Woods v. Westbridge Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Gordon Woods
v. Civil No. 1:24-cv-027-SE-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 034
WestBridge Incorporated, Steven Berry,
Stacie Lucius, Kevin Keefe,
and Phillip Cole
O R D E R
Plaintiff Gordon Woods filed an amended complaint alleging, in large part, employment
discrimination on the basis of his Irish national origin, race, ethnicity, and ancestry. He claims:
(1) discrimination in violation of Title VII; (2) hostile work environment in violation of Title
VII; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (4) race discrimination in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (5) retaliation in violation of § 1981; and (6) hostile work
environment in violation of § 1981. He names as defendants his former employer, WestBridge
Incorporated, and four current or former WestBridge employees, Steven Berry, Stacie Lucius,
Kevin Keefe, and Phillip Cole.
WestBridge, Berry, and Lucius (WestBridge defendants) move to dismiss the amended
complaint in its entirety. Doc. no. 34. Keefe and Cole separately move to dismiss Counts IV and
V of the amended complaint. Doc. no. 32. Keefe and Cole also move to join their co-defendants’
motion to dismiss with their assent. Doc. no. 37. In addition, Woods moves to strike (1) portions
of Keefe and Cole’s reply to his objection to their motion to dismiss, doc. no. 36, and (2) Exhibit
A to the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss, doc. no. 34-2. See doc. nos. 41 & 38.
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For the reasons explained below, the court denies Keefe and Cole’s motion to dismiss
and their motion for joinder. The WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in its
entirety. Woods’s motions to strike are denied as moot.1
Background2
WestBridge is a New Hampshire corporation that provides treatment services for adults
with mental illness and substance use disorders. On May 7, 2013, WestBridge hired Woods as a
part-time mentor. The remaining defendants, employees of WestBridge, worked with or
supervised Woods. Berry worked in various capacities, including CEO. Lucius worked as a Care
Manager and Chief of Clinical Services. Keefe worked as WestBridge’s acting Human
Resources Manager. Cole held various roles at WestBridge including Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy Team Leader and Clinical Director.
For the first 18 years of his life, Woods lived through the “Troubles” conflict in the
Republic of Ireland. During that time, he lived close to the border between Southern and
Northern Ireland. Woods is proficient in a Gaelic dialect and speaks English with an Irish accent.
He immigrated to the United States around age 18.
Woods alleges that the defendants subjected him to a pattern of discrimination,
retaliation, and hostility while he was employed at WestBridge on account of his Irish national
origin, race, ethnicity, and ancestry. The problematic behavior began early in his tenure and
culminated in a 2021 leave of absence that effectively ended his employment.
1 Woods also moves for leave to file a late objection to the WestBridge defendants’
motion to dismiss. Doc. no. 46. The court grants that motion and has considered the objection in
ruling on the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss.
2 The following facts are as alleged in the amended complaint.
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After joining WestBridge in 2013, Woods enrolled in college with the goal of becoming a
Licensed Alcohol and Drug Counselor (LADC) in New Hampshire. The licensure process
required Woods to log hours under the supervision of a licensed professional. During his
employment at WestBridge, various WestBridge employees supervised Woods for this purpose.
Woods alleges that WestBridge employees manipulated the supervision requirement “as a
punitive tool to influence the terms and conditions of . . . employment.” Doc. no. 29 at 5.
Early in his employment, in 2014 and 2015, Woods experienced a raft of comments
related to his Irish nationality and ethnicity. In 2014, Mary Woods, who at times served as
WestBridge’s CEO, asked Woods to fix the way the window blinds were positioned during a
meeting because they looked like “shanty Irish” from the outside. Walker, Woods’s supervisor,
and Berry, Keefe, and Lucius were present and did not object to Mary’s remark. Further, when
Keefe gave Woods the keys to the main office he said: “Why do we have keys . . . To keep
people honest.” Id. at 5. Woods understood this comment to stigmatize “alcoholics (a stereotype
about Irish people) [as] being untrustworthy.” Id.
Also in 2014, employees at WestBridge wrapped Woods’s office chair in tape that looked
like the United Kingdom flag (Union Jack tape). When Woods arrived at work, “people were
snickering under their breath.” Id. at 6. Woods became visibly upset, and shouted things like:
“Who the fuck did this!?”; “What the fuck is this!?”; “What does this mean!?” Lucius was
among those present when this incident occurred. Although Woods complained about the
offense, nothing was done to remedy it. In Woods’s view, “the Union Jack represents British
sovereignty and rule over Ireland and surrounding nations, which includes British imperialism,
persecution, and the genocide of the Irish through the potato famine.” Id. at 7.
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In 2015, Mary and Keefe repeatedly told Woods that his “‘Irish brain’ made him speak
up about concerns.” Id. at 6. Woods asked Mary and Keefe to stop making such offensive
comments, which led to a lunch for the three of them to “talk it through.” Mary and Keefe
explained their interpretation of “Irish brain” as referring to Woods’s temperament and
disposition, and Woods explained why it offended him. Id. After the meeting, Mary and Keefe
continued to make references to Woods’s “Irish brain.”
In another 2015 incident, company leadership selected Woods and other members of the
team to attend an experiential training in Arizona. As part of the training, the facilitator asked
Woods to share personal information regarding his childhood in Ireland, his family history, and
his political and religious views. Woods shared how his experiences living through the Troubles
shaped him as a person. He felt uncomfortable doing so, but shared out of fear of employment
repercussion. He had observed that WestBridge leadership would mistreat employees who
opposed them by making their working conditions difficult, “seemingly to compel them to
resign.” Id. at 8. Upon returning from the leadership training, WestBridge employees, including
Keefe and Lucius, asked Woods and the other attendees to share their experiences in Arizona.
