Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robson Xavier Gomes
v. Civil No. 20-cv-453-LM
Opinion No. 2020 DNH 102
US Department of Homeland Security,
Acting Secretary et al.
O R D E R
In April 2020, civil immigration detainees being held at
the Strafford County House of Corrections (“SCHOC”) filed an
amended “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 2241 and Class Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief.” Doc. no. 5. Petitioners allege respondents have
violated their constitutional due process rights by acting with
deliberate indifference to their risk of contracting COVID-19 at
SCHOC. Petitioners seek emergency relief, including release.
The respondents move to dismiss arguing: (1) petitioners
lack Article III standing; (2) petitioners’ claims are not
cognizable through a habeas petition; (3) petitioners have
failed to state a plausible constitutional due process claim;
and, (4) petitioner’s amended petition fails to put respondents
on notice of their claimed transgressions and so should be
dismissed or amended pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
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Civil Procedure. Doc. no. 128. The court addresses each
argument below.1
DISCUSSION
1. Article III Standing
To satisfy constitutional standing in federal court a
petitioner must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547,
(2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Respondents argue that
petitioners have not suffered an injury in fact because their
“assertion that detention per se poses an increased risk of
health complications or death from COVID-19 is purely
speculative.” Doc. no. 128 at 13. Respondents further contend
that any injury is not fairly traceable to respondents because
1 The court has already issued several orders in this case.
A couple are relevant here. First, the court has concluded that
detainees with medical conditions that place them at higher risk
of death or serious injury from COVID-19 are likely to prevail
on their due process claims (doc. nos. 52 and 123). The court
has also provisionally certified civil immigration detainees at
SCHOC as a class for the purpose of facilitating bail hearings
(doc. no. 50). As of June 15, 2020, the court has conducted
fifteen bail hearings for high-risk detainees and has released
ten detainees on conditions. A more detailed recitation of the
relevant facts and procedural history in this case is available
in the court’s May 14, 2020 order (doc. no. 123).
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the risk of injury from COVID-19 is due to the pandemic itself,
and to any pre-existing conditions a detainee may have, but not
to the respondents.
The court has no trouble finding that petitioners have
standing. As the Supreme Court observed in Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993), “it would be odd to deny an injunction
to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening
condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had
happened to them.” COVID-19 has moved rapidly and expansively
through the country and its detention facilities. SCHOC has not
escaped the pandemic: a member of SCHOC’s medical administration
staff and two provisional class members have tested positive for
COVID-19 since petitioners filed the amended petition. Because
“[a] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic
event,” id., this court joins numerous others in rejecting
respondents’ standing arguments. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf't, No. EDCV191546JGBSHKX, 2020 WL
1932570, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020); Savino v. Souza, No.
CV 20-10617-WGY, 2020 WL 1703844, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020);
Coreas v. Bounds, No. CV TDC-20-0780, 2020 WL 1663133, at *6 (D.
Md. Apr. 3, 2020); Thakker v. Doll, No. 1:20-CV-480, 2020 WL
1671563, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020) (finding standing
challenge “easily resolved”). Indeed, respondents have not
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identified a single case in which a court has determined that
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detainees lack
standing to bring a due process claim based on the risks
presented by COVID-19. Thus, the request to dismiss the
petition for lack of standing is denied.
2. Cognizability of Petitioners’ Claims Through a Habeas
Petition
Respondents next argue that petitioners’ claim is not
cognizable through a 28 U.S.C § 2241 habeas petition.
Respondents assert that petitioners “do not challenge the
authority of the government per se to detain them” but instead
“challenge the conditions under which they are being confined
only in the unique circumstances of the current pandemic.” Doc.
no. 128-1 at 15. In support, respondents rely on decisions from
outside the First Circuit, including an opinion from the
District of Colorado concluding the court lacked jurisdiction
over an ICE detainee’s habeas claim seeking release based on the
conditions of his confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic
because “a prisoner who challenges the conditions of his
confinement must do so through a civil rights action.” Basri v.
