Manchon v. Charlestown, NH Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Marc Manchon
v. Case No. 24-cv-347-LM-AJ
David Tucker, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented plaintiff Marc Manchon brought this civil
rights action against the Charlestown, New Hampshire Police
Department (“CPD”), CPD Chief Patrick Connors, CPD dispatcher
Sirena Relihan, and Bail Commissioner David Tucker, claiming
violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights in
connection with his arrest and the subsequent imposition of
certain bail conditions. Bail Commissioner Tucker is no longer a
defendant.1
Presently before the court for a recommended decision is
CPD, Connors and Relihan’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Doc. No. 29), in which they seek dismissal of the bail-related
claim against them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B); LR 72.1. As explained more fully below, the
defendants’ motion should be granted.
Legal Standard
Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the
pleadings at any time “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but
1 The court dismissed the claim against Bail Commissioner
Tucker on October 3, 2025 (Doc. No. 36).
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early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). On a
Rule 12(c) motion, unlike a Rule 12(b) motion, the Court
considers the pleadings, including the answer. See Aponte-Torres
v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2006). In addition,
“[t]he court may supplement the facts contained in the pleadings
by considering documents fairly incorporated therein and facts
susceptible to judicial notice.” R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-
Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Ultimately, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings is “ordinarily accorded much the same treatment” as a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Aponte-Torres, 445 F.3d at 54 (citing
cases). Accordingly, “[j]udgment on the pleadings is proper
‘only if the uncontested and properly considered facts
conclusively establish the movant's entitlement to a favorable
judgment.’” Zipperer v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 493 F.3d 50, 53 (1st
Cir. 2007) (quoting Aponte-Torres, 445 F.3d at 54). The court
must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true,
construe reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and
“determine whether the factual allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71, 75
(1st Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
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that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Factual Background
Mr. Manchon is an independent journalist. He operates a
YouTube channel called “PressNH Now.” Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 12)
at 2. On October 27, 2021, he entered the lobby of the
Charlestown Police Department to retrieve certain public
records. Id. Mr. Manchon was livestreaming on his YouTube
channel from the police station lobby while multiple viewers of
his channel called the Police Department to “express concerns”
about police conduct. Id. Mr. Manchon tried to discourage such
calls. Id. He was subsequently arrested and charged with
disorderly conduct and obstructing government administration.
Id. at 3.
Bail Commissioner Tucker imposed conditions which
prohibited Mr. Manchon from “entering any public buildings in
Charlestown, NH” unless he was “reporting a crime or injury.”
Id.; Exh. A (Doc. No. 12-1). A week later, Mr. Manchon was
arrested for violating his conditions of bail. Id. Those charges
were dismissed at arraignment, and Mr. Manchon was found not
guilty of the charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing
government administration. Id.
Mr. Manchon asserts two claims in his Amended Complaint
under 42 USC § 1983. In Count I, which he asserts against all
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remaining defendants, Mr. Manchon claims that the bail condition
preventing him from entering town buildings violated his First
Amendment rights. In Count II, he claims that Chief Connor and
Dispatcher Relihan violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
causing his arrest without probable cause. Id. at 1, 3. He seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages, and an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 4.
The instant motion seeks dismissal of only the bail-related
claim asserted in Count I. The defendants assert two bases for
dismissal. First, they assert that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Alternatively, they argue that Mr. Manchon has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Discussion2
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine3
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine preserves the Supreme Court's
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court
2 Since the Rooker-Feldman doctrine implicates the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, motions seeking dismissal on this
basis ordinarily invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Hynes Grp., Civ. No. 21-cv-597-LM, 2022 WL 579237, at
*1 (D.N.H. Feb. 16, 2022). The defendants’ reliance on Rule
12(c) is inconsequential, however, because the court may
consider its jurisdiction sua sponte. Id. (citing Klimowicz v.
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 309, 315 n.4 (D.
Mass. 2017)), aff’d 907 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2018).
3 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
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judgments by divesting lower federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear certain cases brought by parties who have lost in state
court[.]” Klimowicz, 907 F.3d at 64 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The doctrine applies “where ‘the losing
party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state
proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-
court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that
judgment.’” Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de
Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir.