Also in 2015, Woods complained to Keefe—who was acting as the Human Resources
Manager—about harassment he had suffered from coworkers. Keefe responded that Woods had
“resentment.” Id. Later, in 2017, a Westbridge employee “verbally abused, harassed, and
physically postured himself to attack” Woods. Id. Woods complained to Keefe, who was still the
HR Manager, and filed an incident report. In response to the report, Keefe dismissed Woods’s
experience as “subjective,” stating that “when a finger is pointed, remember there are three
pointing back.” Id. at 9. Keefe took no action against the offending employee. When the
employee later left the company, Keefe permitted the former employee to visit the office and
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attend a WestBridge event on the basis that the person’s family had “spent a lot of money here,”
so “had a right to be there . . . anytime.” Id. Woods complained about Keefe’s mishandling of his
complaints to leadership, but WestBridge took no action to investigate the abusive employee or
Keefe’s response.
Also in 2017, WestBridge held an employee training on trauma facilitated by Mary and
Lucius. They asked Woods to “commit more and not be so quiet.” Id. at 10. Woods felt
uncomfortable participating, but shared the same personal information he had shared in 2015 in
Arizona, this time with the entire company. Woods sought guidance from WestBridge leadership
on how to manage his feelings about sharing his past traumas, but received no support.
In 2018, James Sheldon became Woods’s direct supervisor and a team leader. Woods
alleges upon information and belief that Sheldon had heard about Woods’s past experiences in
Ireland through Woods’s participation in the trainings. This allegedly led to harassing comments
such as repeated remarks like: “There is just something about you that triggers me.” Id. at 10.
Sheldon also made comments about how Woods could potentially be violent because of his
experiences growing up in Ireland. At some point, Sheldon insinuated in front of the team he led
that a pregnant employee had a relationship with Woods, saying that her child would “come out
with an Irish accent and a beard.” Id. Woods complained to leadership, but no investigation
occurred and the harassment continued.
At unspecified times, Woods told Lucius about “medication discrepancies” he had found
and asked how to rectify them, but Lucius responded: “Oh I don’t want to find anything.” Id. at
11. This was consistent with Woods’s experience of “a steadfast culture of not investigating
workplace complaints at” WestBridge. Id.
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Around 2018, an unnamed coworker harassed Woods by going to his house and honking
from his car at early hours while Woods’s young son was trying to sleep. Woods complained
repeatedly to HR about the coworker’s conduct, and also complained in a 2018 meeting with
Lucius, Berry, and Keefe, where he described the emotional distress the harassment caused.
Rather than taking any corrective action, the company gave the harassing employee a workplace
award shortly after Woods had raised his complaints.
Woods alleges that the defendants’ discrimination “sharply increased” when Berry
became WestBridge’s CEO in 2018. His tenure resulted in a high turnover of human resources
professionals. Woods learned from a former HR team member that Berry had told her that
Woods “reminds me of me . . . I had to work on my Irish temper too.” Id. at 12. Woods
continued to suffer offensive comments and alleged “racial slurs.” Id. These comments occurred
in a gathering area called the “bullpen,” where Berry and Keefe could hear everything said.
Although one employee was terminated for swearing in the bullpen, Berry and Keefe never
intervened when employees made offensive comments about Woods in the same location.
Around March 2020, a conversation occurred in the bullpen about the Irish potato
famine. Someone asked, in good faith, why the Irish did not fish to survive. Another employee
mockingly, through chuckles, asked: “Yeah, why didn’t they just fish?” Id. at 13. Woods
responded: “If you make a joke about the Holocaust in the workplace you have a lawsuit, but
someone makes a joke about the potato famine and my people dying and it is a big joke.” Id.
Numerous employees and leadership, including Berry, were present for this incident or heard
about it secondhand.
In another incident, WestBridge employees collectively repeated the word “potato” in a
mocking manner that Woods and a new employee found disrespectful. Id. Woods alleges that
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Berry and Keefe either witnessed or heard about both these incidents, and he also complained
about them to Lucius, who took no action. Around twenty times throughout his employment,
WestBridge employees called Woods “Paddy” or “Mick.” Id. Employees said “potato” in a
demeaning manner to Woods with the same frequency. Id. The defendants knew about these
comments but did nothing to stop them.
Cole transferred to WestBridge’s New Hampshire facility around October 2018. He
worked closely with Berry. Cole repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to discriminate against
women in the workplace. He told Woods about how he “would carry out Berry’s directives by
making [WestBridge] participants give false information about [WestBridge] employees . . . as a
pretext to terminate employment.” Id. at 14.
Around 2019, Woods applied for a promotion to an open Team Leader position. He
learned that Cole had also applied. Given Cole’s close relationship with Berry, Woods
anticipated that Cole would get the job, so he withdrew his application. Cole said to Woods:
“Irish need not apply, right?” Woods complained about this comment to Lucius, but she only
rolled her eyes in response. Cole ultimately received the job.
Also in 2019, Cole allegedly falsified that another employee had complained to HR about
Woods, which triggered an investigation. When Woods met with the employee to discuss her
complaint, she said she had never complained to HR about him. Woods again complained to
Lucius to no avail.
Another incident occurred around February 2020, when in front of the team Cole said to
Woods: “You will be rooting for the Irish gypsy this weekend,” in reference to an upcoming
match featuring an Irish boxer. Around March 2020, media reports surfaced about Conor
McGregor, another Irish boxer, having behavioral and substance use problems. In front of the
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team, Cole asked Woods when they would get McGregor as a client and stated: “We only have
room for one Irish guy in recovery here.” Id. at 17. In another incident, Woods told Cole he
could not work certain on-call shifts due to family obligations, and Cole replied: “ILM,” which
he explained meant “Irish lives matter.” Another time, in the presence of Berry and other
leadership and staff, Cole compared Woods to a former employee who had a “wicked Irish
tongue.” Id. Woods privately confronted Cole about the statement. Cole apologized for
comparing Woods to the former employee “but did not apologize for the racist statement.” Id.