Barr, No. 1:20-cv-00940-DDD, slip op. at 3-11 (D. Colo. May 11,
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Toure v.
Hott, No. 1:20-CV-395, 2020 WL 2092639, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Apr.
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29, 2020) (concluding § 2241 is an “improper vehicle” for
conditions of confinement claims in the Fourth Circuit, but
observing that the First Circuit allows these same claims to be
brought through habeas petitions).
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court
held that where a prisoner “challeng[es] the very fact or
duration of his physical imprisonment,” his claim falls within
the “heart” or “core” of habeas corpus, and may be brought in
federal court only by means of a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus. 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The Court reasoned that
allowing state prisoners to bring these claims under the federal
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would evade the
exhaustion and other procedural requirements established for
state habeas cases in the federal courts. Id. at 489–90. But
the Court did not hold the converse to be true: that district
courts lacked jurisdiction over habeas claims that fell outside
the “heart” of habeas corpus. To the contrary, the Court
explicitly cautioned: “This is not to say that habeas corpus may
not also be available to challenge such prison conditions.” Id.
at 499. The Court further noted: “When a prisoner is put under
additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful
custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove
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the restraints making the custody illegal.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Since Preiser, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to
rule on whether detainees may bring claims challenging the
conditions of their confinement through a writ of habeas corpus.
For example, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court left “to another day
the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus
to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct
from the fact or length of the confinement itself.” 441 U.S.
520, 527 n. 6 (1979). More recently, the Supreme Court stated
that it has “left open the question whether [prisoners] might be
able to challenge their confinement conditions via a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, ––– U.S. ––––,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862-63 (2017).
In the absence of clear guidance, circuit courts have split
on the extent to which habeas provides a mechanism for asserting
challenges to conditions of confinement. Wilborn v. Mansukhani,
795 F. App'x 157, 163 (4th Cir. 2019) (listing cases). And the
D.C. Circuit has observed that other circuits that have relied
on Preiser to limit claims that can be brought in habeas may
have fundamentally misunderstood the case. Aamer v. Obama, 742
F.3d 1023, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As the D.C. Circuit
explained: “Preiser imposed a habeas-channeling rule, not a
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habeas-limiting rule: the Court held only that claims lying at
the ‘core’ of the writ must be brought in habeas, and expressly
disclaimed any intention of restricting habeas itself.” Id.
Against this backdrop, the First Circuit has observed that
Preiser “explicitly left open the possibility that a challenge
to prison conditions, cognizable under § 1983, might also be
brought as a habeas corpus claim” and that claims “involving
challenges to the fact or length of confinement” may proceed as
habeas claims. Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1987). The First Circuit has also observed that “Section 2241
provides a remedy for a federal prisoner who contests the
conditions of his confinement,” Miller v. United States, 564
F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1977), and “[i]f the conditions of
incarceration raise Eighth Amendment concerns, habeas corpus is
available.” United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 59 (1st Cir.
2006).2
Here, petitioners have asked the court to “Issue a Writ of
Habeas Corpus . . . and order their immediate release or
placement in community-based alternatives to detention such as
2 But compare Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1036 (relying on DeLeon for
the proposition that the First Circuit has concluded that an
“individual in custody may utilize habeas corpus to challenge
the conditions under which he is held”), with Spencer v. Haynes,
774 F.3d 467, 470 (8th Cir. 2014) (characterizing DeLeon as only
“contributing dictum” to the view that conditions of confinement
claims can be brought by a writ of habeas corpus).
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conditional release, with appropriate public health measures.”
