duration of her post
office box rental contract. Id. at pgs. 2-3 (citing Carter v. Newland, 441 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214 (D.
Mass 2006) (explaining that when complaint pleads viable theory but is so unclear that opposing
party cannot respond or answer, court may convert Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion into Rule 12(e)
motion for more definite statement). Ms. Pierce responded to the court’s order on October 8, 2025
(Doc. No. 18) and submitted a supplemental filing on October 14, 2025 (Doc. No. 19), in which
5 Referring to the court’s order directing Ms. Pierce to clarify details of her post office box rental
contract. Doc. No. 16.
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she alleges that she paid $100.00 in cash to a manager at Concord’s Loudon Road Post Office in
May 2025, and that she has been unable to receive mail at either her home or Post Office box
address since March 1, 2025. Doc. No. 19. This assertion contradicts the payment history listed
on the note provided in her previous filing. See Doc. No. 18. She contends that her box was shut
down following “an argument” and asserts that the post office has refused to provide her with
copies of her contract documents. Id.
DISCUSSION
Defendants primarily argue that the Complaint, as amended, should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants
further contend that to the extent the court construes Plaintiff’s addendum (Doc. No. 8) as asserting
a claim for negligence in the handling of her mail, Rule 12(b)(1) warrants dismissal because the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. No. 12-1 at pg. 1. The court addresses Defendants’
jurisdictional argument first. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02
(1998) (explaining that subject-matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to merits adjudication).
I. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (FRCP 12(b)(1))
Construed liberally, Ms. Pierce’s Complaint alleges that Defendants were negligent in
failing to deliver her mail in a timely manner. See Doc. No. 8. She further alleges that Defendants’
negligence caused her to miss or lose correspondence and precluded her from receiving funds
connected to court matters and unclaimed property claims. Id. Defendants argue that, to the extent
that the court construes Ms. Pierce’s Complaint as alleging negligence, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because “the Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for
claims arising from mis-delivery of the U.S. mail. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).” See Doc. No. 12-1 at
pg. 4. This court agrees and recommends that the district judge dismiss this claim.
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A. Legal Standard
A challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) constitutes a “challenge to federal subject matter
jurisdiction, which includes ripeness, mootness, sovereign immunity, and, of course, subject matter
jurisdiction.” Perez v. P.R. Nat’l Guard, 951 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Valentin
v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001)). “Dismissal ‘is appropriate only when
the facts . . . taken as true, do not justify the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.’” Hamada v.
Gillen, 616 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D. Mass. 2009) (citations omitted). The burden to prove
jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff. See Acosta-Ramírez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 712 F.3d 14, 20
(1st Cir. 2013). Ms. Pierces fails to satisfy this burden.
B. Discussion
The United States, as sovereign, cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued. See States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). “[T]he terms of its consent to be sued in any court define
that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).
“Through the [Federal Torts Claims Act], Congress provided a waiver of sovereign immunity in
certain cases.” Kissell v. Mann, 750 F. Supp. 55, 56 (D.N.H. 1990). Congress retained immunity,
however, for certain tort claims made against the United States. Id. “Specifically, 28 U.S.C. §
2680 provides: ‘[t]he provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to—(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter.’” Id. Thus, “to the extent that it asserts a cause of action for negligence against the Postal
Service, [Ms. Pierce’s] complaint must be dismissed.” See id.
In her Complaint, Ms. Pierce details the alleged mishandling of mail related to her pursuit
of unclaimed funds. See Doc. No. 8-1. She claims the Defendant’s failure to provide timely
delivery or access to her PO box caused her to miss legal notices and financial payments tied to
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court matters and unclaimed property. See id. As alleged, her claim “lies within the ‘negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter’ exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).” Kissell, 750 F. Supp.
at 57. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the negligent mail-handling claim, and
the district judge should grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this regard.
II. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim (FRCP 12(b)(6))
Defendants contend that Ms. Pierce’s remaining claims should be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because she fails to state a plausible breach of contract
claim and fails to state a Fifth Amendment due process claim. Doc. No. 12-1. For the reasons that
follow, the court recommends that the district judge dismiss Ms. Pierce’s due process claim but
deny Defendants’ motion as it relates to the breach of contract claim.
A. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). In evaluating whether the plaintiff has a plausible entitlement to relief, the court must
accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and it must draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. See Burt v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of R.I., 84 F.4th 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2023). Generally,
the court may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
and other materials that are fairly incorporated in the complaint or are subject to judicial notice
such as matters of public record. See Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706, 713-14 (1st Cir. 2023); see also
Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 611 (1st Cir. 2013).