Woods unsuccessfully complained to Lucius about each of these incidents. At some point, Cole
told Woods that Berry had given him permission to “get rid of who you want” and “build your
team from the bottom up.” Id. at 18.
In 2020, Woods complained to Lucius “for months about Cole’s unethical and
discriminatory behavior before [WestBridge] took any action.” Further:
Mr. Woods complained to Lucius that Cole was targeting him by trying to instigate
him with offensive Irish comments, posturing over him with his hands on Mr.
Woods’s shoulder, stating that he preferred fighting to resolve problems like when
he would “duke it out” during his employment in the sanitation field, following Mr.
Woods home, watching his house, insinuating that coworkers were having sexual
affairs, and putting Mr. Woods on work schedules that he specifically asked Cole
not to work.
Id.
WestBridge ultimately investigated Cole’s conduct. Woods alleges that complaints from
numerous employees prompted the investigation. The company placed Cole on administrative
leave, and his employment ended around October 2020. WestBridge permitted Cole to attend a
recovery event after his firing, which caused discomfort amongst employees. Woods complained
to Lucius about Cole’s attendance at the event, but Berry said that Cole had made a
“considerable donation” to WestBridge. Id. at 19.
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Eventually, Woods alleges, Berry’s “conduct and omissions during his tenure as
[WestBridge’s] CEO[ made it] clear that he wanted to terminate” Woods’s employment. Id.
Around January 2021, Woods stepped into the role of Team Coordinator on an interim basis.
Lucius had explained to Woods that the coordinator position “would fizzle out once they had an
ACT Team Leader in place.” Id. He could not, however, apply for the Team Leader position
because WestBridge “changed the job qualifications to require the applicant to have a master’s
degree,” although the company had not previously required that credential. Id. Woods alleges
that WestBridge changed job description because it knew that he did not have a master’s degree
and the change would render him ineligible. He believes the position was “specifically tailored”
to exclude him. Id. at 20.
Woods’s interim term as Team Coordinator ended when another employee was promoted
to the position on a permanent basis. Woods had heard Berry comment multiple times that the
promoted employee “had the right temperament,” in reference to Woods’s “Irish temperament.”
Id. Woods believes “temperament” was a “coded reference” to his “‘Irish brain’ and his national
origin, race, ethnicity, and ancestry.” Id.
On June 3, 2021, Woods was accused of using an inappropriate “tone” while responding
to questions while he was leading an employee training. Id. In response, Woods met with the HR
Director. After speaking with Woods, she told him that no further investigation into the incident
was necessary. The HR Director told Woods that Berry had yelled at her to “find something” on
Woods, but she “told him many times there is nothing to follow up on.” Id. at 21. The HR
Director confirmed to Woods that Berry wanted him out of the company. Berry had told her that
Woods was “yelling” during the training incident, but the HR Director knew that was false and
told Berry. According to the HR Director, Woods had been labeled a “complainer” by
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management. Woods believes this label was in reference to his “voiced concerns about
participant care and the discriminatory and retaliatory treatment he suffered because of his
national origin, race, ethnicity, and ancestry.” Id. Woods asked HR about using an anonymous
tip line, but the Director told him not to because the complaint would go to Berry.
A week after Woods met with HR, around August 5, 2021, Woods had a surprise meeting
with HR, Lucius, and another employee, who told him he was being sent on a two-day
communications training due to the June 3, 2021 “tone” incident. Woods told the group that the
training was a “sell out” and “a retaliatory response because of his complaints about Cole.” Id. at
22. He also told them that he knew from his prior meeting with the HR Director that “Berry
wants me out.” Id. Lucius was silent in response. Woods completed the communications
training.
Later, at a meeting with Lucius, Berry, and HR, WestBridge demoted Woods from his
mentor team leader position and issued a “corrective action” and a final warning for his conduct
on June 3, 2021 and August 5, 2021. Berry and Lucius “bullied” Woods during the meeting by
repeatedly asking him: “Have you nothing to say?” Id. at 22. Woods “could tell that Berry and
Lucius intended to evoke a response . . . to manufacture a termination reason.” Id. Woods asked
to take the paperwork regarding the corrective action home and give notes to HR later. He also
asked how the demotion would affect his salary, but Berry insisted that he “[l]ook at [him]” and
give any notes on the spot. Id. at 23. Woods felt pressured to sign the corrective action
paperwork, which had “discrepancies and was baseless and retaliatory.” Id. Woods did not
consent to his demotion, which he alleges on information and belief would materially affect his
work duties and hours. The meeting resulted in the first corrective action on his record.
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After the meeting, Woods had a nervous breakdown. On August 13, 2021, he emailed HR
that, on his doctor’s recommendation, he was “requesting a medical leave of absence beginning
Monday August 16th due to anxiety and newly diagnosed depression caused directly by [his]
work environment, including . . . ongoing harassment.” Id. at 24.
On August 16, 2021, Lucius, who was supervising Woods’s hours in support of his
LADC licensure, abruptly ended Woods’s three-year supervision agreement. Westbridge and
Lucius had control of the documents related to Woods’s supervision hours and Lucius did not
produce them to Woods after terminating his supervision. On a prior leave of absence related to a
knee surgery around 2018, WestBridge did not revoke or suspend his supervision agreement, in
contrast to the events in 2021.
Further, Lucius had promised Woods she would provide him with a letter of
recommendation for a master’s program. On August 24, 2021, Woods received the letter after
the application deadline had closed. Woods did not get accepted to the master’s program.
After Woods’s leave of absence, WestBridge did not “reintegrate” him into his
employment, and instead left him “hovering in employment purgatory, not knowing where he
stands, which effectively terminated his employment.” Id. at 26. Woods never received any
follow-up regarding his August 13, 2021 complaint of harassment.
On May 18, 2022, Woods filed a charge of discrimination with the New Hampshire
Commission for Human Rights (NHCHR), which he cross-filed with the EEOC. On January 31,
2024, Woods filed his case with this court. His original complaint alleged claims of
discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge under Title VII,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the New Hampshire Law Against
Discrimination. Woods filed his amended complaint with this court on February 28, 2025,
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dropping his ADA and state law claims, and his claims against one of the original defendants.
