Griffin v. Burndy, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John R. Griffin, Jr.
v. 	Case No. 24-cv-00141-LM-AJ
Burndy, LLC and
Hubbell Incorporated
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff John R. Griffin, Jr. brings claims against
his former employer, Burndy, LLC, and Burndy’s parent company
Hubbell Incorporated.1 	In his amended complaint, Mr. Griffin
appears to allege claims for hostile work environment, reverse
discrimination, retaliation, and violation of the New Hampshire
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. 	See Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 45).
The defendants now move to dismiss the complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	(Doc. No. 46). 	Mr. Griffin
objects. 	(Doc. No. 48).2 	The defendants’ motion to dismiss is
before the court for a recommended disposition. 	See Order, May
23, 2025.
1 Mr. Griffin filed his complaint in Coos County Superior
Court, and the defendants removed the case to this court. 	See
Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1). 	For reasons explained in the
court’s January 15, 2025 order (Doc. No. 37), this court has
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and removal
was proper.
The court granted the defendants’ first motion to dismiss,
but permitted Mr. Griffin to file an amended complaint. 	Order,
Mar. 13, 2025 (Doc. No. 44).
2 The defendants also filed a reply brief (Doc. No. 50).
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For reasons explained below, the district judge should
grant in part and deny in part the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
Applicable Legal Standard
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set out in the
complaint and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the
pleader.” 	SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 2010).
Although the complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), it must allege each of the
essential elements of a viable cause of action and “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal punctuation
omitted).
Because Mr. Griffin is proceeding pro se, the court
construes his complaint liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” (internal citations
omitted)). 	Pro se status, however, “does not insulate a party
from complying with procedural and substantive law. 	Even under
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a liberal construction, the complaint must adequately allege the
elements of a claim with the requisite supporting facts.”
Chiras v. Associated Credit Servs., Inc., No. 12-10871-TSH, 2012
WL 3025093, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. July 23, 2012) (quoting Ahmed v.
Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
Background3
On January 30, 2023, Mr. Griffin started working as a
machine operator for Burndy at its manufacturing plants in
Lincoln and Littleton, New Hampshire. 	According to Mr. Griffin,
various coworkers and supervisors were hostile towards him based
on his professed political beliefs. 	For example, a shift
manager “exploded in a rage” when Mr. Griffin “shared a joke”
about the presidential administration. 	Another “group leader .
. . reacted violently” when Mr. Griffin mentioned the phrase
“stolen election” to another employee. 	On November 14, 2023,
Burndy sent Mr. Griffin a written warning regarding
“inappropriate conversation.”
3 The court draws the following factual allegations from Mr.
Griffin’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 45), as well as Mr.
Griffin’s initial state court complaint (Doc. No. 1-1), which he
incorporates by reference. 	Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 45) at 6.
Consistent with the standard of review, the factual allegations
are assumed true.
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According to Mr. Griffin, Burndy employees’ reactions to
his beliefs, coupled with the defendants’ policies, contributed
to a hostile work environment. 	On November 27, 2023, Mr.
Griffin notified the defendants, by letter, of his hostile work
environment complaints.
In early December 2023, Mr. Griffin filed a complaint with
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”),
raising concerns about Burndy’s safety practices. 	Specifically,
Mr. Griffin represented that while he worked for Burndy as a
machine operator, he was exposed to known toxins in a coolant
used for CNC machining when opening the machine door. 	This
exposure caused Mr. Griffin to become ill. 	Although the
defendants transferred Mr. Griffin to another department, Mr.
Griffin requested that respirators be mandatory for CNC machine
operators. 	Mr. Griffin also filed a complaint with the New
Hampshire Labor Board4 about exposure to CNC coolant and Burndy’s
apparent lack of statutorily required signage.
On March 15, 2024, Burndy suspended Mr. Griffin’s
employment, citing two anonymous complaints regarding Mr.
Griffin allegedly making threatening or disparaging remarks.
Burndy advised Mr. Griffin that it would contact him after the
investigation into the complaints completed. 	On March 20, 2024,
4 The court understands that Mr. Griffin refers to the New Hampshire
Department of Labor.
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Mr. Griffin spoke with the investigator and denied making any
threatening or disparaging remarks. 	Nevertheless, on March 28,
2024, Burndy issued a letter of termination, indicating that Mr.