Doc. no. 5 at 28. In Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, the First
Circuit considered a somewhat analogous situation: whether
inmates could bring a habeas claim seeking release from prison
to home confinement and electronic supervision. 607 F.3d 864,
873 (1st Cir. 2010). The court characterized the question as a
“difficult intermediate case” because the inmates were “seeking
neither a change in conditions nor an earlier release, but
rather a less restrictive form of custody.” Id. Relying on an
opinion of the Seventh Circuit, the court held that “habeas
corpus is [the] remedy” for a prisoner seeking what “can fairly
be described as a quantum change in the level of custody” such
as “‘outright freedom’” or “‘freedom subject to the limited
reporting and financial constraints of bond or parole or
probation.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381
(7th Cir. 1991) and citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (approving of “quantum change”
framework)). Applying this framework, the First Circuit
reasoned that because individuals released to the electronic
supervision program could “live with family members, work daily
jobs, attend church, and reside in their own homes rather than
in an institutional setting,” the difference between release and
incarceration could “fairly be described as a quantum change in
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the level of custody.” Id. The First Circuit concluded the
inmates’ claim in Molina was “correctly considered in habeas
corpus.” Id.3
Here, as in Molina, petitioners seek a quantum change in
the level of their custody; they request “immediate release or
placement in community-based alternatives to detention.” Doc.
no. 5 at 28. On this basis, therefore, the court concludes that
petitioners’ claim may properly be brought by a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. See Molina, 607 F.3d at 873-74. In so
holding, the court is in accord with numerous other courts both
in the First Circuit and around the country. See, e.g., Baez v.
Moniz, No. CV 20-10753-LTS, 2020 WL 2527865, at *2 (D. Mass. May
18, 2020) (concluding pretrial detainees’ claims seeking release
due to risk of COVID-19 “sound in habeas” and the court had
jurisdiction to consider them under § 2241); Vazquez Barrera v.
Wolf, No. 4:20-CV-1241, 2020 WL 1904497, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
17, 2020); Coreas v. Bounds, No. CV TDC-20-0780, 2020 WL
1663133, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020); see also Wilson v.
Williams, No. 20-3447, 2020 WL 3056217, at *5, (6th Cir. June 9,
3 Respondents’ motion to dismiss does not rely upon any
First Circuit cases in urging the court to dismiss petitioners’
claims for lack of jurisdiction and does not analyze the effect
of any of the First Circuit cases cited in this portion of the
court’s analysis.
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2020) (court had jurisdiction over § 2241 petition in which
subclass of medically vulnerable inmates sought release due to
the risk of COVID-19).4 For these reasons, respondents’ request
to dismiss this action as an improper habeas petition is denied.
3. Sufficiency of Due Process Constitutional Claim
Respondents next argue the petition should be dismissed
because petitioners have failed to state a constitutional due
process claim. In making this argument, respondents fail to
acknowledge that the court has already concluded that at least
some petitioners (at minimum, those with a medical condition
that puts them at higher risk of death or injury from COVID-19)
have demonstrated a likelihood of success on their due process
constitutional claim. See doc. no. 123 at 42-43.
To the extent that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim may be filed in the context of a § 2241
petition,5 the threshold for surviving such a motion is low. The
4 The court also observes that petitioners have styled their
action as both a habeas petition and a complaint seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Doc. no. 5. Therefore,
petitioners may have a cause of action for equitable relief
“wholly apart from habeas.” Savino v. Souza, No. CV 20-10617-
WGY, 2020 WL 2404923, at *3 (D. Mass. May 12, 2020).
5 See, e.g., Delgado v. Dennehy, 503 F. Supp. 2d 411, 413
(D. Mass. 2007) (“Motions to dismiss habeas petitions pursuant
to [Rule] 12(b)(6) are not inconsistent with habeas rules.”);
see also Rasheed v. Duval, 57 F.3d 1061, 1995 WL 365994, at *1
(1st Cir. 1995) (in granting respondent’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion
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court must accept factual allegations in the complaint as true,
draw reasonable inferences from those facts in the petitioners’
favor, and “determine whether the factual allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which
relief may be granted.” Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772
F.3d 63, 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
As the court has already concluded that at least some
petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim,
it easily concludes that petitioners’ due process claim is
facially plausible.