Keefe and Cole move to dismiss Counts IV and V, which allege race discrimination and
retaliation under § 1981. Doc. no. 32. The WestBridge defendants move to dismiss the amended
complaint in its entirety, doc. no. 34, and Keefe and Cole move to join that motion, doc no. 37.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
make factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if it pleads “factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This
standard “demands that a party do more than suggest in conclusory terms the existence of
questions of fact about the elements of a claim.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d
77, 81 (1st Cir. 2013). To test a complaint’s sufficiency, the court must employ a two-step
approach. First, it must identify and disregard statements that “merely offer ‘legal conclusions
couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ocasio-Hernández
v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alterations
omitted)). Second, the court must credit as true all nonconclusory factual allegations and the
reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations. See id. Only then can the court determine
whether the “combined allegations, taken as true, . . . state a plausible, not a merely conceivable,
case for relief.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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Discussion
Before turning to the arguments raised in the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss,
the court must address several other outstanding motions.
I. Keefe and Cole’s Motion to Dismiss
In addition to his claims against WestBridge, Woods asserted two claims, Counts IV and
V, against Berry, Keefe, Lucius, and Cole as individuals. Those claims are for race
discrimination and retaliation in violation of § 1981. In their motion to dismiss, Keefe and Cole
argue that § 1981 does not allow claims for individual liability, relying on Fantini v. Salem State
College, 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009), which dealt with individual liability for employees
under Title VII. But as Woods correctly counters in his objection to their motion, although the
First Circuit has made clear that there is no individual employee liability under Title VII, it has
not extended that holding to § 1981 and has suggested the opposite. See Alston v. Spiegel, 988
F.3d 564, 572–73 (1st Cir. 2021) (pointing out that a § 1981 claim’s deficiencies included its
failure to allege that an individual defendant’s conduct “impaired” the employment relationship
or that the individual “had any influence on the terms and conditions of” the plaintiff’s
employment or “any role in the enforcement of the contract”). Moreover, in Dalomba v.
Simonsen, Judge Barbadoro rejected the defendants’ argument that § 1981 does not allow claims
against individuals, reasoning that “[a]lthough the First Circuit has not explicitly addressed the
issue, at least five circuits have held that § 1981 permits claims for individual liability.” No. 15-
CV-272-PB, 2016 WL 1257891, at *6 n.7 (D.N.H. Mar. 30, 2016) (collecting cases). This court
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agrees with Judge Barbadoro and the persuasive authority he cites and therefore denies Keefe
and Cole’s motion to dismiss.3 Their argument under Fantini is misplaced.4
II. Keefe and Cole’s Motion to Join WestBridge’s Motion to Dismiss
Keefe and Cole also move to join the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss. Doc.
no. 37. Woods objects to the motion on the bases that (1) “Defendants have waived these
arguments” and (2) “Defendants offer no articulation of why the factual and legal analysis
underlying their co-Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and Mr. Woods’s Objection to same, are
applicable to them.” Doc. no. 43-1 at 3. The court tends to agree with Woods that Keefe and
Cole waived the arguments in the WestBridge defendants’ motion when they omitted those
3 Keefe and Cole also argue that Counts IV and V are actually Title VII claims or should
be dismissed as “defective.” Doc. no. 36. These arguments rely entirely on the references to
“§ 1981 et seq” in the headers for the claims. Doc. no. 29 at 30-32. Keefe and Cole maintain that
the inclusion of “et seq” renders the claims Title VII claims, causes an ambiguity, or
impermissibly pleads multiple claims in a single count. These arguments are unpersuasive. Keefe
and Cole have not explained why Woods would raise separate, explicit Title VII claims for
discrimination and retaliation in other counts, while also somehow implying—via only the
citation form “et seq”—that the claims brought against the individuals under § 1981 are also, or
include, Title VII claims.
4 The court agrees with Woods that Keefe and Cole have improperly raised arguments in
their reply that were not raised in their motion to dismiss. Keefe and Cole’s motion to dismiss
argued only that § 1981 does not provide for individual liability. Woods’s objection properly
responded only to that argument. Keefe and Cole’s reply, however, argues for the first time that
Woods failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for his § 1981 claims against
them. But arguments “raised for the first time in reply briefing are considered waived.” Planet
Fitness Int’l Franchise v. JEG-United, LLC, 633 F. Supp. 3d 484, 501 n.16 (D.N.H. 2022).
Further, Local Rule 7.1(e)(1) restricts reply memoranda to “rebuttal of factual and legal
arguments raised in the objection or opposition memorandum.” Faiella v. Green Tree Servicing
LLC, No. 16-CV-088-JD, 2016 WL 3546232, at *3 n.2 (D.N.H. June 23, 2016).
Because the court deems the arguments raised for the first time in Keefe and Cole’s reply
waived, it denies as moot Woods’s motion to strike those portions of the reply. See doc. no. 41;
see also Moore v. Wetzel, No. 1:18-CV-1523, 2019 WL 1099003, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2019)
(“[I]t is generally held that a brief—as opposed to other forms of pleadings—typically will not
be considered a ‘pleading’ which is properly the subject of a motion to strike.”).
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arguments from their own previously-filed motion to dismiss. See Duro Textiles, LLC v. Sunbelt
Corp., 12 F.Supp.3d 221, 225 (D. Mass. 2014) (“The omission of known grounds for dismissal
from a motion to dismiss generally amounts to a waiver of dismissal on those grounds.” (citing
Crispin-Taveras v. Municipality of Carolina, 647 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011))). That waiver is not
determinative, however, because the court does not grant the relief requested by the WestBridge
defendants in their motion and the court would deny the same relief as to Keefe and Cole even if
it granted the motion for joinder. See doc. no. 53 at 1 (requesting the same relief afforded under
the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss “to the extent the Court grants WestBridge’s,
Berry’s, and [Lucius’s] Motion to Dismiss”). Accordingly, the motion for joinder is denied.
