USA v. Suazo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States
v. 	Case No. 20-mj-37-DL-1
Opinion No. 2020 DNH 120
Inyemar Manuel Suazo
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Inyemar Manuel Suazo was arrested on a criminal complaint
in the District of New Hampshire on February 11, 2020. The
magistrate judge determined that he should be detained. Suazo
has filed a motion to revoke the detention order pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3145(b) (Doc. No. 17). After reviewing the record de
novo, I deny Suazo’s motion.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Standard of Review
When “a person is ordered detained by a magistrate judge,”
he “may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over
the offense, a motion for revocation . . . of the order.” §
3145(b).
Precedent dictates that I must review the magistrate
judge’s detention order de novo. United States v. Tortora, 922
F.2d 880, 883 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
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Oaks, 793 F. App’x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2019) (applying the same
review standard more recently). De novo review, however, does
not require a district judge to reinvent the wheel: If the
magistrate judge has carefully and correctly analyzed the
detention question in a written decision, no purpose is served
by attempting to creatively rephrase the magistrate judge’s
analysis. What matters is that the district judge must
independently assess the evidence and reach his or her own
conclusions.
In so reviewing the detention order, I “may reject the
magistrate judge’s fact finding and start the hearing anew[,] or
[I] may accept the findings of fact made by the magistrate and
hear additional facts and argument.” United States v. Cross, 389
F. Supp. 3d 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting United States v.
Oliveira, 238 F. Supp. 3d 165, 167 (D. Mass. 2017)); accord
Tortora, 922 F.2d at 883 (providing for appellate review of the
district court’s decision, which “accepted the subsidiary facts
as found by the magistrate,” and “the facts as presented in the
record and as found by the magistrate”).
B. 	Bail Factors
When resolving a motion to revoke a detention order, I,
like the magistrate judge who held the initial hearing on the
issue, must “determine whether any conditions or combination of
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conditions set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)] will reasonably
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety
of any other person and the community . . . .” 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f). Pursuant to the provisions of § 3142(g), I consider the
following factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged
. 	. 	. 	; 	(2) 	the 	weight 	of 	the 	evidence 	against 	the
person; 	(3) 	the 	history 	and 	characteristics 	of 	the
person, 	including 	. 	. 	. 	family 	ties, 	employment, 	. 	. 	.
past 	conduct, 	. 	. 	. 	[and] 	criminal 	history 	. 	. 	.; 	and
(4) 	the 	nature 	and 	seriousness 	of 	the 	danger 	to 	any
person 	or 	the 	community 	that 	would 	be 	posed 	by 	the
person’s release.
§ 3142(g)(1)–(4). If I “find[] that no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community,” then I must “order the detention of the person
before trial.” § 3142(e)(1).
“[W]here there is probable cause to believe that the person
committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of
ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. [§] 801 et seq.),” a rebuttable presumption arises
that no such conditions exist. United States v. O’Brien, 895
F.2d 810, 814–15 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting § 3142(e)(3)(A)). “The presumption raised as a
result of a finding of probable cause to believe that a person
has committed a relevant narcotics offense has two components.
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One is that such a person poses a risk of flight; the second is
that he represents a danger to the community.” United States v.
Moss, 887 F.2d 333, 335 n.3 (1st Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Santos-Ferrer, No. 92-1445, No. 92-1446, 1992 WL
120348, at *3–5 (1st Cir. June 5, 1992) (per curiam) (discussing
district court’s application and analysis of the presumption in
a drug trafficking case). The defendant, however, need only
“introduce ‘some evidence’ to the contrary” to rebut the
presumption. O’Brien, 895 F.2d at 815. Even if the defendant
rebuts the presumption by producing some evidence, the
government retains the burden of persuasion and must prove
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence and a risk of
flight by the preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Iglesias-Benitez, No. 92-1837, 1992 WL 210612, at *2 (1st Cir.
Sept. 1, 1992) (citing United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789,
792–93 (1st Cir. 1991)); see also § 3142(f) (applying the clear
and convincing evidence standard to the dangerousness
determination in § 3142(e)(1)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
The magistrate judge issued a carefully considered written
order explaining her decision to detain Suazo. See Order of
Detention, Doc. No. 18. Reviewing the detention issue de novo in
light of the entire record, I conclude that the magistrate judge
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correctly determined that Suazo must be detained because “no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the safety of any other person and the community.” Doc. No. 18
at 12; accord § 3142(e)(1). In reaching this conclusion, I adopt
the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and rulings of law and
write only to explain why Suazo’s arguments to the contrary are
unpersuasive.
