Jeanty v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., Trustee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Alex Jeanty
v. Civil No. 20-cv-163-JD
Opinion No. 2020 DNH 045
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.,
et al.
O R D E R
Alex Jeanty brings this breach of contract action against
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., Select Portfolio Loan
Services, LLC, and Bank of America, N.A. He alleges that the
defendants breached his mortgage contract and two modifications
to that contract.
The defendants move to dismiss Jeanty’s complaint (doc. no.
5). They argue that Jeanty’s claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations and that the facts alleged
fail to support claims upon which relief can be granted. Jeanty
opposes dismissal. The defendants also move to strike (doc. no.
8) an affidavit that Jeanty attached to his opposition to the
motion to dismiss.
Standard of Review
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court asks whether
the plaintiff has made allegations that are sufficient to render
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 1 of 21

2
his entitlement to relief plausible. Manning v. Boston Med.
Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2013). The court accepts
all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Hamann v.
Carpenter, 937 F.3d 86, 88 (1st Cir. 2019). The court
disregards conclusory allegations that simply parrot the
applicable legal standard. Manning, 725 F.3d at 43. To
determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, the
court should use its “judicial experience and common sense,” but
should also avoid disregarding a factual allegation merely
because actual proof of the alleged facts is improbable. Id.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “[t]he court may
supplement the facts contained in the pleadings by considering
documents fairly incorporated therein and facts susceptible to
judicial notice.” R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d
178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). The court may also consider
“documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the
parties,” official public records, documents central to the
plaintiff’s claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the
complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993);
see also Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2007).
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 2 of 21

3
Background
A. Allegations1
In September 2002, Jeanty and his former wife purchased
property at 20 Wilson Road in Londonderry, New Hampshire (the
“Property”). To purchase the Property, Jeanty obtained a
$293,550 loan secured by a mortgage. In March 2004, Jeanty
refinanced the mortgage with non-party Argent Mortgage Co. in
the amount of $345,600, with an adjustable interest rate of 6.55
percent. The monthly payment on the refinanced mortgage was
$2,649 (including property taxes and insurance), which rose to
$3,166.24 in April 2006, and $3,435.04 in October 2006.
By February 2007, Jeanty was nine months delinquent on the
mortgage. In September 2007, Argent assigned the mortgage to
Deutsche Bank and Bank of America began servicing the loan for
Deutsche Bank. Jeanty brought the mortgage current by November
2007.
In January 2008, Jeanty lost his employment and his
marriage ended. Jeanty did not make his mortgage payments
between January and October 2008. “Sometime in early Spring of
2008,” Bank of America supplied Jeanty with an application for
modification of the mortgage terms under the Home Affordable
1 The allegations in the operative complaint were filed in
the state court before the defendants removed the action to this
court.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 3 of 21

4
Modification Program (“HAMP”). Doc. 1-1 at 3, ¶ 15; see also 12
U.S.C. § 5219a (“Home Affordable Modification Program
guidelines”).
At the time the HAMP was offered, Jeanty’s monthly payment
was $3,771.65. Jeanty completed the HAMP application and sent
it to Bank of America, and Bank of America confirmed that it had
received the application and that it was complete. Bank of
America represented to Jeanty that, if he made the mortgage
current and timely made a modified monthly payment of $2,350.81
for a ninety-day probationary period, the modified payment would
extend for five years, the loan would not be in default, and
Bank of America would forbear from seeking further remedies for
default, including foreclosure.
Jeanty made a $23,673.41 payment on the mortgage, which
made the mortgage current as of October 1, 2008. Jeanty made
three payments of the modified amount in November and December
2008 and January 2009. In January 2009, Jeanty sought written
confirmation that he had met the requirements for HAMP and that
the modification would be extended for five years. Bank of
America told Jeanty that his modification had not been finalized
because of the large number of modifications being sought during
the time period. Bank of America told Jeanty to continue to pay
the modified amount until he received final approval.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 4 of 21

5
Accordingly, Jeanty continued to make the modified payments
on the mortgage. He periodically checked in with Bank of
America to see if the modification had been finalized. Bank of
America told Jeanty that the modification was still in process.
“Sometime” while Jeanty was making the modified payments on
the mortgage, his loan servicer became Select Portfolio. Doc.
1-1 ¶ 24. “Upon information and belie[f]” Jeanty was not
provided notice of the servicer change. Id.
In August 2013, Select Portfolio offered Jeanty a “Trial
Modification Plan,” which would set his payment amount at
$2,238.80, and, in September 2013, Select Portfolio told Jeanty
that he was in default. Select Portfolio told Jeanty that there
was no record of a modification under HAMP and that, if an
application had been submitted, the documentation was likely
misplaced.
Jeanty signed the Trial Modification Plan on May 10, 2014,
and Select Portfolio signed on June 5, 2014. Under the terms of
the Trial Modification Plan, Jeanty would have to make all
property taxes on the property current and pay $2,238.80 per
month for a ninety-day probationary period. If the conditions
were met, Jeanty’s mortgage payment would stay at $2,238.80 for
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 5 of 21