III. Woods’s Motion to Strike Exhibit A
In the WestBridge defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, they
rely on a contract attached to the motion to show that “Lucius was required, per the terms of her
professional licensure supervision agreement with [Woods], to report to the New Hampshire
Board of Licensing for Alcohol and Other Drug Use Professionals that he was no longer working
under her supervision.” Doc. no. 34-1 at 4. Woods moves to strike the contract, attached as
Exhibit A to the motion to dismiss, doc. no. 34-2, on the basis that it is evidence not properly
before the court at this stage. Doc. no. 38. The court need not determine whether the supervision
agreement is properly presented with the motion to dismiss because it is not relevant to the
motion. Lucius’s reporting obligations would be relevant to whether she had legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Woods’s supervision agreement under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, but Woods need only make out a prima facie case to
survive the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d
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64, 70 (1st Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the court does not consider the terms of the supervision
agreement in deciding whether Woods’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim. The court thus
denies the motion to strike as moot.
IV. The WestBridge Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The WestBridge defendants argue that Woods’s amended complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for relief, but they also raise certain other issues that they claim entitle them to
dismissal of one or more of Woods’s claims. The court addresses these arguments first before
turning to the merits.
A. Racial Discrimination Under § 1981
The WestBridge defendants argue that Woods’s claims under § 1981 “fail for the
independent reason that they are based on [Woods’s] national origin, rather than his race,” and
national origin is not a protected characteristic under § 1981. Doc. no. 34-1 at 6. Woods counters
that § 1981 defines race broadly enough to permit his claims premised on his “Irish race, his Irish
ancestry, and his Irish ethnicity.” Doc. no. 39-1 at 2. The court agrees with Woods.
“Although § 1981 does not itself use the word ‘race,’ the Court has construed the section
to forbid all ‘racial’ discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts.” Saint
Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987) (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 168, 174–175 (1976)). This includes race-based employment discrimination. See Sinai v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471, 472 (1st Cir. 1993).
A discrimination claim based on national origin alone is not cognizable under § 1981.
Nnadozie v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 730 F. App’x 151, 157 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Ricci v.
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Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc., 768 F.2d 456, 467 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[I]t is doubtful that § 1981
provides any protection against discrimination based solely upon national origin.”). However, the
meaning of race under § 1981 “is much broader than our modern understanding of the term.”
Nnadozie, 730 F. App’x at 156 (citing Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 609–13). The Supreme
Court has held that “Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.” Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613. Section 1981 thus “reaches discrimination
against an individual ‘because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically
distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens.’” Id.
Courts have “recognized that race and national origin discrimination claims may
substantially overlap or even be indistinguishable depending on the specific facts of a case.”
Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Sinai, 3 F.3d at 475). The First Circuit
has cited with approval Justice Brennan’s observation that there is no bright-line between race
and national origin discrimination, as they are often “identical as a factual matter: one was born
in the nation whose primary stock is one’s own ethnic group.” Sinai, 3 F.3d at 474 (quoting Saint
Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
As such, “with evidence of some nexus between ethnic or ancestral characteristics and
workplace discrimination,” a plaintiff may bring a § 1981 claim based on being, for example,
“‘African’ or ‘Nigerian,’” “Jewish,” “Middle Eastern,” or “Iranian.” See Nnadozie, 730 F. App’x
at 157 (citing Sinai, 3 F.3d at 474–75) (further citations omitted). Indeed, in considering the
legislative history of § 1981, the Court in Saint Francis College noted congressional “references
to the Scandinavian races . . . as well as the Chinese, . . . Latin, . . . Spanish, . . . and Anglo-
Saxon races.” 481 U.S. at 612 (citations omitted). The court further emphasized a congressional
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statement that the Voting Rights Act of 1870, which is considered a source of legislative history
for § 1981, would forbid discrimination “against the immigrant from France in favor of the
immigrant from Ireland.” Id. at 612–13 (citations omitted); see also Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella,
814 F.3d 594, 605 n.25 (2d Cir. 2016) (indicating that a “a hypothetical white applicant whose
ancestry is one-half Hispanic and one-half Irish . . . could, in principle, bring a race-
discrimination suit if an employer refuses to hire him because he is Irish-American, and instead
hires a white Italian-American).
In Carl v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., the court considered a § 1981 claim
based on alleged discrimination on account of Irish ancestry. No. CIV.A. 09-3990, 2010 WL
3860432, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010). The court noted the Third Circuit’s holding that race
discrimination “must be based on the plaintiff’s ‘objective appearance to others, not his
subjective feelings about his own ethnicity.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ.,
941 F.2d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 1991)). Racial discrimination, in the Third Circuit’s view, “stems
from a reliance on immaterial outward appearances that stereotype an individual with imagined,
usually undesirable, characteristics thought to be common to members of the group that shares
these superficial traits.” Id. The plaintiff in Carl alleged that his supervisor had referred to him as
an “Irish rat,” but the court reasoned that there were “no factual allegations to suggest Carl
possessed any characteristics thought to be common to the Irish ‘race.’” Id. at *5. Without such
allegations, Carl’s complaint failed to state a claim.
Here, by contrast, Woods alleges repeated derogatory comments about his Irish
temperament, or “Irish brain.” Unlike the “Irish rat” comment, these allegations show the
defendants’ negative stereotyping “based upon some physiological characteristic.” See Ricci v.
Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., 768 F.2d 456, 467 (1st Cir. 1985). Giving Woods every reasonable
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inference, the comments suggested that because Woods is Irish, his brain is predisposed to a
particular temperament. The court recognizes that discrimination based on Irish ancestry or
ethnicity is not the sort of racial discrimination we typically contemplate today. But it is
cognizable as race discrimination under § 1981 given the Supreme Court’s broad definition of
race under the statute, which is based on a historical conception of race as centered on “ancestry
or ethnic characteristics.” Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613.