A. 	The No-Contact Violation
Suazo argues that the magistrate judge mistakenly relied on
Suazo’s violation of a no-contact order in a related case when
determining that he should be detained here. I disagree. Suazo
was indicted on nearly identical charges in the District of
Maine in 2018. Days before his case was originally set for trial
in December 2019, “the government alleged that [Suazo] violated
the condition of his pretrial release that he ‘avoid all contact
directly or indirectly,’ with any co-defendant (except when
counsel is present),” Order of Revocation and Detention at 1,
United States v. Suazo, No. 2:18-cr-00026-DBH (D. Me. Dec. 17,
2019), ECF No. 586, when Suazo (1) arranged a meeting with a co-
defendant, Julio Mejia; (2) showed Mejia a picture of Mejia’s
cooperation agreement; and (3) threatened to publish it on the
internet if Mejia testified against him. Bail Hearing Transcript
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at 7 ll. 17–22, United States v. Suazo, No. 2:18-cr-00026-DBH
(D. Me. Dec. 16, 2019).
Judge D. Brock Hornby “found by clear and convincing
evidence” that Suazo violated the no-contact condition. Order of
Revocation and Detention, supra, at 1. He also found that Suazo
should be detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(2)(B),
because Suazo was “unlikely to abide by any conditions or
combination of conditions of release.” Order of Revocation and
Detention, supra, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting § 3148(b)(2)(B)) (finding that Suazo would not adhere
to the no-contact provision going forward). As a result, Suazo’s
bail was revoked, and he was detained pending trial.
Suazo admits the no-contact violation but claims that it
does not support the detention order in this case because it was
an innocent meeting arranged by Mejia. After reviewing all of
the relevant evidence that bears on the no-contact violation,
much of which was not available to the magistrate judge, I
conclude that clear and convincing evidence establishes that it
was Suazo who initiated contact with Mejia and that Suazo did so
in an effort to prevent Mejia from testifying against him. Given
this finding, the no-contact violation stands as strong evidence
that Suazo presents a danger to potential witnesses in the
current case and that conditions of release cannot sufficiently
manage this danger.
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B. 	Impact of COVID-19 on Suazo’s Ongoing Detention
Suazo argues that he has been denied his due process rights
because he is being detained pending indictment during the
COVID-19 pandemic1 and that such detention has been “prolonged .
. . by the emergency . . . .” Def.’s Mot. to Revoke Detention
Order, Doc. No. 17 at 6. He further states that “the difficulty
of separation from his son and family during this emergency
should . . . be taken into account . . . .” Doc. No. 17 at 7. He
offers no medical evidence to support a claim that he is at an
elevated risk of serious complications should he contract the
disease.
I agree with the magistrate judge’s findings on this issue.
Then, as now, Suazo “has presented no evidence that his age or
health circumstances place him at high risk to experience severe
illness if he contracts the virus. He also presents no evidence
that there has been a lack of precautions or appropriate
measures by the” Merrimack County House of Corrections, where
Suazo is currently detained pending indictment, or that “the
facility is unprepared to . . . care for those who may become
infected with the virus.” Doc. No. 18 at 11. I appreciate both
1 In a previous order, I addressed whether Suazo’s indictment has
been delayed by this court’s standing orders on the COVID-19
pandemic, postponing grand jury proceedings — it has not — and
whether his detention pending indictment has violated his rights
under the Speedy Trial Act — it has not. I do not take up those
arguments again.
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the generalized risk COVID-19 presents to those detained in
correctional facilities and the inherent burden of being
separated from one’s family, especially during trying times.
Without a particularized health risk presented by COVID-19 to
Suazo, however, I cannot order Suazo released based on these
grounds. I agree, therefore, with the magistrate judge that
Suazo fails to make a sufficient argument for his release in
light of COVID-19.
C. 	Other Arguments
Suazo notes that he has no prior criminal record. Doc. No.
17 at 1. He complains about the lengthy period of pretrial
detention he served on the related charges in the District of
Maine, which were dismissed on the eve of trial. Doc. No. 17 at
2, 4. He also argues that he is improperly being housed with
prisoners who have already been adjudged guilty of their crimes.
Doc. No. 17 at 16. None of these arguments persuade me that
Suazo is entitled to pretrial release.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, after reviewing the entire
record in this case de novo, I determine by clear and convincing
evidence that no condition or combination of release conditions
exist that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person
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and the community. Accordingly, I deny Suazo’s motion to revoke
the detention order (Doc. No. 17).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro
Paul J. Barbadoro
United States District Judge
July 10, 2020
cc: 	Johnathan Nathans, Esq.
Michael Conley, Esq.
Edward S. MacColl, Esq.
U.S. Marshal
U.S. Probation
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