6
up to twenty years.2 At the end of the twenty-year period, a
$216,913.64 balloon payment would be due. Under the terms of
the Trial Modification Plan, the loan would be current and
Select Portfolio would forbear from enforcing remedies for
default including foreclosure.
As of the date of the Trial Modification Plan’s enactment
in 2014, there was a $320,965 principal balance on the mortgage.
Jeanty complied with the conditions of the Trial Modification
Plan. Jeanty contacted Select Portfolio to confirm that the
loan modification would be made permanent as per the plan, but
Select Portfolio “failed to provide any definitive response to
this and subsequent requests made by” Jeanty. Doc. 1-1 at 9 ¶
32.
In December 2018, Jeanty was told that he was in default
and that Deutsche Bank was going to foreclose on the Property.
The defendants asserted that Jeanty was $47,570 behind on his
payments and that there was a payoff balance of $656,293. On
February 19, 2019, Jeanty filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but
he voluntarily dismissed his bankruptcy filing because he did
not have a feasible plan to cure the mortgage default without
first challenging the balances in court.
2 The monthly payment was inclusive of property taxes and
insurance, so it could vary slightly if property taxes or
insurance rates changed.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 6 of 21

7
Jeanty also requested documentation relating to the mortgage,
including documents related to the 2008 HAMP and the 2014 Trial
Modification Plan. In November 2019, the defendants asserted
that Jeanty was behind on his payments by $60,213.56, and that
there was interest-bearing principal of $297,308.28 and deferred
principal of $320,965. Jeanty filed his complaint in this case
in state court on December 24, 2019. The defendants removed the
case to this court.
B. Claims
Jeanty’s complaint contains four counts. In Count I,
entitled “Injunctive Relief,” Jeanty requests that the court
enjoin the foreclosure sale, which had been scheduled for
January 3, 2020.3 In Count II, entitled “Accounting”, Jeanty
asserts that he is entitled to documentation relating to the
2008 HAMP and the 2014 Trial Modification Plan. He also asserts
that he is entitled to an accounting of how the defendants
calculated the current arrears and outstanding principal balance
due.
In Count III, “breach of contract” with respect to Deutsche
Bank, Jeanty asserts that Deutsche Bank was bound by the 2008
HAMP and 2014 Trial Modification Plan. Jeanty asserts that
3 The scheduled foreclosure date stated in the complaint
passed before the case was removed to this court on January 27,
2020.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 7 of 21

8
Deutsche Bank breached those agreements by failing to apply the
modified mortgage payments, enforcing default remedies despite
his compliance with the agreements, failing to notify him that
Select Portfolio had replaced Bank of America as the servicing
agent, and depriving him of his right to reinstatement under
paragraph 19 of the Mortgage Agreement by supplying him with
erroneous reinstatement figures.
As remedies, Jeanty asks for specific performance of the
2008 HAMP, 2014 Trial Modification Plan, and the Mortgage
Agreement. Jeanty also asks for money damages.
In Count IV, “breach of contract” with respect to Bank of
America and Select Portfolio, Jeanty alleges that Bank of
America breached the 2008 HAMP agreement by failing to extend
the loan modification for five years. Jeanty alleges that Bank
of America cannot deny the existence of the agreement on the
ground of promissory estoppel.
As to Select Portfolio, Jeanty alleges that he met the
conditions for the 2014 Trial Modification Plan, but that Select
Portfolio breached the agreement by failing to extend the
modification for twenty years, by keeping the mortgage in
default status, and by pursuing remedies for default. As to
remedies for Count IV, Jeanty requests money damages.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 8 of 21