B. Timeliness
The WestBridge defendants argue that Woods’s claims are largely untimely because Title
VII requires that a claimant file his charge of discrimination within 300 days of when the charge
is filed with the state fair employment practices agency. Further, § 1981 claims must be filed
within four years of the unlawful conduct. Accordingly, because Woods filed his charge with the
NHCHR on May 18, 2022, the defendants argue that only events that took place after July 22,
2021, are actionable under Title VII. Further, because he filed his amended complaint on
February 28, 2025, only events that occurred after February 28, 2021, are actionable under
§ 1981. Doc. no. 34-1 at 7–8. Woods concedes that the limitations period on his Title VII claims
began on July 22, 2021. He argues, however, that his § 1981 claims relate back to the filing of
his original complaint, so the limitations period started on January 31, 2020, four years before
the filing of his original complaint. Doc. no. 39-1 at 5. Woods is correct.
“An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . .
the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). The question is
whether “the alteration of the original statement is so substantial that it cannot be said that
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defendant was given adequate notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence that forms the
basis of the claim.” Frederick v. State of New Hampshire, No. 14-CV-403-SM, 2016 WL
4382692, at *7 (D.N.H. Aug. 16, 2016). “This analysis is directed to conduct rather than causes
of action, and new legal theories may relate back to the original filing where there is a shared
basis in factual circumstances.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted). Courts have liberally
applied relation back pursuant to Rule 15(c).5 Gold v. Poccia, No. CV 17-104 WES, 2018 WL
4521940, at *2 (D.R.I. Sept. 21, 2018).
Here, Woods alleges new statutory authority for his claims against certain defendants
named in his original complaint, but the facts alleged in Woods’s amended complaint are nearly
identical to those alleged in his original complaint. The original complaint alleged claims of
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, in part, on the bases of national origin
and race. Although those claims were brought only under Title VII, and the amended complaint
added correlative claims under § 1981, the facts and broad legal theories underlying both
complaints are the same. As such, Woods’s original complaint gave the defendants “adequate
notice” of the factual basis for his § 1981 claims, and the amended complaint did not alter the
operative facts in a way that precludes relation-back. Frederick, 2016 WL 4382692, at *7.
Because the relation-back rule applies, the court will consider conduct that occurred as
far back as January 31, 2020, in resolving the motion to dismiss Woods’s § 1981 claims.
Because Woods does not challenge the date for the Title VII claims set forth by the WestBridge
5 The WestBridge defendants argue, without citation, that an amended complaint should
not relate back to an earlier complaint for the purpose of the statute of limitations “when there
was no excusable basis for the claims not having been brought sooner.” Doc. no. 42 at 4-5. The
court is not aware of any such restriction in Rule 15(c) or the relevant caselaw.
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defendants, the court will consider facts going back to July 22, 2021, with regard to his claims
under Title VII.
C. Merits
The same legal framework governs the Title VII and § 1981 claims for discrimination,
retaliation, and hostile work environment. Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 70 (citing Conward v. Cambridge
Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1999)). Ultimately, Woods will be required to prove
his case with direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory animus or causation. Ames v. Ohio
Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 324–25 (2025). A case involving indirect evidence will
utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.,
846 F.2d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 1988). Under that framework, Woods will be required to establish a
prima facie case as to each claim to shift the burden to the defendants to show legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged conduct, which will then shift the burden back to
Woods to show that the reasons were a pretext. Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 70; see also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
On a motion to dismiss, however, Woods need only satisfy the standard of review
applicable at this stage. In other words and as previously noted, he must plead “factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. He is not required to plead facts sufficient to
establish a prima facie case because the prima facie standard under McDonnell Douglas “is an
evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard.” Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica,
755 F.3d 711, 718 (1st Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, “[t]hose elements are part of the background
against which a plausibility determination should be made,” and “can help a court determine
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whether the cumulative effect of the complaint’s factual allegations is a plausible claim for
relief.” Id. (quotations omitted).
The court notes that the WestBridge defendants did not offer separate arguments in favor
of dismissal of any claim based on the specific allegations against each individual defendant.
Thus, the court will not conduct a defendant-by-defendant analysis of the allegations in support
of discrimination and retaliation.
1. Discrimination (Counts I and IV)
“A prima facie case for discrimination based on disparate treatment presents a four-part
test: (1) the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class; (2) she must be qualified for her job;
(3) she must suffer an adverse employment action at the hands of her employer; and (4) there
must be some evidence of a causal connection between her membership in a protected class and
the adverse employment action, e.g., in the case of a firing, that the position was filled by
someone with similar qualifications.” Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 70.
The WestBridge defendants argue that Woods’s claims fail on the third and fourth prongs
because he did not suffer an adverse employment action caused by his Irish nationality and
ethnicity.6 Woods points to multiple adverse employment actions within the limitations period
including “not receiving a promotion, actually being demoted, being compelled into a leave of
absence, revoking his LADC supervision agreement, and being constructively discharged from
his [Westbridge] employment.” Doc. no. 39-1 at 11. With regard to causation, he relies on First
6 The WestBridge defendants also maintain that, with regard to his § 1981 claim, Woods
is not a member of a protected class. Doc. no. 34-1 at 11. As the court analyzed above, however,
Woods alleges that he was singled out on account of his Irish ethnicity, which is cognizable
under § 1981. The WestBridge defendants make no contention that Woods is unqualified for his
job.
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Circuit authority holding that “stereotyping” and “cognitive bias” are prohibited by the relevant
statutes. Id. at 16.
a. Adverse Employment Action
“To be adverse, an action must materially change the conditions of [the plaintiff’s]
employ.” Gu v. Bos. Police Dep’t, 312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2002). Material changes include
“decreased supervisory authority” as well as “demotions, disadvantageous transfers or
assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations, and toleration of
harassment by other employees.” Id. A material change “must be more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Garmon v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
844 F.3d 307, 314 (1st Cir. 2016). “Reassignment with significantly different responsibilities
may be actionable.” Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2016) (quotations and alterations
omitted).
