Abrahams v. Northern NH Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
RICHARD ABRAHAMS, JR.
v. Civil No. 24-cv-084-SE-TSM
NORTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented Plaintiff Richard Abrahams, Jr., who is incarcerated at the Northern New
Hampshire Correctional Facility (“NCF”), filed a Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and Complaint Addenda
(Doc. Nos. 3, 8-11, 15),1 alleging that officers and officials at both NCF and the New Hampshire
State Prison (“NHSP”) violated his federal constitutional rights. In the initial preliminary review
of this case, conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and LR 4.3(d)(1), the court directed
Abrahams to amend his Complaint to clarify the facts underlying his claims, and to name
individual Defendants to each claim. The court now completes its preliminary review of
Abrahams’s Complaint.2
DISCUSSION
I. Inadequate Medical Care Claim
A. Legal Standard
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate indifference
to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.” Lech v. von Goeler, 92 F.4th 56, 74 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing
1 The court considers Abrahams’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and Complaint Addenda (Doc. Nos. 3,
8-11, 15), together, to be the Complaint in this matter for all purposes.
2 In conducting this preliminary review, the court applies the preliminary review standard set forth
in its April 22, 2024 Order (Doc. No. 6).
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 1 of 10

2
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim
challenging medical care, a prisoner must show both a serious medical need and that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to that need. Id. A serious medical need is one that has
either been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious “even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Lech, 192 F.4th at 74
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Prison officials are deliberately indifferent when
they know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” meaning that they
“either deny needed medical treatment in order to punish the inmate, or display wanton or criminal
recklessness in the treatment afforded.” Id. at 75 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
B. Facts Asserted in the Complaint and Analysis
Abrahams asserts that, since at least 2019, he has had serious problems with his left hip,
which cause him a great deal of pain. In 2020, before his incarceration, he was being treated for
hip issues in the community, and was scheduled to have hip replacement surgery in November
2020. Abrahams states that the surgery did not occur at that time, due to circumstances beyond
his control.
Abrahams was convicted of the offense underlying his present incarceration in November
2022, and on February 27, 2023, he was sentenced to serve 8-16 years in prison. Upon his
conviction, he was briefly detained at the Strafford County Department of Corrections (“SCDC”)
pending sentencing. While at the SCDC, Abrahams asserts, he obtained his medical records, had
x-rays taken, and was medicated with a daily patch.
After Abrahams’s sentencing, he was transferred to the NHSP. While there, Abrahams
experienced daily severe pain due to his left hip issues and had x-rays taken. Abrahams states that
an x-ray technician, upon seeing his x-rays, told Abrahams that his hip looked bad, and like it
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 2 of 10

3
needed treatment. Abrahams alleges that he did not receive any treatment for his hip at the NHSP
before being transferred to the NCF on March 22, 2023.
After his transfer to the NCF, Abrahams asserts that his hip condition and pain worsened,
but that he received no treatment, despite making many requests for treatment at sick call, and
many requests for outside specialized care. Abrahams states that he did not receive any treatment,
possibly until September 2023, when he was taken to see an outside provider at a hospital. In a
filing made shortly after seeing the outside provider, Abrahams said he anticipated having surgery
soon. The current record before the court does not reflect whether he had that surgery or any other
treatment since that time.
Abrahams alleges that A.R.P.N. Elizabeth Munyu is primarily responsible for denying him
treatment at the NCF, and delaying his outside treatment and surgery, as she was his primary
medical provider at the NCF. He alleges that during a sick call visit for his hip pain, Munyu asked
him to take a few steps so that she could watch him walk, and that after he took three steps, Munyu
said she did not see anything wrong with his hip. Abrahams asked her to watch him walk further
and she declined. Abrahams also states that he spoke to other NCF medical providers and medical
department officials about his hip issues, and filed requests and grievances with those individuals,
specifically: Dr. John Mandly, Nurse Coordinator Pelletier (whose first name is unknown
(“FNU”)), Director Paula Mattis, and Deputy Director M. Reed, but that none of those individuals
provided him with or facilitated the provision of the treatment he required.
Abrahams asserted sufficient facts, at this stage of the case, to allow his Eighth Amendment
medical claims to go forward against the above-identified Defendants. Accordingly, in an Order
issued simultaneously with this Report and Recommendation, the court directs service of that
claim upon those Defendants.
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 3 of 10