Griffin was terminated for violating the anti-harassment,
discrimination, and retaliation policies, as well as the
violence-free workplace policy.
Prior to his termination, Mr. Griffin filed a complaint in
Coos County Superior Court on March 25, 2024. 	In that
complaint, Mr. Griffin raised concerns about his exposure to
toxic chemicals.
Discussion
Liberally construing his amended complaint, Mr. Griffin
alleges claims for hostile work environment (Claim 1),
retaliation (Claim 2), political discrimination (Claim 3), and
reverse discrimination (Claim 4) under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”) and RSA
chapter 354–A. 	He also alleges violations of New Hampshire’s
Whistleblower Protection Act, RSA chapter 275-E, (Claim 5). 	The
defendants move to dismiss Mr. Griffin’s complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), arguing that he failed to exhaust the administrative
prerequisites as to his Title VII and RSA chapter 354-A claims.
The defendants also argue that Mr. Griffin fails to state a
claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act and that Hubbell
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should be dismissed. 	The court first addresses the issue of
exhaustion.
I. 	Administrative Exhaustion
An employee alleging discrimination under Title VII must
file an administrative complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or a parallel state agency
before filing suit in court. 	Thornton v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 	The administrative
complaint must be filed “within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” or
within 300 days if “the person aggrieved has initially
instituted proceedings with [an authorized] State or local
agency.” 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 	In either case, the EEOC must
send the employee notice, in the form of what is known as a
right-to-sue letter, which constitutes the necessary
prerequisite for an employee to sue in federal court within 90
days. 	Franceschi v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 514 F.3d 81,
85 (1st Cir. 2008). 	Failing to timely bring a claim “bars the
courthouse door,” unless the court can identify a rarely granted
“equitable exception[ ].” 	Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez,
Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1999).
Similarly, under RSA chapter 354-A, an aggrieved employee
must “file a discrimination complaint with the [New Hampshire
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Commission for Human Rights] within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act.” 	Eldridge v. Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-
Will Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, 168 N.H. 87, 91, 122 A.3d 322 (2015);
see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21, III (“Any complaint
filed pursuant to this section by an aggrieved person must be
filed within 180 days after the alleged act of
discrimination.”). 	Claims under RSA chapter 354-A “are,
therefore, time-barred unless timely filed.” 	Samora v. UPS-SCS,
No. 21-cv-0596-PB, 2021 WL 4949126, at *2 (D.N.H. Oct. 25,
2021). 	“At this stage of the proceedings, dismissal is
appropriate only ‘when the pleader’s allegations leave no doubt
that an asserted claim is time-barred.’” 	Cavanagh v. IDEXX
Labs., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-273-NT, 2024 WL 2724195, at *3 (D. Me.
May 28, 2024) (quoting Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 121 (1st
Cir. 2010)).
Mr. Griffin concedes in his objection that he did not file
an administrative complaint with the EEOC or the New Hampshire
Commission for Human Rights. 	His complaint also contains no
allegations that he first filed his claims with either the EEOC
or the Commission. 	Moreover, his complaint “does not present
any ‘circumstances effectively beyond [his] control’ that would
excuse a delay in filing [an administrative complaint].”
Samora, 2021 WL 4949126, at *2 (quoting Bonilla, 194 F.3d at
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278). 	Mr. Griffin’s argument that the defendants “[brought]
late into litigation this matter of not filing a timely EEOC
charge,” (Doc. No. 48 at 2), is without merit. 	The defendants
raised the issue of administrative exhaustion in their motion to
dismiss Mr. Griffin’s original complaint. 	(See Doc. No. 7-1 at
10). 	Lacking any circumstances excusing his delay in filing
with the EEOC or the Commission, Mr. Griffin’s failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies bars his claims brought
under Title VII and RSA chapter 354-A (Claims 1–4).
Mr. Griffin cites Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385, 393 (1982) for the proposition that “a timely charge
of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that,
like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel,
and equitable tolling.” 	To be sure, and the defendants do not
disagree, Zipes stands for such a proposition, and the court
maintains jurisdiction despite Mr. Griffin’s failure to file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the Commission. 	The
court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin’s
claims, however, does not necessarily imply that his claims are
ones upon which the court may grant relief. 	Thus, while Mr.