Here, Woods alleges that he was demoted from his mentor team leader position at some
time after the August 5, 2021 meeting at which Berry and others told him that they were sending
him to a two-day communications training based on reports that he yelled while leading a
training session. The demotion was an adverse employment action that occurred within the
limitations period for both Woods’s Title VII and § 1981 claims. See Garmon, 844 F.3d at 314.
The WestBridge defendants argue that the demotion is insufficient to allege an adverse
employment action because Woods does not adequately allege that it materially changed the
conditions of his employment because he made the relevant allegations (that the demotion would
affect his job duties and work hours) “on information and belief.” See doc. no. 29 at 23. The
WestBridge defendants, however, misapprehend the case on which they rely. In Kashdan v.
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George Mason Univ., 70 F.4th 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2023), the Fourth Circuit found insufficient the
plaintiff’s allegations, made on information and belief, that the defendant did not investigate
females who violated its policies and punished them less severely than it punished males,
because the allegations were speculative and conclusory and not supported by any facts alleged
in the complaint. Here, the facts alleged on information and belief are not labels and conclusions
or recitals of the elements of the cause of action, but rather specific allegations regarding the
changes Woods expected to the terms and conditions of his employment as the result of his
demotion. Additionally, Woods alleges that he attempted to ascertain whether the demotion
would affect his salary, but Berry refused to answer. It is reasonable to infer that the demotion
would affect his salary. It is likewise reasonable to infer that the demotion would affect his
discretion with respect to the mentor team and his duties. Whether he can prove that these
changes would in fact have occurred or were intended at the time of his demotion is a question
for a later day.
At the same meeting, Woods was also issued a “corrective action”—the first he had
received in his time at WestBridge—because he yelled while leading the company training
session and called the required two-day communications training a “sell out.” Doc. no. 29 at 22.
Woods alleges that HR and Berry were aware that he did not yell while leading the training. As
alleged, this was an “unwarranted negative job evaluation” which could also establish an adverse
employment action. Further, Woods alleges that on July 29, 2021, he was passed over for a
promotion in favor of someone who “had the right temperament.” Id. at 20. This “refusal[] to
promote” could also establish a material change in Woods’s employment.7
7 So too, could WestBridge’s alleged “toleration of harassment by other employees.” See
Garmon, 844 F.3d at 314. Woods alleges that, in 2020 (within the limitations period for § 1981
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Finally, Woods alleges that the defendants’ conduct surrounding the reprimand and
demotion drove him to a nervous breakdown such that he took a leave of absence on the advice
of his doctor. The court notes that the amended complaint is vague as to how Woods’s
employment with WestBridge actually came to a close, but it appears that he never returned from
his leave of absence. He alleges that the defendants left him “hovering in employment purgatory,
not knowing where he stands, which effectively terminated his employment.” Doc. no. 29 at 26.
Further, the defendants never investigated his complaint about the ongoing harassment that led to
his leave of absence. Id. Because Woods was not terminated outright, and instead his
employment appears to have fizzled out based on his and WestBridge’s mutual inaction, he must
rely on a theory of constructive discharge theory to sustain his allegations surrounding the end of
his employment. Constructive discharge requires that “the working conditions imposed by the
employer had become so onerous, abusive, or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 229 F.3d
49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000). The resignation “cannot be triggered solely by an employee’s subjective
beliefs, no matter how sincerely held; rather, the “ultimate test is one of objective
reasonableness.” Id. In Suarez, the court held that a reasonable employee would not have felt
forced to quit where the plaintiff claimed that the defendants “push[ed] him too hard” by forcing
him to work overtime and “demeaned him and undermined his effectiveness” by changing his
working conditions and relocating staff. Id. at 54–55. Because these changes were “administered
even-handedly” to many employees at the company, the plaintiff alleged only an injury to his
ego, not enough to establish constructive discharge. Id. at 55.
but not for Title VII), he was repeatedly harassed by Cole and complained to management to no
avail. Doc. no. 29 at 17–18.
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Here, the events leading up to Woods’s leave of absence go further than the facts in
Suarez. Taking his allegations as true, Woods was berated at multiple meetings and singled out
by company leadership who were set on compelling him to resign. Woods’s reprimand and
demotion followed years of harassment by other employees and management, which WestBridge
had failed to abate despite Woods’s complaints. Woods’s alleged treatment was not “even
handed[],” or a mere hit to his ego. Rather, Woods has alleged working conditions “so onerous,
abusive, or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [his] position would have felt compelled to
resign.”8
b. Caused by a Protected Characteristic
Woods must also show that the adverse employment actions alleged were “caused at least
in part by a forbidden type of bias.” Burns, 829 F.3d at 12. The WestBridge defendants argue
that the court should dismiss the discrimination claims, in part, because Woods has failed to
allege that “his position remains open or was filled by a similarly-qualified individual.” Doc. no.
34-1 at 16. But that is only one way that a plaintiff can allege a causal connection between his
membership in a protected class and the alleged adverse employment action. Stereotyping and
subtle cognitive biases may be sufficient to show that an “employee has been treated disparately
because of [a protected characteristic].” Burns, 829 F.3d at 13 (quotations omitted). Disparate
treatment may be established “regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base
8 Woods also alleges that Lucius’s termination of his supervision agreement during his
leave of absence and failure to timely submit his letter of recommendation were adverse
employment actions. These developments likely would not have compelled a reasonable person
to resign, so may not adequately support Woods’s claim of constructive discharge. The
termination of Woods’s supervision agreement, however, was likely a material change in the
conditions of his employment.
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the adverse employment action on [the characteristic] or simply did so because of unthinking
stereotypes or bias.” Id. (alterations omitted).