4
II. Access to the Courts Claim - Failure to Transport to a Court Hearing
A. Legal Standard
Prisoners have a right to “meaningful access to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
351 (1996). To state a claim alleging a violation of that right, a prisoner-plaintiff must allege facts
showing that defendants actually injured his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous claim either
challenging a criminal conviction, or asserting civil claims the prisoner has a right to litigate. See
id. at 352, 354-55; see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 US. 403, 416 (2002). In the Complaint
“[t]he plaintiff must identify a ‘nonfrivolous,’ ‘arguable’ underlying claim,” and must “show that
the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415-16
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). An injury which can support an access-to-the-courts claim is
one that causes “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the
inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348.
B. Facts Asserted in the Complaint and Analysis
As noted above, Abrahams was convicted in the state Superior Court on the charge
underlying his present incarceration in November 2022 and sentenced on February 27, 2023. Prior
to his sentencing, Abrahams filed a motion in Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing concerning
new evidence in his criminal case. The court granted the motion and scheduled an evidentiary
hearing for March 23, 2023. On March 22, 2023, the day before the hearing, Abrahams was
transferred from the NHSP to the NCF. He was not, however, transported to court for the March
23, 2023 evidentiary hearing.
Abrahams states that his counsel told him that someone at the court had called the prison
and been told that Abrahams had refused transport to the hearing and had locked himself in his
cell, which Abrahams states was a false statement, because he did not refuse transport, and because
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 4 of 10

5
he was housed in a day room and could not have locked himself in his cell. According to the
docket sheet in Abrahams’s criminal case, the evidentiary hearing was held on March 23, 2023.3
Abrahams does not allege any facts about the evidentiary hearing which would allow the
court to determine whether that action was nonfrivolous, and whether it contained arguable claims.
Abrahams provides no specific allegations about the nature of the proceeding, the result he hoped
to achieve at the hearing, or the impact of his absence from the hearing, which his attorney
attended. Abrahams only alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he believes he had “a good chance
to be released and go home” after that hearing, Doc. No. 9, at 3 (cleaned up), and that he “strongly
beli[eves] had [he] made it to court that day, [he] would be a free man today,” Doc. No. 10, at 3.
Those statements, without more, are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief might be granted
for a denial of access to the courts, and the district judge should dismiss that claim, without
prejudice to Abrahams’s ability to assert such a claim, asserting additional facts, in a separate
action.4
3 See Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 1990) (“It is well-accepted that federal courts
may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if those proceedings have relevance to the
matters at hand.”).
4 Even if Abrahams is able to assert sufficient additional facts to state a claim for denial of access
to the courts, such claims are not properly brought in this case, as they are unrelated to his Eighth
Amendment claims, and concern different Defendants than the claims proceeding in this matter.
In general, “[a] party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many
claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18. A plaintiff may join multiple
defendants in a single action if he asserts against each defendant at least one claim to relief that
“aris[es] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and
presents “any question of law or fact common to all defendants.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
The court notes that, should Abrahams wish to file a separate action asserting his access to the
courts claim, the three-year statute of limitations for filing such an action expires March 23, 2026.
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 5 of 10

6
III. September 3, 2024 Incident
A. Facts Asserted in the Complaint
Abrahams asserts that on September 3, 2024, he encountered Sgt. FNU Raymon, a
corrections officer who he states has been abusive to him in the past and asked her “if she feels
good about herself when she goes home.” Doc. No. 11 at pgs. 1-2. Abrahams asserts that, as a
result, he was locked into a bare cell and given two disciplinary tickets.
Abrahams states that when he was being handcuffed in connection with that incident, he
was forced against a wall and ordered to get on his knees. Abrahams asserts that he told the officers
involved many times that he had a serious medical problem with his left hip which required
surgery. Nevertheless, Abrahams asserts that NCF Corrections Officer FNU Dubbie “kept kneeing
[Abrahams] in [his] left hip.” Id. at pg. 2. Abrahams told Dubbie to stop many times. Dubbie
then forced Abrahams to the ground facing the wall. Abrahams asserts he experienced a great deal
of pain during and after the incident.
Abrahams wrote a request to be seen by a doctor for the pain caused by Dubbie’s actions,
and described the incident in his request. Instead of going to the medical department as Abrahams
intended, the request was routed to Lt. FNU Sweat. Abrahams was called to Sweat’s office, where
Sweat “gave [him] hell[] for the medical request.” Doc. No. 15 at pg. 3.
B. Excessive Force Claim
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on
prisoners. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a
prisoner must allege facts to establish that the defendant’s actions were “objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation” and that subjectively the force was applied
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Segrain v. Duffy, 118 F.4th
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 6 of 10