Griffin’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not
divest the court of jurisdiction, it nevertheless “bars the
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courthouse door.” 	Bonilla, 194 F.3d at 278; Franceschi v. U.S.
Dept. of Veterans Aff., 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“[J]udicial recourse under Title VII . . . is not a remedy of
first resort. 	Before an employee may sue in federal court on a
Title VII claim, he must first exhaust administrative remedies.”
(citation omitted)).
The district judge should, therefore, dismiss Mr. Griffin’s
claims brought under Title VII and RSA chapter 354-A (Claims 1–
4) for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
II. 	Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (Claim 5)
The New Hampshire Whistleblowers’ Protection Act provides
that:
No employer shall harass, abuse, intimidate, discharge,
threaten, or otherwise discriminate against any employee
regarding compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because:
(a) The employee, in good faith, reports or causes to be
reported, verbally or in writing, what the employee has
reasonable cause to believe is a violation of any law or
rule 	adopted 	under 	the 	laws 	of 	this 	state, 	a 	political
subdivision of this state, or the United States; or
(b) The employee objects to or refuses to participate in
any activity that the employee, in good faith, believes
is a violation of the law . . . .
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-E:2, I. 	The Act permits aggrieved
employees to bring civil suits alleging violations of the
statute. 	Id. § 275-E:2, II.
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To state a prima facie claim, the employee must allege
that: (1) he engaged in an act protected by RSA chapter 275-E;
(2) he suffered an employment action proscribed by RSA chapter
275–E; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected act and the proscribed employment action. 	Hidalgo-
Semlek v. Hansa Medical, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 236, 261 (D.N.H.
2020). While a complaint need not plead facts sufficient to
establish a prima facie case to make out a plausible claim, the
elements of a prima facie case are “part of the background
against which a plausibility determination should be made.”
Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755 F.3d 711,
718 (1st Cir. 2014).
The defendants contend that Mr. Griffin’s amended complaint
lacks factual support to demonstrate a causal connection between
Mr. Griffin’s complaints about alleged discrimination5 and OSHA
violations and his termination. 	They argue that Mr. Griffin
fails to allege that the defendants knew of Mr. Griffin’s
reports before his termination or that his reports were a factor
in his termination.
Demonstrating a causal connection between a plaintiff’s
protected activity and the adverse employment action from which
5 The Court assumes, without deciding, that Mr. Griffin’s
discrimination complaints constitute protected activity under
New Hampshire’s Whistleblower Protection Act.
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the plaintiff suffered is not unduly burdensome. 	Plaintiffs may
rely on circumstantial evidence to establish a causal connection
because “it is rare that an employer will admit retaliatory
animus in testimony or written evidence.” 	Hidalgo-Semlek, 498
F. Supp. 3d at 266. 	“One type of circumstantial evidence of
causation is the temporal proximity between the protected acts
and the adverse employment action.” 	Id. 	“[C]ases that accept
mere temporal proximity as sufficient evidence of causality to
establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal
proximity must be ‘very close.’” 	Roman v. Hyannis Air Serv.,
Inc., ___ F.4th ___, ___, No. 23-1744, 2025 WL 2693402, at *5
(1st Cir. Sept. 22, 2025) (ellipses omitted). 	And, of course,
the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts either explicitly
alleging that the defendant employer was aware of the
plaintiff’s protected activity, or facts upon which the court
can draw a reasonable inference. 	See Stratton v. Bentley Univ.,
113 F.4th 25, 45 (1st Cir. 2024).
Liberally construed, Mr. Griffin’s factual allegations
sufficiently state a claim for violations of the New Hampshire
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. 	In November 2023, Mr. Griffin
complained to Burndy about what he perceived to be a hostile
work environment. 	Then, in early December 2023, Mr. Griffin
filed an OSHA complaint. 	At some point, Mr. Griffin filed a
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complaint with the Department of Labor related to his concerns
about the CNC machine. 	Finally, on March 25, 2024, ten days
after his suspension and three days before his termination, Mr.
Griffin filed suit in Coos County Superior Court.