9
Discussion
I. Motion to Strike
In support of his opposition to the motion to dismiss,
Jeanty submitted an affidavit (doc. no. 6-1). The defendants
move to strike the affidavit on the ground that it is
duplicative of the allegations in the complaint and therefore
unnecessary to consider in relation to the motion to dismiss.
Jeanty argues that the affidavit was filed to provide factual
support to his claim that he could not have reasonably
discovered his breach of contract claims before December 2018.
The court, in applying the standard applicable to motions to
dismiss, has not considered Jeanty’s affidavit. Therefore, the
motion to strike is denied as moot.
II. Motion to Dismiss
The defendants assert that Jeanty’s breach of contract
claims (Counts III and IV) are barred by New Hampshire’s three-
year statute of limitations under RSA 508:4(I). They also
assert that Jeanty fails to state a cognizable breach of
contract claim as to Count III and that Jeanty’s injunctive
relief and accounting claims (Counts I and II) are not valid
causes of action. Jeanty concedes that Counts I and II do not
state causes of action, but argues that his claims in Counts III
and IV are not time barred and that Count III states a claim for
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 9 of 21

10
relief. The defendants filed a reply, arguing that the evidence
shows that Jeanty discovered his breach of contract claims more
than three years before he filed this suit.
A. Statute of Limitations (Counts III and IV)
New Hampshire provides a three-year statute of limitations
for most personal actions, including breach of contract. RSA
508:4, I. The three-year limitations period begins at the time
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury
and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained
of. Id.4
The defendants contend that the conduct alleged by Jeanty
in Counts III and IV did not occur within three years of his
filing this lawsuit. Jeanty responds, arguing that, as to the
application of modified payments, he would have been unable to
discover that the defendants were violating the terms of the
4 RSA 508:4(I) states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all personal
actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be
brought only within 3 years of the act or omission
complained of, except that when the injury and its
causal relationship to the act or omission were not
discovered and could not reasonably have been
discovered at the time of the act or omission, the
action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time
the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
injury and its causal relationship to the act or
omission complained of.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 10 of 21

11
modification agreement through the exercise of reasonable
diligence prior to December 2018. He argues that the defendants
sent a default notice in December 2018, which places his
December 2019 suit within the filing period. Similarly, Jeanty
argues that he could not have discovered that the defendants
miscalculated the reinstatement amount under paragraph 19 of the
Mortgage Agreement until he received the December 2018
acceleration notice.
1. Count III – Misapplication of Mortgage Payments
Deutsche Bank contends that Jeanty must have discovered
that his mortgage payments were being “misapplied” as part of a
modified mortgage payment program more than three years prior to
his filing of this suit. “In a contract action, the relevant
‘act or omission’ is a party’s alleged breach; thus, the statute
of limitations begins to run when the alleged breach occurs, or
when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that a
breach occurred.” Sykes v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 2 F. Supp. 3d
128, 140 (D.N.H. 2014); Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 100
(2001). “A breach of contract occurs when there is a failure
without legal excuse to perform any promise which forms the
whole or part of a contract.” Audette v. Cummings, 165 N.H.
763, 767 (2013).
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 11 of 21

12
“New Hampshire follows the ‘universal rule that when an
obligation is to be paid in installments the statute of
limitations runs only against each installment as it becomes
due.’” Pierce v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328
(D.N.H. 2004) (quoting Gen. Theraphysical, Inc. v. Dupuis, 118
N.H. 277, 279 (1978)). “In essence, this rule treats each
missed or otherwise deficient payment as an independent breach
of contract subject to its own limitations period.” Id.
Jeanty’s mortgage payments were part of an installment
contract. See Daley v. Babigian, 2015 WL 11071486 (N.H. Feb.
19, 2015) (summarily rejecting argument that installment rule
does not apply to real estate mortgages). Therefore, each
mortgage payment that the defendants are alleged to have
received but failed to acknowledge under the terms of the
Mortgage Agreement and its modifications created an independent
breach of contract cause of action that is subject to its own
limitations period. See Pierce, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
Consequently, this claim can be time barred only to the extent
it is based on payments that could have reasonably been
discovered as misapplied prior to the cutoff date of December
24, 2016,5 three years before Jeanty filed this suit.
5 The court assumes, only for the purpose of this order,
that the limitations period was not tolled for any reason during
three-year period preceding Jeanty’s filing of this lawsuit. As
noted below, this issue can be further explored with a more
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 12 of 21

13
The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to permit a
reasonable inference that at least some of the payments that
Jeanty made prior to December 26, 2016, could not have been
reasonably discovered as misapplied until after that date.
Therefore, considering only the allegations in the complaint,
Jeanty’s breach of contract claim in Count III, to the extent it
is premised on misapplication of payments before December 24,
2016, is not time barred.
The defendants argue that Jeanty received notice that
payments were not being applied as required in the mortgage
modification agreements as early as July 2014. In support, the
defendants attached to their reply letters from July 21, August
19, and October 1, 2014. The defendants characterize these
letters as default notices to Jeanty. The defendants also
attached a letter from February 10, 2016, which they also argue
gave Jeanty notice that he was in default.
The letters that the defendants attached to their reply to
Jeanty’s objection to the motion to dismiss will not be
considered by the court at the motion to dismiss stage. At this
stage, the court is generally limited to considering the facts
alleged in the complaint and documents that are part of or
incorporated into the complaint. Rivera v. Centro Medico de
developed record at summary judgment if warranted and raised by
the parties at that time.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 13 of 21