7
45, 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). Abrahams’s allegations that Dubbie intentionally caused
him pain by kneeing him repeatedly in the left hip, after being told that he had serious issues with
his left hip for which he needed surgery, is sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to allow an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed against Dubbie. In the Order issued
simultaneously with this Report and Recommendation, the court directs service of that claim on
Dubbie.
C. Verbal Harassment and Threatening Claims
Abrahams alleges that both Raymon and Sweat were verbally abusive and/or verbally
threatening to Abrahams in connection with the September 3, 2024 incident. To the extent
Abrahams intends to assert an Eighth Amendment claim based on that conduct, “[a]llegations of
verbal threats and harassment, standing alone, are insufficient to assert any constitutional
violation.” Johnson v. Englander, No. 20-cv-398-JL, 2021 WL 12295097, at *10 (D.N.H. Dec.
15, 2021), R&R approved, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4698, at *2, 2023 WL 159640 (D.N.H. Jan. 11,
2023) (citing Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F. Supp. 2d 177, 200-01 (D. Mass. 1999) (without more, verbal
harassment by officers does not violate prisoner’s constitutional rights) (collecting cases)).
Accordingly, Abrahams’s allegations concerning Raymon’s and Sweat’s threats and/or verbal
harassment are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the district judge
should dismiss those claims.
IV. Retaliation Claims
Abrahams asserts that, in retaliation for bringing this lawsuit, NCF officials and/or officers
have retaliated against him by denying him a job he requested, interfering with his mail, and
engaging in “deliberate indifferences.” Doc. No. 8 at pg. 1; see also Doc. No. 15 at pgs. 3-4.
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 7 of 10

8
“[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from
subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. If
an official takes adverse action against someone based on that forbidden motive,
and “non-retaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse
consequences,” the injured person may generally seek relief by bringing a First
Amendment claim.
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (citations omitted).
“To state an actionable claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must allege facts showing, among
other things, that he has suffered a non-de minimis adverse action at the hands of defendants that
is causally linked to his exercise of First Amendment rights.” Jordan v. Hanks, Civil No. 23-cv-
307-LM-AJ, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73885, at *23, 2025 WL 1135642, at *9 (D.N.H. Jan. 8, 2025)
(citing Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011)), R&R adopted sub nom., Jordan v. NH
Dep’t of Corr., Comm’r, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73885, at *1, 2025 WL 1135589, at *1 (D.N.H.
Apr. 17, 2025). “An adverse act is not de minimis if it ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary
firmness from future First Amendment activities.’” Jordan, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73885, at *23,
2025 WL 1135642, at *9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Abrahams asserts no facts to demonstrate a causal connection between interference with
his mail or unspecified “deliberate indifferences” to his filing this lawsuit. As to his assertion that
he was denied a job in retaliation for this lawsuit, Abrahams states that NCF officers and/or
officials cited a February 2024 disciplinary violation as the basis for the August 2025 denial of his
job request, which Abrahams believes is a pretextual justification for that denial, which he claims
was motivated instead by retaliatory intent. Abrahams failed to allege, however: any causal or
chronological connection between the denial of his job and this lawsuit, that the individual who
denied his job request was aware of this lawsuit, or any facts to demonstrate that the February 2024
disciplinary violation was not by itself a sufficient basis to deny his job request. Therefore,
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 8 of 10

9
Abrahams failed to state sufficient facts to demonstrate that any NCF official or officer violated
his First Amendment rights by taking non-de minimis adverse action against him in retaliation for
filing this lawsuit. Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Abrahams’s retaliation claims.
V. September 28, 2025 Incident
Abrahams asserts that on September 28, 2025, after an interaction between Cpl. FNU
Joseph and a small group of prisoners which included Abrahams, Joseph “made a threat[en]ing
statement[] that he would murder me, then come to my funeral.” Doc. No. 15 at pg. 2. As
discussed above, without more, Joseph’s threatening statement does not amount to a constitutional
violation, and the district judge should dismiss Abrahams’s claim alleging that Joseph threatened
him.
VI. Official Capacity Claims
Abrahams named two state agencies – the NCF and the NHSP – as Defendants to this
action. As discussed in the Court’s April 22, 2024 Order (Doc. No. 6), the Eleventh Amendment
generally precludes a plaintiff from suing state agencies in federal court. See Town of Barnstable
v. O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss all
of the claims asserted against the NCF and the NHSP from this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss all of the claims asserted, and
Defendants named, in this action other than: (1) an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care
claim asserted against Defendants A.P.R.N. Elizabeth Munyu, Dr. John Mandly, Nurse
Coordinator FNU Pelletier, Director Paula Mattis, and Deputy Director M. Reed; and (2) an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim against Correctional Officer FNU Dubbie. In an Order issued
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 9 of 10

10
this date, the court directs service of those claims on the Defendants listed. The district judge
should dismiss Abrahams’s denial of access to the courts claim without prejudice, as set forth
above.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection to this Report and Recommendation are
subject to review in the district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Natl Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by such objection(s) are precluded on
appeal. See id. Failure to file any objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal
the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
______________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
December 10, 2025
cc: Richard Abrahams, Jr., pro se
Case 1:24-cv-00084-JL-TSM Document 16 Filed 12/10/25 Page 10 of 10