The close temporal connection between Mr. Griffin’s
protected activityhis hostile work environment, OSHA, and
Department of Labor complaints and his superior court suitand
his suspension and termination, support causation. 	See Workman
v. Outfront Media, LLC, 474 F. Supp. 3d 373, 377 (D. Mass. 2020)
(causal connection sufficient where protected activity occurred
three months before termination); Mariani-Colon v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. ex rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 216, 224 (1st Cir.
2010) (two months between protected activity and termination
sufficient). 	Mr. Griffin has alleged “very close” temporal
proximity, particularly between the filing of his superior court
suit and his termination. 	While Mr. Griffin’s complaint
includes facts supporting Burndy’s proffered reason for
suspension and termination, the court cannot say that the
“larger picture undercuts any claim of causation.” 	Wright v.
CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003).
Mr. Griffin’s allegations also suffice to demonstrate
Burndy’s knowledge of his protected activity. 	Burndy was on
notice of Mr. Griffin’s November 2023 hostile work environment
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complaint, which he sent directly to the company. 	Further, the
court reasonably infers from Burndy’s transfer of Mr. Griffin to
a different department after his OSHA complaint, that Burndy was
aware of it.6 	Supporting that inference is Mr. Griffin’s request
that Burndy require respirators for CNC machine operators,
showing Burndy’s knowledge, at least in part, of Mr. Griffin’s
complaints. 	Upon review of Mr. Griffin’s allegations, he has
set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that Burndy knew of
his protected conduct when it suspended and terminated his
employment.7 	See Stratton, 113 F.4th at 45; see also Villiarmo
v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[I]n some cases, causation can be inferred from timing alone
6 In his objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr.
Griffin refers to a Burndy plant manager’s response to his OSHA
complaint. 	(Doc. No. 48 at 4). 	The court cannot consider that
fact in its analysis because Mr. Griffin raises it for the first
time in his objection and it is not alleged in his complaint.
“The scope of the court’s analysis on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
usually limited to facts and documents that are part of or
incorporated into the complaint.” 	Ortolano v. City of Nashua,
677 F. Supp. 3d 41, 44 (D.N.H. 2023) (quotation omitted).
7 The defendants argue they were not aware of Mr. Griffin’s
superior court suit before his termination, citing the Return of
Service which indicates they were served following his
termination. 	First, for the same reason the court cannot rely
on facts Mr. Griffin provided outside of the complaint, it
cannot rely on additional facts raised by the defendants.
Second, even if the court were to consider the Return of
Service, it does not necessarily establish that the defendants
were unaware of the suit before they were served.
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where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of
protected activity.”).
Upon conducting the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis “with due regard
for plaintiff’s pro se status,” Bourne v. Arruda, Civ. No. 10-
cv-393-LM, 2011 WL 2357504, at *3 (D.N.H. June 10, 2011), the
court finds that Mr. Griffin alleged facts sufficient to connect
his protected conduct to his discharge. 	For that reason, the
district judge should deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr.
Griffin’s Whistleblower Protection Act Claim (Claim 5).
III. 	Claims Against Hubbell
The defendants move to dismiss Hubbell from this action,
arguing that Mr. Griffin fails to state a claim against it
because his amended complaint lacks any allegations against
Hubbell. 	Mr. Griffin responds, contending that the “deep
pockets doctrine” or respondeat superior support an imposition
of liability against Hubbell. 	Mr. Griffin relies upon authority
analyzing personal jurisdiction, rather than liability. 	The
defendants do not dispute the court’s jurisdiction over Hubbell.
Hubbell should be dismissed because Mr. Griffin does not
allege facts of Hubbell’s wrongdoing. 	Hubbell cannot be held
liable solely arising out of its status as Burndy’s parent
corporation. 	See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61
(1998) (“It is a general principle of corporate law deeply
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ingrained in our economic and legal systems that a parent
corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries.”). 	While, in limited circumstances, a parent
company may be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary, Mr.
Griffin has not alleged facts supporting the application of that
exception. 	See id. (noting that a parent company may be held
liable for its subsidiary’s acts if, for example, the corporate
form is used to accomplish a wrongful purpose such as fraud).
Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Hubbell from this
action.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should grant
in part and deny in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc.
No. 46).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to
this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
district court. 	See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). 	Any issues not preserved by
such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. 	See id. 	Failure to
file specific written objections to the Report and
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Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
_______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
October 30, 2025
cc: 	John R. Griffin, pro se
Counsel of Record
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