14
Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009). An exception
exists for documents central to the plaintiff’s claim or for
documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint, but the
letters are neither sufficiently central to the complaint nor
sufficiently referred to in the complaint to warrant
extraordinary consideration at the motion to dismiss stage. Id.
Furthermore, it is appropriate to refrain from evaluating the
full merits of Deutsche Bank’s argument about timeliness until a
more developed record can be presented at summary judgment. See
Duke v. Community Health Connections, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 3d 49,
55-56 (D. Mass. 2019) (“Whether the discovery rule applies is
often a fact-intensive question and therefore [is] best resolved
at the summary judgment stage.”).
2. Count III – Enforcing Default Remedies
Jeanty also alleges that Deutsche Bank breached the
mortgage agreement, HAMP modification, or Trial Modification
Plan by sending him default notices despite his compliance with
the agreements. The relevant alleged breach occurred in
December 2018, when Deutsche Bank is alleged to have notified
Jeanty of its intent to foreclose on the Property. Doc. 1-1
¶ 33. Jeanty’s action was filed in December 2019, so this claim
is not time barred.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 14 of 21

15
3. Count III – Failure to Notify about Change in
Servicer
Jeanty alleges that Deutsche Bank breached the Mortgage
Agreement by failing to notify him that his mortgage servicer
had changed. Deutsche Bank asserts that Jeanty’s allegations
show that Jeanty knew about the change (and therefore the
failure to notify him about the change) as early as May 2014,
when Jeanty entered into the loan modification with Select
Portfolio. Jeanty did not respond to this argument from
Deutsche Bank.
The allegations of the complaint show that Jeanty learned
that the mortgage servicer had changed as early as May 2014.
See id. ¶¶ 27-29. Therefore, Jeanty knew as early as May 2014
that he had not been told about the change. Jeanty did not file
his complaint until December 2019, which was more than three
years after that discovery. Accordingly, Jeanty’s claim that
Deutsche Bank breached the Mortgage Agreement because it failed
to notify him about the change in mortgage servicer is time
barred.
4. Count III – Deprivation of Reinstatement Rights
The alleged breach regarding paragraph 19 of the Mortgage
Agreement occurred at the earliest in December 2018, when the
first relevant and allegedly incorrect arrearage and pay off
balance was sent to Jeanty. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Therefore, Jeanty’s
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 15 of 21

16
breach of contract claim in Count III on this ground was timely
filed.
5. Count IV (Bank of America) - Breach of HAMP
Agreement
Jeanty alleges in Count IV that Bank of America breached
the terms of the 2008 HAMP agreement by “failing to extend the
loan modification for the 5 year period” even though he had
satisfied the terms of that agreement. Id. ¶ 73. Even
considering the discovery rule, this claim in Count IV against
Bank of America is time barred because Jeanty, by his own
allegations, discovered that Bank of America had failed to
follow the HAMP agreement and extend the modification for the
five-year period as early as the summer of 2013, when Select
Portfolio told Jeanty that he was in default and when Select
Portfolio told Jeanty that it had no record of a HAMP
modification. Id. ¶¶ 25-26; see In re Hatton, No. 16-BK-11327,
2018 WL 770363, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb. 7, 2018) (finding that
debtor’s own allegations showed that he was aware of alleged
breach more than three years before filing suit). Therefore,
Count IV of the complaint, to the extent it is brought against
Bank of America, is dismissed because it is barred by the
statute of limitations. Because this is the only claim Jeanty
brought against Bank of America, Bank of America is dismissed as
a party to the case.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 16 of 21

17
6. Count IV (Select Portfolio) - Breach of Trial
Modification Plan
Jeanty alleges that Select Portfolio breached the mortgage
agreement or Trial Modification Plan by “failing to extend the
loan modification for the 240 month period” despite his
compliance with the terms of the Trial modification Plan. He
also alleges that Select Portfolio breached the agreements by
sending him default notices despite his compliance. Jeanty
alleges that he learned in December 2018, for the first time,
that Select Portfolio had failed to follow the Trial
Modification Plan, which had been executed on June 5, 2014. He
contends that he could not have reasonably discovered Select
Portfolio’s breach before that time. As noted above, the
relevant alleged breach occurred in December 2018, when Deutsche
Bank and Select Portfolio are alleged to have notified Jeanty of
their intent to foreclose on the Property. Doc. 1-1 ¶ 33.
Therefore, Count IV as it pertains to Select Portfolio is not
time barred.
B. Failure to State Claims
The defendants also contend that Jeanty fails to state
claims for relief in Counts I, II, and III of his complaint.
Jeanty concedes that Counts I and II do not state claims for
relief but contends that Counts III is valid.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 17 of 21