2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). Thus, “if federal litigation is
initiated after state proceedings have ended, and the plaintiff
implicitly or explicitly seek[s] review and rejection of [the
state] judgment, then a federal suit seeking an opposite result
is an impermissible attempt to appeal the state judgment to the
lower federal courts, and, under Rooker-Feldman, the federal
courts lack jurisdiction.” Id. at 24 (emphasis and alterations
in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
“[A] federal court's application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is not contingent upon an identity between the issues actually
litigated in the prior state-court proceedings and the issues
proffered in the subsequent federal suit.” Klimowicz, 907 F.3d
at 66. Therefore, “a plaintiff cannot escape the Rooker-Feldman
bar through the simple expedient of introducing a new legal
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theory in the federal forum that was not broached in the state
courts.” Id. On the other hand, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not bar a ‘general attack on the constitutionality’ of a
state law that ‘do[es] not require review of a judicial decision
in a particular case.’” Tyler v. Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., 914
F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487). As long as the “federal plaintiff
presents an independent claim” that is not “directed towards
undoing the prior state judgment[,]” the doctrine presents no
impediment to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
Here, it cannot reasonably be disputed that Mr. Manchon’s
suit is barred by Rooker-Feldman. It was commenced well after
the conclusion of his state criminal proceedings. Moreover, it
unquestionably seeks “review and rejection of” Bail Commissioner
Tucker’s decision, as Mr. Manchon seeks, among other things, a
declaration that the bail condition was improper. Federación de
Maestros de P.R., 410 F.3d at 23-24 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.,
544 U.S. at 291)).
Put another way, Mr. Manchon would have no reason to file
this lawsuit if Bail Commissioner Tucker had not imposed the
condition at issue here. His injuries were, therefore, “caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced” and he is “inviting district court review
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and rejection of [that] judgment[].” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S.
at 284. Nor does he present any “independent” claim that is not
“directed towards undoing the judgments of the New Hampshire
courts.” Tyler v. Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., 914 F.3d 47, 51 (1st
Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 487 (1983)) (quotations and citations
omitted).
Although Mr. Manchon asserts in his objection that he is
bringing an independent claim, Pltf. Obj. (Doc. No. 30) at 2,
resolution of his claims indisputably requires this court to
pass judgment on Bail Commissioner Tucker’s ruling. This is
beyond the court’s jurisdiction.4 See, e.g., Cipollini v.
Hilburt, No. 3:22-CV-558, 2022 WL 2313153, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr.
19, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2307466
(M.D. Pa. June 27, 2022) (dismissing, on Rooker-Feldman grounds,
case in which “the plaintiff appears to necessarily urge us to,
in effect, sit as a state appellate court and review, re-
examine, and reject state court bail determinations . . . .”).
Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires dismissal of
Count I.
4 As the defendants correctly observe, state law provided
Mr. Manchon with the appropriate forum to seeks review of his
bail conditions – first to a Superior Court, and then to the
State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Def.
Mem. (Doc. No. 29-1) at 4 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597:6-
e).
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B. Failure to State a Claim
Even if not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Mr.
Manchon’s Amended Complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim
against the moving defendants. The Amended Complaint (Doc. No.
12) states that Mr. Manchon “was subjected to” unconstitutional
bail conditions, id. at 3, and later referred to “Bail
Commissioner Tucker’s restriction” being “imposed as a form of
retaliation against [him] for exercising his First Amendment
rights.” Id. But Mr. Manchon fails to set forth any factual
allegations tying any of the moving defendants to Bail
Commissioner Tucker’s ultimate decision.
The absence of such facts is consistent with New Hampshire
law, under which bail conditions are set by bail commissioners
and/or courts, not police. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597:5,
15, 15-a; see also Lamarche v. McCarthy, 965 A.2d 992, 998 (N.H.
2008) (observing that arrestees can wait for a regular court
session to have bail set, rather than appear before a bail
commissioner); Follansbee v. Plymouth Dist. Ct., 856 A.2d 740,
742 (N.H. 2004) (noting that a person arrested for a bailable
offense may, at any time prior to his arraignment, apply to have
bail determined by a bail commissioner, who is empowered to “fix
the amount of and receive bail in the same manner as the court
might do, . . . .” (quoting N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597:18));
State v. Nott, 821 A.2d 976, 978 (N.H. 2003) (“ Bail
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commissioners are subordinate officers of the court, appointed
by the superior and district courts with commissions of five
years.”)
Mr. Manchon’s only reference to the moving defendants in
connection with bail is in his objection to the instant motion
(Doc. No. 30), where he argues that “[w]hether the police merely
conveyed the request or explicitly urged the commissioner to
adopt [the condition] is a factual issue not appropriate for
resolution on the pleadings.” Id. at 2. The Amended Complaint,
however, does not allege any involvement by the defendants in
Bail Commissioner Tucker’s decision. There are no facts alleged
to support Mr. Manchon’s conclusory implication that the
defendants “convey[ed] a request to” or “urg[ed]” Commissioner
Tucker to impose the allegedly unconstitutional condition.
Without any facts that could allow the court to make the
inference that the defendants engaged in any unconstitutional
conduct, the claim fails and must be dismissed. Accordingly, the
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings should also be
granted because the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice [to state a claim]).”
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should grant
the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No.
29).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Failure to file any objection within the specified time
waives the right to appeal the district court's Order. See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016). Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this
Report and Recommendation “are subject to review in the district
court.” Id. (cleaned up). Additionally, any issues “not
preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal.” Id.
_________________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
November 10, 2025
cc: Marc Jon Manchon, pro se
Counsel of Record
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