Pro se litigants, like Ms. Pierce, are entitled to have their complaints construed liberally.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “[A] pro se complaint . . . can only be dismissed
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for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim[.]’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-521 (quotation marks omitted)). “However, pro se status does not insulate a party from
complying with procedural and substantive law.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st
Cir. 1997). “[E]ven a pro se plaintiff is required ‘to set forth factual allegations, either direct or
inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable
legal theory.’” Adams v. Stephenson, 116 F.3d 464, 1997 WL 351633, at *1 (1st Cir. 1997)
(unpublished table decision) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.
1988)).
B. Discussion
i. Breach of contract
Defendants contend in their motion to dismiss that Ms. Pierce failed to allege sufficient
facts to state a claim for breach of contract under New Hampshire law based on her failure to allege
the date the contract began, the contract’s expiration date, and the date of the alleged breach. Doc.
No. 12-1 at pg. 2. According to Defendants, Ms. Pierce’s Complaint effectively concedes that the
rental term of her PO Box “expired and that she received mail at her post office box for at least the
six-month-term she contracted for.” Doc. No. 12-1 at pg. 3. Defendants further assert that Ms.
Pierce “acknowledges that Defendants provided her the necessary paperwork to renew her post
office box agreement, which she apparently chose not to complete.” Id. Accordingly, Defendants
maintain that Ms. Pierce failed to plead sufficient facts to establish “when, and to what extent” a
contractual obligation existed at the time Defendants allegedly stopped delivering mail to Ms.
Pierce. Id. This court concludes that the Complaint alleges a plausible claim for breach of contract.
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To state a claim for breach of contract under New Hampshire law, a plaintiff must allege
“(1) that a valid, binding contract existed between the parties, and (2) that the defendant breached
the terms of that contract.” Doe v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 615 F. Supp. 3d 47, 60 (D.N.H. 2022).
“A breach of contract occurs when there is a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise
which forms the whole or part of a contract.” Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 588 (2008).
In this case, Ms. Pierce sufficiently alleged that a valid, binding contract existed between
her and the Post Office for her PO Box. Doc. No. 18. Ms. Pierce opened her PO Box on May 3,
2024, at which time Ms. Pierce paid $100.00. Id. Ms. Pierce renewed her contract for her PO Box
in October 2024. Id. Her next payment for renewal was due on April 30, 2025. Id. The complaint
and addenda allege that Ms. Pierce stopped receiving her mail at least two months before filing
this lawsuit on May 13, 2025, which was before her rental contract expired and before the Post
Office blocked her PO Box on May 1, 2025. Id.; Doc. No. 1. These facts plausibly demonstrate
that a valid contract existed between the parties and that Defendants breached that contract by
failing to deliver Ms. Pierce’s mail before that contract expired. Accordingly, the district judge
should deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim.
ii. Fifth Amendment Violation
In addition, Defendants attack the sufficiency of the alleged facts concerning Ms. Pierce’s
claim that Defendants violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights. Doc. No. 12-1 at pg. 4.
In her Complaint, Ms. Pierce alleged that Defendants have “taken away my American Amendment
Rights,” which the court liberally construed as asserting a violation of her due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment. See Doc. Nos. 1, 4. Defendants maintain that this statement is conclusory
and fails to state which protected right was violated. See Doc. No. 12-1 at pg. 4.
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For a procedural due process claim to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff “must show
that (1) it was deprived of a protected property interest, and (2) the procedures attendant to that
deprivation were constitutionally inadequate.” Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sanchez, 715 F.3d
1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013); See also Breda v. McDonald, 153 F. Supp. 3d 496, 502 (D. Mass. 2015). Ms.
Pierce asserted that Defendants “held” her mail for over two months and that by doing so
Defendants have “taken away [her] American Amendment Rights.” Doc. No. 1 at 2. Assuming
(without deciding) that the allegations of Ms. Pierce’s complaint and addenda “suffice to establish
that USPS deprived [Ms. Pierce] of a protected property interest in the disputed mail . . . [Ms.
Pierce] alleges no facts supporting [her] contention that [she] did not receive ‘the process [she was]
due.’” See Eagle Tr. Fund v. United States Postal Serv., 365 F. Supp. 3d 57, 69 (D.D.C. 2019),
aff’d, 811 F. App’x 669 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Therefore, she fails to allege an essential element of a
due process claim. Accordingly, to the extent that Ms. Pierce claims that Defendants violated her
Fifth Amendment rights by breaching the post office box contract, the district judge should grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons detailed herein, this court recommends that the district judge grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 12) as to the Fifth Amendment due process claim and the
claim for negligent transmission of mail, but deny the motion as to the breach of contract claim.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days of
receipt of this notice. The fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. Failure to file any
objection within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s Order. See Santos-
Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016). Only those issues raised in the
objection(s) to this Report and Recommendation “are subject to review in the district court” and
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any issues “not preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal.” Sch. Union No. 37 v. United
Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Keating v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988)).
______________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
February 12, 2026
cc: Rosemary D. Pierce, pro se
Counsel of record
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