4. Rule 8
Respondents final attempt at dismissal appears in their
reply. Respondents argue that the court should dismiss
to dismiss court could consider exhibits attached to petition).
But see Banister v. Davis, No. 18-6943, 2020 WL 2814300, at *12
(U.S. June 1, 2020) (a “civil mainstay, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, . . . has no place in habeas” (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citing Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Illinois,
434 U.S. 257, 269 n.14 (1978).
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petitioners’ amended petition, or require petitioners to file a
second amended pleading, because the amended petition lacks
sufficient factual allegations and does not account for
“substantial reforms” that respondents have taken since the
petition was filed. Doc. no. 191 at 9-10. Respondents assert
that the amended petition “does not notify respondents of how,
specifically, respondents have been either deliberately
indifferent or objectively unreasonable”; therefore, it does not
comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
at 10.
Rule 8 applies here to the extent that it is not
inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 2 of the Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases (“§ 2254 rules”). See DeAtley v.
Williams, 782 F. App’x 736, 737 n.3 (10th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, No. 19-7915, 2020 WL 2515817 (U.S. May 18, 2020); see
also § 2254 Rule 1 (the district court may apply § 2254 rules to
petitions filed under § 2241). Rule 2 of the § 2254 rules
requires, in pertinent part, that habeas petitions must specify
all of the grounds for relief, state the facts supporting each
ground, and state the relief requested. “A prime purpose of
Rule 2(c)’s demand that habeas petitioners plead with
particularity is to assist the district court in determining on
the face of the petition whether the State should be ordered to
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“‘show cause why the writ should not be granted,’” or whether
the petition should be summarily dismissed without the court
ordering a responsive pleading. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,
656 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the
complaint “must contain ... a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The purpose of a clear and succinct pleading
is to give a defendant fair notice of the claim and its basis as
well as to provide an opportunity for a cogent answer and
defense.” Belanger v. BNY Mellon Asset Mgmt., LLC, 307 F.R.D.
55, 57 (D. Mass. 2015); see also Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d
422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006).
Dismissal for noncompliance with Rule 8 is typically
“reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused,
ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised.” Sayied v. White, 89 F.
App’x 284, 2004 WL 489060, at *1 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In evaluating whether a pleading
meets Rule 8’s short and plain statement requirement, the court
should consider the nature of the action, the relief sought and
a number of other pragmatic matters.” Currier v. Town of
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Gilmanton, No. 18-CV-1204-LM, 2020 WL 1923357, at *1 (D.N.H.
Apr. 21, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, although it is true that the facts have developed
since petitioners filed their amended petition on April 17, the
amended petition is far from confused, vague, or unintelligible.
See Sayied, 2004 WL 489060, at *1. On the contrary, the amended
petition alleges that specific actions—for example, respondents’
“failure or inability to facilitate social distancing at
[SCHOC],” the mixing of civil immigration detainees with general
population inmates at SCHOC, and the transfer of detainees from
other facilities to SCHOC—violate petitioners’ due process
rights. Doc. no. 5 at ¶ 73. Respondents’ litigation of this
case over the last two months, combined with respondents’
discussion of petitioners’ constitutional arguments in their
motion to dismiss, demonstrates that respondents have fair
notice of petitioners’ claims. See Belanger, 307 F.R.D. at 57.
This court has already determined from reviewing the face
of the amended petition that summary dismissal was not
appropriate and directed respondents to file an answer. See
Apr. 20, 2020 Endorsed Order. The matters asserted in
respondents’ motion to dismiss do not demonstrate that the court
erred in that regard. The court has no trouble concluding that
the amended petition satisfies all pertinent pleading
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requirements. For these reasons, the request to dismiss the
petition for violating Rule 8 is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion to dismiss
(doc. no. 128) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
June 16, 2020
cc: Counsel of Record.
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