Woods sufficiently alleges that he was demoted because of anti-Irish sentiment. Woods
has alleged that the defendants have often associated Irishness with derogatory comments about
temperament, such as Berry’s statement that he needed “to work on [his] Irish temper,” like
Woods, Cole’s statement about a “wicked Irish tongue,” and the repeated references by
WestBridge leadership to Woods’s “Irish brain.” Doc. no. 29 at 6, 12, and 17. Further, Woods
has alleged that the defendants have made employment decisions on this basis, supported by
Berry’s statement that the employee who received the promotion to Team Coordinator “had the
right temperament.” Id. at 20. It is reasonable to infer that the defendants stereotyped Woods as
having a temper that made him unfit for certain roles because he was Irish. The allegedly
disproportionate reprimand and demotion Woods received for yelling while leading a training
could be explained by subtle anti-Irish bias. So too could the defendants’ failure to promote
Woods in favor of an employee with “the right temperament.”
Because Woods has alleged facts that could support a finding that he suffered various
adverse employment actions because he was Irish, his discrimination claim is sufficient to
survive the WestBridge defendants’ motion to dismiss.
2. Hostile Work Environment (Counts II and VI)
“To make out a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [a plaintiff] must point to
evidence showing, inter alia, that facts and circumstances of her employment viewed objectively
were so ‘severe,’ ‘pervasive,’ and ‘abusive’ as to ‘alter the conditions’ of her job.” Bhatti, 659
F.3d at 73 (quoting Vega-Colon v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 625 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010)).
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However, a “plaintiff need only show that her work environment was severe or that it was
pervasive.” Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2019).
Courts consider “several factors, none of which is individually determinative: ‘the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.’” Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 73–74. The “‘accumulated effect’ of
behaviors that individually fall short may, taken together, constitute a hostile work
environment.” Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, 876 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2017).
Further, the court is conscious of its role at this stage of the proceedings. “At the motion to
dismiss phase in particular, subject to some policing at the outer bounds, the issue of whether
harassment was severe or pervasive is commonly one of degree -- both as to severity and
pervasiveness -- to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Rae v. Woburn Pub. Schs., 113 F.4th 86, 111
(1st Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Here, Woods alleges that WestBridge employees repeatedly and persistently taunted him
about his Irish nationality and ethnicity, and management failed to act despite his repeated
complaints. The WestBridge defendants argue that the harassment Woods alleges was not severe
and pervasive. Doc. no. 34-1 at 9–10. Although each insult might not on its own be severe, taken
together a jury could find that the problem was pervasive. Further, the “accumulated effect” of
the pattern could support a finding that the hostile environment was severe. Given the frequency
of the harassment, the humiliating and isolating nature of the comments, and Woods’s repeated
unaddressed complaints, the allegations state a claim based on a hostile work environment.
Much of the harassment Woods alleges occurred outside the limitations period, but under
the continuing violation doctrine an employee may “seek damages for otherwise time-barred
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allegations if they are deemed part of an ongoing series of discriminatory acts and there is ‘some
violation within the statute of limitations period that anchors the earlier claims.’” O’Rourke v.
City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir. 2001). “Ultimately, whether allegedly
discriminatory conduct constituted a single continuing violation is a factual question.” Lee v.
Maine Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 1:21-CV-00219-LEW, 2022 WL 612396, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 2,
2022). Woods has sufficiently included multiple allegations that involve “the same type of
employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, or were perpetrated by the same managers,”
or discriminatory acts that “involved similar subject matter.” Id. (quotation omitted). For the
purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court is satisfied that he is “permitted to reach
back and rely upon the direct evidence of the discrimination he suffered in support of his claims
(e.g., ‘Paddy,’ ‘Mick,’ ‘Potato,’ ‘Irish need not apply,’ ‘Irish gypsy,’ ‘Irish temperament’
‘Shanty Irish,’ ‘Wicked Irish tongue,’ etc.).” Doc. no. 39-1 at 24. While the anti-Irish comments
Woods endured began well outside the limitations period, Woods alleges that they culminated in
his reprimand and demotion for the yelling incident, which occurred at and after the August 5,
2021 meeting. As already explained, Woods has sufficiently alleged that these decisions were
connected to his Irishness.
In sum, Woods has sufficiently alleged a severe and pervasive hostile work environment,
and the continuing violation doctrine applies.
3. Retaliation (Counts IV and V)
“To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that her employer took some
objectively and materially adverse action against her because she opposed a practice forbidden
by Title VII, such as race discrimination.” Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 73. “[T]he prima facie burden in
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this context is not an onerous one.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir.
2004).
Here, Woods has alleged that he repeatedly engaged in protected conduct by complaining
to management about the discriminatory and hostile treatment he suffered. He argues that
company leadership labeled him a “complainer” as a result, which motivated them to
“manufacture[] a narrative that [Woods] yelled during a training event to take corrective action
against him.” Doc. no. 39 at 24. These allegations state a claim that WestBridge retaliated
against Woods for complaining about discrimination and hostility in the workplace. As explained
above, the demotion and warning Woods received as a result of the alleged retaliation was an
adverse employment action. As such, Woods has met his low burden to show a prima facie case
of retaliation at the motion to dismiss stage.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court grants Woods’s motion to file a late objection
(doc. no. 46) and denies WestBridge, Berry, and Lucius’s motion to dismiss (doc. no. 34). The
court further denies Keefe and Cole’s motion to dismiss (doc. no. 32). Keefe and Cole’s motion
to join WestBridge, Berry, and Lucius’s motion to dismiss (doc. no. 37) is denied. Woods’s
motions to strike (1) portions of Keefe and Cole’s reply to their motion to dismiss (doc. no. 41)
and (2) Exhibit A to WestBridge, Berry, and Lucius’s motion to dismiss (doc. no. 38) are denied
as moot.
SO ORDERED.
Samantha D. Elliott
United States District Judge
March 31, 2026
cc: Counsel of record.
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