18
1. Counts I (“Injunctive Relief”) and II
(“Accounting”)
The defendants argue that Count I is a “stand-alone claim
for injunctive relief,” which must be dismissed as there is no
cause of action supporting it. The defendants also argue that
Count II, “accounting”, is not a cause of action and that, in
any event, the claim is moot because the defendants have
provided Jeanty with the requested documentation.
Jeanty states that the allegations in Counts I and II are
remedies requested and demanded in relation to his breach of
contract claims in Counts III and IV. The court dismisses
Counts I and II because Jeanty concedes they do not state claims
for relief.
In his objection to the motion to dismiss, Jeanty requests
an opportunity to amend his complaint to incorporate the
remedial requests in Counts I and II into Counts III and IV.
Under Local Rule 7.1(a)(1), “[o]bjections to pending motions and
affirmative motions for relief shall not be combined in one
filing.” To the extent he wishes to seek leave to file an
amended complaint, Jeanty must file a separate motion.
2. Paragraph 19 of the Mortgage Agreement (Count III)
Count III is brought, in part, on Deutsche Bank’s breach of
an implied good faith obligation in paragraph 19 of the Mortgage
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 18 of 21

19
Agreement. Paragraph 19 of the Mortgage Agreement states the
following, in relevant part:
19. Borrower’s Right to Reinstate After Acceleration.
If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower shall
have the right to have enforcement of this Security
Instrument discontinued . . . . Those conditions are
that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which then
would be due under this Security Instrument and the
Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any
default or any other covenants or agreements; (c) pays
all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security
Instrument, including, but not limited to, reasonable
attorneys’ fees, property inspection and valuation
fees, and other fees incurred for the purpose of
protecting Lender’s interest in the Property and
rights under this Security Instrument; and (d) takes
such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure
that Lender’s interest in the Property and rights
under this Security Instrument, and Borrower’s
obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security
Instrument, shall continue unchanged.
Doc. 5-2 at 13 (emphasis added).
Deutsche Bank argues that Jeanty has failed to a state a
claim for relief because he did not allege compliance with the
conditions of paragraph 19. Jeanty asserts that whether he has
met the conditions in paragraph 19 is immaterial to his claim.
Jeanty argues that condition ‘a’ of paragraph 19, which requires
him to pay all amounts due as if no acceleration had occurred,
implies that Deutsche Bank would, in good faith, provide an
accurate sum due to meet the condition. Jeanty asserts that
Deutsche Bank breached this implied obligation by providing an
inaccurate sum.
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 19 of 21

20
Because Jeanty’s claim is based on a breach of an alleged
implied good faith obligation arising from one of the conditions
of paragraph 19, not from a breach of paragraph 19 itself,
Jeanty did not need to allege compliance with the conditions of
paragraph 19 to state a claim for relief. In other words, the
claim is not based on Deutsche Bank’s failure to discontinue
enforcement of default remedies under paragraph 19 after Jeanty
met the conditions, but on Deutsche Bank’s failure to supply him
with information necessary for him to meet one of the
conditions. Therefore, the motion to dismiss as to this claim
is denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to
dismiss (doc. no. 5) is granted in part and denied in part. The
motion is granted as to Counts I and II. Counts I and II of the
complaint are dismissed without prejudice.
The motion to dismiss is denied as to Count III, except to
the extent Jeanty’s claims in Count III are premised on Deutsche
Bank’s failure to notify Jeanty about the change in mortgage
servicer. That basis for Jeanty’s breach of contract claim in
Count III is time barred and dismissed with prejudice. The
motion to dismiss is also granted as to Count IV to the extent
it is based on Bank of America’s failure to adhere to the HAMP
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 20 of 21

21
modification. Because no claims remain against it, Bank of
America is dismissed as a party to this case.
The motion to dismiss is otherwise denied. The defendants’
motion to strike Jeanty’s affidavit (doc. no. 8) is denied as
moot.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
March 24, 2020
cc: Counsel of Record
Case 1:20-cv-00163-JD Document 10 Filed 03/24/20 Page 21 of 21